Se propone el uso de la Semiótica como herramienta integradora para investigar los aspectos fundamentales de los seres vivos. Como tal, la Biosemiótica abre nuevas perspectivas metodológicas para integrar un gran numero de fenómenos aparentemente no vinculados o incompatibles entre sí. EI principio básico es que la Biología, desde el nivel molecular al sistemíco, puede ser estudiada como comunicación, y los procesos biológicos como interacciones mediadas por signos. La vida es definida como una propiedad sistemica de la materia. La (...) Biología es, en si misma y en todos sus aspectos, Semiótica Natural próxima al caos determinista. EI paradigma biosemiótico es propuesto como un paso hacia la formulación de una teoría sintética de la vida, que incorpore los componentes mecanistico-moIeculares, interpretaciones semioticas, y Ia historia natural de los sistemas vivientes.Semiotics is introduced as an integrative approach to investigate the intimate features of living systems. As an overarching concept, Biosemiotics offers new methodological perspectives to integrate a vast number of apparently unrelated phenomena. The basic tenet is that Biology, from the molecular to the systemic level, can be investigated as communication, and biological processes as sign-mediated interactions. Life is defined as a systemic property of matter. Biology is then, in all its aspects, Natural Semiotics with a proximity to deterministic chaos. The biosemiotic paradigm is intended as a step toward the establishment of a synthetic theory of life, incorporating the molecular-mechanistic components, the semiotic interpretations, and the natural history of the living systems. (shrink)

In questo lavoro si dimostra che l'opinione comune, secondo cui è Heidegger a introdurre Jacob von Uexküll nel dibattito filosofico è scorretta, in quanto è Scheler, due decenni prima, a scoprire e valorizzare la portata filosofica di Uexküll. -/- Pure la distinzione fra mondo (Welt) e ambiente (Umwelt), come quella fra apertura al mondo e chiusura ambientale, non è introdotta da Heidegger nel 1929 (cfr. l'Introduzione di Marco Mazzeo al testo di Uexküll, Ambienti animali e ambienti umani, p.18 e seg.) (...) ma è già presente in Scheler negli scritti del periodo 1909-1913. (shrink)

How comes that two organisms can interact with each other or that we can comprehend what the other experiences? The theories of embodiment, intersubjectivity or empathy have repeatedly taken as their starting point an individualistic assumption (the comprehension of the other comes after the self-comprehension) or a cognitivist one (the affective dimension follows the cognitive process). The thesis of this book is that there are no two isolated entities at the origin which successively interact with each other. There is, rather, (...) an impersonal stratum – the original affectivity (Gefühlsdrang) – which lets the living organisms be constitutively attuned with the expressive dimension of the life from the very beginning. The book aims to rethink the issue of corporality on the basis of a biosemiotics of the interaction between lived body (Leib) and environment (Umwelt). The human emotions reveals themselves as devices that experiment further attunement levels and expose the human being – because of her ex-centricity – to the alienation in various forms of the psychopathological existence. This is an unprecedented perspective that turns to psychopathology to reread against the light the watermark weaving the structure of personal singularity. What emerges is an intermediate territory confining both with philosophy and psychiatry: the psychopathology of ordo amoris. The author advances the project of a new psychopathology of ordo amoris, not only tackling with the 19th-century tradition of psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology, but also with the contemporary disputes on intersubjectivity in phenomenology and with those on schizophrenia as disruption of aida or as disembodiment process in psychiatry. What results from his project is the first systematic study on the international level showing the relevance of Schelerian concepts of body schema (Leibschema) and order of feeling (ordo amoris) to understand the disruptions of emotional regulation on the psychopathological dimension as well as on the formation process of the singularity. (shrink)

La percepción puede proponerse como uno de los factores centrales que propician el inicio de procesos semiósicos. La complejidad de esta primera fase cognitiva exige una perspectiva trans e interdisciplinar. Así, desde una postura biosemiótica, trataremos de proponer uno de los conceptos centrales de esta novel teoría, a saber, ‘biosemiosis’. Para ello, nos apoyaremos en ciertos experimentos emanados de las neurociencias. Esta vinculación, en la actualidad, ya no debe resultar extraña si comprendemos que, en nuestro caso, el ser humano (...) es una entidad compuesta por dos esferas fundamentales: la biológica y la cultural. Nos encontramos en un momento en el que el Universo puede entenderse como una enorme red interconectada. Así, la cooperación entre diferentes campos del conocimiento permitirá una mejor comprensión de dichas redes. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se analizan conceptos clave de la obra de Jakob von Uexküll, a partir de la confrontación con el darwinismo mecanicista de principios del siglo XX, al cual, Uexküll contrapone la idea de un mundo viviente de interrelaciones, conformado de acuerdo con un Plan u Orden subyacent..

I present different approaches to psychological causality usually neglected. The debate between mechanism and dualism in psychology has obscured other pluralistic philosophical positions. I begin by setting out Schopenhauer’s position, the "analogic" one, which includes, in a pluralistic view, diverse causations (mechanical, stimulate, and motive reasons) but with a monism of the will at the noumenal level. Then, I review other approaches in psychology and biological sciences: dialectical, constructivist and biosemiotics. All agree to see reality as plural and self-constituted. En (...) este trabajo presento distintos enfoques sobre la causalidad psicológica normalmente desatendidos. El debate entre mecanicismo y dualismo en la psicología ha oscurecido otras posiciones filosóficas pluralistas. Comienzo por exponer la postura "analógica" de Schopenhauer, que incluye -de forma pluralista- una diversidad de causaciones (mecánica, estimular y causalidad por motivos) pero con un monismo de la voluntad en el plano nouménico. Después reviso otros enfoques dialécticos en la psicología y en las ciencias biológicas: dialécticas, constructivistas y biosemióticas. Todos ellos coinciden en ver la realidad como plural y autoconstituida. (shrink)

In this research work we approach to the knowledge of undiagnosed diseases. These diseases are framed within the so-called rare diseases, because they are not frequent. They generate a series of conditions in the lives of the affected people and in their social relationships. This is the result of the semiotic break between the biological and the social code. This situation can force people with these diseases to be out of the social structure, and they also can be reduced their (...) capacity to make decisions. For this reason, it is necessary to develop semiotics bridges that connect the codes we have talked about. (shrink)

En este trabajo presento distintos enfoques sobre la causalidad psicológica normalmente desatendidos. El debate entre mecanicismo y dualismo en la psicología ha oscurecido otras posiciones filosóficas pluralistas. Comienzo por exponer la postura "analógica" de Schopenhauer, que incluye -de forma plu..

We attempt a review to several currents that, nowadays, are self-claimed "constructivists", inside of a biological overview of knowledge. We’ll try to throw some light about the question: are all of them a very alternative to realism? If they are in opposition of realism, or they are antipoda..

In this paper, I show that, although Husserl explicitly explains a kinetic theory of Leib already in § 83 of Raum und Ding, a real phenomenology of the distinction between Leib (living body) and Körper (corporeal object) is not conceivable without Scheler's contribution. It’s quite common to search for the origin of this distinction in Ideen II, in a work composed of texts written in different moments from 1912 on. Before 1912 Husserl dedicated himself to the theme of corporeality in (...) the first part of Göttinger Vorlesungen 1904/1905 as well as in the lectures in the Sommersemester of 1907 titled Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. Both lectures, however, lack an explicit analysis on the distinction between Leib and Körper. Scheler instead mentions it already in an unpublished text from 1908/1909 and fully develops it in the years 1911 and 1912, where the issue is explored in a more organic and radical way than in the writings of Husserl. -/- In diesem Beitrag möchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass, obwohl Husserl bereits in § 83 von Raum und Ding eine kinetische Theorie von Leib erklärt, eine reale Phänomenologie der Unterscheidung zwischen Leib und Körper ohne Schelers Beitrag nicht denkbar wäre. Im Allgemeinen wird ihr Ursprung in den Ideen II festgestellt, einer Schrift, die aus den Texten verschiedener Zeiten nach 1912 besteht. Vor 1912 widmet sich Husserl dem Thema der Körperlichkeit in dem ersten Teil der Göttinger Vorlesungen 1904/1905 sowie in den Vorlesungen aus dem Sommersemester 1907 über Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. In beiden Vorlesungen fehlt jedoch eine explizite Untersuchung zum Unterschied zwischen Leib und Körper. Bei Scheler hingegen ist sie bereits in einem Nachlasstext aus 1908/1909 auffindbar und wird in den Jahren 1911 und 1912 sehr ausführlich entfaltet. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Thematik erfolgt bei ihm viel organischer und eingehender als bei Husserl. -/- In questo scritto dimostro che, sebbene Husserl espliciti una teoria cinetica del Leib già nel § 83 di Raum und Ding, una vera e propria fenomenologia della distinzione fra Leib (corpo vivente) e Körper (oggetto corporeo) è inconcepibile senza il contributo di Scheler. Generalmente tale distinzione viene ricondotta a Idee II, un testo che è il risultato di diverse versioni composte a partire dal 1912. Prima del 1912 Husserl si dedica al tema della corporeità nella prima parte delle Göttinger Vorlesungen del 1904/5, e nelle lezioni del Sommersemester del 1907 dedicate a Ding und Raum [Hua XVI]. In entrambi questi testi manca però un’analisi esplicita sulla differenza fra Leib e Körper. In Scheler invece tale distinzione è già rintracciabile in un inedito del 1908/09 per poi essere pienamente esplicitata nel biennio 1911-1912, dove è presente un’elaborazione di questa tematica ben più organica e radicale rispetto a quella presente negli scritti di Husserl. (shrink)