Theoria, aisthesis, mimesis and doxa are terms that sometimes are opposed, and sometimes their particular relationships are denied. However, the system of the paradox that often animates esthetic theories and conceptions of mimesis have only the pathetic enjoyment of reclaimed and affirmed unsolvable questions. Therefore it would be well to grasp the historical configuration that ordered the play of these concepts and their evolution up until our contemporary poetics.

The phrase koine aisthesis appears, as far as I can see, very rarely in Aristotle. There is one definite use of the phrase in the De Anima, at 425a27. The word koine without aisthesis but such that the latter must be supplied may possibly occur at 431b5, but the text is uncertain there, and there is every reason why the word should be deleted from the text. This leaves us with a single occurrence of the phrase koine aisthesis in the (...) De Anima and it is used explicitly to deal with perception of the koina, the so-called common sensibles. Outside the De Anima, the phrase occurs at De Memoria 450a10, and at De Partibus Animalium 686a27, and I think nowhere else. Of these two passages that from the De Memoria is, although somewhat obscure, in line with the De Anima reference; it seems to invoke the common sense for the perception of magnitude, motion and time, and also says that an image is a pathos of the common sense, presumably because an image must be of a magnitude. The De Partibus Animalium passage is somewhat more eccentric. It is concerned with the fact that man is the only animal to walk upright, and associates this with the fact that man can think. This would not be easy if he had much of his body weighing down on him from above, for weight makes unresponsive thought and the common sense- τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν. Whatever be the other curiosities in this passage, the close association of thought and the common sense is itself at first sight rather strange. If any account can be given of it, it is presumably because of the facts adduced in the De Memoria passage, that thinking involves images, and these the koine aisthesis. (shrink)

Divided beauty (Dresden, 1764) -- Little gods of the street (Munich-Berlin, 1828) -- Plebeian heaven (Paris, 1830) -- The poet of the new world (Boston, 1841-New York, 1855) -- The gymnasts of the impossible (Paris, 1879) -- The dance of light (Paris, Folies Bergère, 1893) -- The immobile theatre (Paris 1894-95) -- Decorative art as social art: temple, house, factory (Paris-London-Berlin) -- Master of surfaces (Paris, 1902) -- The temple staircase (Moscow-Dresden, 1912) -- The machine and its shadow (Hollywood, 1916) (...) -- The majesty of the moment (New York, 1921) -- Seeing things through things (Moscow, 1926) -- The cruel radiance of what is (Hale County, 1936-New York, 1941). (shrink)

In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle (...) considers nous to be a different capacity than mere perception and one through which particulars and indemonstrable principles become intelligible. Moreover, I will show that Aristotle considers that the objects of nous differ in kind from those that sensation (our senses) and perception (inference from our senses) grasp. After examining critically Baracchi’s thesis in light of a close reading of those two relevant passages, I will conclude the paper by showing the significance of Aristotle’s claim that a state is defined in terms of its objects of apprehension for understanding the distinction between nous and aisthēsis. (shrink)

A shared goal amongst most educators, we argue, is to supplant students’ raw or “naive” intuitions with more refined intuitions about a particular domain. Educators want students, and people more generally, to recognize when ideas, frameworks, and processes don’t “look right”. When we know that something does not look right, sound right, or feel right, we investigate further. We seek to fill in the gaps between our knowledge and we attempt to learn new approaches for solving problems. Lifelong learning, in (...) other words, builds from a recognition of incoherence. We hope students will be more likely to recognize flawed reasoning or rhetorical appeals, even if they have long forgotten the details of logic, statistics, and argumentation. They have acquired a refined (one might even say “aesthetic”) sense of what is likely correct or incorrect; what is likely promising or empty. This sense is “aisthesis”. -/- Aisthesis is a marker of education. Although it doesn’t refer to particular sets of knowledge or particular skills in analyzing and evaluating problems, it provides a overarching framework that binds educators in both literature and science. Consequently, aisthesis provides a novel lens for pedagogy. Insofar as we are correct that education is about the cultivation of an aesthetic discrimination between good and bad work, aisthesis could be more explicitly targeted. Educators hope to instill in students an aisthetic sense of how to recognize when statements, issues, or artifacts are problematic and require further engagmeent. (shrink)

In the de Anima, Aristotle outlines a theory of perception. In de Anima II, 5-12, he considers the basic kinds of sensory perception — seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. He uses a few basic elements, viz., the five senses and their proper, common and incidental objects, and a few explanatory principles to explain sensory perception. In de Anima III, 1–2, Aristotle turns to apperception, viz. perceptual selfawareness. He considers several basic cases of apperception – the selfconscious awareness of occurrent (...) perceptions and the awareness that the objects of different senses are different. (shrink)

Kazimir Malevich’s style of Suprematist painting represents the inauguration of nothing less than a new form of culture premised upon a demolition of the Western tradition’s reifying habits of objective thought. In ridding his canvases of all objects and mimetic conventions, Malevich sought to reconfigure human perception in such a way as to open consciousness to alternative modes of organization and signification. In this paper, I argue that Malevich’s revolutionary aesthetic strategy can be illuminated by a return to the very (...) basis of this tradition, namely by a reconsideration of Aristotle’s account in De Anima III.2 of the initial possibility of objective perception as such. (shrink)

La psicología clásica griega se sirvió de la acotación filosófica de expresiones del lenguaje ordinario para desarrollar su teoría de las facultades del alma. Tal fue el caso de la facultad sensible. El artículo muestra cómo en la República de Platón convive la documentación de la amplitud de significados del uso ordinario de aisthanesthai y aisthesis con una aproximación a la acuñación filosófica del término aisthesis, a través del concepto de dynamis que, como muestra la frecuente indistinción entre aisthesis y (...) doxa, no alcanza los rasgos definitorios presentes en diálogos posteriores. Palabras clave: Platón; Psicología; Teoría de la PercepciónClassical Greek psychology made use of the philosophical marking off of everyday language expressions to develop its theory of soul faculties. So it was with the sensitive faculty. The paper shows how in Plato’s Republic there coexist the documenting of the many meanings of aisthanesthai and aisthesis in their ordinary usage, together with an approach to the philosophical coining of the term aisthesis, by means of the concept of dynamis. As the frequent lack of distinction between aisthesis and doxa shows, the former does not reach the definiteness of later dialogues. Keywords : Plato; Psychology; Theory of Perception. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende dilucidar el significado del sentir profundizando en la fenomenología genética y dialogando con la ontología fenomenológica, particularmente con la Métaphysique du sentiment de R. Barbaras. Comienza descubriendo los sentidos del cuerpo y lo que denominamos “re-flexión” corporal, siempre vinculada a la aisthesis (lato y stricto sensu) y a la afectividad. Aborda posteriormente la correlación entre fenomenología y estética como ejemplo de la pasividad en la actividad del sentir. Comprenderemos esta dinámica como movimiento ontológico que aúna la aisthesis (...) con el logos y exige ser expresado. Cézanne estará presente en esta investigación, como lo estuvo en la obra de Merleau-Ponty y de Maldiney, porque su pintura encarna ese movimiento en el que la creación es necesaria para experimentar y expresar el ser, y porque filosofía y arte son indispensables para sentir y pensar. Aceptaremos la crítica que Barbaras dirige Maldiney, mientras que continuaremos desarrollando la ontología fenomenológica de Merleau-Ponty para arrojar luz sobre le sentir. (shrink)