The more primitive kind of reasoning described by Peacocke (1996) requires that one know one’s own thoughts without self-ascribing them. I call this kind of self-knowledge ‘acquaintance with one’s own thoughts.’ I investigate acquaintance with one’s own thoughts and show that it consists in one’s grasp of the propositional content of one’s own thoughts, and one acquires such knowledge by listening to one’s inner speech. I further investigate the relationship between acquaintance with one’s own thoughts and knowledge about one’s own (...) thoughts, showing how the latter inherits the peculiarities associated with the former. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to share cross-border challenges in the ethical design, establishment, implementation, and evaluation of the performance of alliance...

First published in 1982. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article reviews some of the definitions in circulation that reveal the varied perspectives and goals of the field of neuroethics. It discusses a brief taxonomy of neuroethical questions. It deals with two specific contentious issues, one clinical and one from social sciences and shows how neuroethicists can serve to inform and to protect. Neuroethicists need education that encompasses many domains. The study describes the academic grounding and qualifications that should be required and also considers the pivotal roles neuroethicists should (...) play. It contributes views that may help define the field of neuroethics and give structure and relevance to its activities. Finally, it concludes that neuroethicists are needed, now more than ever. (shrink)

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of (...) the mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide. (shrink)

Creativity is the hallmark of human cognition, yet scientific understanding of creative processes is limited. However, there is increasing interest in revealing the neural correlates of human creativity. Though many of these studies, pioneering in nature, help demystification of creativity, but the field is still dominated by popular beliefs in associating creativity with "right brain thinking", "divergent thinking", "altered states" and so on (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). In this article, we discuss a computational framework for creativity based on Baars' global (...) workspace theory (Baars, 1988) enhanced with mechanisms based on information theory. Next we propose a neurocognitive architecture of creativity with a strong focus on various facets (i.e., unconscious thought theory, mind wandering, spontaneous brain states) of un/pre-conscious brain responses. Our principal argument is that pre-conscious creativity happens prior to conscious creativity happens prior to conscious creativity and the proposed computational model may provide a mechanism by which this transition is managed. This integrative approach, albeit unconventional, will hopefully stimulate future neuroscientific studies of the inscrutable phenomenon of creativity. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind, both in the conceptual analysis tradition and in the empirical informed school, have been implicitly neglecting the potential conceptual role of the Peripheral Nervous System (PNS) in understanding sensory and perceptual states. Instead, the philosophical as well as the neuroscientific literature has been assuming that it is the Central Nervous System (CNS) alone, and more exactly the brain, that should prima facie be taken as conceptually and empirically crucial for a philosophical analysis of such states This (...) is the first monograph that focuses on the PNS and its constitutive role in sensory states, including pain, mechanoception, proprioception, tactile perception, and so forth. -/- The author argues that the brain-centeredness of current philosophy of mind is a prejudice, and proposes a series of original ways in which classic puzzles in the philosophy of mind can be solved once the hypothesis that PNS is a constitutive element of mental states is taken seriously. The author calls this “the Peripheral Mind Hypothesis”, and employs it in a vast range of issues, such as functionalism, physicalism, mental content, embodiment, as well as some issues in neuroethics. -/- Making equal use of conceptual analysis, empirical data from neuroscience, first-person phenomenological data, and philosophical speculation, this work offers a fresh look at, and novel solutions to many philosophical problems. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the status of Descartes' notion of the mind-body union as an object of knowledge in the framework of his new philosophy of nature, and argues that it should be taken seriously as representing a third kind of real thing or reality—that of human nature. Because it does not meet the criteria of distinctness that the two natures composing it—those of thinking minds and extended bodies— meet, the phenomena referred to it, which are objects of psychology (...) as traditionally understood, fall outside the scope of clear and distinct perception required for knowledge. The prospects for rationalist psychology are bleak, since because of the mind-body union so little of the contents of the human mind are accessible to rational inspection or introspection. Mechanistic natural philosophy on the other hand gives us knowledge only of the physiological and corporeal aspects of the phenomena Descartes classifies as mental. What pertains to the mind-body union can only be known through the senses, moreover, we learn to conceive the mind-body union only through daily experience (“usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaries”, AT 3, 695). I discuss the nature of this experience, and the sense in which Cartesian psychology without being part of his philosophy of nature in the strict sense of the term, can still be seen as a naturalist undertaking in a more traditional sense of nature where life, sentience, reasoning and rational action are all seen as natural phenomena. (shrink)

Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito (2021) describe the Mind-Technology Problem as a new constellation of philosophical problems about the nature of mind generated by advances in technology we increasingly rely on to meet both theoretical and practical aims. We agree with Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito that the problems they identify frame a timely and worthwhile new research programme. We aim to contribute to this research programme by motivating and canvassing the key contours of four different Mind-Technology problems that (...) arise for, and which are distinctive to, approaches to knowledge-how that give abilities a central theoretical role in explaining intelligent states and behaviour. The result is an agenda in the theory of know-how aimed at reconciling prevailing anti-intellectualist thinking about know-how apt abilities and their exercise with the datum that much of our know-how is increasingly supported by our use of smart technological scaffolding. We don’t fully answer the questions we raise; our objective is to put them on the map and show why we think they matter. (shrink)

Originally published in 1957 and written by one of the 20th Century's leading botanists and a fierce advocate of organicism, this book explores concepts about man and his relation to life and the universe, and about the great creative and spiritual powers within and around him. The author provides answers to perennial human questions whilst discussing the problems of sin, justice, ugliness and beauty.

The Intelligent Mind conceives the psychological reality of thought and language, explaining how intelligence develops from intuition to representation and then to linguistic interaction and thinking. Overcoming the prevailing dogmas regarding how discursive reason emerges, this book secures the psychological possibility of the philosophy of mind.