Results for 'constitutivism'

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  1. Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.
    Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source (...)
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  2. Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of (...)
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  3. Deriving Ethics From Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.
    This paper has two goals. First, I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s puzzling claims about will to power. I argue that the will to power thesis is a version of constitutivism. Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of agency; in particular, constitutivism rests on the idea that all actions are motivated by a common, higher-order aim, whose presence generates a standard of assessment for actions. Nietzsche’s version (...)
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  4.  84
    The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.Amir Saemi - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):733-747.
    Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the (...)
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  5.  55
    Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms.Emer O'Hagan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):17-31.
    I defend constitutivism against two prominent objections and argue that agential constitutivism has the resources to take normative and ethical deliberation seriously. I first consider David Enoch’s shmagency challenge and argue that it does not form a coherent objection. I counter Enoch’s view that the phenomenology of first-person deliberation pragmatically justifies belief in irreducibly realist normative truths, claiming that constitutivism can respect the practice of moral deliberation without appeal to robustly realist truths. Secondly, I argue that the (...)
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  6.  32
    Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-19.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection in a variety of ways. For Korsgaard (1996: Lecture 3; 2009: 25-ff), it is a necessary feature of the process of deciding which principles we want to guide our actions and to comprise the kinds of agents that we become. For Velleman (1989: 32; 2000a: 193), it is a product of the constitutivist aim of autonomy (or, later (2006a), the aim of intelligibility) that we have in action. Interestingly enough, however, there is no (...)
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  7.  14
    Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory: Editorial Introduction.Christoph Hanisch & Sorin Baiasu - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-4.
    The introduction summarizes the main arguments formulated in the six papers of this special issue on Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory. We highlight the unifying theme addressed in the essays, i.e., the question of whether constitutivism is able to fulfill the promise of providing an account of normativity starting from relatively slender assumptions, including the avoidance of realist presuppositions.
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  8.  8
    Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.Sorin Baiasu - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, (...)
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  9.  88
    Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Paul Katsafanas explores how we can justify normative claims such as 'murder is wrong'. He defends an original account of constitutivism--the view that we do so by showing that agents become committed to them in virtue of acting--and resolves philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims.
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  10. Katsafanas, Paul.Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 267. $75.00. [REVIEW]Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):883-888.
  11.  77
    Review: Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism[REVIEW]Review by: Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):883-888,.
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  12.  11
    Rescuing Nietzsche From Constitutivism.Simon Robertson - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:353-377.
    Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts about constitutive features of agency. In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas uses Nietzsche to elucidate a version of the position he believes avoids worries besetting its competitors. This paper argues that Nietzschean constitutivism falters in many of the same places: it may remain vulnerable to ‘schmagency’ objections; it faces problems giving an account of the weights of reasons that adequately (...)
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  13.  16
    Constitutivism About Practical Principles: Its Claims, Goals, Task and Failure.Christine Bratu & Moritz Dittmeyer - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-15.
    The aim of this paper is twofold: In its first part, we work out the key features of constitutivism as presented by Christine Korsgaard. This reconstruction serves to clarify which goals Korsgaard wants to achieve with her account and which of its central claims she has to defend in particular. In the second part, we discuss whether Korsgaard can vindicate constitutivism's most central claim. To do this, we analyse two important arguments - the argument from unavoidability and the (...)
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  14. Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke's Criticisms of Constitutivism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.
    Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility (...)
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  15.  5
    Constitutivism, Error, and Moral Responsibility in Bishop Butler's Ethics.David G. Dick - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):415-438.
    In his writings on moral philosophy, Bishop Joseph Butler adopts an identifiably “constitutivist” strategy because he seeks to ground normativity in features of agency. Butler's constitutivist strategy deserves our attention both because he is an influential precursor to much modern moral philosophy and because it sheds light on current debates about constitutivism. For example, Butler's approach can easily satisfy the “error constraint” that is often thought to derail modern constitutivist approaches. It does this by defining actions relative to the (...)
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  16.  16
    Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - In Iain Thomson & Kelly Becker (eds.), he Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945-2015. Cambridge University Press.
    A brief explanation and overview of constitutivism.
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  17.  82
    First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  18.  4
    Korsgaard’s Constitutivism and the Possibility of Bad Action.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-20.
    Neo-Kantian accounts which try to ground morality in the necessary requirements of agency face the problem of “bad action”. The most prominent example is Christine Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism that considers the categorical imperative to be indispensable for an agent’s self-constitution. In my paper I will argue that a constitutive account can solve the problem of bad action by applying the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules to the categorical imperative. The result is that an autonomous agent can violate (...)
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  19.  19
    Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive (...)
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  20.  39
    Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M, then S has M. Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, (...)
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  21.  4
    Rescuing Nietzsche From Constitutivism.Robertson Simon - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts about constitutive features of agency. In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas uses Nietzsche to elucidate a version of the position he believes avoids worries besetting its competitors. This paper argues that Nietzschean constitutivism falters in many of the same places: it may remain vulnerable to ‘schmagency’ objections; it faces problems giving an account of the weights of reasons that adequately (...)
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  22.  55
    Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence.Stefano Bertea - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81-95.
    In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency? their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds of (...)
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  23.  33
    Normativity and the Will to Power: Challenges for a Nietzschean Constitutivism.Andrew Huddleston - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3):435-456.
    The past decade and a half has seen a considerable flowering of interest in Nietzsche’s metaethics. In this time, Nietzsche has been presented with nearly as wide a range of views in metaethics as there are exegetical options on the table—views ranging from nihilism to subjective realism to expressivism to fictionalism to objective realism to, most recently, constructivism and constitutivism. Interpreters must square Nietzsche’s apparently skeptical remarks about the objectivity of value with his seeming commitment to a certain privileged (...)
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  24.  5
    Comments on Paul Katsafanas's Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism.Bernard Reginster - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3):403-417.
    Paul Katsafanas’s book, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, is in many respects a remarkable achievement.1 In recent years, more and more philosophically rigorous scholarship has been produced on Nietzsche’s thought, particularly on his theory of value. Katsafanas’s book not only holds its own when compared to the best of that scholarship, but also manages to articulate an original interpretation of central issues in Nietzsche’s metaethics. This alone is quite a feat, since, even before Katsafanas’s book, it (...)
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  25.  7
    Constitutivism and Inescapability: A Diagnosis.Christoph Hanisch - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly (...)
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  26.  3
    A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism.Davide Fassio - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):343-364.
    Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism is the view that beliefs are constitutively governed by deontic norms. This roughly means that a full account and understanding of the nature of these mental attitudes cannot be reached unless one appeals to some norm of this type. My aim in this article is to provide an objection to such a conception of the normativity of belief. I argue that if some deontic norm is constitutive of belief, then the addressees of such a norm are (...)
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  27.  1
    Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework.David Alm - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.
    In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the ‘is’/’ought’ problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that (...)
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  28. Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion.A. Herzberg Larry - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M, then S has M. Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, (...)
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  29.  19
    On Nietzschean Constitutivism.Peter Poellner - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):162-169.
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  30.  3
    Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy.Sorin Baiasu - 2017 - In Micha H. Werner, Robert Stern & Jens Peter Brune (eds.), Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory. De Gruyter. pp. 109-140.
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  31. Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oxford University Press.
  32.  15
    Going Social with Constitutivism.David A. Borman - 2015 - Philosophical Forum 46 (2):205-225.
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  33.  8
    Paul Katsafanas , Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism . Reviewed By.Ariela Tubert - 2014 - Philosophy in Review 34 (6):316-318.
  34.  7
    Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, by Paul Katsafanas.J. N. Berry - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):646-652.
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  35.  1
    Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments.Micha H. Werner - 2017 - In Micha H. Werner, Robert Stern & Jens Peter Brune (eds.), Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory. De Gruyter. pp. 231-246.
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  36.  7
    Kierkegaard's Constitutivism: Agency, the Stages of Existence and the Issue of Motivation.Walter Wietzke - 2011 - Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2011 (1):411-432.
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  37. Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge.P. Katsafanas - 2007 - APA Proceedings and Addresses 80 (3).
     
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  38. Constitutivism.Michael Smith - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 371-384.
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  39.  11
    Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers an analysis of the authoritatively normative concept PRACTICAL OUGHT that appeals to the constitutive norms for the activity of non-arbitrary selection. I argue that this analysis permits an attractive and substantive explanation of what the distinctive normative authority of this concept amounts to. I contrast my account with more familiar constitutivist theories, and briefly show how it answers ‘schmagency’-style objections to constitutivist explanations of normativity. Finally, I explain how the account offered here can be used to help (...)
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  40.  85
    Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.
    Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in (...)
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  41. Shmagency Revisited.David Enoch - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    1. The Shmagency Challenge to Constitutivism In metaethics – and indeed, meta-normativity – constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman, constitutivism seems to be gaining grounds in the current literature. The promises of constitutivism are significant. Perhaps chief among them are the hope to provide (...)
     
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  42.  61
    Why Care About Being an Agent?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.
    The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative (...)
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  43.  93
    Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising (...)
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  44. Inescapability Revisited.Luca Ferrero - manuscript
    According to constitutivism, the objective authority of practical reason is to be grounded in the constitutive features of agency. In this paper, I offer a brief survey of the basic structure of constitutive argument about objectivity and consider how constitutivism might dispel the worry that it can only ground a *conditional* kind of authority. In response to Enoch's original shmagency challenge, in the past I argued that the inescapability of agency shows that we should not be worried by (...)
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  45. Nietzsche on the Diachronic Will and the Problem of Morality.Alessandra Tanesini - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):652-675.
    In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche's metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are owned or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using the vocabulary of self-mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and (...)
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  46.  22
    Forms of Rational Agency.Douglas Lavin - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:171-193.
    A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the external breed standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the internal standards of health at work in the veterinarian's office. This paper is about practical standards, measures of acting well and badly, and so measures deployed in deliberation and choice. More specifically, it (...)
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  47. ‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  48.  71
    Normative Reasons as Good Bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a (...)
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  49.  20
    The Foundations of Agency – and Ethics?Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-17.
    In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas’ alleged aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples. More importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is most likely false, as it requires our values to do work (...)
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  50.  40
    Ethics and the Possibility of Failure: Getting It Right About Getting It Wrong.David G. Dick - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Entire moral philosophies have been rejected for ruling out the possibility of failure. This “fallibility constraint” (also sometimes called the “error constraint”) cannot be justified by appealing either to Wittgensteinian considerations about rules or to the moral importance of alternate possibilities. I propose instead that support for such a constraint in ethics can be found in the Strawsonian reactive attitudes. I then use the constraint to reveal hidden weaknesses in contemporary contstitutivist strategies to ground moral normativity such as Christine Korsgaard’s, (...)
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