Results for 'STRONG AI'

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  1.  10
    Die Starke KI-TheseThe Strong AI-Thesis.Stephan Zelewski - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):337-348.
    Summary The controversy about the strong AI-thesis was recently revived by two interrelated contributions stemming from J. R. Searle on the one hand and from P. M. and P. S. Churchland on the other hand. It is shown that the strong AI-thesis cannot be defended in the formulation used by the three authors. It violates some well accepted criterions of scientific argumentation, especially the rejection of essentialistic definitions. Moreover, Searle's ‘proof’ is not conclusive. Though it may be reconstructed (...)
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  2. Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI.Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
    Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest (...)
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  3.  8
    Tu Quoque: The Strong AI Challenge to Selfhood, Intentionality and Meaning and Some Artistic Responses.Erik C. Banks - manuscript
    This paper offers a "tu quoque" defense of strong AI, based on the argument that phenomena of self-consciousness and intentionality are nothing but the "negative space" drawn around the concrete phenomena of brain states and causally connected utterances and objects. Any machine that was capable of concretely implementing the positive phenomena would automatically inherit the negative space around these that we call self-consciousness and intention. Because this paper was written for a literary audience, some examples from Greek tragedy, noir (...)
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  4. A Modal Defence of Strong AI.Steffen Borge - 2007 - In Dermot Moran Stephen Voss (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy. The Philosophical Society of Turkey. pp. 127-131.
    John Searle has argued that the aim of strong AI of creating a thinking computer is misguided. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to show that syntax does not suffice for semantics and that computer programs as such must fail to have intrinsic intentionality. But we are not mainly interested in the program itself but rather the implementation of the program in some material. It does not follow by necessity from the fact that computer programs are defined syntactically that the (...)
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  5. The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about (...)
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  6.  55
    Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.Ronald L. Chrisley - unknown
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I elaborate on and defend this response to (...)
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  7.  3
    A Modal Defence of Strong AI.Steffen Borge - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:127-131.
    John Searle has argued that the aim of strong AI to create a thinking computer is misguided. Searle's "Chinese Room Argument" purports to show that syntax does not suffice for semantics and that computer programs as such must fail to have intrinsic intentionality But we are not mainly interested in the program itself, but rather the implementation of the program in some material. It does not follow by necessity from the fact that computer programs are defined syntactically that the (...)
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  8.  4
    A Voice of One's Own: Aesthetics, Politics, and Maturity: Symposium on Tracy Strong's Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without a Banister in the Twentieth Century, University of Chicago Press, 2012.P. Markell, L. Zerilli, M. G. Dietz & T. B. Strong - 2014 - Political Theory 42 (5):590-625.
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  9. Ai Silin Lun Wen Xuan.Silin Ai - 2011 - Zhonghua Shu Ju.
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  10. Logics in Ai European Workshop Jelia '92, Berlin, Germany, September 7-10, 1992 : Proceedings'.David A. Pearce, Gerd Wagner & European Workshop on Logics in Ai - 1992
     
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  11. Consciousness as Computation: A Defense of Strong AI Based on Quantum-State Functionalism.R. Michael Perry - 2006 - In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 4: Twenty Years After De Beauvoir, Thirty Years After Heidegger. Palo Alto: Ria University Press.
  12. Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI.Georges Rey - 2003 - In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225.
     
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  13.  89
    Searle on Strong AI.Philip Cam - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8.
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  14.  82
    Did Searle Attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI?Aaron Sloman - 1986 - In Artificial Intelligence and its Applications. Chichester.
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  15.  10
    The Chess Room: Further Demythologizing of Strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441.
  16.  24
    Searle, Strong AI, and Two Ways of Sorting Cucumbers.Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50.
    This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails.
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  17.  4
    Strong AI and the Problem of “Second-Order” Algorithms.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):663-664.
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  18.  1
    " Strong AI": An Adolescent Disorder.M. Gams - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams (ed.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: Ios Press. pp. 43--1.
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  19. Redcar Rocks: Strong AI and Panpsychism.J. M. Bishop - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S35 - S35.
     
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  20. Godel's Theorem and Strong Ai: Is Reason Blind?Burton Voorhees - 1999 - In S. Smets J. P. Van Bendegem G. C. Cornelis (ed.), Metadebates on Science. Vub-Press & Kluwer. pp. 6--43.
     
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  21.  78
    Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”.Blake H. Dournaee - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.
    In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings of (...)
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  22.  82
    On the Irrationality of Mind-Uploading: A Rely to Neil Levy. [REVIEW]Nicholas Agar - 2012 - AI and Society 27 (4):431-436.
    In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agar’s argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agar’s original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may someday be possible (...)
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  23.  11
    Die Starke KI-These.Stephan Zelewski - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):337 - 348.
    The Strong AI-Thesis. The controversy about the strong AI-thesis was recently revived by two interrelated contributions stemming from J. R. Searle on the one hand and from P. M. and P. S. Churchland on the other hand. It is shown that the strong AI-thesis cannot be defended in the formulation used by the three authors. It violates some well accepted criterions of scientific argumentation, especially the rejection of essentialistic definitions. Moreover, Searle's 'proof' is not conclusive. Though it (...)
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  24.  50
    Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism.J. M. Bishop - 2002 - In J. M. Bishop (ed.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. pp. 360-379.
    The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. The main (...)
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  25. Representation, Analytic Pragmatism and AI.Raffaela Giovagnoli - 2013 - In Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic Raffaela Giovagnoli (ed.), Computing Nature. pp. 161--169.
    Our contribution aims at individuating a valid philosophical strategy for a fruitful confrontation between human and artificial representation. The ground for this theoretical option resides in the necessity to find a solution that overcomes, on the one side, strong AI (i.e. Haugeland) and, on the other side, the view that rules out AI as explanation of human capacities (i.e. Dreyfus). We try to argue for Analytic Pragmatism (AP) as a valid strategy to present arguments for a form of weak (...)
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  26.  55
    How the Problem of Consciousness Could Emerge in Robots.Bernard Molyneux - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):277-297.
    I show how a robot with what looks like a hard problem of consciousness might emerge from the earnest attempt to make a robot that is smart and self-reflective. This problem arises independently of any assumption to the effect that the robot is conscious, but deserves to be thought of as related to the human problem in virtue of the fact that (1) the problem is one the robot encounters when it tries to naturalistically reduce its own subjective states (2) (...)
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  27. The Logic of Searle's Chinese Room Argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
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  28.  68
    Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science.Restrepo Echavarria Ricardo - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle’s employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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  29.  9
    Strong Determinism Vs. Computability.Cristian Calude, Douglas Campbell, Karl Svozil & Doru Ştefănescu - 1995 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 3:115-131.
    Penrose [40] has discussed a new point of view concerning the nature of physics that might underline conscious thought processes. He has argued that it might be the case that some physical laws are not computable, i.e. they cannot be properly simulated by computer; such laws can most probably arise on the “no-man’s-land” between classical and quantum physics. Furthermore, conscious thinking is a non-algorithmic activity. He is opposing both strong AI , and Searle’s [47] contrary viewpoint mathematical “laws”).
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  30.  13
    Zombie Mouse in a Chinese Room.Slawomir J. Nasuto, John Mark Bishop, Etienne B. Roesch & Matthew C. Spencer - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):209-223.
    John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to blurring the divide (...)
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  31.  22
    Medium AI and Experimental Science.André Kukla - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):493-5012.
    It has been claimed that a great deal of AI research is an attempt to discover the empirical laws describing a new type of entity in the world—the artificial computing system. I call this enterprise 'medium AI', since it is in some respects stronger than Searle's 'weak AI', and in other respects weaker than 'strong AI'. Bruce Buchanan, among others, conceives of medium AI as an empirical science entirely on a par with psychology or chemistry. I argue that medium (...)
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  32.  23
    Rehabilitating AI: Argument Loci and the Case for Artificial Intelligence. [REVIEW]Barbara Warnick - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (2):149-170.
    This article examines argument structures and strategies in pro and con argumentation about the possibility of human-level artificial intelligence (AI) in the near term future. It examines renewed controversy about strong AI that originated in a prominent 1999 book and continued at major conferences and in periodicals, media commentary, and Web-based discussions through 2002. It will be argued that the book made use of implicit, anticipatory refutation to reverse prevailing value hierarchies related to AI. Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (...)
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  33.  4
    Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science.Ricardo Restrepo - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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  34.  66
    Thinking Inside the Box: Controlling and Using an Oracle AI.Stuart Armstrong, Anders Sandberg & Nick Bostrom - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):299-324.
    There is no strong reason to believe that human-level intelligence represents an upper limit of the capacity of artificial intelligence, should it be realized. This poses serious safety issues, since a superintelligent system would have great power to direct the future according to its possibly flawed motivation system. Solving this issue in general has proven to be considerably harder than expected. This paper looks at one particular approach, Oracle AI. An Oracle AI is an AI that does not act (...)
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  35.  59
    Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right?Matjaz Gams (ed.) - 1997 - Amsterdam: IOS Press.
  36. Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise (...)
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  37.  33
    Computers, Postmodernism and the Culture of the Artificial.Colin Beardon - 1994 - AI and Society 8 (1):1-16.
    The term ‘the artificial’ can only be given a precise meaning in the context of the evolution of computational technology and this in turn can only be fully understood within a cultural setting that includes an epistemological perspective. The argument is illustrated in two case studies from the history of computational machinery: the first calculating machines and the first programmable computers. In the early years of electronic computers, the dominant form of computing was data processing which was a reflection of (...)
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  38.  1
    Cuatro problemas irresolubles de la IA simbólica.Manuel Carabantes López - 2015 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 40 (1):81-104.
    Within the strong branch of artificial intelligence, which is aimed at creating thinking machines with intellectual powers like those of man, the most explored research program is symbolic aI, defined as the attempt to use electronic computers to replicate the human mind, either assuming a structural and functional similarity between them, or trying to replicate the behavior produced by the human mind through computational processes that also have an intentional structure but are only instrumentally equivalent. In this paper we (...)
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  39. The Failures of Computationalism.John R. Searle - 2001 - Http.
    Harnad and I agree that the Chinese Room Argument deals a knockout blow to Strong AI, but beyond that point we do not agree on much at all. So let's begin by pondering the implications of the Chinese Room. The Chinese Room shows that a system, me for example, could pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, for example, and could implement any program you like and still not understand a word of Chinese. Now, why? What does the genuine (...)
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  40. Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) (...)
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  41. Murmurs in the Cathedral: Review of R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind[REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Times Literary Supplement (September) 29.
    The idea that a computer could be conscious--or equivalently, that human consciousness is the effect of some complex computation mechanically performed by our brains--strikes some scientists and philosophers as a beautiful idea. They find it initially surprising and unsettling, as all beautiful ideas are, but the inevitable culmination of the scientific advances that have gradually demystified and unified the material world. The ideologues of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been its most articulate supporters. To others, this idea is deeply repellent: philistine, (...)
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  42. Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, (...)
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  43.  98
    Searle's Experiments with Thought.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (June):271-9.
    A critique of several recent objections to John Searle's Chinese-Room Argument against the possibility of "strong AI" is presented. The objections are found to miss the point, and a stronger argument against Searle is presented, based on a distinction between "syntactic" and "semantic" understanding.
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  44.  56
    Of Robots and Believing.C. T. A. Schmidt - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (2):195-205.
    Discussion about the application of scientific knowledge in robotics in order to build people helpers is widespread. The issue herein addressed is philosophically poignant, that of robots that are “people”. It is currently popular to speak about robots and the image of Man. Behind this lurks the dialogical mind and the questions about the significance of an artificial version of it. Without intending to defend or refute the discourse in favour of ‘recreating’ Man, a lesser familiar question is brought forth: (...)
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  45. John Searle's Chinese Room Argument.John McCarthy - manuscript
    John Searle begins his ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with " ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article criticising what I call Strong AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be summarized in one sentence: {it a system, me for example, (...)
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  46. The Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - manuscript
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to (...)
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  47. Searle's Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    John Searle's 1980a) thought experiment and associated 1984a) argument is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (roughly, someday will) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't suffice_ _for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not (...)
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  48.  55
    Can Semantics Be Syntactic?Neal Jahren - 1990 - Synthese 82 (3):309-28.
    The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only (...)
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  49. What is It Like to Be a Rock?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    This paper aims to replace deep sounding unanswerable, time-wasting pseudo- questions which are often posed in the context of attacking some version of the strong AI thesis, with deep, discovery-driving, real questions about the nature and content of internal states of intelligent agents of various kinds. In particular the question.
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  50.  34
    The Chinese Carnival.Mark Sprevak - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):203-209.
    In contrast to many areas of contemporary philosophy, something like a carnival atmosphere surrounds Searle’s Chinese room argument. Not many recent philosophical arguments have exerted such a pull on the popular imagination, or have produced such strong reactions. People from a wide range of fields have expressed their views on the argument. The argument has appeared in Scientific American, television shows, newspapers, and popular science books. Preston and Bishop’s recent volume of essays reflects this interdisciplinary atmosphere. The volume includes (...)
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