Results for 'имидж'

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  1.  54
    The Evidence Against Kronz.Peter Achinstein - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):169-175.
    Frederick Kronz constructs interesting examples in an attempt to show deficiencies in my concept of evidence and the advantages in Carnap's positive relevance idea. His discussion raises general questions of importance in developing an adequate account of scientific evidence questions about the relationship between evidence and belief and the role of emphasis in determining evidence. His examples are challenging, but do they work?
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  2.  66
    Bioethics and the Problem of Pluralism.Donald C. Ainslie - 2002 - Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2):1-28.
    The state that we inhabit plays a significant role in shaping our lives. For not only do its institutions constrain the kinds of lives we can lead, but it also claims the right to punish us if our choices take us beyond what it deems to be appropriate limits. Political philosophers have traditionally tried to justify the state's power by appealing to their preferred theories of justice, as articulated in complex and wide-ranging moral theories—utilitarianism, Kantianism, and the like. One of (...)
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  3. A Bat Without Qualities?Kathleen Akins - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. pp. 345--358.
  4. What is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?Kathleen Akins - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
  5.  60
    The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 149 Pages. [REVIEW]J. McKenzie Alexander - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):441-448.
  6. A Space Oddity: Colin McGinn on Consciousness and Space.Sophie R. Allen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):61-82.
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  7.  34
    Knowledge and Civilization.Barry Allen - 2003 - Westview Press.
    Knowledge and Civilization advances detailed criticism of philosophy's usual approach to knowledge and describes a redirection, away from textbook problems of epistemology, toward an ecological philosophy of technology and civilization. Rejecting theories that confine knowledge to language or discourse, Allen situates knowledge in the greater field of artifacts, technical performance, and human evolution. His wide ranging considerations draw on ideas from evolutionary biology, archaeology, anthropology, and the history of cities, art, and technology.
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  8.  43
    'What Am I?' Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem - Reply. [REVIEW]J. Almog - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):717-734.
    In his Meditations, René Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop (...)
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  9. A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
    Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine physicalism unless (...)
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  10. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?Torin Alter - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--76.
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation. But now he rejects the argument . On his view, it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (...)
     
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  11. Garrett on Causal Essentialism and Zombies.Torin Alter - manuscript
  12. Imagining Subjective Absence: Marcus on Zombies.Torin Alter - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.
    Many philosophers accept the conceivability of zombies: creatures that lack consciousness but are physically and functionally identical to conscious human beings. Many also believe that the conceivability of zombies supports their metaphysical possibility. And most agree that if zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. So, the claim that zombies are conceivable may have considerable significance. 1.
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  13. Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis.Torin Alter - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
    David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . Does it?
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  14. Mary's New Perspective.Torin Alter - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):585-84.
    I wish to consider an objection to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument recently made by Derk Pereboom.
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  15. Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism.Torin Alter - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.
    In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved.
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  16. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism.Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and (...)
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  17. The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Torin Alter - forthcoming - In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
     
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  18. The Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 1999 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that everything is physical. The general thrust of the KA is that physicalism errs by misconstruing or denying the existence of the subjective features of experience. Physicalists have given numerous responses, and the debate continues about whether the KA ultimately succeeds in refuting any or all forms of physicalism. Jackson himself has recently.
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  19. The Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 396--405.
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy. But some doubt that phenomenal consciousness.
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  20. A Simple Refutation of the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.James T. Anderson - manuscript
    One of the most persuasive objections to the identity thesis.
     
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  21. Consciousness and Realism.David Leech Anderson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful influence of externalist versions of (...)
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  22.  41
    The Relational Theory of Mind.Frederick Anderson - 1942 - Journal of Philosophy 39 (May):253-260.
  23. Concepts of Consciousness, Kinds of Consciousness, Meanings of 'Consciousness'.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16.
    The use of expressions like ‘concepts of consciousness’, ‘kinds of consciousness’, and ‘meanings of ‘consciousness’’ interchangeably is ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is argued that this practice can be made sense of in only two ways. The first involves interpreting ‘concepts of consciousness’ and ‘kinds of consciousness’ metalinguistically to mean concepts expressed by ‘consciousness’ and kinds expressed by ‘consciousness’; and the second involves certain literal, though semantically deviant, interpretations of those expressions. The trouble is that researchers typically use the (...)
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  24. Conceiving Simple Experiences.Michael V. Antony - 2001 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-86.
    That consciousness is composed of simple or basic elements that combine to form complex experiences is an idea with a long history. This idea is approached through an examination of our “picture” or conception of consciousness . It is argued that CC commits us to a certain abstract notion of simple experiential events, or simples, and that traditional critiques of simple elements of experience do not threaten simples. To the extent that CC is taken to conform to how consciousness really (...)
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  25. Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous?Michael V. Antony - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
    It is widely assumed that ‘ consciousness ’ is multiply ambiguous within the consciousness literature. Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine: ‘ consciousness ’ is best viewed as univocal within the literature. The second point is that researchers would do (...)
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  26.  97
    Outline of a General Methodology for Consciousness Research.Michael V. Antony - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2):43-56.
    In spite of the enormous interdisciplinary interest in consciousness these days, sorely lacking are general methodologies in terms of which individual research efforts across disciplines can be seen as contributing to a common end. In the paper I outline such a methodology. The central idea is that empirically studying our conception of consciousness—what we have in mind when we think about consciousness—can lead to progress on consciousness itself. The paper clarifies and motivates that idea.
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  27. Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open (...)
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  28. Chalmers' Zombie Argument.István Aranyosi - 2005 - In Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University.
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  29. Powers and the Mind–Body Problem.István Aranyosi - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.
    This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality.
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  30. Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows[REVIEW]István Aranyosi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  31. Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus.Istvan A. Aranyosi - 2005 - Dissertation, Central European University
     
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  32. Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm - 1984 - Blackwell.
  33. Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain.David M. Armstrong - 1983 - In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
     
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  34. Three Types of Consciousness.David M. Armstrong - 1979 - In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69). pp. 235.
  35. What is Consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
  36. Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth.Marcus Arvan - 1998 - Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances.".
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  37. Consciousness, Conceivability Arguments, and Perspectivalism: The Dialectics of the Debate.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):99-122.
  38. Qualia and Theory Reduction: A Criticism of Paul Churchland.Jay E. Bachrach - 1990 - Iyyun 281.
  39.  12
    Beth's Property Fails in $L^{.Lee Badger - 1980 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (2):284-290.
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  40. $\Underset{\Tilde}{\Delta}^1_n$ Sets of Reals.Joan Bagaria & W. Hugh Woodin - 1997 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4):1379-1428.
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  41. Definition and Problems of Consciousness.Alexander Bain - 1894 - Mind 3 (11):348-361.
  42. Mind and Body.Alexander Bain - 1883 - Mind 8 (31):402-412.
  43. Physicalism and the Preposterousness of Zombies.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
  44. The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
    It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to (...)
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  45. Zombies Support Biological Theories of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - manuscript
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  46. A Critique of Materialism.John R. Baker - 1946 - Hibbert Journal 45:31-37.
     
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  47. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  48. Introspectible Consciousness: What Philosophers Can Do About It.Hiranmoy Banerjee - 2003 - In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
  49.  38
    Structure of Twins in Gaas Nanowires Grown by the Vapour-Liquid-Solid Process.R. Banerjee, A. Bhattacharya, A. Genc & B. M. Arora - 2006 - Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.
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  50. Awareness.S. S. Barlingay - 1976 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (October):83-96.
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