Results for ' moral evil'

938 found
Order:
See also
  1. Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy.Sam Duncan - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):973-991.
    Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy?, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  2.  11
    Moral evil.Andrew Michael Flescher - 2013 - Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
    The idea of moral evil has always held a special place in philosophy and theology because the existence of evil has implications for the dignity of the human and the limits of human action. Andrew M. Flescher proposes four interpretations of evil, drawing on philosophical and theological sources and using them to trace through history the moral traditions that are associated with them. The first model, evil as the presence of badness, offers a traditional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  27
    Intrinsic Moral Evils in the Middle Ages: Augustine as a Source of the Theological Doctrine.Matthew R. McWhorter - 2016 - Studies in Christian Ethics 29 (4):409-423.
    Contemporary historians examining moral theology in the Middle Ages question whether the practice of proscribing certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils has a legitimate basis in the Christian ethical tradition. John Dedek argues that this proscription does not fully emerge until the work of the fourteenth-century thinker Durandus of St. Pourçain. Dedek’s historical focus, however, is upon theological discussions which consider God’s absolute power and his ability to dispense from or command any human act whatsoever. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Moral Evil and Leibniz’s Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence.Jill Graper Hernandez - 2010 - Sophia 49 (1):1-13.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  18
    Moral Evil in Practical Ethics.Shlomit Harrosh & Roger Crisp (eds.) - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    The concept of evil is one of the most powerful in our moral vocabulary, and is commonly used today in both religious and secular spheres to condemn ideas, people, their actions, and much else besides. Yet appeals to evil in public debate have often deepened existing conflicts, through corruption of rational discourse and demonization of the other. With its religious overtones and implied absolutism, the concept of evil seems ill-suited to advancing public discourse and pro-social relations (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Moral evil and human freedom: A reply to Tierno.Yujin Nagasawa - 2003 - Sophia 42 (2):107-111.
    Many theists believe that the so-called ‘free will defence’ successfully undermines the antitheist argument from moral evil. However, in a recent issue of Sophia Joel Thomas Tierno provides the ‘adequacy argument’ in order to show an alleged difficulty with the free will defence. I argue that the adequacy argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of moral evil.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Moral Evil: St. Thomas and the Thomists.C. S. S. R. Dermot Mulligan - 1959 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 9:3-26.
    It is quite clear that sin like any other evil involves the privation of a requisite perfection, that it has what is called a negative malice. But is that all? Even a superficial examination of a sin of transgression shows that there is another element, an act, which is something positive: peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito ordine privatus; peccatum est actus inordinatus. Is this positive element the formal constituent of sin, so that sin may be (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The Privation Account of Moral Evil.W. Matthews Grant - 2015 - International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):271-286.
    The privation account of moral evil holds that the badness of morally bad acts consists not in the positive act itself or in any positive feature of the act but rather in the act’s lack of conformity to the moral standard. Traditionally recognized for its theological usefulness, the account has been the target of at least five recent objections. In this paper I offer a positive philosophical argument for the account and then show that the objections fail.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Non‐Moral Evil.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):18-34.
    There is, I shall assume, such a thing as moral evil (more on which below). My question is whether is also such a thing as non-moral evil, and in particular whether there are such things as aesthetic evil and epistemic evil. More exactly, my question is whether there is such a thing as moral evil but not such a thing as non-moral evil, in some sense that reveals something special about (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  10. The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  11.  14
    Moral Evil as Apparent Disvalue.David C. Hicks - 1977 - Religious Studies 13 (1):1 - 16.
  12.  78
    Moral Evil, Privation, and God.W. Matthews Grant - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):125--145.
    On a traditional account, God causes sinful acts and their properties, insofar as they are real, but God does not cause sin, since only the sinner causes the privations in virtue of which such acts are sinful. After explicating this privation solution, I defend it against two objections: (1) that God would cause the sinful act’s privation simply by causing the act and its positive features; and (2) that there is no principled way to deny that God causes the privation (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  55
    Moral Evil without Consequences?Michael J. Coughlan - 1979 - Analysis 39 (1):58 - 60.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14.  6
    The Inscrutability of Moral Evil in Kant.Gordon E. Michalson - 1987 - The Thomist 51 (2):246-269.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INSCRUTABILITY O:F MORAL EVIL IN KANT ((W:HENCE COMETH EVIL?" Late in his career, Immanuel Kant would turn his attention to this perennial question with an elaborate account of " radical evil " in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. His discussion produced consternation among his admirers, such as Goethe, and continues to produce puzzlement among his commentators. Among the chief difficulties facing the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  15.  13
    Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil.Michelle Kosch - 2006 - In Freedom and reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense.Kenneth Boyce - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
    Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there are non- (...) evils in the world (i.e., that there obtain morally bad states of affairs for which no creature is morally responsible). But many of us firmly believe that there are evils of that sort. I show how Plantinga’s free will defense can be extended so as to redress this weakness. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Moral evil: The comparative response.C. Stephen Layman - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (1):1-23.
    Theists may argue that, although theism does not explain the presence of all evils well, it provides an explanation that is as good as (or better than) the explanation provided by some (or all) of theism’s metaphysical rivals. Let us call this approach “The Comparative Response” since it involves comparing theistic explanations of evil with explanations provided by theism’s metaphysical rivals. The Comparative Response has received little attention in recent discussions of the problem of evil, and I propose (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18.  46
    (1 other version)How to Counter Moral Evil: Paideia and Nomos.Luciano Floridi - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (1):1-5.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. From Metaphysical to Moral Evil: Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Evil and Sin in the "Disputed Questions de Malo", Questions One to Three.Robert J. Barry - 1996 - Dissertation, Boston College
    Thomas' theory of sin is a specification of his general theory of metaphysical evil. Both his theory of evil in general and his theory of moral evil specifically provide an understanding that constitutes a scientia, for both theories consist of an explanation of the four causes of evil. As a contrary of good, evil can be explained by means of its causes, for the scientia of good includes the understanding of the contrary of good. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  60
    Vice-based accounts of moral evil.Alan T. Wilson - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2825-2845.
    In this paper, I highlight three objections to vice-based accounts of moral evil: (1) the worry that vice-based accounts of evil are explanatorily inadequate; (2) the worry that even extreme vice is not sufficient for evil; and (3) the worry that not all vices are inversions of virtue (and so vice-based accounts will struggle to explain the “mirror thesis”). I argue that it is possible to respond to these objections by developing a vice-based account of (...) that draws on insights from virtue (and vice) epistemology. In this way, I seek to defend the strategy of understanding evil in terms of vice, and to provide guidance on how best to develop such an account. I also briefly consider what vice-based accounts of moral evil might imply about evil in other normative domains where it is common to talk of virtue and vice, including the possibilities of epistemic evil and aesthetic evil. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  9
    Moral Evil as Apparent Disvalue: DAVID C. HICKS.David C. Hicks - 1977 - Religious Studies 13 (1):01-16.
    In this article 1 I have two theological interests and a less direct philosophical one.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Unsociable Sociability, Moral Evil and the Origin of Human History in Kant.Natalia Lerussi - 2018 - Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (13):149-168.
    La tesis principal de este trabajo es que el principio con el que Kant comprende el origen de la cultura o de la historia humana en la tesis cuarta de I dea de una historia universal desde el punto de vista cosmopolita, la insociable sociabilidad, no implica “conceptualmente” el mal moral. Defiendo así, contra una larga tradición de lectura que sostiene lo contrario, que la cultura es producto de dos disposiciones diferentes de la especie humana que son originarias e (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. (1 other version)Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics.R. Hackforth - 1946 - Classical Quarterly 40 (3-4):118-.
    It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οδες κν μαρτνει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Arguments from Moral Evil.Graham Oppy - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):59 - 87.
    In this paper, I argue that -- contrary to widely received opinion -- logical arguments from evil are well and truly alive and kicking.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. Moral evil and divine concurrence in the Theodicy.Tad M. Schmaltz - 2014 - In Larry M. Jorgensen & Samuel Newlands (eds.), New Essays on Leibniz’s Theodicy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  26. The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: On the Descriptive Adequacy of Kant's Conception of Moral Evil.Mark Timmons - 2017 - In Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics. New York: Oup Usa. pp. 293-330.
    This chapter argues for an interpretation of Kant's psychology of moral evil that accommodates the so-called excluded middle cases and allows for variations in the magnitude of evil. The strategy involves distinguishing Kant's transcendental psychology from his empirical psychology and arguing that Kant's character rigorism is restricted to the transcendental level. The chapter also explains how Kant's theory of moral evil accommodates 'the badass'; someone who does evil for evil's sake.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Moral evil under challenge.Johannes Baptist Metz (ed.) - 1970 - [New York]: Herder & Herder.
  28.  1
    The idealistic view of moral evil.Paul Ramsey - 1946 - [n.p.,:
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Ontic evil and moral evil.Louis Janssens - 2000 - In Christopher Robert Kaczor (ed.), Proportionalism: for and against. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press.
  30. The thematic primacy of moral evil.Aurel Kolnai - 1956 - Philosophical Quarterly 6 (22):27-42.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31.  69
    The idealistic view of moral evil: Josiah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet.Paul Ramsey - 1945 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (4):554-589.
  32.  24
    Moral Evil.Dermot Mulligan - 1959 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 9:3-26.
  33.  42
    Moral Evil.Dermot Mulligan - 1959 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 9:3-26.
  34. (1 other version)Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence.A. M. Weisberger - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (3):375-390.
    One of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of religion is the existence of moral evil in light of an omnipotent and wholly good deity. A popular mode of diffusing the argument from evil lies in the appeal to free will. Traditionally it is argued that there is a strong connection, even a necessary one, between the ability to exercise free will and the occurrence of wrong-doing. Transworld depravity, as characterized by Alvin Plantinga, is a concept (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35.  59
    On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' third critique.Joel Thomas Tierno - 2008 - Sophia 47 (2):223-230.
    In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  29
    Moral Evil and the Existence of God.Theodore J. Kondoleon - 1973 - New Scholasticism 47 (3):366-374.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  6
    The Fact of Moral Evil; and Free Will.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - In Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Part 3 of this book shows how God has to allow the possibility of bad things if he is to provide the good things described in Part 2. First, he has to allow creatures to freely choose what is bad. Although it is implausible to suppose that all possible creatures would suffer from ‘transworld depravity’, as Plantinga supposes, creatures do need bad desires if they are to have a choice between good and bad.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  6
    The Range of Moral Evil; and Responsibility.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - In Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    If God is to give to creatures significant responsibility for themselves and others, he must allow them to damage their characters, and to cause pain and ignorance. It is good that humans, who do not seek to benefit their fellow humans, should have the temptations of sloth—to hurt them by doing nothing, as well as the more serious temptation of actively causing them hurt.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Fichte’s Theory of Moral Evil.David James - 2021 - In Stefano Bacin & Owen Ware (eds.), Fichte's _System of Ethics_: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131–149.
  40. An Ontology of Inevitable Moral Evil.Joe E. Barnhart - 1966 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):102.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  9
    The Metaphysics of Moral Evil: Context, Truth and Character.James G. Hanink - 2010 - Maritain Studies/Etudes Maritainiennes 26:99-109.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  47
    Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus on the First Cause of Moral Evil.Tobias Hoffmann - 2023 - Quaestio 22:407-431.
    While it is unproblematic that someone evil causes further evil, it is difficult to explain how a good person can cause his or her first evil act. Augustine, denying that something good can be the cause of evil, concludes that the first moral evil has only a ‘deficient cause’, not an efficient cause, which is to say that it has no explanation. By contrast, Aquinas and Scotus hold that the first moral evil (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  65
    On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' second critique.Joel Thomas Tierno - 2006 - Sophia 45 (2):131-138.
    In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  19
    Could there be a voluntarism in Thomas Aquinas's psychological explanation about the causes of moral evil?David E. Téllez Maqueo - 2020 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 46:135-155.
    Resumen La mayoría de los comentarios y estudios tradicionales sobre Tomás de Aquino, como los que han predominado en la escolástica y la neoescolástica, se han caracte rizado por el intelectualismo de su pensamiento basado principalmente, aunque no exclusivamente, en la primacía ontológica del intelecto sobre la voluntad; en la afir mación de la ignorancia como una de las causas primordiales del mal actuar, y en la existencia de una facultad como la voluntad que tiende a seguir el juicio de (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  76
    On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom.Joel Thomas Tierno - 2001 - Sophia 40 (2):1-6.
    Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  54
    On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: Response to Nagasawa and Trakakis.Joel Thomas Tierno - 2004 - Sophia 43 (1):115-126.
    In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils.I. What Admirable Immorality & Nonadmirable Morality Are - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Beyond Privation: Moral Evil In Aquinas’s De Malo.Gregory M. Reichberg - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (4):751 - 784.
    EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY in the notion of privation to dispel our human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated whether this concept is adequate to the task. The intensity and scope of evil in the twentieth century—which has seen the horrors of world war and genocide—have added fuel to the debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. A Deontological Theodicy? Swinburne’s Lapse and the Problem of Moral Evil.Eric Reitan - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (2):181-203.
    Richard Swinburne’s formulation of the argument from evil is representative of a pervasive way of understanding the challenge evil poses for theistic belief. But there is an error in Swinburne’s formulation : he fails to consider possible deontological constraints on God’s legitimate responses to evil. To demonstrate the error’s significance, I show that some important objections to Swinburne’s theodicy admit of a novel answer once we correct for Swinburne’s Lapse. While more is needed to show that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50.  30
    Beyond Privation: Moral Evil In Aquinas’s De Malo.Gregory M. Reichberg - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (4):751-784.
    EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY in the notion of privation to dispel our human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated whether this concept is adequate to the task. The intensity and scope of evil in the twentieth century—which has seen the horrors of world war and genocide—have added fuel to the debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 938