Results for 'epistemic closure'

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  1. Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished (...)
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  2. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  3. Epistemic Closure, Assumptions and Topics of Inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.
    According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic (...)
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  4. Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering (...)
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  5.  25
    Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.
    In spite of the intuitiveness of epistemic closure, there has been a stubborn stalemate regarding whether it is true, largely because some of the “Moorean” things we seem to know easily seem clearly to entail “heavyweight” philosophical things that we apparently cannot know easily—or perhaps even at all. In this paper, I will show that two widely accepted facts about what we do and don’t know—facts with which any minimally acceptable understanding of knowledge must comport—are jointly inconsistent with (...)
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  6.  88
    Epistemic closure.Peter Baumann - 2011 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 597--608.
    This article gives an overview over different principles of epistemic closure, their attractions and their problems.
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  7.  81
    Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - 2018 - In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-70.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions (...)
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  8.  59
    The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure.Charles B. Cross - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):319-333.
    In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
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  9.  66
    The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected.C. B. Cross - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):457-466.
    This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic (...)
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  10.  36
    Knowing by Way of Tracking and Epistemic Closure.Murali Ramachandran - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):217-223.
    Tracking accounts of knowledge were originally motivated by putative counter-examples to epistemic closure. But, as is now well known, these early accounts have many highly counterintuitive consequences. In this note, I motivate a tracking-based account which respects closure but which resolves many of the familiar problems for earlier tracking account along the way.
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  11.  43
    More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure.Charles B. Cross - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):109-114.
    In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure”, MIND 110:319-33, 2001, I develop a version of the Knower Paradox which does not assume epistemic closure, and I use it to argue that the original Knower Paradox does not support an argument against epistemic closure. In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure?”, MIND 113:95-107, 2004, Gabriel Uzquiano, using his own result, argues that my rebuttal to the anti-closure argument is (...)
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  12.  5
    Extended Rationality: Some Queries About Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):258-271.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 258 - 271 This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s _Extended Rationality_ is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean (...)
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    Epistemic Closure's Clash with Technology in New Markets.Dennis R. Cooley - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 108 (2):181-199.
    Many people, such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher, and William Sharpe, assume that free markets full of rational people automatically lead to ethical actions and outcomes. After all, at its equilibrium point, a perfectly competitive free market maximizes utility, respects autonomy, and fulfills justice’s dictates. Unfortunately, in some technology markets, there are a significant number of people who have undergone epistemic closure. Epistemic closure entails that all reliable evidence that would challenge deeply held beliefs (...)
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  14.  64
    Epistemic Closure and Commutative, Nonassociative Residuated Structures.Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):113-128.
    K-axiom-based epistemic closure for explicit knowledge is rejected for even the most trivial cases of deductive inferential reasoning on account of the fact that the closure axiom does not extend beyond a raw consequence relation. The recognition that deductive inference concerns interaction as much as it concerns consequence allows for perspectives from logics of multi-agent information flow to be refocused onto mono-agent deductive reasoning. Instead of modeling the information flow between different agents in a communicative or announcement (...)
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  15. Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic (...)
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  16. Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, (...)
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  17.  41
    Ryan on Epistemic Closure Principles.John M. Collins - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):371-376.
    Sharon Ryan (2000) argues against one epistemic closure principle but defends another one. I argue that the phenomenon of blameless propositional recognition failure provides a counter-example to this closure principle. I suggest a revision to the closure principle to make it immune to this sort of counter-example.
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  18.  38
    An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report (...)
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  19. When Does Epistemic Closure Fail?M. Yan - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):260-264.
    Ted A. Warfield reviews the history of epistemology and argues that epistemologists mistakenly take for granted the inference that the failure of closure of some necessary condition on knowledge is sufficient for the failure of epistemic closure. So he concludes that epistemologists should avoid using this inference to explain the failure of epistemic closure. However, I will defend the inference that epistemologists often employ in their discussions. My thesis is that although this inference is invalid, (...)
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  20. ``Cognition and Epistemic Closure".Radu Bogdan - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):55--63.
    JUSTIFICATION and knowledge are thought to be closed under known implication..1 This widely shared assumption is embodied in the following principles of epistemic closure.
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  21.  77
    Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
    This paper contributes to the current debate about radical scepticism and the structure of warrant. After a presentation of the standard version of the radical sceptic’s challenge, both in its barest and its more refined form, three anti-sceptical responses, and their respective commitments, are being identified: the Dogmatist response, the Conservativist response and the Dretskean response. It is then argued that both the Dretskean and the Conservativist are right that the anti-sceptical hypothesis cannot inherit any perceptual warrants from ordinary propositions (...)
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  22.  98
    The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure.Stephen Maitzen - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can (...)
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  23. Epistemic Closure Principles.John M. Collins - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia article about epistemic closure principles. The article explains what they are, their various philosophical uses, how they are argued for or against, and provides an overview of the related literature.
     
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  24.  74
    Epistemic Closure in Context.Yves Bouchard - unknown
    The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: (...)
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  25. The Epistemic Closure Principle.Steven Luper - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (or logically implied by) things we know. The set of things we know is closed under entailment (or under deduction or logical implication), which means that we know that a given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby, that it follows from what we know. However, some theorists deny that knowledge is closed under entailment, and the issue remains controversial. The arguments (...)
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  26.  85
    Epistemic Closure Principles.Steven D. Hales - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):185-202.
    This paper evaluates a number of closure principles (for both knowledge and justification) that have appeared in the literature. Counterexamples are presented to all but one of these principles, which is conceded to be true but trivially so. It is argued that a consequence of the failure of these closure principles is that certain projects of doxastic logic are doomed, and that doxastic logic is of dubious merit for epistemologists interested in actual knowers in the actual world.
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  27.  7
    Epistemic Closure and Skepticism.J. A. Barker & F. Adams - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):221-246.
    Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons : S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske (...)
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  28.  56
    Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination.Cameron Boult - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.
    Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two (...)
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  29.  1
    Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203-226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has put pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g. if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, (...)
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  30. When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson From the History of Epistemology.Ted A. Warfield - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):35–41.
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  31.  81
    The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure?Gabriel Uzquiano - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):95-107.
  32. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  33.  1
    Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility.de Almeida Claudio - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
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  34.  9
    When Epistemic Closure Does and Does Not Fail: A Lesson From the History of Epistemology.T. A. Warfield - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):35-41.
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  35.  5
    ``Skepticism and Epistemic Closure&Quot.Anthony Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89--117.
  36. DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure.Christopher Buford - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):255-259.
  37.  2
    Epistemic Closure Principles.Steven D. Hales - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):185-201.
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  38.  24
    A Rejection of the Epistemic Closure Principle.Richard Greene - 2001 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (2):59-73.
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  39. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
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  40.  30
    Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.
    According to a popular closure principle for epistemic justification, if one is justified in believing each of the premises in set Φ and one comes to believe that ψ on the basis of competently deducing ψ from Φ—while retaining justified beliefs in the premises—then one is justified in believing that ψ. This principle is prima facie compelling; it seems to capture the sense in which competent deduction is an epistemically secure means to extend belief. However, even the single-premise (...)
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  41.  50
    Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances (...)
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  42.  67
    Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
    In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to (...)
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  43. Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and (...)
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  44.  66
    Epistemic Issues in the Free Will Debate: Can We Know When We Are Free?Scott Sehon - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):363-380.
    In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a (...)
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  45.  17
    Epistemic Justification and Deductive Closure.Samir Okasha - 1999 - Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 31 (92):37-51.
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  46.  3
    Groups as Epistemic Providers: Need for Closure and the Unfolding of Group-Centrism.Arie W. Kruglanski, Antonio Pierro, Lucia Mannetti & Eraldo De Grada - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (1):84-100.
  47. A Strategy for Assessing Closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a (...)
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  48.  88
    Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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    Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained.Michael Hughes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.
    The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism’s opponents charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the skeptical hypotheses are false. It (...)
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  50. Deductive Closure and Epistemic Context.Yves Bouchard - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):439-451.
     
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