Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage (...) in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition in 24 sites, located in 23 countries and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely (...) asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)
Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)
En años recientes se han diseñado múltiples experimentos que muestran cómo el razonamiento humano tiende a quebrantar lo que usualmente se consideran los principios normativos de razonamiento, a saber, los principios de la teoría estándar de la probabilidad y de la lógica clásica. Estos supuestos quebrantos han sido interpretados como muestra de la irracionalidad humana. Una noción de norma del razonamiento diferente de la subyacente en dicha interpretación me permite afirmar que razonar correctamente implica razonar de acuerdo con reglas diseñadas (...) para resolver una clase limitada de problemas en el marco de un dominio especifico y que pueden no ser formulados en términos de principios generales. Esta idea me lleva a sostener que la estructura heurística de nuestro razonamiento apunta a la manera como somos racionales. /// Much research in the last decades has demonstrated that khuman reasoning tends to violate what have usually been regarded as the normative principles of reasoning -- e.g. the principles of standard theory of probability or classical logic. These supposed violations have been interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. A notion of a reasoning norm different from that underlying such an interpretation allows me to assert that correct reasoning implies reasoning in accordance with rules designed to solve a limited class of problems in a specific domain of knowledge and which are not susceptible to being formulated in terms of general principies. This contention leads me to sustain that the heuristic structure of our reasoning signáis the way in which we are rational. (shrink)
Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)
We analysed research ethics committee (REC) letters. We found that RECs frequently identify process errors in applications from researchers that are not deemed “favourable” at first review. Errors include procedural violations (identified in 74% of all applications), missing information (68%), slip-ups (44%) and discrepancies (25%). Important questions arise about why the level of error identified by RECs is so high, and about how errors of different types should be handled.
Research Ethics Committees (RECs) are frequently a focus of complaints from researchers, but evidence about the operation and decisions of RECs tends to be anecdotal. We conducted a systematic study to identify and compare the ethical issues raised in 54 letters to researchers about the same 18 applications submitted to three RECs over one year. The most common type of ethical trouble identified in REC letters related to informed consent, followed by scientific design and conduct, care and protection of research (...) participants, confidentiality, recruitment and documentation. Community considerations were least frequently raised. There was evidence of variability in the ethical troubles identified and the remedies recommended. This analysis suggests that some principles may be more institutionalized than others, and offers some evidence of inconsistency between RECs. Inconsistency is often treated as evidence of incompetence and caprice, but a more sophisticated understanding of the role of RECs and their functioning is required. (shrink)
There has been longstanding interest in the consistency of decisions made by research ethics committees in the UK, but most of the evidence has come from single studies submitted to multiple committees. A systematic comparison was carried out of the decisions made on 18 purposively selected applications, each of which was reviewed independently by three different RECs in a single strategic health authority. Decisions on 11 applications were consistent, but disparities were found among RECs on decisions on seven applications. An (...) analysis of the agreement between decisions of RECs yielded an overall measure of agreement of κ = 0.286 , indicating a level of agreement that, although probably better than chance, may be described as “slight”. The small sample size limits the robustness of these findings. Further research on reasons for inconsistencies in decision making between RECs, and on the importance of such inconsistencies for a range of arguments, is needed. (shrink)
Two separate regulatory regimes govern research with adults who lack capacity to consent in England and Wales: the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 and the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (“the Regulations”). A service evaluation was conducted to investigate how research ethics committees (RECs) are interpreting the requirements. With the use of a coding scheme and qualitative software, a sample of REC decision letters where applicants indicated that their project involved adults who lacked mental capacity was analysed. (...) The analysis focuses on 45 letters about projects covered by the MCA and 12 letters about projects covered by the Regulations. The legal requirements for involving incapacitated adults in research were not consistently interpreted correctly. Letters often lacked explicitness and clarity. Neither consent nor assent from third parties is a legally valid concept for purposes of the MCA, yet they were suggested or endorsed in 10 post-MCA letters, and there was evidence of confusion about the consultee processes. The correct terms were also not consistently used in relation to clinical trials. Inappropriate use of terms such as “relative” had the potential to exclude people eligible to be consulted. Unless the correct terms and legal concepts are used in research projects, there is potential for confusion and for exclusion of people who are eligible to be consulted about involvement of adults who lack capacity. Improved clarity, explicitness and accuracy are needed when submitting and reviewing applications for ethical review of research in this area. (shrink)
In E. Levinass phenomenology of time three stages belonging to three different works can be distinguished: Le temps et lAutre (1947), Totalité et Infini (1961), and Autrément quêtre ou au-delà de lessence (1974). This paper systematically reconstructs these three periods, displaying the progress..
El artículo realiza una lectura fenomenológico-hermenéutica de la cuestión de la esperanza en el pensamiento de S. Kierkegaard. Primero funda en la noción de espíritu la peculiar legitimidad del fenómeno. Luego explicita en términos filosóficos la esperanza en el reino de Dios, como una correlación ontogénica que se realiza procesualmente. A continuación analiza el silencio, la obediencia y la alegría como indicios de la vivencia de la esperanza. Finalmente determina la temporalidad y la dimensión estética del fenómeno.
In this philosophy classic, which was first published in 1951, E. R. Dodds takes on the traditional view of Greek culture as a triumph of rationalism. Using the analytical tools of modern anthropology and psychology, Dodds asks, "Why should we attribute to the ancient Greeks an immunity from 'primitive' modes of thought which we do not find in any society open to our direct observation?" Praised by reviewers as "an event in modern Greek scholarship" and "a book which it would (...) be difficult to over-praise," _The Greeks and the Irrational _was Volume 25 of the Sather Classical Lectures series. (shrink)
RESUMENEl artículo analiza la concepción de la esperanza de Welte y la contrapone al "principio esperanza" de Bloch. Primeramente el análisis distingue la esperanza ontológica de la religiosa y determina ambos conceptos. Luego expone la relación dinámica entre las dos formas de esperanza. Finalmente muestra cómo el paso de la esperanza ontológica a la religiosa supone una reversión temporal. La contraposición explicita, por un lado, el carácter parcial del análisis de Bloch frente al de Welte, pero, por otro lado, muestra (...) que ambos análisis no son contradictorios, sino complementarios.PALABRAS CLAVEESPERANZA-SENTIDO-RELIGIÓN-TEMPORALIDADABSTRACTThe article examines Welte´s notion of hope and sets it off against Bloch´s "hope principle". First, the difference between ontological hope and relgious hope is outlined, and the distinctive characters of both notions are described. Secondly, the dynamic relationship holding between both types of hope is developed. Finally, it is shown how the passage from ontological hope to religious hope entails a temporal reversion. The comparison attempts to show, on the one had, the one-sidedness of Bloch´s analysis, and, on the other, that both standpoints are not contradictory but rather complementary.KEYWORDSHOPE-MEANING-RELIGION-TEMPORALITY. (shrink)
RESUMENEl artículo analiza la significación del pensamiento de J. Patočka para un acceso no confesional al fenómeno religioso. El análisis persigue dos objetivos. Primero determinar en qué medida los fundamentos de su filosofía de la historia implican una conmoción del orden fenoménico que abre el pensamiento hacia el Misterio que trasciende pero, a la vez, posibilita la historia humana. Segundo, explicitar el sacrificio como el medio por excelencia a través del cual el hombre en la era nihilista puede religarse con (...) el llamado de ese Misterio trascendente a realizar la infinita riqueza del ser y mantener viva la historia como historia con sentido.PALABRAS CLAVE HISTORIA, SACRIFICIO, SENTIDO, LO DIVINO.ABSTRACTThe paper analyzes the significance of J. Patočka’s thought for a non confessional access to the religious phenomenon. The analysis pursues two objectives. Firstly, to determine to what extent the foundations of his philosophy of history imply a commotion of the phenomenal order that opens the thought to the Mystery that transcends, but, at the same time, makes human history a reality. Secondly, to explicit sacrifice as the medium par excellence through which the man in the nihilistic era can connect himself with the call from this transcendent Mystery to fulfil the infinite richness of being and maintaining history alive as well as meaningful.KEYWORDSHISTORy, SACRIFICE, MEANING, THE DIVIN. (shrink)
RESUMENEl artículo estudia primero el paradigma religioso de Scheler, el ético de Jankélévitch y el ontológico de Rombach de la alegría, intentando en cada caso despejar los rasgos formales esenciales que definen el fenómeno en todos ellos. Redefine luego estos rasgos valiéndose de las nociones de sincronía y sintonía y muestra el trasfondo estético propio de los diferentes paradigmas de la alegría. Finalmente se refiere al enamoramiento como un modo abierto a todo hombre de experimentar la alegría en su esencia.PALABRAS (...) CLAVEALEGRÍA, SENTIDO, SINCRONÍA, ABSTRACTThe article first deals with Scheler’s religious, Jankélévitch’s ethical, and Rombach’s ontological paradigm on happiness, and describes the essential formal traits that define the phenomenon in the three patterns. Second, it articulates these traits by resorting to the notions of synchrony and syntony, and shows the aesthetic backgound proper to the different paradigms of happiness. Finally, the article refers to the act of falling in love as a mood open to every human being in order to experience happiness in its essential nature.KEYWORDSHAPPINESS, MEANING, SYNCHRONY, GRACE. (shrink)
RESUMEN Este artículo realiza un análisis hermenéutico-critico de la noción de instante como autoafirmación del yo en el joven Lévinas y como relación diacrónica con el otro en sus obras de madurez. Primero elucida la significación esencial del espacio en la constitución del instante. Luego explicita por qué la espacialidad del fenómeno implica la relación con la alteridad como condición de toda forma del instante, incluso del instante de autoafirmación del yo. Finalmente describe el paso del instante de identificación del (...) yo al instante resultante de la asignación ética del otro como consecuencia de una inversión de la espacialidad del fenómeno. ABSTRACT This article attempts a hermeneutical and critical analysis of the notion of instant as a self-assertion of the ego in the early Lévinas and as a diachronic relation to the Other in the later works. First, it elucidates the essential significance of space in the constitution of the instant. Secondly, it explains why the spatiality of phenomena implies the relationship with alterity as a condition of any form of instant, including the instant of self-assertion of the ego. Finally, it analyzes the transition from the instant of identification of the ego to the instant that results from the ethical assignation of the Other as a consequence of an inversion of the spatiality of phenomena. (shrink)
RESUMENEl artículo se ocupa de la cuestión de Dios y la muerte en el pensamiento de Patocka. Comienza analizando los dos primeros movimientos del mundo de la vida, para centrarse en el tercero: «el descubrimiento del sí». Luego procura mostrar cómo, a través de la divinización del tiempo al cual debemos sacrificar la propia vida, la filosofía de Patocka consuma la subordinación de la problemática ética al renovarse de la temporalidad como sentido del ser. En este contexto se analiza la (...) relación entre la muerte como sacrificio por un lado y el ser, lo Divino y la temporalidad por el otro. PALABRAS CLAVE PATOCKA-DIOS-MUERTE-TIEMPO.ABSTRACTThe article is about God's question and death in Patocka's thought. It starts analysing the first two movements in the world of life, to focus on the third one: «the discovery of oneself». Then, it sets out to show how, throught time divinity, to wich we have to sacifice our own life, Patocka's philosophy consummates the subordination of the ethic problem when renewing the temporality as sense of being. In this context it is analysed the relationship between death and sacrifice, on one side, and divinity and temporality, on the otherKEYWORDSPATOCKA-GOD-DEATH-TIME. (shrink)
Primeramente, el artículo explicite las tres convergencias fundamentales entre la concepción kantiana y la levinasiana de la religión. La primera convergencia se refiere al acceso fenomenológico a la religión común a Kant y a Levinas. La segunda al hecho de que para ambos la modalidad concreta de la religión es ética. La tercera alude a un mismo modo de comprender el Reino y el acercamiento a él como "sentido último" del fenómeno religioso. En segundo lugar, el estudio señala cómo las (...) tres convergencias son posibles porque ambos pensadores suponen un tiempo otro que se cruza con el tiempo fenoménico. (shrink)
El artículo distingue, primero, dos formas fundamentales del tiempo: isocronía y sincronía y establece la relación existente entre ellas. Luego analiza dos nociones de eternidad, a saber, atemporalidad y ultratemporalidad que resultan de negar el discurrir propio de la isocronía y la sincronía. Finalmente esboza un concepto positivo de eternidad como supratemporalidad. Describe el temporaciarse propia de esta supratemporalidad como diacronía y explicita en qué medida la esperanza testimonia esta eternidad positiva.
The article explains the extent in which, in Kierkegaard’s thought, the genesis of Eros has a significance that is at once aesthetic and religious. It then restates the meaning of the aesthetic and the religious, and shows how the intensity with which both dimensions are experienced blends them in matrimony. The article then goes on to redefine the concept of matrimony on the basis of a hermeneutics of the notion of resolution. Finally, it specifies hope as the ultimate meaning of (...) the conjunction of the aesthetic and the religious in Eros. (shrink)
In this article, we explore the possibilities that works of art might possess for looking in original and unforeseen ways into something that, at first sight, has little to do with arts and artistic practice. To be more precise, we present here three artistic representations, taken from various times and style periods, that depict a well-known figure in art history: angels. A detailed description and analysis of these images give us the opportunity to figure out something about another figure, which (...) is fascinating to us as philosophers of education: the teacher. Our basic intuition is that the way in which three important artists—Albrecht Dürer, William Hogarth, and Paul Klee—have tried to capture and trace out... (shrink)