Results for 'hinge propositions'

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  1.  63
    Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):165-181.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 165 - 181 Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this topic tends to divide into two camps: either a ‘quasi-epistemic’ reading is offered that seeks to downplay the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s proposal by assimilating his thought (...)
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  2.  53
    Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth.Andrew W. Howat - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  3.  31
    Doubting Pritchard’s Account of Hinge Propositions.Jonathan Nebel - 2019 - Synthese:1-13.
    In On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forth a unique defense against skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, “we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” These hinges provide the necessary framework for epistemic evaluation. The question is how to understand Wittgenstein’s language here. Duncan Pritchard puts forward a non-belief reading whereby one has a non-belief propositional attitude towards hinge propositions. (...)
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  4.  32
    Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing Across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    Wittgenstein famously introduced the notion of ‘hinge propositions’: propositions that are assumptions or presuppositions of our languages, conceptual schemes, and language games, presuppositions that cannot themselves be rationally established, defended, or challenged. This idea has given rise to an epistemological approach, ‘hinge epistemology’, which itself has important implications for argumentation. In particular, it develops and provides support for Robert Fogelin’s case for deep disagreements: disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved by processes of rational argumentation. In this (...)
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  5.  13
    Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.
    Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart (...)
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  6. Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287.
    Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.
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  7.  38
    Are Economic Decisions Rational? Path Dependence, Lock-In and ‘HingePropositions.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Philosophy of Management 2 (3):29-40.
    According to neo-classical economic theory, free markets should eventually settle at the most efficient equilibrium. Critics of the view have claimed, however, that even if the idealised conditions demanded by the theory were met one would still not find those markets settling at the optimally efficient equilibrium because of the path dependent' nature of economic decision-making. Essentially, the claim is that economic decision-making is always informed by the historical setting in such a way as to prevent those decisions from generally (...)
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  8.  55
    Did Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Hinge Propositions?Deborah Jane Orr - 1989 - Philosophical Investigations 12 (2):134-153.
  9.  14
    Wittgenstein and the Myth of Hinge Propositions.Alejandro Tomasini Bassols - 2010 - In Jesús Padilla Gálvez & Eric Lemaire (eds.), Wittgenstein: Issues and Debates. De Gruyter. pp. 83-116.
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  10. 'Hinge Propositions' and Radical Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2012 - In Jesús Padilla Gálvez & Margit Gaffal (eds.), Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism. Ontos. pp. 53.
     
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  11. Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep (...)
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  12. Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given rise to so far are presented and (...)
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  13.  78
    Introduction: Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 73 - 78 This introduction gives a summary of the content of the special issue _Hinge Epistemology_, grouping the papers in three sections: more exegetical accounts of Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge certainties and their bearing on a theory of justification and knowledge as well as on the topic of external world scepticism; papers critical of the very notion of hinge certainty; and papers that apply the notion to various areas of epistemology (...)
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  14.  95
    What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Topoi.
    What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than (...)
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  15. Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of Scepticism.Daniele Moyal-Sharrock - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (2):125-148.
    So-called 'hinge propositions', Wittgenstein's version of our basic beliefs, are not propositions at all, but heuristic expressions of our bounds of sense which, as such, cannot meaningfully be said but only show themselves in what we say and do. Yet if our foundational certainty is necessarily an ineffable, enacted certainty, any challenge of it must also be enacted. Philosophical scepticism – being a mere mouthing of doubt – is impotent to unsettle a certainty whose salient conceptual feature (...)
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  16.  13
    Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):431-448.
    According to “disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, (...)
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  17.  68
    Closure, Deduction and Hinge Commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Duncan Pritchard recently proposed a Wittgensteinian solution to closure-based skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, all epistemic systems assume certain truths. The notions that we are not disembodied brains, that the Earth has existed for a long time and that one’s name is such-and-such all function as “hinge commitments.” Pritchard views a hinge commitment as a positive propositional attitude that is not a belief. Because closure principles concern only knowledge-apt beliefs, they do not apply to hinge commitments. Thus, from (...)
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  18.  90
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main (...)
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  19.  19
    On What Does Rationality Hinge?Yuval Avnur - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):246-257.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 246 - 257 The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable (...)
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  20. Understanding Wittgenstein's on Certainty.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2004 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, On Certainty, has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of scepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-in, a primitive confidence or ur-trust whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved categorial gap between belief and action.
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  21.  22
    The Illusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press UK.
    The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic's answer is 'not very much' if we cannot prove that we are not subject to deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic's move, but this book shows that the radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don't need to answer (...)
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  22.  76
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst.John Greco - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):51-61.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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  23.  52
    Epistemic Norms, Closure, and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim (...)
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  24. Concepts, Conceptual Schemes and Grammar.Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):653-668.
    This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...)
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  25. Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner (eds.), Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as (...)
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  26. Cartesian Epistemology Without Cartesian Dreams? Commentary on Jennifer Windt's Dreaming.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):30-43.
    Jennifer Windt’s Dreaming is an enormously rich and thorough book, developing illuminating connections between dreaming, the methodology of psychology, and various philosophical subfields. I’ll focus on two epistemological threads that run through the book. The first has to do with the status of certain assumptions about dreams. Windt argues that the assumptions that dreams involve experiences, and that dream reports are reliable — are methodologically necessary default assumptions, akin to Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. I’ll suggest that Windt is quietly (...)
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  27. How to Defeat Belief in the External World.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.
    I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as (...)
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  28.  17
    Schutz-Wittgenstein: On the Problem of the Natural Attitude.Luigi Muzzetto - 2018 - Schutzian Research 10:11-36.
    The first part of this paper aims to highlight the analogies between Schutz’s vision of the natural attitude and Wittgenstein’s vision of a phenomenon that concerns the same problematic field, i.e. certainty, the belief of common sense that is free of all doubt, that the world “out there” is as it appears, absolutely real. These certainties form the basis, the foundation of language games and therefore of knowledge in general and in its entirety. This foundation is unfounded and yet indispensable. (...)
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  29.  75
    Summa Contra Scepticos.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):184-193.
    This critical notice concerns Duncan Pritchard's Epistemic Angst. After a summary of the book, I offer some brief critical comments on five issues: the distinction between overriding and undercutting strategies against scepticism, epistemic relativism, foundationalist hinge epistemology, the relationship between hinge propositions and evidence, and the universality of rational evaluation. Epistemic Angst is Duncan Pritchard's to-date most comprehensive attempt to defuse Cartesian epistemic scepticism. The argument builds on Pritchard's more than sixty previous publications on the same general (...)
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  30.  78
    Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.
    It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-à-vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of one’s epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis “a cat is a cat” is harder to improve than one’s position vis-à-vis “a cat is on the mat”, and (...)
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  31.  34
    Scepticism, Closure and Rationally Grounded Knowledge: A New Solution.Ju Wang - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374.
    Radical scepticism contends that our knowledge of the external world is impossible. Particularly, radical scepticism can be motivated by the closure principle. Several commentators have noted that a straightforward way to respond to such arguments is via externalist strategies, e.g., Goldman, Greco, Bergmann. However, these externalist strategies are not effective against a slightly weaker form of the argument, a closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge, closureRK.\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${closure}_{RK.}$$\end{document} The sceptical argument, framed around the (...)
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  32. A Pragmatist Conception of Certainty: Wittgenstein and Santayana.Guy Bennett-Hunter - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2):146-157.
    The ways in which Wittgenstein was directly influenced by William James (by his early psychological work as well his later philosophy) have been thoroughly explored and charted by Russell B. Goodman. In particular, Goodman has drawn attention to the pragmatist resonances of the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge propositions as developedand articulated in the posthumously edited and published work, On Certainty. This paper attempts to extend Goodman’s observation, moving beyond his focus on James (specifically, James’s Pragmatism) as his pragmatist (...)
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  33.  30
    On the Grammatical Aspects of Radical Scientific Discovery.Aristides Baltas - 2004 - Philosophia Scientiae 8 (1):169-201.
    Radical scientific discovery and the associated radical “paradigm change” are treated here as following from the disclosure of what I call background ‘assumptions’. These are taken as more or less equivalent to the “hinge propositions” that Wittgenstein discusses in his On Certainty. On this basis, various issues connected to meaning variance, theory change, incommensurability and so forth, are discussed. It is shown that Kuhn’s overall account need not, with qualifications, imply either idealism or relativism while rationality and scientific (...)
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  34.  8
    Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.Bart Bezooijen, Martin Peterson & J. Carter - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.
    It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-à-vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of one’s epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis “a cat is a cat” is harder to improve than one’s position vis-à-vis “a cat is on the mat”, and (...)
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  35.  47
    Concepts, Conceptual Schemes and Grammar.Hans Johann Glock - 2009 - .
    This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...)
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  36.  30
    Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification.Shaul Tor - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):81-108.
    Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen (...)
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  37.  55
    Philosophy Rehinged?Hans Johann Glock - 2016 - .
    This paper is devoted to the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy. It starts by distinguishing different ways in which propositions can be basic or fundamental and by arguing that the foundational status of hinge propositions cannot be reduced to any of the others. The second part maintains that hinges have anti-sceptical potential, provided that one combines Wittgenstein’s critique of sense with Moore’s method of differential certainty. The final part briefly (...)
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  38. Wittgenstein's Scepticism' in on Certainty.Norman Malcolm - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):277 – 293.
    This paper compares Wittgenstein's conception of ?objective certainty? with Descartes's ?metaphysical certainty?. According to both conceptions if you are certain of something in these senses, then it is inconceivable that you are mistaken. But a striking difference is that for Descartes, if you are metaphysically certain of something it follows both that the something is so and that you know it is so; whereas on Wittgenstein's conception neither thing follows. I try to show that there is a form of ?scepticism? (...)
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  39.  20
    Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs.Svetlana Bardina - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):546-560.
    ABSTRACTThis article intends to reconsider the epistemological status of delusional beliefs on the basis of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty. Several works over the last two decades have compared delusional beliefs with so-called hinge propositions, which – according to Wittgenstein – function as expressions of objective certainty. This gives rise to a paradox. On the one hand, delusions are compatible to Wittgensteinian certainties in some respects; on the other hand, they contradict beliefs shared by other members of the community, (...)
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  40.  42
    Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo.Rico Gutschmidt - 2016 - Wittgenstein-Studien 7 (1):131-147.
    The relation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to skepticism seems to be ambiguous, since he rejects radical skepticism but also highlights the groundlessness of our beliefs. In this paper, I am going to discuss Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions in this respect. Against the usual view, I will show that they do not function as a contextualist or foundationalist refutation of skepticism. What is more, they also do not confirm skepticism. In contrast, I will argue that following Wittgenstein skepticism is neither (...)
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  41.  24
    The Difficulties with Groundlessness.Keith Dromm - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (4):418-435.
    In On Certainty, §166, Wittgenstein mentions the difficulty of realizing the “groundlessness of our believing.” In the course of reviewing what makes this realization so difficult, I examine a certain way of understanding one of Wittgenstein's techniques for getting us to realize it, his use of the “hinge” metaphor. It implies that hinge-propositions possess that status inherently; for some commentators, this is because of their connection to instinctive and habitual behaviours. I offer an alternative interpretation of the (...)
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  42.  3
    Are There Any Intrinsically Unjust Acts?Roger Teichmann - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (2):201-219.
    In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Anscombe characterises the virtue of justice by reference to two features of the just person: that of having a standing intention not ‘to commit or participate in any unjust actions for fear of any consequences, or to obtain any advantage, for himself or anyone else’; and that of being someone who ‘quite excludes’ certain types of action from consideration. I investigate what and together amount to and entail. The investigation covers a number of issues, including the (...)
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  43.  30
    Reading Wittgenstein (on Belief) with Tillich (on Doubt).Gorazd Andrejč - 2015 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 57 (1):60-86.
    In this paper, I explore the possibility of reading Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious belief with Tillich’s concept of existential/religious doubt, especially as developed in his Dynamics of Faith. I argue, first, that Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious belief as a deep certainty of a grammatical remark is not the same as his understanding of hinge-certainty of “hinge propositions”, and that the relevant difference is that Wittgenstein leaves room for the possibility of doubt in the former but not in (...)
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  44.  17
    Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Magic.Raymun Festin - 2009 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 15 (1):41-70.
    This paper explores Collingwood's and Wittgen-stein's views on magic. It argues that their insights converge at some interesting points. But this is just a tip of the iceberg. For beneath their overlapping views on magic and religion lie their notions of absolute presuppositions and hinge-propositions which also exhibit striking similarities. At bottom, this paper contends that, although Collingwood and Wittgenstein come fromdifferent intellectual backgrounds, they are essentially philosophers of kindred thought.
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  45. О синтезе двух эпистемологий (On a synthesis of two epistemologies).Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - Аль-Фараби 3.
    В статье анализируется предложенный Кристофом Келпом подход к знанию, синтезирующий эпистемологию способностей (эпистемология Эрнеста Соза и другие) и эпистемологию, принимающую концепт знания в качестве первичного концепта (эпистемология Тимоти Уильямсона и другие). Предложенный синтез устраняет некоторые проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются эпистемологические дисджонктивизмы Дункана Притчарда и Алена Миллара, а также «чистая» эпистемология способностей. В то же время, как мы утверждаем, подход Келпа имеет свои собственные недостатки, которые отсутствуют в эпистемологии Уильямсона. Последняя является более фундаментальным подходом. Более того, она совместима с эпистемологией Витгенштейна. (...)
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  46. Fundamental Convictions and the Need for Justification.Michael B. Wakoff - 1996 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The abandonment of sole reliance on the logical positivist canon of wholly general, topic-neutral, a priori inference principles has created a pressing need for a principled way to set limits on the demand for justification. I diagnose the problems with several contemporary proposals via two case studies, the first concerned with the possibility of groundlessly rational theism, and the second with the use of groundlessly rational commitments in defense of scientific rationality. ;I argue that William Alston's appeal to the "practical" (...)
     
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  47. A Theory of Structured Propositions.Andrew Bacon - manuscript
    This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn't arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the $\lambda$-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist had independent reasons to reject these underlying assumptions. The theory is given (...)
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  48. Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and the Distinction Between Actions and Products.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701.
    This paper argues that attitudinal objects, entities of the sort of John's judgment, John's thought, and John's claim, should play the role of propositions, as the cognitive products of cognitive acts, not the acts themselves.
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    The Linguistic Basis for Propositions.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions.
    Propositions are traditionally regarded as performing vital roles in theories of natural language, logic, and cognition. This chapter offers an opinionated survey of recent literature to assess whether they are still needed to perform three linguistic roles: be the meaning of a declarative sentence in a context, be what is designated by certain linguistic expressions, and be the content of illocutionary acts. After considering many of the relevant choice-points, I suggest that there remains a linguistic basis for propositions, (...)
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    Instrumentalism About Structured Propositions.Ori Simchen - forthcoming - In Adam Murray & Chris Tillman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    Theories deploy various theoretical representations of their explananda and one question we can ask about those representations is whether to regard them under a realist attitude, i.e. as revealing the nature of what they represent, or whether to regard them under an instrumentalist attitude instead, i.e. as serving particular explanatory ends without the further revelatory aspect. I consider structured propositions as theoretical representations within a particular explanatory setting -- the metaphysics of what is said -- and argue that a (...)
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