This paper argues that early phenomenologists used the concept of empathy not only to refer to the direct perception of the other’s experiences – as underscored by contemporary proponents of the Direct Perception Theory – but also to describe – in a sense close to Lipps’s theory and contemporary Simulation Theory – how, by virtue of imagining, we “feel into” animate and inanimate objects. Focusing on this second usage of the term, two kinds of imagination-based accounts of empathy in early (...) phenomenology are identified. According to “radical imaginationists”, empathy can be explained in terms of the series of imaginative processes entailed in the idea of “feeling into”, such as projecting oneself into the target, “imitating” its feelings, and resonating with it. Voigtländer’s account of empathizing with one’s own self in Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) and Geiger’s account of empathy with atmospheres in “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung” (1911) can in this sense be regarded as radical imaginationist theories. According to “moderate imaginationists”, empathy might (but need not) entail imagining. Stein’s account of empathy with others in On the Problem of Empathy (Zum Problem der Einfühlung) (1917/1989) as a three-step process which can involve imagination-like states is a good example of a moderate imaginationist account. (shrink)

This paper explores Max Scheler’s metaphilosophical views. In particular, the paper seeks to reconstruct and assess Scheler’s thesis according to which philosophical knowledge presupposes a moral attitude which he describes as an “act of upsurge” on the part of the whole person of the philosopher toward the essential, an act which cannot be found in either the natural worldview or the sciences. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper explores how Scheler approaches the question about the (...) nature of philosophy by focusing on the type of person of the philosopher (section 2). It then examines Scheler’s claim according to which philosophy is fundamentally distinct from the sciences (section 3), before exploring the moral attitude of the philosopher by examining three of its constitutive attitudes: love, self-humbling, and self-mastery (section 4). The paper presents some challenges and objections against Scheler’s metaphilosophical thesis. In particular, critiques of its metaphysical implications and of the view of science implicit in it are provided (section 5). Finally, it is also argued that the thesis contains a grain of truth and as such a moderate interpretation of it could be defended (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, das Projekt angewandter interkultureller Philosophie „Briefe über Philosophie weltweit“ vorzustellen. Der Beitrag ist in vier Teile gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt werden Anlass und Profil des Projektes vorgestellt. Der „akademische Nomadismus“ der Gegenwart verstärkt die immer schon interkulturelle Verfasstheit der akademischen Praxis und stellt den lebensweltlichen Anlass des Projektes dar, dies in Form von Briefen über die verschiedenen Bedingungen des Philosophierens auch zu reflektieren. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird genauer nach Erfahrungen gefragt, die in den Briefen zum (...) Ausdruck kommen und die wir als „interkulturelle Erfahrungen“ bezeichnen und näher bestimmen wollen. Thema des dritten Abschnitts ist die gewählte Darstellungsform für derartige interkulturelle Erfahrungen, nämlich die Briefform als Medium für Perspektivität. Im vierten Abschnitt machen wir abschließend den Versuch, das Projekt als Form angewandter interkultureller Philosophie zu profilieren. (shrink)

This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the main arguments that explain why several hostile (...) affective states involve a feeling of diminution in the subject’s own value (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of how the negative feeling of self-worth motivates self-deception. While in extrinsically motivated self-deception, the subject feels diminished in worth after negatively evaluating her own hostile affective states, in intrinsically motivated self-deception, the negative feelings of self-worth are constituent elements of the hostile affective state in question (section 3). Cases of intrinsically motivated self-deception are particularly intriguing because in them the motivation for self-deception is inherent to the hostile affective state, independently of external reasons. I coin the expression “self-deceptive style” to capture the distinctive form in which each hostile affective state intrinsically motivates changes in the architecture of the mind (e.g., perception, imagining, memory, judgment, attention, etc.) in order to generate an upliftment of the self (section 4). To show the descriptive and explanatory function of this concept, a comparative analysis of the self-deceptive styles of envy and hate is provided (section 5). The conclusion summarizes the main findings and explores directions for further research (section 6). (shrink)

In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.

This paper employs the concept of “transformative experience” to develop a radical version of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which engaging with literary perspectives might lead the reader to experience not only an epistemic but also a personal transformation. It is argued that the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities when subjected to the aesthetic norms that govern a literary work can mobilize other aspects of her psychology, eliciting in this way a change in her core values and, consequently, in the way (...) in which she engages with the world. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper discusses the “scope” of literary perspectives in terms of the character’s subjective experiences (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of the “depth” of literary perspectives in terms of the degree of involvement of the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities (section 3). It proceeds to examine how the interplay between the “scope” and “depth” in the reader’s engagement with a literary perspective can explain her epistemic and personal transformation (section 4). In the final part, the paper analyzes how the personal transformation changes the reader’s value system (section 5). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag handelt von der Empathie in der Kunst. Ich beginne mit einer Reflexion über die Ursprünge des Begriffes und seine Verwendung in der Ästhetik. Es folgt eine Analyse der Empathie im Vergleich zu anderen Formen der Anteilnahme an Kunstwerken. Im dritten Teil untersuche ich die Mechanismen der Empathie in der Kunst und die Funktion der Imagination. Der vierte Teil widmet sich der Bedeutung der Gefühle bei der Empathie für Kunstfiguren. Schließlich thematisiere ich den epistemischen, moralischen und ästhetischen Wert der (...) Empathie für die Kunst. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem Begriff "Männlichkeit". Die Klärung des Begriffes soll mithilfe dreier philosophischer Strategien unternommen werden. Erstens werde ich zwei philosophische Modelle von Männlichkeit einander gegenüberstellen. Harvey C. Mansfields Theorie soll mithilfe von Pierre Bourdieus Konzept der männlichen Herrschaft kritisiert werden. Während Mansfield eine verbreitete Auffassung von Männlichkeit vertritt, die diese mit Assertivität, Mut und Adel verbindet, bietet Bourdieu uns ein gutes Instrumentarium dafür, versteckte Strukturen der männlichen Ordnung hinter diesem Bild zu entdecken. Zweitens wird diese Kritik mit (...) Bourdieu durch einen phänomenologischen Hintergrund motiviert. Dabei werde ich sowohl die phänomenologischen Wurzeln von Bourdieus Denken als auch die Möglichkeit der phänomenologischen Weiterführung seiner Ideen berücksichtigen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird den Übereinstimmungen von Bourdieu und Max Scheler gewidmet. Schließlich werde ich den Vorschlag machen, „Männlichkeit“ als einen offenen Begriff zu verstehen, der historisch, sozial und kulturell wandelbar ist. Die Idee des offenen Begriffs bietet eine Alternative zu essenzialistischen Definitionen anhand notwendiger und hinreichenden Kriterien, lässt genügend Freiraum, um die Interdependenz zwischen gesellschaftlichem Wandel und un-seren Männlichkeitskonstruktionen zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine them (...) experientially, and this means that we imagine feeling them (section 2). I proceed to analyze the content of such imaginings in terms of the phenomenal properties of emotions undergone from a particular subjective perspective within the imagined scenario (section 3). Next, I argue that the mode in which such emotions are experientially imagined requires other-oriented perspective-shifting and the recreation of an emotion-like state (section 4). I examine how we recreate emotion-like states in two cases: when the emotion has been previously felt (section 5) and when it has not been previously experienced (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

This paper explores “existential envy” as a kind of envy in which the subject targets the rival’s entire being rather than one of her possessions, achievements or talents. It argues that existential envy is characterized by a weakening of the distinction between good and rival and by a strong focus on the envious self. In existential envy, the subject becomes aware that another person is closer to her ideal self than she is, such that the rival painfully reminds her of (...) unfulfilled but now unrealizable possibilities inherent to her being. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper analyzes the intentional object of existential envy, i.e., of what it means that the envier targets the other’s being (section 2). The next section explores existential envy’s focus on the self by examining the series of feelings of diminution in the envier’s own value (section 3). The paper then turns to the set of comparisons between the self and the other and the counterfactual thought “I could have been you!” which is shown to be definitory of this type of envy (section 4). In the final part of the paper, the relation between the envier’s bad self-image, self-reproach, and self-deception is discussed (section 5), before the main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

Der Aufsatz ist in zwei Teile gegliedert. Im ersten Teil unterscheide ich das Phänomen der Empathie von ähnlichen Phänomenen. Im zweiten Teil werde ich auf die Bedingungen für Empathie eingehen. In diesem Teil geht es mir darum zu zeigen, dass wir es trotz einiger Unterschiede zwischen Empathie für Mitmenschen und Empathie für Figuren mit demselben Phänomen zu tun haben.

This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1, while sect. 2 presents Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of the artwork; and enjoyment, which is understood to be an emotional response. Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light of current research. In particular, I provide arguments in favor of (...) Geiger’s distinction between liking and enjoyment, but I call into question the claim that liking reveals aesthetic values. In sect. 4, I suggest that liking is a form of feeling motivated by the cognition of aesthetic value and I distinguish it from both the grasping of values and emotional responses. I conclude in sect. 5 by briefly summarizing my main claims. (shrink)

Aunque la figura de Meinong se asocia a posiciones realistas acerca delos valores, un análisis más cuidadoso de su obra revela al menos tres concepcionesdiferentes de esta noción. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en examinar sistemáti-camente las tesis acerca de los valores sostenidas en tres de sus obras. Se analizará primero la teoría disposicionalista defendida en Psychologische ethische Untersuc-hungen zur Werttheorie (1894) según la cual los valores son posibles sentimientosde valor. Centraremos después nuestra atención a los cambios realizados en (...) “ÜberWerthaltung und Wert” (1895), obra en la que se explica el concepto de valor rela-cionándolo con los conceptos de emoción y deseo. Finalmente, nos centraremos enlas tesis realistas expuestas en Emotionale Präsentation (1917) y mostraremos la actualidad de las mismas para el debate contemporáneo. (shrink)

This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative affective (...) attitudes. Our aim is twofold: to investigate the influence of Scheler on Zambrano’s thought and to demonstrate how Scheler’s phenomenology of affectivity transformed in Spanish philosophy and, in particular, in Zambrano’s work. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper focuses on Scheler’s model of affectivity (section 2), presents an overview of Scheler’s reception in Spain focusing on Zambrano’s knowledge of his works (section 3), and examines Zambrano’s notion of the heart tracing parallelisms in Scheler’s works (section 4). The paper concludes with a discussion on Zambrano’s extension and transformation of the metaphor of the heart in the context of Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...) be regarded as a piece of philosophical work. (shrink)

This chapter examines the critiques of sentimentalism developed by Moritz Geiger and José Ortega y Gasset within the field of phenomenological aesthetics. It explores and evaluates the main arguments behind this critique: namely the existence of an aesthetic attitude, an intellectualized view of appreciation, and the predominance of form over content. Though both authors utilize Kant’s idea of “aesthetic disinterestedness”, they endorse a view of appreciation which differs from the Kantian one in substantial respects.

This paper offers a reading of Hartmann’s philosophy of literature from the perspective of contemporary aesthetics. In particular, I focus on his defense of the truth-value of literary works. After outlining the main concern of the paper (sect. 1), I place Hartmann’s view within the context of current aesthetic cognitivism (sect. 2). In the following three sections, I discuss Hartmann’s account, examining his critique of the thesis that literature is cognitively valuable because it transmits factual truths (sect. 3); his defense (...) of the view that literature discloses life (sect. 4); and the link between cognitive value and the ontology of the literary work (sect. 5). Finally, I discuss Hartmann’s focus on the concept of “truth” in the light of recent debates on knowledge of “what it is like” and on “understanding” (sect. 6). (shrink)

If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...) other feels because we are not acquainted with it, empathy cannot take place. Contrary to such criticism, this paper takes a moderately optimistic view of the simulationist claim. It develops a model to explain how we imagine the other’s emotions by drawing on phenomenal concepts, affective memories, and imaginative scaffoldings. I argue that this model can explain how we empathize with the other’s emotions regardless of whether these are familiar or novel to us. However, in the latter case, the imagined phenomenal quality is not identical but probably only similar to the other’s emotion. This similarity suffices for us to speak about empathy. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that the expression of an emotion is the external bodily manifestation of an internal psychological state. In contrast to this “general view”, this paper presents and discusses an alternative view put forward by Scheler and developed by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. According to the “phenomenological view”, emotional expression is a phenomenon of the lived body. In exploring this view, the paper analyzes four of its main tenets: a) the concept of the lived body as (...) distinct from the physical body; b) the idea that emotional expression functions as a symbol; c) the thesis of the universal grammar of emotions; and d) the distinction between final and expressive movements. In the conclusion, I discuss the value and relevance of the phenomenological view to contemporary research. (shrink)

Dieses Kapitel bietet einen Überblick über die analytische Emotionsforschung. Es beginnt mit der Geschichte der analytischen Philosophie der Emotionen, bei der Forschungslinien und Hauptwerke dargestellt werden. Der zweite Teil ist einer Taxonomie der analytischen Emotionsbegriffe gewidmet. Zuletzt werden aktuelle Gesprächspartner und spezielle Forschungsfelder präsentiert.

Tener miedo del más allá, sentirse amado incondicionalmente por un ser superior, avergonzarse de la condición imperfecta del ser humano, son algunos ejemplos de emociones que no dudaríamos en calificar como religiosas. Ahora bien ¿Cómo describir su estructura? ¿Por qué llamamos a estas emociones “religiosas”? ¿Cuálos son los rasgos distintivos que sirven para diferenciarlas de las emociones “no religiosas”? En este artículo se examinan los rasgos distintivos de las emociones religiosas. Para ello, se analizan tres elementos cruciales de la experiencia (...) emocional: su fenomenología, sus bases cognitivas y su relación con los valores. Se argumenta que las emociones religiosas poseen profundidad experiencial afectando totalmente a la persona, tienen un contenido religioso y responden a valores religiosos. Cada una de estas tres condiciones es necesaria para considerar a una emoción como religiosa, aunque por sí sola ninguna es suficiente. Son las tres condiciones conjuntas lo que explica el carácter religioso de una emoción. (shrink)

This paper provides an account on how to understand “emotional depth” and applies it to the particular case of religious experiences. After motivating the topic (section 1), I turn to classical and contemporary approaches to “emotional depth”. I divide these accounts into two main groups depending on whether they interpret depth as a constitutive or a momentary feature of the affective experience. I argue that despite their descriptive power, none of the existing accounts adequately captures the depth of affective religious (...) experiences (section 2). Next, I present and critically assess Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of the depth of religious feelings. In particular, I explore his concept of “specific depth”. In my reading, this notion conveys the momentary structure of a feeling (section 3). I then proceed to develop my own account according to which emotional depth is a phenomenal quality which depends on the intentional structure of a feeling. In particular, I argue that the feature of depth is explainable in terms of the specific ways in which a feeling is directed toward an object (directedness) and evaluatively presents it (evaluative presentation). Drawing on this idea, I examine three varieties of affective intentionality and distinguish between emotions, sentiments, and moods (section 4). I then apply my model to explain the depth of affective religious experiences (section 5). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

This paper maintains that empathy with fictional characters, aka fictional empathy, is morally valuable insofar as it can provide the empathizer with knowledge of values. More precisely, the paper argues that fictional empathy enables the empathizer to become imaginatively acquainted with the other’s values, even if these values are very different from one’s own. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper presents some thoughts about the epistemology of value and empathy, establishing a distinction between direct and (...) imaginative acquaintance with values (section 2). Next, it argues that empathy can lead the empathizer to co-experience the other’s values and, in so doing, make her directly or imaginatively acquainted with them (section 3). The paper discusses a possible challenge concerning the epistemic function of the imagination and explores different ways in which we can become imaginatively acquainted with values (section 4). It then examines features of fiction that explain why fictional empathy might be better suited than empathy for real others in pursuing this task (section 5). The paper closes by providing some reasons why we should regard the imaginative acquaintance with value attained through fictional empathy as morally valuable (section 6). (shrink)

In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage danach behandeln, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich zunächst auf die Struktur des Hasses eingehen: Ich werde für die These plädieren, dass der Hass als eine Gesinnung zu verstehen ist, die aus einem Prozess der Sedimentierung feinlicher Gefühle entsteht. Der Hass hat eine Geschichte. Diese Geschichte werde ich mich danach widmen, um die Hartnäckigkeit und Beharrung des Hasses besser zu verstehen. Denn seine Geschichte (...) macht der Hass nicht nur zu einer vorübergehenden Gemütsbewegung, sondern zu einem Teil unserer Person. Anschließend werde ich eine Antwort auf die Frage meines Aufsatzes geben, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. (shrink)

In ordinary language, “calmness”, “melancholy”, “cheerfulness”, and “sadness” are employed to describe affective states experienced by sentient beings. More precisely, these terms are used to report instances of moods. Yet, the very same terms are used to describe what seem to be properties of certain objects (e.g., things, situations) which, unlike sentient beings, are unable to feel. We usually describe atmospheres employing these terms: We speak about the calmness of a forest, the melancholy of a painting, the cheerfulness of a (...) field of flowers and the sadness of a landscape. Are we in fact referring to the same phenomenon? If not, why then do we employ the same terms? (shrink)

This paper explores Landmann-Kalischer’s analogy between the sensing of secondary qualities and the feeling of values in her work “Philosophie der Werte” (Philosophy of Values) (1910). Attention is paid to the epistemic motivation of the analogy, the distinction between pure feelings and affects, and the relation of pure feelings to value judgments. Her account is contrasted with two other accounts of the Brentanian tradition: Scheler’s approach within early phenomenology and Meinong’s account within the Graz School. I demonstrate that Landmann-Kalischer’s pioneering (...) work helped to forge a new view of affectivity which became dominant among Brentano’s followers. According to this new view, there is a type of affective experience which is both intentional and cognitive. More precisely, she argued that the affective experience in question is a feeling. The paper also argues that her account can enrich today’s meta-ethical research. It is argued that her account of pure feelings provides arguments against the view that makes emotions responsible for the apprehension of value. Furthermore, it is shown that we need an analysis of how objective knowledge of value can be obtained from our affective intuitions. -/- . (shrink)

Dieses Kapitel widmet sich dem Typologie-Komplex Neid und Eifersucht. Nach einer Besprechung der Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen beiden Emotionen (1) werden Neid (2) und Eifersucht (3) getrennt voneinander und jeweils im Hinblick auf ihre Hauptmerkmale, Spielarten und moralische Rechtfertigung untersucht.

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...) in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)

This paper explores Max Scheler’s (1874–1928) essay “On Shame and Feelings of Modesty” (Über Scham und Schamgefühl) (1913). It analyzes Scheler’s view on shame as a specifically human self-conscious emotion in which the subject becomes aware of the positive values of the self, i.e., her self-worth. It is argued that, in the context of current research, Scheler should be regarded as defending a radical revisionary approach to this emotion. First, against today’s widespread view that shame is an intrinsically social emotion (...) that requires real or imagined others to take place and which emerges to guarantee compliance with social norms, Scheler argues that shame is an emotion about the self which requires neither a relation with others nor internalized social norms. Second, rather than regarding shame as having a negative impact on the individual and her interpersonal relations, for Scheler, shame accomplishes the valuable function of disclosing and protecting positive values of the self, even if this self is not one’s own. With both claims, Scheler challenges what Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2011) have labeled respectively “shame socialism” and “shame pessimism,” and offers an alternative to understand the nature, functions, and varieties of shame which remains as innovative today as it was in his own time. -/- . (shrink)

According to Brentano and his followers, there is a genuine affective mode of intentional reference which consists in presenting the targeted objects imbued with value as being good or bad, and as inviting us to adopt a pro- or contra-attitude toward them. Let us call this view “the affective intentionality thesis”. In Brentano’s version of this thesis, not only do strictly affective phenomena such as feelings and emotions exhibit a sui generis affective intentionality, but so do conative ones, such as (...) wishes, desires, and acts of the will. However, in the version defended by the majority of his early phenomenological followers, this thesis applies only to affective phenomena in the narrow sense. This paper analyzes the reception of this later version of “the affective intentionality thesis” in Edith Stein’s early works, arguing that a further transformation of the thesis took place within her work. It argues that, for Stein, the intentionality exhibited by affective phenomena comes in different forms. According to this reading, the mode in which states that are affective in the strictest sense present their object as imbued with value admits variations. As I will demonstrate, a close analysis of her views on the stratification of the affective life and the different types of affective phenomena (general feelings, moods, emotions, and sentiments) suggests that at least three different forms of affective intentionality can be identified. I call them object intentionality, horizon intentionality, and personal intentionality. Since similar views can be found in other early phenomenologists, I suggest that Stein’s views can be taken as representative of a transformation that took place within this movement. -/- . (shrink)

According to «the emotional intentionality thesis», emotional experiences exhibit a sui generis intentional structure which consists in presenting the values of the objects they target. This paper examines the versions of this thesis put forward by Meinong and Scheler. While Meinong’s «emotional presentation account» maintains that emotions present values, Scheler’s «value-ception account» carefully dis-tinguishes between the apprehension of value in a feeling and the emotional response. The comparative study of both accounts is articulated around two issues central to contemporary emotion (...) research: 1) the «epistemic question» that examines which emotional experience is in fact responsible for the appre-hension of value; and 2) the «cognitive bases question» which explores the relation between emotional experiences and the cognitive states responsible for presenting the objects that the emotional experiences target. After introducing the emotional intentionality thesis and its historical roots in Brentano (sec-tion 1), the next two sections examine in turn the versions of this thesis provided by Meinong and Scheler (sections 2 and 3). The paper concludes by summarizing the results of the comparative study and extracting some teachings for current research (section 4). (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Fragen nach dem Ort der Werte in der Erfahrung und nach ihrer Natur als Qualität besonderer Art anhand von Ansätzen der Brentanoschule und der Gestaltpsychologie untersucht. Konkret geht es darum, diejenigen Positionen innerhalb dieser Schulen zu analysieren, welche die Werte sowohl in Abhängigkeit von den Eigenschaften des Objektes, an dem diese haften, als auch von der psychophysischen Konstitution des Subjektes, welche sich auf Werte bezieht, verstehen. Brentanos Dispositionalismus, Meinongs erste und zweite dispositionalistische Theorie der Werte (...) und Landmann-Kalischers Theorie der Werte als sekundäre Qualitäten werden exemplarisch als Vertreter der Brentanoschule untersucht, während Köhlers These der Werte als Gestaltqualitäten die Auffassung der Berliner gestalttheoretischen Schule repräsentieren soll. Die Untersuchung dieser Positionen wird einen neuen Blick auf das Wertphänomen werfen, die sich sowohl vom Realismus als auch vom Emotivismus unterscheidet, und welche darin besteht, es in Abhängigkeit von unseren affektiven Dispositionen zu erklären, seien diese als Gemütsbewegungen, Begehrungen, Gefühle oder emotionale Wahrnehmungen verstanden. (shrink)

This paper examines the model of the emotions put forward by Reinach and Scheler at the beginning of the 20th century and presents it as a plausible alternative to the contemporary “perceptual model.” According to the Reinach-Scheler view, emotions are not perceptions of value, but possible responses to values given to us in value-feelings. The paper is divided into two parts. The first is an historical investigation of the origins of the model in Reinach’s and Scheler’s works within the broader (...) context of early phenomenology. The second part presents systematic arguments for the distinction between value-feeling and emotional response. (shrink)

This chapter examines Else Voigtländer’s place within early phenomenology. The chapter starts by disclosing her relation to Lipps and to prominent phenomenologists of the Munich Circle, such as Pfänder, Scheler, Geiger, and Daubert. It proceeds to offer an analysis of her work as it is embedded within the phenomenological tradition. In particular, the chapter focuses on her original application of the phenomenological method, her contribution to the emotivist theory of self-consciousness, her analysis of the social dimension of the self, her (...) development of a concept of affectivity as intimately linked to value, and her study of specific phenomena, such as Ressentiment and erotic love. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the mechanisms that might have led to Voigtländer’s omission from the canon of phenomenology and an argument for the necessity of rewriting the history of the phenomenological movement to include her as a fully-fledged member. (shrink)