Results for 'truth-value'

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  1. Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability.Xinli Wang - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):465-485.
    Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its own context, lack truth values when (...)
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  2. Descriptions, Truth Value Intuitions, and Questions.Anders J. Schoubye - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6):583-617.
    Since the famous debate between Russell (Mind 14: 479–493, 1905, Mind 66: 385–389, 1957) and Strawson (Mind 59: 320–344, 1950; Introduction to logical theory, 1952; Theoria, 30: 96–118, 1964) linguistic intuitions about truth values have been considered notoriously unreliable as a guide to the semantics of definite descriptions. As a result, most existing semantic analyses of definites leave a large number of intuitions unexplained. In this paper, I explore the nature of the relationship between truth value intuitions and non-referring definites. (...)
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  3.  19
    Two Methods to Find Truth-Value Gaps and Their Application to the Projection Problem of Homogeneity.Manuel Križ & Emmanuel Chemla - 2015 - Natural Language Semantics 23 (3):205-248.
    Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to (...)
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  4. The Categoricity Problem and Truth-Value Gaps.Ian Rumfitt - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):223–236.
    In his article 'Rejection' (1996), Timothy Smiley had shown how a logical system allowing rules of rejection could provide a categorical axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus. This paper shows how rules of rejection, when placed in a multiple conclusion setting, can also provide categorical axiomatizations of a range of non-classical calculi which permit truth-value gaps, among them the calculus in Smiley's own 'Sense without denotation' (1960).
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  5.  71
    What is a Truth-Value Gap?James R. Shaw - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (6):503-534.
    Truth-value gaps have received little attention from a foundational perspective, a fact which has rightfully opened up gap theories to charges of vacuousness. This paper develops an account of the foundations of gap-like behavior which has some hope of avoiding such charges. I begin by reviewing and sharpening a powerful argument of Dummett’s to constrain the options that gap theorists have to make sense of their views. I then show that within these strictures, we can give an account of (...)
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  6.  71
    Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All.Michael Morreau - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148 - 156.
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  7.  92
    Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is (...)
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  8. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  9.  57
    Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends (...)
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  10.  7
    Truth-Value Semantics and Functional Extensions for Classical Logic of Partial Terms Based on Equality.F. Parlamento - 2014 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (3):383-395.
    We develop a bottom-up approach to truth-value semantics for classical logic of partial terms based on equality and apply it to prove the conservativity of the addition of partial description and selection functions, independently of any strictness assumption.
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  11. Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506.
    A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there is a single notion of degree (...)
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  12.  82
    Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality.Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  13.  10
    Sense, Reference and Truth-Value Links.Christoph Hoerl - 1997 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Analyomen 2: Proceedings of the 2nd conference 'Perspectives in analytical philosophy'. Vol. II: Philosophy of language, metaphysics. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 125-130.
  14. Expressivism and the Value of Truth.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  15. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values.Lynch Michael - 2009 - In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
     
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  16. Truth as a Value in Plato's Republic.Raphael Woolf - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (1):9-39.
    To what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded as worth possessing (...)
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  17.  31
    The Value of Truth and the Value of Information : On Isaac Levi's Epistemology.Hans Rott - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. pp. 179.
    The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in his model of (...)
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  18. Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps.Patrick Greenough - 2010 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...)
     
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  19.  48
    The Truth Value of Mystical Experience.H. Hunt - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):5-43.
    Can mystics intuit something of what modern physicists calculate? And if so, how? The question of the relation between the classical mysticisms and modern science is approached in Part I in terms of the multiple forms and definitions of 'truth value'. Intuition/epiphany, pragmatism, coherence, and correspondence are considered as forms of truth that have also been proposed for unitive mystical experience. Since 'correspondence' or 'representation' has been the definition at the core of modern science, it in particular is approached by (...)
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  20. Fregean Connection: Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value.Gottfried Gabriel - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):372-376.
    It is shown how frege's problematic connection between truth-Value and "bedeutung" (of a sentence) becomes more plausible when set against the background of german language and philosophy, Especially by comparing frege's position with the value-Theoretical school of neo-Kantianism (w windelband).
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  21. Religion Versus Science: The Conflict in Reference to Truth Value, Not Cash Value.Ervin Laszlo - 2005 - Zygon 40 (1):57-61.
    The rift between science and religion needs to be assessed not merely on pragmatic grounds, on the basis of the effect of scientific versus religious beliefs on people's behavior, as John Caiazza's essay does, but also and above all in regard to the cogency of the respective beliefs in reference to what we can reasonably assume is the true face of reality. About such truth value, the conflict is not irremediable; there are elements of belief regarding the nature of reality (...)
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  22. Anti-Realism, Truth-Value Links and Tensed Truth Predicates.Bernhard Weiss - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):577-602.
    Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by (...)
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  23. On Identifying Reference with Truth-Value.Gautam Sengupta - 1983 - Analysis 43 (2):72 - 74.
    The purpose of the paper is to refute the fregean assumption that declarative sentences refer to truth-Values. A consequence of the assumption is that the truth-Value of a declarative sentence containing another as part remains unchanged when the part is replaced by another sentence having the same truth-Value, Provided that the part as part has only customary reference and expresses a complete thought. The refutation proceeds by demonstrating this consequence to be false.
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  24. On Applications of Truth-Value Connectives for Testing Arguments with Natural Connectives.Andrzej Pietruszczak - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):143-156.
    In introductory logic courses the authors often limit their considerations to the truth-value operators. Then they write that conditionals and biconditionals of natural language ("if" and "if and only if") may be represented as material implications and equivalences ("⊃" and "≡"), respectively. Yet material implications are not suitable for conditionals. Lewis' strict implications are much better for this purpose. Similarly, strict equivalences are better for representing biconditionals (than material equivalences). In this paper we prove that the methods from standard (...)
     
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  25.  79
    The Truth Value of Literary Statements.Marcia Eaton - 1972 - British Journal of Aesthetics 12 (2):163-174.
    After summarizing approaches taken previously to the problem of the determination of truth-Value of statements constituting literary works (ryle, Russell, Quine, Strawson, Davidson, Et. Al.) the author argues for a treatment of the problem based upon the linguistic status of such statements as translocutions and their relation to the context in which they occur.
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  26. Was Frege Wrong When Identifying Reference with Truth-Value?Jean-Yves Béziau - 1999 - Sorites 11:15-23.
    We discuss Sengupta's argumentation according to which Frege was wrong identifying reference with truth-value.After stating various possible interpretations of Frege's principle of substitution, we show that there is no coherent interpretation under which Sengupta's argumentation is valid.Finally we try to show how Frege's distinction can work in the context of modern mathematics and how modern logic grasps it.
     
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  27.  24
    The Truth-Value of the Aristotelian 'Areti'.Ioanna Patsioti-Tsacpounidis - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2:165-172.
    This paper examines the concept of ‘areti’ as encountered in the Aristotelian ethical system in order to establish its relationship to the modern concept of virtue as well as to that of moral truth, that is, to identify its truth-value. I intend to show that the Aristotelian ‘areti’ as a developed state of character and as an advanced stage of ethical understanding entails moral truth. ‘Areti’ as a good-in-itself possesses an intrinsic value which reflects moral truth, and as a (...)
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  28.  31
    Can a Mental Proposition Change its Truth‐Value? Some 17th-Century Views.Gabriel Nuchelmans - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):69-84.
    In the first half of the 17th century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth-value.In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer and (...)
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  29.  27
    Probabilities as Truth-Value Estimates.Hugues Leblanc - 1961 - Philosophy of Science 28 (4):414-417.
    The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L, qualifies as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and (...)
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  30.  55
    Bivalence and the Challenge of Truth-Value Gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true (...)
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  31.  83
    Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.
    Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
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  32.  93
    The Value of Truth and the Normativity of Evidence.Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - Synthese.
    To say that evidence is normative is to say that what evidence one possesses, and how this evidence relates to any proposition, determines which attitude among believing, dis-believing and withholding one ought to take toward this proposition if one deliberates about whether to believe it. It has been suggested by McHugh that this view can be vindi-cated by resting on the premise that truth is epistemically valuable. In this paper, I modify the strategy sketched by McHugh so as to overcome (...)
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  33. What is a Truth Value And How Many Are There?Roy T. Cook - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (2):183-201.
    Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes (...)
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  34.  46
    Averaging the Truth-Value in Łukasiewicz Logic.Daniele Mundici - 1995 - Studia Logica 55 (1):113 - 127.
    Chang's MV algebras are the algebras of the infinite-valued sentential calculus of ukasiewicz. We introduce finitely additive measures (called states) on MV algebras with the intent of capturing the notion of average degree of truth of a proposition. Since Boolean algebras coincide with idempotent MV algebras, states yield a generalization of finitely additive measures. Since MV algebras stand to Boolean algebras as AFC*-algebras stand to commutative AFC*-algebras, states are naturally related to noncommutativeC*-algebraic measures.
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  35. Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.Richard Holton - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):137-168.
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling minimalism with emotivism, where (...)
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  36. Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps.Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
  37.  36
    Martinus Dacus and Boethius Dacus on the Signification of Terms and the Truth-Value of Assertions.Ana María Mora-Márquez - 2014 - Vivarium 52 (1-2):23-48.
    The article intends to show: a) that the modist Martin of Dacia sides with the traditional reading of the first chapter of Aristotle’s De interpretatione that we find in masters of arts from the first half of the thirteenth century; and b) that the modist Boethius of Dacia is one of the first thirteenth-century scholars to depart from this reading. In fact, Boethius presents us with an account of propositional verification where the terms’ signification is not operational and where the (...)
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  38.  89
    Curiosity and the Value of Truth.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-284.
    This chapter focuses on the question of whether true belief can have final value because it answers our ‘intellectual interest’ or ‘natural curiosity’. The idea is that sometimes we are interested in the truth on some issue not for any ulterior purpose, but simply because we are curious about that issue. It is argued that this approach fails to provide an adequate explanation of the final value of true belief, since there is an unbridgeable gap between our valuing the truth (...)
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  39. Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
  40.  25
    Symposium: Does the Concept of »Truth« Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy? Rosemont Jr, James Maffie, John Maraldo & Sonam Thakchoe - 2014 - IsFrontMatter: put either 1 or 0: 1 if this is not an article but a "front matter" type of entry, e.g. a list of books received, 0 otherwise 1:150-217.
    The symposium »Does the Concept of ›Truth‹ Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?« hones on a methodological question which has deep implications on doing philosophy cross-culturally. Drawing on early Confucian writers, the anchor, Henry Rosemont, Jr., attempts to explain why he is skeptical of pat, affirmative answers to this question. His co-symposiasts James Maffie, John Maraldo, and Sonam Thakchoe follow his trail in working out multi-faceted views on truth from Mexican, Japanese Confucian, and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives respectively. As (...)
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  41.  14
    Slurs, Truth-Value Judgements, and Context Sensitivity.Roberto B. Sileo - 2018 - Human Affairs 28 (1):17-23.
    Cappelen and Lepore claim that the English language contains a basic and limited set of context-sensitive expressions, as only expressions within this set pass the truth-related tests that they propose to single out context-sensitive from context-insensitive words. In this paper, I argue that racial and ethnic slurs also pass Cappelen and Lepore’s context sensitivity tests and that, as a result, slurs should also be seen as context-sensitive expressions in a truth-related sense.
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  42.  23
    Magidor on Anomaly and Truth-Value Gaps.James R. Shaw - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):513-528.
    In Category Mistakes, Ofra Magidor provides two arguments against the view that category mistakes express propositions that are not truth-evaluable at some world. I argue that her first, Williamsonian argument against this view begs the question, and that her second argument rests on a misleading conception of how semantic defect results in infelicity judgments. I conclude by conceding that she is still correct to stress that the view she opposes face noteworthy foundational and empirical challenges.
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  43.  30
    Truth, Value, and Truth Value. Frege's Theory of Judgement and its Historical Background.Gottfried Gabriel - 2013 - In Mark Textor (ed.), Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Palgrave. pp. 36.
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  44.  44
    Justification and Truth Value: A Reply.Robert Almeder - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):319-322.
    Among other things, Odegard urged that a person can be completely justified in believing a false proposition because the truth condition can be shown to be satisfied independently of the satisfaction of the evidence condition for human knowledge. I respond to his argument and other arguments attacking the arguments I previously offered for the view that a person cannot be completely justified in believing a false proposition.
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  45.  30
    Complete Justification and Truth Value.Douglas Odegard - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):311-318.
    Almeder effectively defends his view that justification entails truth against some earlier objections and offers new arguments for the entailment. Although the arguments make clear that truth claims depend on justification claims, They still fail to establish an entailment.
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  46. Value Without Truth-Value.Barbara H. Smith - 1988 - In John Fekete (ed.), Life After Postmodernism: Essays on Value and Culture. Macmillan Education.
  47.  23
    Truth, Value, and Consolation.Damian Cox - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):413-424.
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  48. Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
  49. Would You Believe It? The King of France is Back! (Presuppositions and Truth-Value Intuitions).Kai von Fintel - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press.
     
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  50. Structure and Categoricity: Determinacy of Reference and Truth Value in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):283-307.
    This article surveys recent literature by Parsons, McGee, Shapiro and others on the significance of categoricity arguments in the philosophy of mathematics. After discussing whether categoricity arguments are sufficient to secure reference to mathematical structures up to isomorphism, we assess what exactly is achieved by recent ‘internal’ renditions of the famous categoricity arguments for arithmetic and set theory.
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