Let T be a complete first-order theory over a finite relational language which is axiomatized by universal and existential sentences. It is shown that T is almost trivial in the sense that the universe of any model of T can be written $F \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_1 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_2 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} \cdots \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_n$ , where F is finite and I 1 , I 2 ,...,I n are mutually indiscernible over F. Some results about complete theories with ∃∀-axioms over a (...) finite relational language are also mentioned. (shrink)

This paper offers a new semantic theory of existentials (sentences of the form There be NP pivot XP coda ) in which pivots are (second order) predicates and codas are modifiers. The theory retains the analysis of pivots as denoting generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan 1987), but departs from previous analyses in analyzing codas as contextual modifiers on a par with temporal/locative frame adverbials. Existing analyses universally assume that pivots are arguments of some predicate, and that codas (...) are main or secondary predicates. It is shown that these analyses cannot account for the behavior of codas with quantifiers and for the interaction of multiple codas, both of which receive a simple treatment on the proposed theory. The assimilation of codas to frame adverbials explains several semantic properties which have not been analyzed in the semantic literature, and that distinguish existentials from their copular counterparts. Furthermore, it highlights important properties of the semantics of modification and its relation to predication. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theory of 'function' and function as a deontic modal word and phenomenon. Kratzer’s account of the semantics for the deontic modals is invoked and using her approach a formal schema for the semantics of 'function'-sentences is proposed. My account of function is a modalized and extended version of Cummins’ systems-type account of function. In the biological and physical sciences, on this account, function is a complex empirical deontic modal property. It is built on (...) the property of X’s doing Y well enough to enable Z, which is implicitly deontic because of the evaluative but nonetheless empirical in its biological and physical applications. This account of function resolves many of the traditional puzzles about biological and physical function, and extends naturally to include the other types of function. With a variant treatment of the semantics, this account is argued also to apply to mathematical function, where it is shown to be interestingly related to Frege’s account of function. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception - a canonical text of twentieth-century philosophy - concludes with an appeal to 'heroism' by citing a series of enigmatic sentences drawn from Saint-Exupe;ry's Pilote de guerre. Surprisingly, however, these lines are antithetical to the philosophical thrust of Merleau-Ponty's project. This book aims to explain this situation. Foregrounding liminal themes in Merleau-Ponty's thought that have been largely overlooked - e.g., sacrifice, death, myth, faith - and showing how these themes support Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, (...) Smyth shows that Merleau-Ponty's appeal to 'heroism' represents an extra-philosophical appeal to a historical purposiveness as a universal feature of human nature, and that Merleau-Ponty makes this appeal in virtue of his recognition of the intrinsic methodological limitations of philosophy as a theoretical endeavor. The book thus recovers the 'militant' dimension of Merleau-Ponty's thought. This sheds considerable new light on his work. It does so in a way that challenges some of the basic parameters of existing Merleau-Ponty scholarship by illuminating the intrinsic normativity of his existential phenomenology, and its epistemic reliance on forms of non-reason such as faith and myth. (shrink)

Contemporary logicians continue to address problems associated with the existential import of categorical propositions. One notable problem concerns invalid instances of subalternation in the case of a universal proposition with an empty subject term. To remedy problems, logicians restrict first-order predicate logics to exclude such terms. Examining the historical origins of contemporary discussions reveals that logicians continue to make various category mistakes. We now believe that no proposition per se has existential import as commonly understood and thus (...) it is unnecessary to restrict first-order predicate logics to non-empty classes. After introducing the problem, we trace some nineteenth century treatments of the issue to locate a source of misconstruing propositional import in misconceptions of ‘implies’ and ‘affirms’ and name the process/product fallacy, along with the translation of categorical sentences using quantifiers and accommodating an empty class. Next we treat some metalogical matters to orient our discussion by which we provide a more precise nomenclature about ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition’ to correct previous misconceptions; here we uncover a common category mistake in respect of a proposition’s efficacy. The semantic distinction between agent and force is helpful in this connection. We conclude by showing that logicians have reinserted existence as a predicate, a position previously excised by Kant, and that the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis applies only to relationships within a categorical sentence between grammatical predicate and subject. (shrink)

We present various results regarding the decidability of certain sets of sentences by Simple Type Theory. First, we introduce the notion of decreasing sentence, and prove that the set of decreasing sentences is undecidable by Simple Type Theory with infinitely many zero-type elements ; a result that follows directly from the fact that every sentence is equivalent to a decreasing sentence. We then establish two different positive decidability results for a weak subtheory of math formula. Namely, the decidability (...) of math formula and math formula. Finally, we present some consequences for the set of existential-universal sentences. All the above results have direct implications for Quine's theory of “New Foundations” and its weak subtheory math formula. (shrink)

Some theories assume that sentences like (i) with a presupposition trigger in the scope of a quantifier carry an existential presupposition, as in (ii); others assume that they carry a universal presupposition, as in (iii). No student knows that he is lucky. Existential presupposition: At least one student is lucky.Universal presupposition: Every student is lucky. This work is an experimental investigation of this issue in French. Native speakers were recruited to evaluate the robustness of the (...) inference from (i) to (iii). The main result is that presuppositions triggered from the scope of the quantifier aucun‘no’ are in fact universal. But the present results also suggest that the presuppositions triggered from the scope of other quantifiers depend on the quantifier. This calls for important changes in the main theories of presupposition projection. (shrink)

Sylvia Wynter ends her monumental essay “‘No Humans Involved:’ An Open Letter to My Colleagues” (1994) with an urgent call to address the dire condition of the jobless and poor: “We must now undo their narratively condemned status.” Who are “we”? The sentence separates the university and its “narratively condemned” other. In fact, what the pronoun “we” in the open letter refers to is situated and far from universal, for it is “we in academia” that institute the Western imperial (...) constructs of race and class through “rigorous elaboration” of the present order of knowledge, the one that fails to register its misfits as humans, thus demoting them to the category of N.H.I. (“no humans involved”). I take Wynter’s letter as a point of departure by attending to its mode of address, its conscious use of the pronoun “we,” in light of her genealogy of the Eurocentric conceptions of humanity fundamentally entrenched in university vocation. In so doing, I re-raise the ethical and existential questions around the university, that is, its accountability for the enduring abjection of the N.H.I.-categorized Other, as well as the purpose and very reason for its being as an institutional structure. (shrink)

Presents a set-theoretic version of the analysis of "there be" as predicating instantiation of a property, a property-theoretic version of which was developed in McNally 1992. This paper provides a solution to the criticism that McNally 1992's analysis could not account for sentences in which postverbal nominal contains a monotone decreasing or nonmonotonic determiner.

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each. NOTE the published paper has a mistake. I have corrected this in the version on this site. A correction note will appear in Analysis.

Although the theory of definability had many important antecedents—such as the descriptive set theory initiated by the French semi-intuitionists in the early 1900s—the main ideas were first laid out in precise mathematical terms by Alfred Tarski beginning in 1929. We review here the basic notions of languages, explicit definability, and grammatical complexity, and emphasize common themes in the theories of definability for four important languages underlying, respectively, descriptive set theory, recursive function theory, classical pure logic, and finite-universe logic. We review (...) the history of previous studies of the similarities and differences in the theories of definability of the first three of these four languages. A seminal role leading toward unification of the theories has been played by the separation principles introduced by Nikolai Luzin in 1927. Emphasizing analogies and driving toward further unification embracing finite-universe logic we concentrate on a simple example—the first and second separation principles for existential-universal first-order sentences . Using this as a test case for the fundamental problem of how to “finitize” arguments in classical pure logic to the finite-universe case, we are led to the analogous negative solution by using the theory of certain special graphs: a graph is - special for any positive integers m , n , p , q iff it is bipartite with m red points and n blue points and for every p -tuple of red points there is a blue point to which they are all connected . As an aside we introduce for further study a natural “Ramseyesque” increasing sequence A of positive integers, where A is the least positive integer n for which an -special graph exists. (shrink)

The current study aims to examine the hope levels of theology students in the context of their education level. The correlational (relational) screening method was used in this study. The sample of the study consists of a total of 429 students (328 girls, 101 boys) studying at the Faculty of Theology at Erzincan Binali Yildirim University. Hope levels of the students were determined by Karaca-Kandemir Hope Scale developed by Karaca and Kandemir. The scale consists of three sub-dimensions: goal-oriented, hope and (...) significance, and stability. One-way analysis of variance (ANO-VA) was used for data analysis. According to the findings obtained as a result of the analysis, it is seen that the education levels of the Theology Faculty students cause differentiation in terms of goal-oriented and stability which are sub-dimensions of hope; however, it was found that the scale did not cause any difference in terms of hope and meaningfulness subscale and total hope levels. This finding did not corroborate the research hypothesis that the higher the education level of theology faculty students, the higher their hope level. The results, however, give an idea that theology education can have a positive effect on students' hope levels.Summary: Hope, which is a fundamental feature of human existence, has many functions, both individually and socially. Hope, which is one of the main characteristics that distinguish human beings from other beings, is one of the most powerful tools that help create and implement future designs of individuals and societies. It is possible to see this powerful effect of hope in the object of all human works and actions such as art, literature, and architecture. However, despite the expressed impact of hope, religion, which accompanies it in the existential journey of humanity and is one of its most influential sources of motivation, has the potential to produce a highly useful function on hope. Because religion demands the individual to be future-oriented rather than the past. This demand of religion does not mean that the past actions of the individual and society have no importance. While building the future of the individual and society on lessons learned from the past, religion orders that he should not be a prisoner of his past and that he hopes for the energy he has produced by taking shelter in the attributes of Allah, Most Gracious and Merciful. For this reason, the Qur'an equates despair of Allah's mercy with coming out of religion (Yusuf 12 / / 87).Despite the strong relations between religion and hope, empirical studies on the issue are not yet adequate. However, in recent times, especially with the effect of Positive Psychology, it is a fact that empirical studies have been carried out to determine the relationship of these emotions with religiosity about positive emotions such as patience, optimism, empathy, and self-regulation. One of the positive emotions expressed is hope. However, it is seen that some empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship between hope and religiosity. However, apart from these studies, empirical studies on higher education levels are needed in order to reveal the relationship between hope and religiosity in a healthier way. Because of the strong relationship between religion and hope, it is expected that there will be an increase in parallel with the religious education taken in higher education. From this point of view, this study primarily aims to reveal the strong connection between religion and hope. The main problem of this study, which is based on the primary hypothesis that learning religion at a higher education level, will increase the level of hope of students, is the relationship between theology education and hope. In this study, which was conducted to determine the hope levels of the students of the Faculty of Theology, the method of collecting information related to the questionnaire technique used in the screening model was used.The population of the study consists of 744 students enrolled in Erzincan Binali Yıldırım University Theology Faculty in the fall semester of 2018-2019 academic year. The sample group of the research is 429 students in the faculty during the application period. Accordingly, 144 (33.6%) of the total students in the sample group were in the “preparatory class,” 79 (18.4%) were in the “first grade”, and 78 (18.2%) were in the “second grade,” while 60 (14.0%) were in the “third grade,” 68 (15.9%) were in the “fourth grade.”“Personal Data Questionnaire” and “Karaca-Kandemir’s Hope Scale” were used as data collection instruments. In the “Personal Data Questionnaire,” there are questions about the learning levels of the working group.Karaca-Kandemir’s Hope Scale, which is used in the study, is a scale developed by Karaca and Kandemir based on their cultural codes to determine the hope levels of individuals.The scale is a 5-point Likert type and consists of three sub-dimensions: “goal-oriented,” “hope and meaningfulness,” and “stability.” Of the 13 items in the scale, 8 (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 12) had a positive sentence structure such as “Dreaming about the future excites me,” 5 of them (3, 6, 8, 11 and 13) it has a negative sentence structure such as “I cannot bring the end of a job easily after starting a job.” In the scoring phase of the hope scale, negative sentences were reversed. While the lowest score that can be obtained from the “goal-oriented” dimension of the scale is 5, the highest score is 25; the lowest score that can be obtained from the dimension of “hope and meaningfulness” is 4, the highest score is 20; the lowest score that can be obtained from the “stability” sub-dimension is 4, while the highest score is 20. As a result, the lowest score that can be obtained from the total of the scale is 13, and the highest score is 65. Low scores from the scale indicate that the individual's level of hope is low, and high scores indicate high levels of hope.In order to determine the differentiation between class levels, Single Factor Analysis of Variance-ANOVA was applied to the data set. As a result of the analysis, multiple comparisons were made between the means with statistically significant differences. For this purpose, Post Hoc LSD and Tukey HSD tests were used to determine the source of the difference. The significance level of “.05 “ was taken as a criterion for all these operations. In the research, it was seen that the education they received from the Faculty of Theology students caused a differentiation in the “goal-oriented and stability” sub-dimension of hope; however, “hope and meaningfulness” subscale and “total hope” did not cause any differentiation. This result did not confirm the research hypothesis that “the level of hope differs according to class (education) level and the level of hope increases as the level of education (education) increases hope. However, in the “goal-oriented” dimension of hope, the second and third-grade students of fourth-grade students; In terms of “stability” dimension, the fact that the first-grade students scored significantly higher than the preparatory class students gives an important idea that the education received in the Faculty of Theology can have an effect on hope. However, it is thought that similar studies that will be conducted with a large sample group and centering on all dimensions and hopes of religiosity will produce remarkable results. (shrink)

Graham Priest's new book is about things being about things—about what it is for things which are about things, such as beliefs, hopes and fears, and the like, and sentences which express them, to be about the things they are about, and about the range of things about which things which are about are about—in a word, intentionality. It has two principal objectives—to develop a formal semantics for intentionality, and to promote and defend a philosophical thesis about what exists (...) and what does not. The semantics proposed is an extension of the familiar ‘world’1 semantics for modal logic. The philosophical thesis asserts that while some things exist, not everything does, or equivalently that while some things exist, some others do not. Priest, following Richard Routley , calls this Noneism to mark the divergence from Meinong's view, with which, nevertheless, it has a good deal in common. Meinong likewise denies that everything exists, and asserts that some things exist and some do not, but further holds that some things which, according to him, do not exist do have another ‘form of being’—they ‘subsist’ rather than exist—while other things which, according to him, do not exist do not exist simpliciter . Noneism avoids this complication, at least, and—or so Priest claims—avoids proliferating kinds of being altogether, requiring only a single kind of being and a distinction between two kinds of quantifier. In the noneist view, the basic universal and particular quantifiers are to be understood in an ontologically unloaded way, as ranging over a single all-inclusive domain of objects, some of which exist and some of which do not. The usual—existentially loaded—quantifiers are construed as a type of restricted quantifier, definable using an existence predicate: ‘GraphicxAx’ as ‘For some x, …. (shrink)

‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that (...) standard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can. (shrink)

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence ϕ in the language (...) of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to graded model theory, in the context of mathematical fuzzy logic. We study characterizations of classes of graded structures in terms of the syntactic form of their first-order axiomatization. We focus on classes given by universal and universal-existential sentences. In particular, we prove two amalgamation results using the technique of diagrams in the setting of structures valued on a finite MTL-algebra, from which analogues of the Łoś–Tarski and the Chang–Łoś–Suszko preservation theorems (...) follow. (shrink)

We study the relations between abelian groups B and C that every universal (resp. universal-existential) sentence true in B is also true in C, and give algebraic criteria for these relations to hold. As a consequence we characterize the inductive complete theories of abelian groups and prove that they are exactly the model-complete theories.

Logic does not have purely existential theorems: the only existential sentences that are valid are those with valid universal analogues. Here, we show indeed this is so, when properly interpreted: every existential validity has a simple universal analogue, which is also valid. We also characterize existential and universal validities in terms of tautologies.

There are several ways for defining the notion submodel for Kripke models of intuitionistic first‐order logic. In our approach a Kripke model A is a submodel of a Kripke model B if they have the same frame and for each two corresponding worlds Aα and Bα of them, Aα is a subset of Bα and forcing of atomic formulas with parameters in the smaller one, in A and B, are the same. In this case, B is called an extension of (...) A. We characterize theories that are preserved under taking submodels and also those that are preserved under taking extensions as universal and existential theories, respectively. We also study the notion elementary submodel defined in the same style and give some results concerning this notion. In particular, we prove that the relation between each two corresponding worlds of finite Kripke models A ≤ B is elementary extension (in the classical sense) (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents "existential manipulation." Our responsibility practices are impacted in different (...) ways by universal and existential phenomena. And this is a relevant difference, especially on Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility, which take facts about our responsibility practices to be deeply connected to the nature of responsibility itself. We argue that Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are immune to manipulation arguments, and no attempt to modify the scope of manipulation or determinism featured in these arguments will help incompatibilists secure their desired conclusion. (shrink)

Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such (...) as: “For every metal there is a melting point.” All-and-some statements are both universally and existentially quantified in that order. Watkins argued that AS should be regarded as both nonfalsifiable and nonverifiable, for they partake in the logical fate of both universal and existential statements. This claim is subject to the proviso that the bound variables are “uncircumscribed” ; i.e., that the universe of discourse is infinite. (shrink)

A logically impossible sentence is one which entails a contradiction, a logically necessary sentence is one whose negation entails a contradiction, and a logically possible sentence is one which does not entail a contradiction. Metaphysically impossible, necessary and possible sentences are ones which become logically impossible, necessary, or possible by substituting what I call informative rigid designators for uninformative ones. It does seem very strongly that a negative existential sentence cannot entail a contradiction, and so ”there is a (...) God’ cannot be a metaphysically necessary truth. If it were such a truth, innumerable other sentences which seem paradigm examples of logically possible sentences, such as ”no one knows everything’ would turn out to be logically impossible. The only way in which God could be a logically necessary being is if there were eternal necessary propositions independent of human language or God’s will, such that the proposition that there is no God would entail -- via propositions inaccessible to us -- a contradiction. But if there were such propositions, God would have less control over the universe than he would have otherwise. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a grammatical account of scalar implicatures. In particular, I submit new evidence in favor of the contextual blindness principle, assumed in recent versions of the grammatical account. I argue that mismatching scalar implicatures can be generated even when the restrictor of the universal quantifier in a universal alternative is contextually known to be empty. The crucial evidence consists of a hitherto unnoticed oddness asymmetry between formally analogous existential sentences with reference failure (...) NPs. I conclude that the generation of mismatching scalar implicatures does not require contextual access. (shrink)

Sentences such as Olivia can take Logic or Algebra (‘♢∨-sentences’) are typically interpreted as entailing that Olivia can take Logic and can take Algebra. Given a standard semantics for modals and disjunction, those ‘Free choice’ (FC) readings are not predicted from the surface form of ♢∨-sentences. Yet the standard semantics is appropriate for the ‘double prohibition’ reading typically assigned to ¬♢∨-sentences like Olivia can’t take Logic or Algebra. Several extant approaches to FC can account for those (...) two cases, but face challenges when ♢∨, ¬♢∨ and related sentences appear embedded in certain environments. In this paper, we present a novel account of FC that builds on a ‘grammatical’ theory of scalar implicatures — proposed by Bassi et al. (2021) and Del Pinal (2021) — according to which covert exhaustification is a presupposition trigger such that the prejacent forms the assertive content while any excludable or includable alternatives are incorporated at the non-at issue, presuppositional level. Applied to ♢∨, ¬♢∨, and similar sentences, ‘presuppositional exhaustification’ predicts that their default interpretations have an assertive component (roughly, the classical interpretation of the prejacent) and a homogeneity presupposition which projects in standard ways. Those predictions, we then show, support a uniform account of the puzzling behavior of ♢∨, ¬♢∨, and related sentences when embedded under (negative) factives (Marty & Romoli 2020), disjunctions (Romoli & Santorio 2019), and in the scope of universal, existential (Bar-Lev & Fox 2020) and non-monotonic quantifiers (Gotzner et al. 2020). (shrink)

In 2001, Le Bars proved that there exists an existential monadic second-order sentence such that the probability that it is true on [Formula: see text] does not converge and conjectured that, for EMSO sentences with two first-order variables, the zero–one law holds. In this paper, we prove that the conjecture fails for [Formula: see text], and give new examples of sentences with fewer variables without convergence.

This book presents and defends a large number of theses in ontology and meta-ontology. The meta-ontological theses are broadly Quinean: that existence or being is what is expressed by the existential quantifier of formal logic; that the variables the quantifiers bind are essentially third-person-singular pronouns; that the “ontological commitments” of a person or theory are best revealed when the sentences of the person or theory are translated into the quantifier-variable idiom. Much of the book is devoted to ontological, (...) as opposed to meta-ontological, questions: Are there things that do not exist—or even things that have no sort of being whatever? Are there universals—or, more generally, abstract objects? What sort of thing is a property (quality, attribute…)? What are the ontological commitments of modal discourse? Are there possible worlds? If there are, do some of them contain “non-actual” individuals? (The meta-ontology severely constrains the ontology. For example, a non-actual but possible individual is an individual thing that might exist but does not. Therefore, non-actual individuals do not exist. That is to say, there aren’t any.) The book closes with the presentation and defense of an ontology consistent with everything said in the earlier parts of the book. The central thesis of this ontology is that everything belongs to one of two ontological categories, substance and relation. Relations are universals, and propositions are special kinds of relation. Special consideration is given to the absence of sets from the ontology. (shrink)

We define two notions for intuitionistic predicate logic: that of a submodel of a Kripke model, and that of a universal sentence. We then prove a corresponding preservation theorem. If a Kripke model is viewed as a functor from a small category to the category of all classical models with morphisms between them, then we define a submodel of a Kripke model to be a restriction of the original Kripke model to a subcategory of its domain, where every node (...) in the subcategory is mapped to a classical submodel of the corresponding classical model in the range of the original Kripke model. We call a sentence universal if it is built inductively from atoms using ∧, ∨, ∀, and →, with the restriction that antecedents of → must be atomic. We prove that an intuitionistic theory is axiomatized by universal sentences if and only if it is preserved under Kripke submodels. We also prove the following analogue of a classical model-consistency theorem: The universal fragment of a theory Γ is contained in the universal fragment of a theory Δ if and only if every rooted Kripke model of Δ is strongly equivalent to a submodel of a rooted Kripke model of Γ. Our notions of Kripke submodel and universal sentence are natural in the sense that in the presence of the rule of excluded middle, they collapse to the classical notions of submodel and universal sentence. (shrink)

This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whether they are compatible with the view advocated by them (so-called Moral and Semantic Innocence) remains open. Helping ourselves to the standard model-theoretical framework Hom and May (presumably) work in, we (...) prove they are compatible with the view. Given that the issues of both the moral import of pejoratives and the practical effects of their utterance are not settled by the proof, we then highlight unwelcome moral and pragmatic implications for some of the pejorative sentences under scrutiny, thereby showing that the view, broadly understood, is not as morally and semantically innocuous as it is meant to be. (shrink)

This book contains an original analysis of the existential there-sentence from a philosophical-linguistic perspective. At its core is the claim that there-sentences' form is distinct from that of ordinary subject–predicate sentences, and that this fundamental difference explains the construction's unusual grammatical and discourse properties.

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In (...) Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper we define a suitable version of the notion of homomorphism for Kripke models of intuitionistic first-order logic and characterize theories that are preserved under images and also those that are preserved under inverse images of homomorphisms. Moreover, we define a notion of union of chain for Kripke models and define a class of formulas that is preserved in unions of chains. We also define similar classes of formulas and investigate their behavior in Kripke models. An application to (...) intuitionistic first-order arithmetic is also given. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente artigo contempla uma das tentativas mais significativas e controversas de explicar o significado de pejorativos como itens lexicais, a saber, a de Hom e May. Após apresentarmos em linhas gerais a teoria, identificamos conjuntos de sentenças pejorativas que saem verdadeiras nessa teoria e para as quais a questão da sua compatibilidade com a visão por eles defendida (a chamada Inocência Moral e Semântica) permanece em aberto. Explorando o arcabouço teórico padrão da teoria dos modelos em que Hom (...) e May (presumivelmente) trabalham, damos uma prova de sua compatibilidade com a visão. Dado que as questões relativas tanto à importância moral de pejorativos quanto aos efeitos práticos de seu proferimento não são resolvidas pela prova, destacamos, em seguida, implicações morais e pragmáticas indesejáveis para algumas das sentenças pejorativas sob escrutínio, mostrando assim que a visão de Hom e May, interpretada de maneira ampla, não é tão moral e semanticamente inócua como deveria ser. (shrink)

Read this book to get a deeper understanding of a wide range of semantics research on complex sentences and meaning in discourse. These in-depth articles from leading names in their fields cover the core concepts of sentential semantics such as tense, modality, conditionality, propositional attitudes, scope, negation, and coordination. The highly cited material, covers questions, imperatives, copular clauses, and existential sentences. It also includes essential research on sentence types, and explains central concepts in the theory of information (...) structure and discourse structure, such as topics, cohesion and coherence, accessibility and discourse particles. (shrink)

The problem at the core of this ethical study is how Existentialist Ethics comprises the absolute character of obligation and how it is able to join the ethical postulate to the conrete situation without losing the absolute. Kariuki is chiefly interested in Sartre because he presents, in a most logical fashion, a model of Realistic Ethics that excludes all transcendence. At the same time, Kariuki shows the similarity between Sartre and A.I. Melden.