The article argues that universals of law, i.e. the laws of nature, are the general axioms of a deductive system of all knowledge, and their deductive consequences. Universals of fact are generalisations deducible from these together with particular facts.

This book suggests a bold comparative approach to broad cultural differences between Africa and Melanesia. Its theme is personhood, understood in terms of what anthropologists call embodiment. These concepts are applied to questions ranging from the meanings of spirit possession, to the logics of witchcraft and kinship relations, the use of rituals in healing, and even the impact of capitalism. Questioning common assumptions about the huge differences among these discrete areas, the contributions document surprising continuities.

Jones recognizes the existence of “primitives of conceptual structures,” out of which “local representations of kinship are constructed.” NSM semantics has identified these primitives through a cross-linguistic search for lexical universals (“NSM” stands for Natural Semantic Metalanguage and also for the corresponding linguistic theory). These empirical universals provide, I argue, a better bridge between cognitive anthropology and evolutionary psychology than the abstract constructs of OT, with dubious claim to conceptual reality.

Alexander's views on universals are, it seems, quite important in the history of western philosophy. When Boethius gives in his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge his solution to the problem of universals as he conceived it, he claims to be adopting Alexander's approach. If true, this means that the locus classicus for all western medieval thinkers on this topic is really a rendering of Alexander's teaching. Alexander commented Aristotle’s statement in his On the Soul “The universal animal either (...) is nothing at all or is posterior if it exists”, and this commentary has been translated into Arabic several times in the classical period. In this study the anonymous Arabic translations of Alexander’s commentary has been translated into English. (shrink)

A substantial article-length introduction to the theme of personhood.

It is evident, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic that has physicians confronting death and dying at unprecedented levels along with growing data suggesting that physicians who care for dying patients face complex emotional, psychological and behavioural effects, that there is a need for their better understanding and the implementation of supportive measures. Taking into account data positing that effects of caring for dying patients may impact a physician’s concept of personhood, or “what makes you, ‘you’”, we adopt (...) Radha Krishna’s Ring Theory of Personhood (RToP) to scrutinise the experiences of physicians working in intensive care units (ICU) using a fictional scenario that was inspired by real events. The impact of death and dying, its catalysts, internal constituents, external factors, dyssynchrony, and buffers, specific to ICU physicians, were identified and explored. Such a framework allows for ramifications to be considered holistically and facilitates the curation of strategies for conflict resolution. This evaluation of the RToP acknowledges the experience and wide-ranging effects it has on ICU physicians. As such, our findings provide insight into their specific needs and highlight the importance of support on a personal and organisational level. Although further research needs to be conducted, the RToP could serve as the basis for a longitudinal assessment tool supported by the use of portfolios or mentorship due to their provision of personalised, appropriate, specific, timely, accessible and long-term support. (shrink)

Amongst traditionally-available frameworks within which end-of-life decisions in Intensive Care Units are situated, we favour Ordinary versus Extra-ordinary care distinctions as the most helpful. Predicated on this framework, we revisit the concepts of personhood and autonomy. We argue that a full account of personhood locates its foundation in relationships with others, rather than merely in “rationality”. A full account of autonomy also recognises relationships with others, as well as the actual reality of the patient’s situation-in-the-world. The fact that, (...) when critically ill, the patient may no longer be able to take an active role in decision-making does not bring about the end of their personhood, or of their autonomy. Because the patient’s autonomy is intimately linked to their relationships with others, once critical illness supervenes, respect for their autonomy devolves to those others with whom the patient is in relationship. In practical application, this means that there must be a dialogue, as the end-of-life of the critically-ill patient in ICU comes into view. Such dialogue should be grounded on this understanding in order to conform best to moral philosophical principles. Ideally the dialogue will involve all those with whom the patient is in relationship and, practical difficulties within an ICU notwithstanding, will aim to be inclusive, non-coercive and reflective as it seeks to maximise the good of the patient in their unique context. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater degree of personhood than another. I describe both criteria of general personhood, which distinguish between persons and non-persons, and criteria of particular personhood, which distinguish between one person and another. I examine some of the consequences for ethics, (...) including the rights to life, self-determination, and treatment. There may be circumstances in medicine where we have to judge the value of a patient's life in order to decide what medical treatment, if any, to provide, and although it may be emotionally difficult and politically dangerous, one relevant factor is what degree of personhood that individual has. (shrink)

The concept of personhood has been central to bioethics debates about abortion, the treatment of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious states, as well as patients with advanced dementia. More recently, the concept has been employed to think about new questions related to human-brain organoids, artificial intelligence, uploaded minds, human-animal chimeras, and human embryos, to name a few. A common move has been to ask what these entities have in common with persons (in the normative sense), and then (...) draw conclusions about what we do (or do not) owe them. This paper argues that at best the concept of “personhood” is unhelpful to much of bioethics today and at worst it is harmful and pernicious. I suggest that we (bioethicists) stop using the concept of personhood and instead ask normative questions more directly (e.g., how ought we to treat this being and why?) and use other philosophical concepts (e.g., interests, sentience, recognition respect) to help us answer them. It is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood. (shrink)

The concept of personhood has been central to bioethics debates about abortion, the treatment of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious states, as well as patients with advanced dementia. More recently, the concept has been employed to think about new questions related to human-brain organoids, artificial intelligence, uploaded minds, human-animal chimeras, and human embryos, to name a few. A common move has been to ask what these entities have in common with persons (in the normative sense), and then (...) draw conclusions about what we do (or do not) owe them. This paper argues that at best the concept of “personhood” is unhelpful to much of bioethics today and at worst it is harmful and pernicious. I suggest that we (bioethicists) stop using the concept of personhood and instead ask normative questions more directly (e.g., how ought we to treat this being and why?) and use other philosophical concepts (e.g., interests, sentience, recognition respect) to help us answer them. It is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood. (shrink)

A resale copy of a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Volume 14, Issue 5-6, 2007). This collection of original articles considers the perennial question ‘What are persons?’ It aims first of all to clarify the nature of the question and its relation to associated questions such as the nature of the human animal; how the concepts of human being, person, subject, and self are related; the persistence and unity of persons; and questions as to the conditions for (...) class='Hi'>personhood and personality.The ‘dimensions’ of the book’s title reflects the volume’s focus on the relations that persons have with themselves and each other. (shrink)

The starting point of Joseph Margolis' last philosophical effort is represented by the problem of the human "gap" in animal continuity: "There appear to be no comparable variants of animal evolution [...] effected by anything like the culturally enabled creation". While we share with other animals more or less refined forms of societal life, acquiring a natural language remains a distinctively human character: although it is grounded in the completely natural favourable changes in the human vocal apparatus and brain, the (...) merely causal emergence of language in humans reacts back into human primates by transforming them into persons or selves. The artifactuality of persons appears to be at the same time a natural and emergent phenomenon, constituting the other side of the process of language acquisition both by early hominids and by human infants. In this perspective the largely informal, mongrel and approximate functionality of ordinary language is interpreted as a good tool for the cultural animal to cope with the world, while the collective dimension of human forms of life appears as the shared context of external and internal constitution of the human selves. (shrink)

This paper attempts to interpret the theory of personhood in the works of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in a way that refutes a certain type of Nishida interpretation that Critical Buddhism offers. According to this type of interpretation, the logic of basho is a modern version of the Qixinlun system. Based on this interpretation, Critical Buddhism denounces Kyoto School philosophy as "topical Buddhism." This paper shows how Nishida himself consciously differentiates his philosophy from the idealistic and monistic system with which (...) the earlier version of the logic of basho can easily be confused. To show that his theory of personhood opposes the Qixinlun-like system, I argue that Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Tiantai theory of personhood is analogous to Nishida's and explore the common nature of their philosophies. (shrink)

Familial determination, replete with its frequent usurping of patient autonomy, propagation of collusion, and circumnavigation of direct patient involvement in their own care deliberations, continues to impact clinical practice in many Asian nations. Suggestions that underpinning this practice, in Confucian-inspired societies, is the adherence of the populace to the familial centric ideas of personhood espoused by Confucian ethics, provide a novel means of understanding and improving patient-centred care at the end of life. Clinical experience in Confucian-inspired Singapore, however, suggests (...) that personhood is conceived in broader terms. This diverging view inspired a study of local conceptions of personhood and scrutiny of the influence of the family upon it. From the data gathered, a culturally appropriate, clinically relevant and ethically sensitive concept of personhood was proposed: the Ring Theory of Personhood that better captures the nuances of local conceptions of personhood. The Ring Theory highlights the fact that, far from being solely dependent upon familial centric ideals, local conceptions of personhood are dynamic, context dependent, evolving ideas delineated by four dimensions. Using the Ring Theory, the nature of familial influences upon the four dimensions of personhood – the Innate, Individual, Relational and Societal – are examined to reveal that, contrary to perceived knowledge, conceptions of personhood within Confucian societies are not the prime reason for the continued presence of this decision-making model but remain present within local thinking and practices as a sociocultural residue and primarily because of inertia in updating ideas. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that temporal anaphora in French and English depends on the aspectual distinction between events and states. For example, temporal location as well as temporal update depends on the aspectual type. This paper presents a general theory of aspect-based temporal anaphora, which extends from languages with grammatical tenses (like French and English) to tenseless languages (e.g. Kalaallisut). This theory also extends to additional aspect-dependent phenomena and to non-atomic aspectual types, processes and habits, which license anaphora to (...) proper atomic parts (cf. nominal pluralities and kinds). (shrink)

Inspired by early Confucian texts such as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi, defenders of Confucian role ethics argue that persons are constituted by their social roles and relationships. However, this has the puzzling implication that persons cannot survive changes in social roles and relationships. This paper proposes ways to understand this claim by appealing to the notions of essence, material constitution, and four-dimensionalism. In particular, it will be suggested that role ethicists should distinguish biological humans from persons and should say (...) either that (i) persons are materially constituted by biological humans, or that (ii) persons are four-dimensional objects that merely overlap with biological humans. There has thus far not been much contact between early Chinese philosophy and contemporary metaphysics in this vein. A secondary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that views in early Chinese philosophy can be examined within frameworks from contemporary metaphysics, and furthermore, that the results include novel theses not yet recognized in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

Despite the many well-documented similarities -- genetic, cognitive, behavioral, social -- between our human selves and our evolutionary forebears, a significant gulf remains between us and them. Why is that? How did it come about? And how did we come to be the way we are? In this book fourteen distinguished scholars -- including humanist, atheist, and theist voices -- address such questions as they explore how and when human personhood emerged. Representing various disciplines, the contributors all offer significant (...) insights into new scientific research about the origins of human nature -- research that challenges some traditional views. CONTRIBUTORS Francisco J. Ayala Justin L. Barrett Roy F. Baumeister Warren S. Brown Richard W. Byrne Matthew J. Jarvinen Malcolm Jeeves Timothy O'Connor Lynn K. Paul Colin Renfrew Ian Tattersall Anthony C. Thiselton Alan J. Torrance Adam Zeman. (shrink)

인공지능(artificial intelligence) 로봇과 관련된 과학 기술의 비약적 발전으로 인해, 이들 존재의 현실화가 예견되면서 인격(person) 논의의 필요성이 부각되고 있다. 왜냐하면, 앞으로 이들과 인간과의 사회적 관계가 전개되는 과정에서 제기될 수 있는 법적 또는 도덕적 차원의 문제들에 규범적으로 대응할 수 있는 이론의 가장 기초적인 논의가 인격 개념이기 때문이다. 따라서 본 논문은 인공지능 시대에 적합한 인격 개념을 모색하고자 한다. 전통적인 인격 개념에 대한 기존 해석은, 해당 존재가 합리성이나 쾌고 감수 능력(sentiment)과 같은 특정한 내재적 속성을 보유했는가와 관련되는데, 이러한 기존의 인격 논의는 인간종내에서도 식물인간과 같은 가장자리 (...) 상황(marginal cases) 인간을 어떻게 대우해야 할지에 대해 분명한 입장을 제시하지 못할 뿐만 아니라, 자연종인 동물을 배제할 때 제기되는 종차별주의(speciesism) 비판에 취약하다. 더욱이 이러한 기존의 인격 개념은 자연종에 토대를 두고 있어, 인공지능 로봇과 같은 인공종을 고려 대상에서 처음부터 배제한다는 문제가 있다. 본 논문은 인공지능 시대에 적합한 인격 개념은 인정(recognition)에 토대를 둔 논의라고 주장하고 인정에 근거한 모델을 제시한다. 인정에 근거한 인격 개념 모델은 전통적인 인격 개념의 정의를 유지하면서도 내재적 속성 해석이 갖는 한계를 극복할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라, 인정의 범위에 대한 확장 가능성, 인정 논의 세분화를 통한 인격 개념의 분화 설명, 효과적인 규범적 판단 기준 제시 등의 장점이 있다. (shrink)

This book explores the salient ethical idea of personhood in African philosophy. It is a philosophical exposition that pursues the ethical and political consequences of the normative idea of personhood as a robust or even foundational ethical category. Personhood refers to the moral achievements of the moral agent usually captured in terms of a virtuous character, which have consequences for both morality and politics. The aim is not to argue for the plausibility of the ethical and political (...) consequences of the idea of personhood. Rather, the book showcases some of the moral-political content and consequences of the account it presents. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Confucian formulations of personhood and the implications they may have for bioethics and medical practice. We discuss how an appreciation of the Confucian concept of personhood can provide insights into the practice of informed consent and, in particular, the role of family members and physicians in medical decision-making in societies influenced by Confucian culture. We suggest that Western notions of informed consent appear ethically misguided when viewed from a Confucian perspective.

This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood — the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized — are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a ‘basic view’that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition depends (...) analyti- cally on such pre-existing normative requirements: it is a matter of responsiveness to them. The paper then discusses four challenges. The challenges claim that pace the basic view, the relevant capacities depend on recognition, that recognition seems to have normative rele- vance, and that the basic view cannot as such explain the equality either of persons, or of humans. Responding to these challenges amounts to refining the basic view accordingly. (shrink)

This book was originally published in 1981 and the theme of universals attracted a great deal of attention in the decade preceding publication.

There is an important but underappreciated ambiguity in Hobbes’ concept of personhood. In one sense, persons are representatives or actors. In the other sense, persons are representees or characters. An estate agent is a person in the first sense; her client is a person in the second. This ambiguity is crucial for understanding Hobbes’ claim that the state is a person. Most scholars follow the first sense of ‘person’, which suggests that the state is a kind of actor – (...) in modern terms, a ‘corporate agent’. I argue that Hobbes’ state is a person only in the second sense: a character rather than an actor. If there are any primitive corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, they are representative assemblies, not states or corporations. Contemporary political theorists and philosophers tend to miss what is unique and valuable about Hobbes’ idea of state personality because they project the idea of corporate agency onto it. (shrink)

Inspite of growing interest in research on language universals the concept of language universal itself has not been clarified beyond its status in Greenberg 1966. The present paper is an attempt at further clarification. The concept of language universal presents at least the following basic problems : Which entities are to be called universal? How can universality statements be deductively related to statements on individual languages and to non-linguistic statements, e.g. psychological ones? How are we to conceive the relation (...) between the 'empirical' and the 'non-empirical' in universality research? It is argued that the universal entities should be properties of languages. Three conceptions of universals are characterized: The Naive View , the Semantic View , and the Pragmatic View proposed by the author . It is argued that the Naive View and the Semantic View do not, and that the Pragmatic View may solve the basic problems formulated in Part I. Combining the Pragmatic View with the conception of theories developed in Lieb to appear the author characterizes the ultimate aim of universality research as defining a set of properties that, if taken as universal by any linguist, maximize the fruitfulness of any theory of language. The main task of universality research consists in making universality proposals that are well-founded with respect to that aim. Various principles are suggested by which the well-foundedness of universality proposals can be judged. (shrink)

Children's reading and spelling errors show that orthographic learning involves complex interactions with phonology, morphology, and meaning throughout development. Even young children seek to make their visual word recognition strategies linguistically coherent. Orthographic knowledge gained through spelling affects reading, and vice versa. Developmental data support Frost's claim that letter-coding flexibility reflects the optimization of encoding resources in a highly developed system.

There is an important but underappreciated ambiguity in Hobbes’ concept of personhood. In one sense, persons are representatives or actors. In the other sense, persons are representees or characters. An estate agent is a person in the first sense; her client is a person in the second. This ambiguity is crucial for understanding Hobbes’ claim that the state is a person. Most scholars follow the first sense of ‘person’, which suggests that the state is a kind of actor – (...) in modern terms, a ‘corporate agent’. I argue that Hobbes’ state is a person only in the second sense: a character rather than an actor. If there are any primitive corporate agents in Hobbes’ political thought, they are representative assemblies, not states or corporations. Contemporary political theorists and philosophers tend to miss what is unique and valuable about Hobbes’ idea of state personality because they project the idea of corporate agency onto it. (shrink)

Saunders and van Brakel's observation that “linguistic evidence provides no grounds for the universality of basic color categories” also applies to the concept of “colour” itself. The language of “seeing” is rooted in human experience, and its basic frame of reference is provided by the universal rhythm of “light” days and “dark” nights and by the fundamental and visually salient features of human environment: the sky, the sun, vegetation, fire, the sea, the naked earth.

There has been a debate, popularized by Ifenyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye, regarding philosophical understandings of the human person in Africa. The debate revolves around the saying "So and so is not a person." Gyekye convincingly argues that the saying is a manner of speech, intended to be a moral evaluation of a person's actions. Menkiti, however, goes further and suggests that many of the African conceptions of a person are based on a dynamic understanding of the self. Similar findings (...) were made of Maasai concepts of personhood in the study done by Patrick Dikirr. The "potential self" is not given but is always being constructed by one's deeds and one's relations. While it is certainly a romanticization to imagine Africans as harmoniously communal in contrast to the "isolated individuals" who supposedly inhabit the West, nevertheless, for a Maasai one gains self-identity and status to a large extent through one's relations to other persons and to animals. However, the paper illustrates the many ways in which Maasais still emphasize individual achievement and thought, debunking notions of African "group-think" and conformity. The paper then draws on Axel Honneth's insights into "recognition" to note the extent to which Maasai recognition of each other prevents the community's capitulation to the value system of other ethnic groups in Kenya or Western influence. (shrink)

: This paper examines the ethical status of animals and nature within the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins. Though Calkins held that her self-psychology and absolute personalistic idealism were compatible in many ways, the two schools of thought offer different conceptions of personhood with respect to animals and nature. On the one hand, Calkins's self-psychology classified animals and nature as non-persons, due to the fact that self-psychology viewed animals and nature as physical entities bereft of the psychical qualities necessary (...) for personhood. On the other hand, Calkins's absolute personalistic idealism classified animals and nature as persons, due to the absolute personalistic idealist understanding of the universe as ultimately mental and personal. Because Calkins's ethics requires the ethical individual to will for the benefit of all human beings, an ethics that adopts Calkins's psychological conception of personhood promotes an anthropocentrism that views animals and nature as possessing merely instrumental value, while an ethics that adopts Calkins's philosophical conception of personhood views animals and nature as possessing intrinsic value. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introducing persons and the psychology of personhood Jack Martin and Mark H. Bickhard; Part I. Philosophical, Conceptual Perspectives: 2. The person concept and the ontology of persons Michael A. Tissaw; 3. Achieving personhood: the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology Charles Guignon; Part II. Historical Perspectives: 4. Historical psychology of persons: categories and practice Kurt Danziger; 5. Persons and historical ontology Jeff Sugarman; 6. Critical personalism: on its tenets, its historical obscurity, and its future prospects (...) James T. Lamiell; Part III. Social-Developmental Perspectives: 7. Conceiving of self and others as persons: evolution and development John Barresi, Chris Moore and Raymond Martin; 8. Position exchange theory and personhood: moving between positions and perspectives within physical, sociocultural and psychological space and time Jack Martin and Alex Gillespie; 9. The emergent ontology of persons Mark H. Bickhard; 10. Theorising personhood for the world in transition and change: reflections from a transformative activist stance on human development Anna Stetsenko; Part IV. Narrative Perspectives: 11. Identity and narrative as root metaphors of personhood Amia Lieblich and Ruthellen Josselson; 12. Storied persons: the double triad of narrative identity Mark Freeman. (shrink)

In her highly thought-provoking article, “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) presents a number of reasons why bioethics should “… end talk about personhood.” Some of these rea...

In this paper, I critically explore Ann Sharp’s conception of personhood as it figures in the theory and practice of the community of philosophical inquiry (CPI). Through surveying Sharp’s rich and varied philosophical output, it will be shown how Sharp’s conception of personhood as a trilateral relationship (between self, other(s), and community) maps onto “the Three C’s” of critical, creative, and caring thinking that make up the practice of Philosophy for Children. After thus presenting Sharp’s conception of (...) class='Hi'>personhood, the paper brings into view an aspect of said conception which could benefit from further development. This potential shortfall in Sharp’s thought is identified as “the problem of closure”. In highlighting the problem of closure, I will indicate how Sharp marshals the concept of faith in her conception of CPI as a spiritual community, a relationship that is coincident with personhood itself, as it stands for the bond that ties together the individual (self and other(s)) and the collective (community) dimensions of CPI. I argue that faith serves, among other things, as an agent of closure between the individual and the collective in Sharp’s thought. In considering the function of faith in CPI, I will suggest an avenue of possible resolution to the problem of closure in Leonard Nelson’s conception of “the Socratic spirit” as the embodiment of “reason’s self-confidence”. Finally, the paper looks ahead to David Kennedy’s writings on the intentionality structure that governs the relationship between the individual and the collective in CPI as a resource that promises to offer a more rigorous and systematic treatment of the problem of closure. (shrink)

In this insightful set of essays, the concept of the psychological humanities is defined and explored. A clear rationale is provided for its necessity in the study and understanding of the individual and identity in a discipline that is largely occupied by empirical studies that report aggregated data and its analysis. Contributors to this volume are leading scholars in theoretical psychology who believe that psychology must be about persons and their lives. In these essays, they draw from a variety of (...) disciplines that include art, literature, life writing, and history to make a case for the psychological humanities. A final chapter provides a critical commentary on the value of the psychological humanities. It is argued that psychology must draw on the knowledge and practices of the humanities, as well as the sciences and social sciences, in order to attain a greater understanding of personhood. This book is aimed at upper level undergraduate and postgraduate students and scholars of psychology, particularly theoretical psychology, philosophy of the mind, and those from a humanities background interested in exploring the concept of the psychological humanities. (shrink)

This book articulates an African conception of dignity in light of the salient axiological category of personhood in African cultures. The idea of personhood embodies a moral system for evaluating human lives exuding with virtue or ones that are morally excellent. This book argues that this idea of personhood embodies an under-explored conception of dignity, which accounts for it in terms of our capacity for the virtue of sympathy. It then proceeds to apply this personhood-based conception (...) of dignity to bioethical questions, specifically, those of abortion and euthanasia. Regarding abortion, it concludes that it is impermissible since foetuses possess partial moral status. Regarding euthanasia, it argues that it is permissible for reasons revolving around avoiding the reversing of personhood. It also, though, minimally, touches on the questions regarding the mentally disabled and animals, to which it assigns lower moral status. (shrink)

: The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant (...) form of self-consciousness or its functional equivalent. Although nonhuman animals are not plausible candidates for moral personhood, humans too fail to qualify as moral persons if they lack one or more of the conditions of moral personhood. If moral personhood were the sole basis of moral rights, then these humans would lack rights--and precisely for the reasons that nonhuman animals would. (shrink)