Results for ' induction'

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  1. Mark Siderits deductive, inductive, both or neither?Inductive Deductive - 2003 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 31:303-321.
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  2. Wesley C. salmon.Inductive Logic - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 24--47.
  3. Jaakko Hintikka.Inductive Generalization - 1975 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist: Materials and Perspectives. D. Reidel Pub. Co.. pp. 73--371.
     
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  4. Ian I-iacking.Linguistically Invariant Inductive Logic - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel.
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  5. Richard C. Jeffrey.Carnap'S. Inductive Logic - 1975 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist: Materials and Perspectives. D. Reidel Pub. Co.. pp. 73--325.
     
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  6. Bruno de finetti.I. Inductive Reasoning - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 3.
  7. Isaac Levi.Comments on‘Linguistically Invariant & Inductive Logic’by Ian Hacking - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel.
     
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  8.  13
    Reasoning by Mathematical Induction in Children's Arithmetic.Leslie Smith - 2002 - Elsevier.
    The central argument that Leslie Smith makes in this study is that reasoning by mathematical induction develops during childhood. The basis for this claim is a study conducted with children aged five to seven years in school years one and two.
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  9.  60
    The logical problem of induction.G. H. von Wright - 1957 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
    'The most thorough and scrupulous of contemporary students of induction' (the execrable Quinton 1993, p. 172).
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  10. Human Induction in Machine Learning: A Survey of the Nexus.Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - forthcoming - ACM Computing Surveys.
    As our epistemic ambitions grow, the common and scientific endeavours are becoming increasingly dependent on Machine Learning (ML). The field rests on a single experimental paradigm, which consists of splitting the available data into a training and testing set and using the latter to measure how well the trained ML model generalises to unseen samples. If the model reaches acceptable accuracy, an a posteriori contract comes into effect between humans and the model, supposedly allowing its deployment to target environments. Yet (...)
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  11.  45
    The justification of induction.Richard Swinburne (ed.) - 1974 - New York]: Oxford University Press.
  12. Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
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  13.  24
    Inductive Plausibility and Certainty.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - 2021 - In Marcin Trepczyński (ed.), Philosophical Approaches to the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics: In Honor of Stanisław Krajewski. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 193-210.
    Is it possible to combine different logics into a coherent system with the goal of applying it to specific problems so that it sheds some light on foundational aspects of those logics? These are two of the most basic issues of combining logics. Paranormal modal logic is a combination of paraconsistent logic and modal logic. In this paper, I propose two further combinatory developments, focusing on each one of these two issues. On the foundational side, I combine paranormal modal logic (...)
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  14. Skepticism about Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
    This article considers two arguments that purport to show that inductive reasoning is unjustified: the argument adduced by Sextus Empiricus and the (better known and more formidable) argument given by Hume in the Treatise. While Sextus’ argument can quite easily be rebutted, a close examination of the premises of Hume’s argument shows that they are seemingly cogent. Because the sceptical claim is very unintuitive, the sceptical argument constitutes a paradox. And since attributions of justification are theoretical, and the claim that (...)
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  15. The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments.Michael T. Stuart - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83 (C):17-27.
    John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The (...)
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  16.  5
    The method of mathematical induction.I. S. Sominskiĭ - 1961 - Boston,: Heath. Edited by L. I. Golovina & I. M. I︠A︡glom.
    The method of mathematical induction: The method of mathematical induction -- Examples and exercises -- The proof of induction of some theorems of elemetary algebra -- Solutions.
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  17. Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
    Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ =0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We (...)
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  18.  41
    Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science.Kevin Christopher Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.) - 2017 - New York: Oup Usa.
    This book brings together eleven case studies of inductive risk-the chance that scientific inference is incorrect-that range over a wide variety of scientific contexts and fields. The chapters are designed to illustrate the pervasiveness of inductive risk, assist scientists and policymakers in responding to it, and productively move theoretical discussions of the topic forward.
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  19. Historical inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - 2015 - Synthese:1-15.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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  20. Inductive risk and the contexts of communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
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  21. Induction and the Glue of the World.Harjit Bhogal - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):319-333.
    Views which deny that there are necessary connections between distinct existences have often been criticized for leading to inductive skepticism. If there is no glue holding the world together then there seems to be no basis on which to infer from past to future. However, deniers of necessary connections have typically been unconcerned. After all, they say, everyone has a problem with induction. But, if we look at the connection between induction and explanation, we can develop the problem (...)
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  22.  94
    Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.
    Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the (...)
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  23.  56
    Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?Markus Dressel - 2022 - Theoria 37 (2):181-207.
    The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that (...)
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  24. Inductive Reasoning Involving Social Kinds.Barrett Emerick & Tyler Hildebrand - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
    Most social policies cannot be defended without making inductive inferences. For example, consider certain arguments for racial profiling and affirmative action, respectively. They begin with statistics about crime or socioeconomic indicators. Next, there is an inductive step in which the statistic is projected from the past to the future. Finally, there is a normative step in which a policy is proposed as a response in the service of some goal—for example, to reduce crime or to correct socioeconomic imbalances. In comparison (...)
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  25. Induction and Natural Kinds Revisited.Howard Sankey - 2021 - In Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 284-299.
    In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is (...)
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  26. Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):61-73.
    The pessimistic induction plays an important role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. But there is some disagreement about the structure and aim of the argument. And a number of scholars have noted that there is more than one type of PI in the philosophical literature. I review four different versions of the PI. I aim to show that PIs have been appealed to by philosophers of science for a variety of reasons. Even some realists have (...)
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  27. Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
    In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between (...)
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  28.  35
    Elementary induction on abstract structures.Yiannis Nicholas Moschovakis - 1974 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
    Hailed by the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society as "easy to use and a pleasure to read," this research monograph is recommended for students and professionals interested in model theory and definability theory. The sole prerequisite is a familiarity with the basics of logic, model theory, and set theory. 1974 edition.
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  29.  44
    Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - MIT Press.
    An account of inductive inference is presented which addresses both its epistemological and metaphysical dimensions. It is argued that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world.
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  30.  25
    Scientific Method, Induction, and Probability: The Whewell–De Morgan Debate on Baconianism, 1830s–1850s.Lukas M. Verburgt - 2024 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 14 (1):134-163.
    By focusing on the nineteenth-century debate between William Whewell and Augustus De Morgan on the nature and scope of scientific method and induction, this article captures an important episode in the history of Baconianism. More specifically, it sheds new light on the social and intellectual construction of Francis Bacon as an emblem of modern science and on British Baconianism as part of the creation of a vision of the modern enterprise. A critic of Whewell’s renovated Baconianism and an advocate (...)
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  31. Induction, explanation, and natural necessity.John Foster - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:87-101.
    I want to examine a possible solution to the problem of induction-one which, as far as I know, has not been discussed elsewhere. The solution makes crucial use of the notion of objective natural necessity. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall assume that this notion is coherent. I am aware that this assumption is controversial, but I do not have space to examine the issue here.
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  32. Backwards induction in the centipede game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...)
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  33.  53
    VI*—Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity.John Foster - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):87-102.
    John Foster; VI*—Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 87–102, https://d.
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  34.  98
    Inductive metaphysics: Editors' introduction.Kristina Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter & Ansgar Seide - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):1-26.
    This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.
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  35.  11
    Pure Inductive Logic.Jeffrey Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Alena Vencovská.
    Pure Inductive Logic is the study of rational probability treated as a branch of mathematical logic. This monograph, the first devoted to this approach, brings together the key results from the past seventy years, plus the main contributions of the authors and their collaborators over the last decade, to present a comprehensive account of the discipline within a single unified context.
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  36. Inductive Knowledge.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):354-388.
    This paper formulates some paradoxes of inductive knowledge. Two responses in particular are explored: According to the first sort of theory, one is able to know in advance that certain observations will not be made unless a law exists. According to the other, this sort of knowledge is not available until after the observations have been made. Certain natural assumptions, such as the idea that the observations are just as informative as each other, the idea that they are independent, and (...)
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  37. Induction and inference to the best explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
    In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.
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  38.  30
    Deduction, Induction and Causality. Siemens - 1981 - Philosophical Inquiry 3 (2):117-125.
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  39.  59
    Historical inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):3979-3993.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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  40. Induction in the Socratic Tradition.John P. McCaskey - 2014 - In Paolo C. Biondi & Louis F. Groarke (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 161-192.
    Aristotle said that induction (epagōgē) is a proceeding from particulars to a universal, and the definition has been conventional ever since. But there is an ambiguity here. Induction in the Scholastic and the (so-called) Humean tradition has presumed that Aristotle meant going from particular statements to universal statements. But the alternate view, namely that Aristotle meant going from particular things to universal ideas, prevailed all through antiquity and then again from the time of Francis Bacon until the mid-nineteenth (...)
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  41. Induction, Simplicity and Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 1979 - Scientia 114 (14):629-653.
    In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role (...)
     
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  42. Induction and Natural Kinds.Howard Sankey - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of (...)
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  43.  67
    Practical induction.Elijah Millgram - 1997 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force.
  44. Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
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  45. Inductive Risk, Understanding, and Opaque Machine Learning Models.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (5):1065-1074.
    Under what conditions does machine learning (ML) model opacity inhibit the possibility of explaining and understanding phenomena? In this article, I argue that nonepistemic values give shape to the ML opacity problem even if we keep researcher interests fixed. Treating ML models as an instance of doing model-based science to explain and understand phenomena reveals that there is (i) an external opacity problem, where the presence of inductive risk imposes higher standards on externally validating models, and (ii) an internal opacity (...)
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  46.  31
    Transcending inductive category formation in learning.Roger C. Schank, Gregg C. Collins & Lawrence E. Hunter - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):639-651.
    The inductive category formation framework, an influential set of theories of learning in psychology and artificial intelligence, is deeply flawed. In this framework a set of necessary and sufficient features is taken to define a category. Such definitions are not functionally justified, are not used by people, and are not inducible by a learning system. Inductive theories depend on having access to all and only relevant features, which is not only impossible but begs a key question in learning. The crucial (...)
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  47. Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that (...)
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  48.  13
    Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought.P. B. Medawar - 1969 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.
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  49. Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing.Bruno De Finetti - 1972 - New York: John Wiley.
  50. Induction and Probability.Ned Hall & Alan Hájek - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 149-172.
    Arguably, Hume's greatest single contribution to contemporary philosophy of science has been the problem of induction (1739). Before attempting its statement, we need to spend a few words identifying the subject matter of this corner of epistemology. At a first pass, induction concerns ampliative inferences drawn on the basis of evidence (presumably, evidence acquired more or less directly from experience)—that is, inferences whose conclusions are not (validly) entailed by the premises. Philosophers have historically drawn further distinctions, often appropriating (...)
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