The hermeneutical circle is one of the most fundamental and contentious doctrines of hermeneutical theory. In its most basic form in contemporary hermeneutics, it is the idea that we always understand or interpret out of some presuppositions. Hermeneutical thinkers like Heidegger, Bultmann, Ricoeur, and Gadamer view the hermeneutical circle favorably since it constitutes for them an inescapable and positive element of understanding: as finite and historical beings, we understand because we are guided by anticipations, (...) expectations, and questions. For them, the key is not to escape the hermeneutical circle, but, to enter into it in the right way. The notion of the hermeneutical circle is recent, but its roots go back to antiquity and ancient rhetoric. The hermeneutical circle, Heidegger contends, describes the constant and ongoing process of trial and error, where one always strives to develop the right anticipations which have to be “borne out by the things themselves”. (shrink)

In this article, we show how postphenomenology can be used to analyze the Affinity Map: a data visualization that reveals the hidden dynamics that exist between individuals within large organizations. We make use of the Affinity Map to expand the classic postphenomenology that privileges a ‘linear’ understanding of technological mediations and introduce the notions of ‘iterativity’ and ‘collectivity.’ In the first section of the paper, we discuss both classic and more recent descriptions of human-technology-world relations in order to transcendentally approach (...) the discipline of data visualization. In the second section, we use the Affinity Map case study to consider three elements: 1) the collection of data and the design process; 2) the visual grammar of the data visualization, and 3) the process of self-recognition for the map ‘reader.’ In the third section, we introduce the hermeneutic circle of data visualization. Finally, we suggest that the Affinity Map, because of its ethical and political multistability, might be seen as a material encounter between postphenomenology, actor-network theory (ANT), and hermeneutics. (shrink)

In Truth and Method, Gadamer tries to show that the understanding of art is scientific (wissenscaftlich). But even though the understanding of art is a kind of science, it is different from natural sciences. As objects of human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft), works of art should be dealt differently than in dealing with theobjects of natural sciences. But if the understanding of art is somewhat scientific, it means that in artistic understanding there is a claim to truth which is different from such (...) a claim as in the natural sciences. Then how can this truth be assured? The task of assuring truth in art understanding can be achieved by the hermeneutical circle. Thus, we investigated the role and significance of the hermeneutical circle in scientific understanding of art. (shrink)

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a (...) solution, but this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts. (shrink)

At the start of his account of hermeneutic experience, Gadamer quotes Heidegger: “Our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.” Heidegger’s “fore-structures” reflect our practical pre-understanding and ongoing engagement with our world or “the things themselves.” Yet, if so, how can we work these fore-structures (...) out in terms of them? Gadamer claims to take his answer to this question from Heidegger and to appeal, like him, to the hermeneutic circle. However, I argue that Gadamer takes the question more seriously than Heidegger does by supplementing recourse to the hermeneutic circle with an appeal to dialogue. I also explore concerns about this supplement. Gadamer conceives of understanding as a dialogue in which we test our fore-meanings against those of others and come to a consensus with others about a subject matter (Sache). Yet, dialogue can just as easily reinforce or even exaggerate our fore-meanings as test them For its part, consensus is as easily to be feared as sought. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, is an extremely important branch of epistemology that has, in the past twenty years, been receiving an increasing amount of attention. There is now a fairly extensive body of rather daunting literature in the field, most of it originating in the European phenomenological tradition. Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle is intended to give readers who are philosophically sophisticated but not yet conversant with hermeneutics a comprehensive overview of the history and concerns of the (...) discipline. It shows how the development of hermeneutics in the past two centuries coincided with a gradual increase in our appreciation of the subtleties and many variations of the hermeneutic circle. It also makes explicity some of the more important ways in which the hermeneutic circle can be seen to function in the practices of the natural sciences, thus bridging the methodological gap between the Geisteswissenschaften and the natural sciences. The book is illustrated with forty diagrams representing the variation of the hermeneutic circle, further reinforcing the clarity of exposition. It will therefore be appropriate as core text for graduate or senior courses on hermeneutics or literary theory, and as supplementary text for courses in the philosophy of science, historiography, and aesthetics. (shrink)

IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, I shall examine two questions. Is there an anticipation of the understanding that constitutes the act of interpretation? If so, does that anticipatory understanding possess a structure of the sort that stands to the act of interpretation as the ontological ground is held to stand to the ontic or factual consequences of that ground? These questions together make up the problem of the hermeneutical circle.

Brain functions are stochastic processes without intentionality whereas mind emerges from brain functions as a Hegelian “change from quantity”, that is, on the order of 1012 profusely interconnected neurons, “into a new quality”: the collective phenomenon of the brain's self-experience. This self-referential and self-observing quality we have in mind is capable of (recursively) observing its self-observations, i.e., interpreting change that is meaningful in relation to itself. The notion of self-interpretation embodies the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”, that is, (in (...) interpretation theory) the treatment of the whole in relation to its parts. (shrink)

In this article, an attempt is made to analyse important implications of the hermeneutic approach in qualitative studies. The article discusses the hermeneutic circle with regard to reasoning contexts, on which the researcher's interpretation is based. Problems in connection with achievement of ‘proper’ understanding in an interpretative process are discussed in light of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy. Some features of qualitative studies are addressed. This is concerned with arguments in the presentation of findings in qualitative studies using the hermeneutic approach. (...) The essence of the article is there are grounds for reasonable understanding, even though it cannot be absolute in the hermeneutic. (shrink)

The hermeneutic circle serves as a standard argument for all those who raise a claim to the autonomy of the human sciences. The proponents of an alternative methodology for the human sciences present the hermeneutic circle either as an ontological problem or as a specific methodological problem in the social sciences and the humanities. This paper checks the soundness of the argument by sketching out three variations of the problem and critically discussing them.

Such is the criticism commonly passed upon Socrates in our age, which boasts of its positivity much as if a polytheist were to speak with scorn of the negativity of a monotheist, for the polytheist has many gods, the monotheist only one. So our philosophers have many thoughts, all valid to a certain extent; Socrates had only one, which was absolute.

This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore‐conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA’s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the (...) method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore‐conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy. (shrink)

John Llewelyn's two books concern theories of understanding and signification in continental philosophy. Beyond Metaphysics? examines Heidegger's argument that existentials constitute a prescientific understanding of the "categories of scientific knowledge." He explores how the hermeneutic circle is beyond metaphysics, if metaphysics is regarded as the epistemological relation of objects presented to subjects. Following a chapter on how Husserl's phenomenology anticipates Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the remainder of the book is devoted to examining the extent to which some Continental philosophers agree (...) or disagree with Heidegger's notion of the fore-structure of understanding. In the more recent book, he extends his study of the break from subject-object dualism in modern theories of meaning to consider Derrida's anasemiology or problematizing of the logic of opposition that characterizes Western philosophy. The two books, therefore, are closely united, and the reader is well advised to study the two in order of publication. (shrink)

In this essay I present culture as a realm constituted by a circular movement where progress is constantly confronted by different forms of reversions. By progress I mean specifically oriented changes we observe in culture. Many of them are rooted in the development of technology and science, or stem from demographical changes and intercultural influences. Reactions to these changes frequently involve returning to certain forms of behavior or responses that were common in the past but have been later abandoned. I (...) intend to present examples of this phenomenon observed in culture. (shrink)

The quest for finding the right interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is as old as QM and still has not ended, and may never end. The question what an interpretation of QM is has hardly ever been raised explicitly, let alone answered. We raise it and answer it. Then the quest for the right interpretation can continue self-consciously, for we then know exactly what we are after. We present a list of minimal requirements that something has to meet in order to (...) qualify as an interpretation of QM. We also raise, as a side issue, the question how the discourse on the interpretation of QM relates to hermeneutics in Continental Philosophy. (shrink)

In his 1815 version of The Ages of the World, Schelling describes the human being and history in a similar manner, and initiates a turn towards the hermeneutic understanding of history that resurfaces in the work of Paul Ricoeur. The author focuses his attention on how Schelling, with his new depiction of ‘God’ is able discuss the idea of history innovatively because of the manner in which God affects the human being. The paper aims to show how Schelling enacts a (...) turn towards a hermeneutic view of history, and underscores parallels between the views of Schelling and those of Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)

The Critical Circle investigates the celebrated hermeneutic circle, especially as it manifests itself in historical inquiry and literary criticism. Formulated variously in different theories of hermeneutics, the circle generally describes how, in the process of understanding an interpretation, part and whole are related in a circular way: in order to understand the while, it is necessary to understand the parts, while to understand the parts it is necessary to have some comprehension of the whole. --from the Foreword.