'By identifying the extent to which Aristotle's thinking about ethics was shaped by notions drawn from the crafts Angier has thrown new light on a surprising number of topics and has deepened our understanding of tensions within Aristotle's thought. It is by now a rare achievement to have said something new, true and important about Aristotle.' -- Alasdair MacIntyre, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, USA.

How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practical technê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, in conclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.

Techne and praxis are the most useful and appropriate terms with which one can approach the larger question of theory and praxis in the Platonic dialogues, and it is this question which is the principal theme of this dissertation. Since the issue of theory, praxis, and, it must be added, production is made most explicit as a philosophical issue by Aristotle, Chapter II attempts to delineate exactly how he understands and divides these three terms. Particularly, how and why he (...) divides knowledge into three branches, the theoretical, practical, and productive, is discussed. ;Chapter III argues that the Aristotelian division of knowledge is prefigured partially in the Platonic dialogues. An extended series of "division passages" is studied to show that such a division is present in Plato but that a glaring difference obtains between him and Aristotle. For Plato the division is consistently twofold and is between theoretical and productive knowledge, or techne as he will usually call it. There is no mention in these passages of a correlate to Aristotle's practical knowledge, namely an "ethics" or a "politics." ;Chapter IV begins to ask why this is the case and what significance this fact has for Platonic thinking in general. It is argued that there is no possibility of a Platonic version of practical knowledge. There is no possibility, as there is for Aristotle, of a theory of praxis. This is essentially a result of the Platonic conception of both techne, the word in his vocabulary most significant of theory, and praxis. Given the conceptual structure of the former, it is impossible for the latter to become an object of a genuine techne. ;Chaper V discusses portions of the Republic. Here, more than anywhere else, Plato does seem to posit a theory of praxis. That such a theory is present is certainly the basis of many, if not most, of the readings of this dialogue. It cannot be denied that a theory of praxis is, in some sense, put forth in the Republic. It is argued here, however, that it is not present as an actual theoretical accomplishment or even as a projection of a future or possible accomplishment. For reasons discussed at length the thesis is maintained that even in the Republic praxis, despite appearances to the contrary, remains an illegitimate object of techne. ;Throughout Chapters IV and V the implications and significance of this thesis are discussed. There is both a negative and a positive pole to this discussion. As mentioned, it is argued that a theory of praxis is impossible for Plato. More positively, the manner in which praxis is prior to and conditions or "surrounds" techne is considered. Techne emerges and is never fully independent from praxis. (shrink)

Die Platonische Techne-Analogie hat eine heuristische Funktion. In ihr wird eine bestimmte (vom Verfasser «technisch» genannte) Denkweise sichtbar, die in der platonischen Philosophie durchgehend einflussreich bleibt. Die vorliegende Untersuchung besteht aus zwei Teilen. Der erste Teil analysiert die vielfältigen Strukturen der platonischen Techne-Analogie und bringt die in ihnen wirkende «technische» Denkweise zum Licht. Der zweite Teil behandelt den Einfluss dieser Denkweise auf verschiedene Bereiche der platonischen Philosophie.

In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is superior to rhetoric in part because the former is a techne while the latter is not. I argue that the Socratic practice of philosophy within this dialogue fails to qualify as a techne for exactly the same reasons that rhetoric fails to qualify as a techne. In doing so, I introduce a new kind of Socratic ignorance: methodological ignorance. I reject both Charles Kahn’s account of the relationship between the (...) dialogue’s dramatic and philosophical contents, and Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith’s claim that Socrates never regarded his practice as a techne. (shrink)

My paper addresses a number of questions raised in the Statesman by the Eleatic Visitor’s identification of certain ontological conditions for the existence of art of due measure, and therefore of all the technai. My view is that evidence relevant to these questions can be found in the Philebus, and specifically, in an ontological doctrine presented at 23c–27c. What emerges from an examination of the Statesman and Philebus is a highly developed conception of technê, one that affords a place for (...) such ordinary human activities within the broader framework of Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

En el Gorgias, Platón distingue el modo de ser y actuar propio del filósofofrente al modo de ser y actuar propio del retórico. Para esto, usa comocriterio a la misma retórica a partir de la distinción retórica aduladora – retóricacientífica. Frente a esto, Aristóteles realiza una toma de posición quereformula las críticas platónicas referentes a la posibilidad de una technêretórica. El presente texto confrontara las condiciones que según el Gorgiasdebe cumplir la retórica para llegar a ser technê con las características (...) que,según Aristóteles, tiene la retórica a partir de su relación con la dialéctica. (shrink)

"In techne of giving, Timothy Campbell elaborates a notion of generosity as way of responding to contemporary biopower. Reading films from Visconti, Rossellini, and Antonioni, he both updates their political lexicon while adopting them as models able to push back against neoliberal forms of gift-giving"--.

While it is generally accepted that we need to use our intelligence in order to get what we want, it is thought to be a cardinal error to imagine that by reasoning we can discover what we ought to want. Reason can in no way constrain the choice of ends, it can only constrain the choice of means once an end has been adopted. In Plato's philosophy we find a view strongly opposed to this attitude towards reason. It is widely (...) held, however, that to arrive at a position which is plainly opposed to common sense, Plato must have grossly confused reasoning about means with reasoning about ends. Evidence of this confusion is found in Plato's use of analogies between statecraft and navigation, and between virtue and skill. But the diagnosis of confusion rests on a misunderstanding of how Plato wanted to use the word translated ‘skill’, i.e. ‘ technē ’, and this misunderstanding is shared even by those who see Plato as rejecting the virtue/skill analogy. (shrink)

Returning to the Greek understanding of art to rethink its capacities, Creation and the Function of Art focuses on the relationship between techné and phusis (nature). Moving away from the theoretical Platonism which dominates contemporary understandings of art, this book instead reinvigorates Aristotelian causation. Beginning with the Greek topos and turning to insights from philosophy, pure mathematics, psychoanalysis and biology, Jason Tuckwell re-problematises techné in functional terms. This book examines the deviations at play within logical forms, the subject, and upon (...) phusis to better situate the role of the function in poiesis (art). In so doing, Tuckwell argues that art concerns a genuinely creative labour that cannot be resolved via an ontological or epistemological problem, but which instead constitutes an encounter with the problematic. As such, techné is shown to be a property of the living, of intelligence coupled to action, that not only enacts poiesis or art, but indicates a broader role for creative deviation in nature. (shrink)

The preparation of food and nutrition is a pervasive techne in the classical Greek world. Indeed, food technology may be a defining characteristic of humanity. We begin with a glimpse of a tension in the use of the word techne in relation to the preparation of food in Plato’s Gorgias 462d-e. Turning to the Presocratics, we discern three distinct perspectives on food, those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the treatise Regimen. In Regimen, we find an anticipation of the distinctions (...) made by Plato in the Gorgias passage, and trace some of the implications in what we may call the “food technology” of this treatise that manages to be both philosophical and technically informative. (shrink)

This is a brief dictionary entry on the Greek word "techne" (art or skill) as used in ancient Greek philosophy, in particular in the work of Plato and Aristotle. A techne may be a manual craft, such as carpentry, or a science, such as medicine. A techne is based on universal principles and is capable of being taught.

In affective neuroscience, constructivist models are acutely influenced by the modern technological evolution, which underwrites an ongoing epistemological substitution of techne for episteme. Evidenced symptomatically in the influence of artificial intelligence (AI), affective artefacts, these models inform an ontological incursion of techne seen to coincide with posthumanist aspirations and anthropology. It is from the perspective of this neuroscientific techne that posthumanism views the human being as increasingly ill adapted to the modern technological civilization, which, conversely, is understood (...) to require a technical governance of the sort envisioned through AI. Among the projects thought necessary for implementing this framework is a recasting of the human emotional spectrum. Revealed through its techne recasting, however, are explanatory commitments to a metaphysic of extrinsic and contiguous causes, where malleability is ontologically constitutive. Aligned with posthumanist assertions malleability is invoked to argue for a rapid advance of the human form, normatively driven by enlightenment ideals. The ontological claim, however, dispenses with the stability of an a priori, intersubjective and interrelational metaphysical form that undergirds the emotions, leading to the collapse of a definitional anthropos. This paper will argue that techne models of the emotions selectively endorse philosophy of science commitments, thereby introducing a normative inversion that deconstructs the notion of anthropology pursued in posthumanist aspirations. (shrink)

Technology extends human perception and it intervenes in relations to the environment. Life in cities is particularly affected by newest technological developments, and city dwellers are most shielded and disconnected from the natural world by these very same technologies. The term technology stems from the Greek techne, and it refers to an instrumental relation to the world—a manipulation and adaptation of the environment to human needs. However, by intervening in everyday life and modifying relations to the environment, technology also (...) produces new forms of life and is therefore also poetic in the sense of poiesis. It is clearly distinguished from literary works because it opens worlds of possibilities that are not fictional. This makes a reflection on its poeticity all the more urgent, because the large-scale advent of new technologies such as the industrialization or the digitization radically changes the modes of perception and relations to urban environments. Art works like literature absorb and articulate these changes and are therefore useful “strange tools” for putting on display the changing modes of experiencing cities. For instance, industrialization, explosive urban growth and the rapid modernization of cities overwhelmed the senses. In its very form and rhythm, modernist literature performs the fragmented and brisk-paced experience of modernity. The digital age ostensibly promises intelligibility and order, for digital technologies can survey and manage vast amounts of information. Smart cities are designed for this purpose and for offering tailored solutions to the inhabitants’ individual needs. However, data analytics cannot capture the phenomenological quality of lived experience. Art works can, and contemporary literary works put on display urban life-forms characterized by disembodiment and by exhaustive information on any subject that on its own does not translate into any sense of meaning or belonging. (shrink)

In support of an interpretation of the techne-analogy not as a doctrine about virtue, but as a dialectical tool employed by the Platonic Socrates, I analyze an atypical example: the 'healthy city' of 'Republic' II. First, I survey the more 'typical' uses of the techne-analogy in Book I, where Socrates seeks to understand justice by comparing it to various 'technai'. Then, I proceed to show that Socrates' Healthy City, essentially an association of craftsmen, is used in a very (...) similar manner to provoke questions about the relation of virtue to knowledge. Finally, I speculate on the kinds of considerations about justice that Socrates tries to draw his interlocutors to by means of the Healthy City, looking backward to Book I and forward to the rest of the 'Republic'. (shrink)

This essay re-problematises the Aristotelian concept of techne in terms of the mathematical function to demonstrate the centrality of agency in technics. This schema animates computational theory as an agential operator or computer, to situate agency’s necessity to the technical apparatus and the production of abstract relations.

This paper discusses the interpretation of Charmides 164Dff. given by John Gould in The Development of Plato's Ethics. Gould claims that in this passage Plato wishes to indicate that he wants to delimit or qualify Socrates' analogy between morality or virtue on the one hand and art or craft (technē) on the other. Plato does this, supposedly, by showing us the unacceptable consequences which follow from assuming a complete analogy between morality and technē. I argue that this interpretation conflicts with (...) the text, which seems to indicate that the root of whatever problems occur in the dialectic is not the technē analogy, but rather that the analogy is not being applied strictly enough. In particular, I try to show that the failure of Critias' definition of temperance is due, in large measure, to his failure to specify an object for the knowledge which he asserts is equivalent to temperance. (shrink)

Abstract:Curiously, Marxist literary and art criticism often historicizes everything but the artist's labor. This essay articulates "techne-Marxism" as a critical standpoint that locates the ontological core of the artwork in conceptual and technical labor. It posits techne as the materialist substrate of art forms often explained away as part of an ideology of bourgeois taste rather than the proper bedrock of a Marxism that avoids alienating labor in a symptomology of historical structure. Ultimately, the value of techne-Marxism (...) is its ability to synthesize socially objective knowledge about art and the critic's ability to build labor-oriented evaluative judgments out of that knowledge. (shrink)

Does the idea of human enhancement presuppose a goal or an ideal to direct technological modifications? In the absence of such an agreed ideal in today’s culture, can Christian theology help clarify the goal or the meaning of “perfection” when applied to human beings? A theological perspective rooted in scripture and in the writings of theologians such as Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nyssa suggests that theology instead of offering its own definition of the human ideal, theology rejects the possibility (...) of any defined human goal. An analysis of the biblical word teleios (“mature” or “perfect”), along with Gregory’s view of infinite ascent, leads to the conclusion that the human goal is found in relationship to the triune God and not in any anthropologically-definable status. (shrink)

Since the publication of Part I of our joint special issue on Nanotech Challenges (see Techné 8.2 & Hyle 10.2), several international conferences have taken place that brought together scholars from the humanities and the social, natural, and engineering sciences to reflect on the challenges posed by nanotechnology. These included Nanotechnology in Science, Economy and Society , University of Marburg, 13-15 January 2005; Nano-Ethics, University of South Carolina, 2-6 March 2005; Nano Before There Was Nano , Chemical Heritage Foundation, Philadelphia, (...) PA, 18-19 March 2005. In addition, numerous research groups worldwide, who used to investigate the science-technology-society interfaces, have put nanotechnology at the top of their agenda; international expert groups are being formed; and national centers will soon be established in the US and UK. (shrink)

AbstractThe notion of techné in Husserl’s phenomenology is related to his treatment of the three layers of the “teaching of craft” and the two layers of the science of “life-world.” The superior layer of both is of philosophical significance. Aristotle’s statement in ethics and metaphysics: techné is man-made, but can transit to spontaneity, and then to natural becoming, which manifests physis as the ultimate aim of his philosophical system, enlightens us to notice the following aspects in Husserl’s phenomenology. 1. Pure (...) or formal ethics is of a high-level téchne in the philosophical sense. 2. The concept of life-world leads to transcendental phenomenology. 3. What Ideas II implies – as a technique the method of phenomenology tends to let the pure I and spiritual I as matters appear themselves by the natural attitude – could conduct us to understand the artistic aspect of Husserl’s philosophical theory. (shrink)

Resumen En la historia de la filosofía, la oposición entre episteme y téchne ha sido convencional. Ya sea que se interprete a Platón o Aristóteles, o se revisen las invenciones de Arquímedes, Ctesibio, Filón de Bizancio o Herón de Alejandría, hay una marginalidad temática de la téchne frente a la jerarquía epistémica de un pensamiento puro (logis-mós). En este artículo se propone una interpretación diferente, de carácter arqueológico y genealógico, según la cual se podría postular una episteme en la téchne (...) y una téchne en la episteme. La indagación inicia con una lectura de fuentes, recurriendo a la etimología como téchne hermenéutica (o método hermenéutico). Como fuente primaria principal se utilizan los Tratados hipocráticos.In the history of philosophy, the opposition between episteme and téchne has been conventional. Whether Plato or Aristotle is interpreted, or whether Archimedes, Ctesibius, Philo of Byzantium or Heron of Alexandria are revised, there is a margi-nalization of the téchne as compared to the epistemic hierarchy of pure thought (logismós). I propose a different interpretation of an archaeological and genealogical nature, according to which an episteme in the téchne and a téchne in the episteme could be postulated. The inquiry begins with a reading of sources making use of ety-mology as a hermeneutic téchne (or hermeneutic method). The Hippocratic treatises have been used as the principal primary source. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, the opposition between epistēmē and téchnē has been conventional. Whether Plato or Aristotle is interpreted, or whether Archimedes, Ctesibius, Philo of Byzantium or Heron of Alexandria are revised, there is a marginalization of the téchnē as compared to the epistemic hierarchy of pure thought . I propose a different interpretation of an archaeological and genealogical nature, according to which an epistēmē in the téchnē and a téchnē in the epistēmē could be postulated.The inquiry begins with (...) a reading of sources making use of etymology as a hermeneutic téchnē . The Hippocratic treatises have been used as the principal primary source. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Intentions of Art Can Private Intentions Go Public? The Intention to Make a Poem Poems Are Made out of Words Blake's “London”.

Informatics is generally understood as a “new technology” and is therewith discussed according to technological aspects such as speed, data retrieval, information control and so on. Its widespread use from home appliances to enterprises and universities is not the result of a clear-cut analysis of its inner possibilities but is rather dependent on all sorts of ideological promises of unlimited progress. We will discuss the theoretical definition of informatics proposed in 1936 by Alan Turing in order to show that it (...) should be taken as final and complete. This definition has no relation to the technology because Turing defines computers as doing the work of solving problems with numbers. This formal definition implies nonetheless a relation to the non-formalized elements around informatics, which we shall discuss through the Greek notion of téchne. (shrink)