Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, popularized by Patanjali and Bhartruhari will be scientifically analyzed. Sphota Vada, proposed and nurtured by the Sanskrit grammarians will be interpreted from modern physics and communication engineering points of view. Insight about the theory of language and modes of language acquisition and communication available in the Brahma Kanda of Vakyapadeeyam will be translated into modern computational terms. A flowchart of language processing in humans will be given. A gross model of human language acquisition, comprehension and communication (...) process forming the basis to develop software for relevant mind-machine modeling will be presented. The implications of such a model to artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences will be discussed. The essentiality and necessity of a physics, communication engineering , biophysical and biochemical insight as both complementary and supplementary to using mathematical and computational methods in delineating the theory of Sanskrit language is put forward. Natural language comprehension as distinct and different from natural language processing is pointed out. (shrink)

Patrick Hopkins has claimed that SM is compatible with feminist principles. I argue that his account relies on both mistaken analogies and an untenable account of the allegedly changed meaning of SM scenes.

It is a commonplace of long standing that one should be “authentic” or—in expressions which may have an approximately similar meaning—that one should be “true to oneself” or that one should “lead a life of one’s own”. Duty and morality aside, this command to be “authentic” leads the prudentially-minded reader to ask, “Why? Why should I be authentic, or true to myself, or lead a life of my own? Will I, of necessity, be horribly unhappy if I am not authentic? (...) Is not an inauthentic, but happy life, at least a conceptual possibility? And, if I can be happy though inauthentic, then why should I strive toward authenticity, especially since the psychological literature on this subject makes much of the considerable pain involved in this process?” It is not self-evidently clear, from the prudential point of view, why authenticity is desirable. (shrink)

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of speech. The Court's dismissal itself violates the free speech of the proposers of the Ordinance. It is not possible for both pornographers to perform the speech act of making pornography and feminists to perform the speech act of proposing the Ordinance. I show that the speech act of proposing the Ordinance takes First Amendment precedence over the speech act of making pornography.

Study of the philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian philosopher and fundamentals of Hindu philosophy.

Vāda, the classical name for the act of discussion/debate in the Indian tradition, forms the basis of every conversation undertaken to reach correct knowledge. The paper explores the Indian tradition of Vāda and its subcategories with the intention of highlighting the all-encompassing and holistic nature of this Indian tool of cultural studies in both theory and praxis. It checks into its evolution through contemporary times, wherein it has lost its essence to accommodate the corrupted interests of modern individuals as well (...) as leaders and debaters. Through the analysis of various examples, the paper endeavours to establish Vāda as a comprehensive way to attain correct knowledge. Examples from day-to-day life as well as the historic-literary world help to explicitly comprehend these tools that have been used for establishing the nearest truth from ancient times in India. These tools are potent to all aspects of research across spatial-temporal limits as they are innate and immutable to all disciplines of knowledge and education. (shrink)

Study on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar in Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari.

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of paśyantī, pratibhā, sphoţa and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus (...) the identification of sphoţa and jāti as well as of paśyantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhartŗhari. (shrink)

According to Bhartrhari, these are the three levels of language through which ... necessarily identified with language, since these levels of language, ...

SOME REMARKS ON LAGHU-TATTVA-SPHOTA XXI.9–24 The article is aimed at analysis of 9–24 stanzas of XXI chapter of philosophical poem Laghu-tattva-sphoṭa, i.e. A Light Bursting of the Reality, authored by Amṛtachandra-sūri (10th c. A.D.), the Jain thinker. Chapter XXI is dedicated to the problem of universals and particulars, meaningful and influential subject of Indian, as well as Western philosophy.

Indepth analization of three states of Consciousness in spiritual life.

In a rare book published in Trivandrum (1927), entitled Sphoṭasiddhiḥ Bharatamiśrapranītā , we find an interesting argument in defense of sphoṭa -theory, based on āgamic quotations, especially RV X, 71, 4 (the stanza where the poet describes his own activity in perceiving the essence of Speech as like a beloved woman naked). The main idea is that the numerous word sphoṭas , as an atemporal multiplicity, free from any sensuous quality, were the objects of the Ṛṣis’ primordial intuition. So the (...) internal diversity of the Veda is not a mere subjective convention in order to adapt the highest truth to limited human minds. The absolute brahman has an objective cosmogonical power of which the temporal mutiplicity is only the very last result. There is also an intermediate ideal multiplicity, which the Veda, as eternal and transcending the guru-śiṣya transmission, consists in. (shrink)

This article examines the emergence of the Nyāya distinction between vāda and jalpa as didactic-scientific and agonistic-sophistical forms of debate, respectively. Looking at the relevant sutras in Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra (NS 1.2.1-3) in light of the earlier discussion of the types of debate in Caraka Saṃhitā 8, the article argues that certain ambiguities and obscurities in the former text can be explained on the hypothesis that the early Nyāya presupposed an agonistic understanding of vāda similar to what we find in Caraka.

_Contemporary discussions of self and consciousness have for some time incorporated Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the existence and nature of self (Ram-Prasad 2012). The ideal of responsibly_ _incorporating this dialogue raises an interpretive dilemma: on the one hand, we should eschew the simplistic picture of a “sterile contest” in which all Hindu schools are committed to the doctrine of the self (ātmavāda) and all Buddhists are invariantly committed to denying its existence (2012: 3). To treat Hindu ātmavādins as monolithically opposed to (...) Buddhist no-self theorists without attending to disagreements within the two camps would be to woefully underrepresent the complexity of the terrain at hand. Yet, we should not forget that what we are dealing with is still a structured debate of some sort. I propose that two Jaina “disambiguation strategies” (Balcerowicz 2017)—the theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda) and the theory of sevenfold predication (syād-vāda), also called the sevenfold formula (__sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__)—can together facilitate a re-imaginative reconstruction of Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the self as something other than a two-sided battle or an arbitrary cluster of views. Following superimposition of the __sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__ onto what I temporarily term “the debate,” wherein each figure (bha__ṅ__ga)__ is understood as indexed in part by a specific viewpoint (naya) or a set thereof, we find a dynamic description of an indeterminate phenomenon, embracing affirmation and negation of the “self” (ātman) without antecedent commitment to the substantive existence of the referent of the term. This exercise in working with Jaina tools has implications for broader methodological concerns facing cross-cultural philosophical projects, and bears on how we might fruitfully re-imagine otherwise stymied contemporary debates. _. (shrink)

기원후 7세기경에 아디셰샤가 쓴????빠라마르타 사라????(이하, PS)는 제설혼합주의의 표본 에 해당하는????바가바드 기따????를 계승하면서도 독자적인 특징을 가지는 제설혼합주의를 제 시한 문헌이다. 20세기 초반부터 21세기 초반까지 상당수의 연구자들은 PS의 사상적 정 체성을 제설혼합주의와 관련하여 다양하게 검토했고, 그 결과 PS는 대체로 ‘상크야, 아 드바이따 베단따, 베다-아베다 베단따, 바이슈나바 유신론’이라는 4가지 힌두교 사상들 의 일부나 전부가 혼합된 문헌으로 간주되었다. PS의 연구자들은 거의 예외 없이 4가지 사상들 가운데 어느 하나가 중심이 되는 ‘단일 중심적 제설혼합주의’의 견지에서 PS를 분석했다. 그러나 PS의 시대에 애당초 제설혼합 주의가 하나의 장르로서 존재했고 (...) PS가 그 제설혼합주의를 바탕으로 특정 주제마다 여러 사상들을 혼합시켰을 가능성이 크기 때문에, PS는 ‘다중심적 제설혼합주의’를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 더 나아가, PS는 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’(sarva-ātma-vāda, 모든 것이 아뜨 만이라는 이론)를 통해 이 세상의 모든 사상을 일거에 통합하고자 하기 때문에, PS는 ‘사 르바-아뜨마-바다’를 특징으로 하는 제설혼합주의를 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 이로부터 PS에서 구축되는 것은 ‘독자적인 제설혼합주의 이론’과 ‘제설혼합주의적 구원론’이다. 그런데 PS의 ‘사르바-아뜨마-바다’는 보편주의의 전략을 통해 일원론적 또는 일신론 적 기획을 도모하는 까닭에 오히려 다중심적 제설혼합주의로부터 암시되는 다원적이고 다 가치적인 혼합이라는 장점을 잃어버릴 수 있다. PS의 예시처럼 제설혼합주의에서 다중심성을 더 강조할 것이냐 아니면 보편성을 더 강조할 것이냐 하는 것은 현재의 힌두교 사상이 당면한 중요한 문제이기도 하다. (shrink)

This paper argues that the grammarians Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa did innovate in the realm of grammatical philosophy, without however admitting or perhaps even knowing it. Their most important innovation is the reinterpretation of the sphoṭa. For reasons linked to new developments in sentence interpretation (śābdabodha), in their hands the sphoṭa became a semantic rather that an ontological entity.

Melinda Vadas rejects my claim that there are morally relevant differences between simulations of unjust events and actual unjust events on the ground that I overlook the connection between simulations and that which they simulate. I argue that this purported moral connection can only be understood as either the result of a necessary psychological disposition or as a "magical," metaphysical attachment, neither of which is defensible or satisfactory.

AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In Advaitavedānta, the (...) world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

Illustrations: Numerous B/w Figures Description: Key questions in the history of Navya-nyaya (New Nyaya) remain unresolved: when did this school of logic begin, who was its founder, what distinguishes Navya-nyaya from Pracina-nyaya (Old Nyaya), and so on. This book attempts to answer these key questions in Part I. Part II provides a translation, analysis, and critical edition of the Lion and Tiger Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Simha-vyaghra-laksana: LT Chapter) of the Tattva-cintamani-rahasya (TCR) of Mathuranatha (16th-17th c.). The hypothesis adopted (...) by the author with regard to the first question is that Udayana, who lived in the 11th century, is the founder of Navya-nyaya. This hypothesis is closely linked to the hypothesis offered regarding the second question, which is that the feature that distinguishes Navya-nyaya from the earlier school is its description of concepts and the structure of the world in terms of relation. Early Navya-nyaya authors, who flourished between Udayana and Gangesa (14th c.), devised specific terminology, of which delimitor (avacchedaka) and describer (niËpaka) are the most important, in order to identify or specify relation. This book attempts to illustrate the function of these and other Navya-nyaya terms from the viewpoint of relation. The main sources upon which the author has based his conclusions are Udayana s Laksanavali and the chapters on invariable concomitance or pervasion (vyapti) of the Nyaya-siddhanta-dipa (NSD) of Sasadhara (13rd-14th c.), the Tattva-cintamaÆi (TC) of Gangesa, and the TCR. Of these Sanskrit texts no scholar has worked on the Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-vada) of the NSD in detail or the LT Chapter of the TCR. The latter chapter follows in the TCR the Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-pancaka), which Ingalls edited, translated, and analyzed in his epoch-making book Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (1951). One major innovation of this book made in Part II is to explain the structure of Navya-nyaya analysis by employing 86 diagrams based on the dharma-dharmin (property and property-possessor) relation, which serve as a visual aid and help readers to more easily understand the complicated structure of its analysis. The diagrams are also helpful in ascertaining how the definitions of invariable concomitance apply to individual cases and how the entities are connected in the application of the definitions. Another major innovation is: almost every sub-section of the LT Chapter of the TCR contains Mathuranatha s clarification of part of the two definitions; but this clarification does not give the definition incorporating prior clarifications and insertions; this book provides such a definition accompanied by a diagram. In other words, Part II illustrates the structure of the whole definition at every process of the clarification, which (definition) is never presented as such in Mathuranatha s text. (shrink)

The comprehensive nature of information and insight available in the Upanishads, the Indian philosophical systems like the Advaita Philosophy, Sabdabrahma Siddhanta, Sphota Vaada and the Shaddarsanas, in relation to the idea of human consciousness, mind and its functions, cognitive science and scheme of human cognition and communication are presented. All this is highlighted with vivid classification of conscious-, cognitive-, functional- states of mind; by differentiating cognition as a combination of cognitive agent, cognizing element, cognized element; formation; form and structure (...) of cognition, instruments and means of cognition, validity of cognition and the nature of energy/matter which facilitates and also is the medium of cognition- cognizing process; and also as the container and content of cognition. The human communication process which is just the reverse of cognizing process is also presented with necessary description and detail. The sameness of cognitive / communicative process during language acquisition and communication processes and the modes of language acquisition and communication are also given. The hardware and software of human cognition, language acquisition and communication as envisaged in Indian spiritual and philosophical expressions are given. In the light of the information and insight obtained as above, the axioms for human cognition / communication are formed, framed and presented. A brain-wave frequency modulation / demodulation model of human cognition, communication and language acquisition and communication process based on Upanishadic expressions, Shaddarsanas and Sabdabrahma Siddhhanta is defined and discussed here. The use of these theories and models and axioms in mind-machine modelling and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence will be put forward and highlighted. (shrink)

Nathmal Tatia, one of the leading Jaina scholars of our time, provides us with the first systematic and in-depth study of the great problems dealt with in Jaina philosophy. It begins with the basic Jaina worldview of non-absolutism (anekanta-vada), and deals next with Jaina epistemology.Three major topics are then studied in great detail, with full reference to the Jaina scriptures. These are: the problem of avidya in the various Indian schools; the Jaina doctrine of karman; and Jaina yoga. This (...) latter includes an important study of Haribhadra's comparative studies in yoga. Tatia hashere given us a first-rate advanced level study of Jaina philosophy. (shrink)

È una credenza diffusa che i marchi di origine (DOCG, DOC, DOP, IGT, IGP e PAT, rispettivamente: di origine controllata e garantita; di origine controllata; di origine protetta; indicazione geografica tipica; indicazione geografica protetta; prodotti agroalimentari tradizionali) siano di grande utilità sia per i consumatori che per i produttori: certificando l’origine e il metodo di produzione di un prodotto, essi ne garantiscono una certa qualità di fronte al consumatore. Ma è proprio così? Che cosa giustifica l’introduzione di un marchio di (...) origine? Quanto sostengo qui di seguito è che, sebbene non credo si possa negare che i marchi di origine segnalino anche una certa qualità di un prodotto, forse non sono il modo migliore per farlo. Di fatto, per il consumatore, i marchi non garantiscono niente che vada oltre alla qualità richiesta affinché la certificazione venga rilasciata; ma, al contempo, in quanto forme di protezionismo, favoriscono certi produttori, prevenendo l’utilizzo della denominazione a chi offre un prodotto di qualità analoga o superiore, ma provienente da una zona priva di tradizioni. In altre parole: se vi sono prodotti equiparabili per qualità e gusto ad un dato prodotto di origine, e possibilmente più economicamente vantaggiosi, il consumatore non avrà modo di accorgersene dalla sola nomenclatura. Quindi: i marchi di origine sono (talvolta) un ostacolo all’acquisto e al godimento dei prodotti migliori al miglior prezzo. Talvolta: questo deve essere ben sottolineato, poiché in certi casi (per esempio quello dei PAT) il prodotto certificato dal marchio ha un mercato talmente di nicchia da costituire un tuttuno tra qualità e origine. (Si potrebbe aggiungere che le certificazioni dei marchi non sono sempre ottenute attraverso procedure affidabili. Non insisterò oltre su questo punto, per il quale si rimanda a: Paolo Conti, La leggenda del buon cibo italiano e altri miti alimentari contemporanei, Fazi Editore, 2006; Peter Singer e Jim Mason: The Way We Eat.. (shrink)

L’abbandono heideggeriano dell’atteggiamento teoreticistico è condotto a partire dalla centralità dell’esperienza significativa propria dell’esserci in quanto storico. La critica alla problematica filosofica dell’a-priori è condotta proprio in nome dell’idea che l’origine dei significati vada ricercata nella storicità dell’esserci. Significatività del mondo e temporalità dell’esserci, come due facce della stessa medaglia, caratterizzano la trascendenza dell’esserci quale apertura alle possibilità del progettare, in un modo che differisce radicalmente dal soggettivismo trascendentale e dall’ipotesi di a-priori conoscitivi e valoriali. Il saggio segue un (...) tale processo di storicizzazione, mostrando che la posizione heideggeriana non implica un ingenuo relativismo, ma riporta l’origine dei significati al loro contesto di senso, inteso come espressione della vita stessa e delle risorse fondative della sua temporalità. (shrink)

Sguardo d'insieme -- Armonia delle sfere celesti : Hildegard von Bingen, symphonia -- Il tempo di Dio : Johann Sebastian Bach, Cantata Gottes Zeit -- Trasmutazioni : Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Die Zauberflöte -- "Questo bacio vada al mondo intero" : Ludwig van Beethoven, An die Freude -- Viaggio d'inverno : Franz Schubert, Winterreise -- Inni all notte : Richard Wagner, Tristan und Isolde -- L'ultimo rito : Richard Wagner, Parsifal -- Azzurre solitudini : Gustav Mahler, Terza sinfonia -- Universi (...) sonori : Gustav Mahler, Ottava sinfonia -- Orizzonti perduti : Gustav Mahler, Das Lied von der Erde -- Labirinti : Richard Strauss, Also sprach Zarathustra -- Cortei di ombre : Richard Strauss, Metamorphosen -- La terza via : Omaggio a Francesco d'Avalos. (shrink)

The Nyayamanjari was composed in Kashmir, in the ninth century CE, by Bhatta Jayanta. It is a compendium of theses concerning ontological, epistemological and linguistic issues developed in the classical period of Indian philosophy. Jayanta's approximate date is confirmed by both internal and external evidences, so the Nyayamanjari has become a landmark in the historiography of Indian philosophy. Despite its relevance, however, the history of the textual transmission of the Nyayamanjari is in many respects still unknown. This new critical edition (...) is based on a comprehensive inventory of all the known sources, on a detailed description of the manuscripts, on a textual bibliography of the printed editions, on a genealogical study of the textual transmission, and on a rich apparatus of the indirect transmission. An important result of this research has been the development of a new, rigorous, and yet pragmatic method to edit Nyayamanjari passages, without the demand of formidable resources in terms of time, man-power, and funds. The first part of this publication includes all the propaedeutic steps in view of the critical edition. More specifically, it consists of the recensio of the known Nyayamanjari sources, including their inventory, their description, the collation of their variants, and the study of their genealogy, resulting in a fully documented stemma codicum which guides the editorial choices during the reconstruction of the edited text. The second part contains the critical edition, which covers the first of the three sections composing the sixth book of the Nyayamanjari. This particular section consists of a discussion on semantics and epistemology from the perspective of the Vyakarana, Mimansa and Nyaya traditions, hinging around the holistic theory of the sphota. (shrink)

In Indian knowledge traditions, Vyākaraṇa describes the rules for the formation (prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāga) and use of correct words (sādhuśabda). The Vākya (sentence) is postulated as the primary unit of communication. “śābdabodha” deals with the cognition of sentential meaning. Similarly, in Indian music, every rāga has a lexicon and grammar (rāga-lakṣaṇa): a rāga only allows some notes and not others, and it has rules for constructing phrases—notes to be highlighted, notes to end phrases on, ornamentation, etc. These phrases of the rāga are (...) comparable to “vākya” which when presented with due regard to certain other considerations generate an apprehension of the rāga (rāgabodha). During presentation of a rāga, an artist aims to evoke the rāga-cchāyā or rāga-svarūpa and also an emotive state in the listener. There is a cognitive aspect to the informed listening of a rāga that is parallel to linguistic communication. We seek to understand how these parallels work between śābdabodha and rāgabodha. We postulate that the conditions of expectancy (ākāṅkśā), logical consistency (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) in combination with the theory of sphoṭa provide a framework to explain how a rāga is expounded and cognised. (shrink)

: In direct opposition to the dominant nativist perspective tracing back to Descartes, William James suggested that the sense of self is constructed through a never-ending process of reflexivity. In more recent years, empirical data from various psychological domains have further strengthened this constructivist perspective. Notably, Gergely and Watson’s social biofeedback model has been proposed as a central mechanism in the development of emotional introspection, which itself constitutes a crucial step in the process leading to a mature sense of self. (...) In accordance with the social biofeedback model, it has been suggested that reiterated failures in biofeedback mechanisms predispose an individual to mental suffering. While borderline personality disorder and antisocial behavior have received the most attention, here I make a preliminary attempt to examine the impact of dysfunctional biofeedback on the pathogenesis of narcissism, suggesting that some central features of pathological narcissism may result from serious and reiterated disruptions in social biofeedback. This preliminary exploration aims to deepen our understanding of the origins of psychological suffering. In this sense, my effort could contribute to the construction of a causal model going beyond the purely categorical, atheoretical analysis of mental diseases typical of the diagnostic and statistical manuals. Keywords: Self; Self-ing Process; Social Biofeedback Model; Narcissism Il farsi e il disfarsi del sé. Biofeedback sociale, meccanismi causali e narcisismo patologico Riassunto: La prospettiva costruttivista sullo sviluppo del sé, efficacemente difesa da William James in opposizione all’innatismo di stampo cartesiano, è oggi ulteriormente avvalorata da numerosi dati empirici provenienti da diversi ambiti della psicologia. Il modello del biofeedback sociale di Gergely e Watson è stato proposto quale meccanismo centrale nello sviluppo dell’introspezione emotiva. In accordo a tale modello, ripetuti gravi fallimenti del biofeedback predispongono al disturbo mentale, segnatamente al disturbo borderline di personalità e al comportamento antisociale. In questo saggio mi occuperò di disturbo narcisistico di personalità, suggerendo che anche alcuni dei sintomi principali di questa patologia potrebbero derivare da disfunzioni gravi e reiterate del biofeedback. Nonostante la sua natura preliminare, la mia indagine si inscrive nell’alveo di quelle ricerche che mirano costruzione di un modello causale che vada oltre l’analisi puramente categoriale e ateoretica tipica dei manuali statistico-diagnostici. Parole chiave: Self; Identità personale; Social Biofeedback Model; Disturbo narcisistico di personalità. (shrink)

For many people, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is so total that it is far from clear to them that God exists at all. Reasonably enough, they therefore do not believe that God exists. Yet it is possible, whilst lacking belief in God’s reality, nonetheless to see it as a possibility that is both realistic and attractive; and in this situation, one will likely want to be open to the considerable benefits that would be available if God were real. In (...) this paper I argue that certain kinds of desire for God can aid this non-believing openness. It is possible to desire God even in a state of non-belief, since desire does not require belief that its object exists. I argue that if we desire God in some particular capacity, and with some sense of what would constitute satisfaction, then through the desire we have knowledge -- incomplete yet vivid in its personal significance -- about the attributes God would need in order to satisfy us; thus, if God is real and does have those attributes, one knows something about God through desiring him. Because desire does not require belief, neither does the knowledge in question. Expanding on recent work by Vadas and Wynn, I sketch the epistemology of desire needed to support this argument. I then apply this epistemology to desire for God. An important question is how one might cultivate the requisite kinds desire for God; and one way, I argue, is through engaging with certain kinds of sacred music. I illustrate desire’s religiously epistemic power in this context, before replying to two objections. (shrink)