Qu'est-ce que la santé? L'absence de maladie ou plus que cela? Comment l'idée, mais aussi l'expérience de la santé se présentent-elles à nous, quand nous l'avons perdue, retrouvée ou bien lorsque nous entreprenons de la conserver ou de l'améliorer? Ces questions seront abordées avec deux objectifs successifs. Le premier est de rechercher ce qu'en disent quelques-uns des auteurs consacrés par l'histoire de la philosophie, de la santé conçue comme harmonie chez Platon et Aristote à la " grande santé " de (...) Nietzsche, en passant par Epicure, Sénèque, Montaigne, Descartes, Spinoza et Kant, s'attachant aux écrits de chaque auteur dans leur contexte biographique. Le deuxième est de se pencher sur quelques grandes problématiques traitées par les philosophes contemporains : penser la santé comme concept, décrire et interpréter l'expérience de la santé, envisager la santé comme un devoir ou comme un droit, examiner les liens entre la santé et la technique et enfin, se poser la question centrale des rapports entre la santé, le bien-être et le bonheur. Depuis cette vue d'ensemble, une synthèse conclusive vise à repérer les problématiques récurrentes et les ruptures, les attentes justifiées et les illusions. (shrink)

L’outil de la norme s’est imposé à travers la tradition française de philosophie des sciences comme une grille de lecture de la notion de santé. A partir d’un historique des différents aspects de la santé que mettent à jour les différentes formes de la norme, nous tenterons d’analyser l’actualité des problématiques de santé. Il s’agira de comprendre les enjeux de la santé contemporaine comme nouvelle norme du soin.

The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, (...) I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds. (shrink)

The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity (...) and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. (shrink)

Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...) that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory????\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}$$\end{document} is a first order theory which allows us to cope with certain collections of objects where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that x = x is not a formula, if x is an arbitrary term. The terms of????\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}$$\end{document} are either collections or atoms (empty terms who are not collections), in a precise sense. (...) Within this context,????\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}$$\end{document} is supposed to be some sort of generalization of ZFU (ZF with atoms). Strangely enough, no one published any permutation model of quasi-set theory until now, although this theory is already 30 years old. In this paper I introduce a class of permutation models of????′\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}'$$\end{document} defined as????−{Axiom of Choice and all axioms involving quasi-cardinality}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}-\{\text{Axiom of Choice and all axioms involving quasi-cardinality}\}$$\end{document}. I show, for example, that all permutation models of????′\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathfrak {Q}'$$\end{document} are models of ZFU−{Axiom of Choice}. (shrink)

The relation between scepticism and health is not considered in the same light by the sceptics and by their enemies. According to its enemies, scepticism is a disease of the soul that has no access to truth ; whereas for the sceptics, it is the only means to mental health. But in fact, things are more complex. Modern sceptics like Montaigne or Hume, see doubt as something that has to be overcome. They view scepticism as a critical moment leading to (...) health.RésuméEn ce qui concerne la santé et la maladie, le scepticisme est diversement apprécié par ses détracteurs ou ses adeptes. Pour les premiers, il est la figure même de la maladie de l’âme privée de vérité, pour les seconds il est le seul moyen d’atteindre la santé mentale. Mais les choses sont plus compliquées, car certains sceptiques modernes, comme Hume ou Montaigne, voient dans le doute un moment critique qu’il faut traverser. (shrink)

Una lettura critica dell'incontro-scontro fra Arendt e il suo maestro Heidegger. Emerge la centralità del giudizio quale espressione di amore. Il giudizio nasce dalla decisione di prendere parte al mondo, come tentativo di salvaguardia della realtà. L'amore come passione dell'esistenza, accettazione dell'opacità del proprio essere. La carenza d'essere, che l'uomo evidenzia con la sua azione, non ha esito nichilistico, bensì rimanda a un altro.

L’outil de la norme s’est imposé à travers la tradition française de philosophie des sciences comme une grille de lecture de la notion de santé. A partir d’un historique des différents aspects de la santé que mettent à jour les différentes formes de la norme, nous tenterons d’analyser l’actualité des problématiques de santé. Il s’agira de comprendre les enjeux de la santé contemporaine comme nouvelle norme du soin.

This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)

Marc Dumas L’objectif de cette contribution est de présenter un premier parcours réflexif de quelques révolutions que sont auteur a réalisé depuis un certain temps autour du monde de la santé et de l’univers tillichien. Le point de départ est une tension entre un système de santé en souffrance, l’éviction de la notion de salut et la présence d’approches complémentaires et alternatives à critiquer. L’oeuvre de Tillich et particulièrement ses travaux sur ce que nous pourrions nommer une théologie de la (...) santé deviennent ici les ressources du chantier de recherche à venir. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer la proximité importante de deux auteurs, a priori très différents, au sujet de la question de la santé et de la maladie : Georges Canguilhem et Oliver Sacks. Ils se sont tous deux efforcés de critiquer une conception naturaliste et objectiviste de la santé et de la maladie, le premier en forgeant et en travaillant le concept de norme vitale, le deuxième en décrivant des patients atteints de troubles neurologiques. Ils se rejoignent pour (...) soutenir que la maladie n’est pas une réalité antinaturelle ou aberrante, mais une façon de vivre, une forme d’équilibre physiologique. Toutefois, leurs façons de concevoir la santé vont s’avérer très différentes, pour ne pas dire antinomiques. Canguilhem se reconnaît très influencé par Nieztsche : la santé, c’est la grande santé, la capacité à surmonter les maladies et les épreuves. Il s’ensuit un dualisme entre les héros de la grande santé et la vie plus faible et plus fragile de tous les autres, un dualisme que Sacks remet radicalement en cause lorsqu’il montre que la maladie est aussi une expérience qui nous ouvre à des possibilités nouvelles. Le dialogue qui peut s’ouvrir entre ces deux penseurs permet de problématiser des enjeux essentiels de la question de la santé et de la maladie. (shrink)

The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will (...) have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representationalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features. (shrink)

The 12 chapters cover 6 questions: I. What is the relationship between memory and imagination? II. Do memory traces have content? III. What is the nature of mnemonic confabulation? IV. What is the function of episodic memory? V. Do non-human animals have episodic memory? VI. Does episodic memory give us knowledge of the past?

This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential (...) relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering. (shrink)

According to Georges Canguilhem, no measurement of deviation from a statistical norm could form the basis of a definition of disease. Being healthy means being able to adapt to and this process of adaptation is active. What characterizes health is “normativity”, the possibility of tolerating infractions and of instituting new norms in response. Any normality limited to maintaining itself, hostile to any variation, and incapable of adapting to new situations does not represent health but sickness. Thus, even a sick organism (...) exhibits biological norms. We’ll try to show in what extend this theory can be exported to teratology, psychology and evolution’s theories.RésuméSelon Georges Canguilhem, les fondements d’une définition de la maladie ne peuvent reposer sur la mesure d’une déviation par rapport à une norme statistique. Être sain, c’est être capable de s’adapter de manière active. La santé se caractérise par la normativité, la possibilité de tolérer les infractions du milieu et d’instituer de nouvelles normes. Une normalité se contentant de se maintenir elle-même, hostile à la variation et incapable de s’adapter à de nouvelles situations ne correspond pas à la santé mais à la maladie. De ce fait, même un organisme malade répond à des normes biologiques. Nous tenterons de montrer dans quelle mesure cette théorie peut être appliquée à la tératologie, à la psychologie et aux théories de l’évolution. (shrink)

The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian have suggested that the dispute over the continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead (...) be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory. (shrink)

Health and Life. - Speaking of health, or of sickness, can only be metaphorical as far as it concerns inanimate objects. Only living beings can be healthy, as well as they can be sick. Morever, to be healthy understates the possibility of being sick ; death being unavoidable, there is no such thing as absolute health. What are the more explicit relations between health and life?RésuméLa santé et la vie. - Les mots « santé » et « maladie » ne (...) s’emploient que par métaphore dans le cas des objets inanimés. Seuls les êtres vivants peuvent être en bonne santé, comme seuls ils peuvent être malades. En outre, la santé sous-entend la possibilité de la maladie, et l’inéluctabilité de la mort exclut même tout absolu de santé. Quelles sont, plus explicitement, les relations qu’entretiennent la santé et la vie? (shrink)

Originally understood as memory for the “what”, the “when”, and the “where” of experienced past events, episodic memory has, in recent years, been redefined as a form of past-oriented mental time travel. Following a brief review of empirical research on memory as mental time travel, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, which explore the theoretical implications of that research.