Can externalist concepts really capture an individual.

My paper examines the popular idea, defended by Kripke, that meaning is an essentially normative notion. I consider four common versions of this idea and suggest that none of them can be supported, either because the alleged normativity has nothing to do with normativity or because it cannot plausibly be said that meaning is normative in the sense suggested. I argue that contrary to received opinion, we don’t need normativity to secure the possibility of meaning. I conclude by considering the (...) repercussions of rejecting semantic normativity on three central issues: justification, communication, and naturalism. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less (...) straightforward than assumed - in particular, it is far from clear what it might mean to say that a kind term is rigid. Strikingly, however, these worries have not done much to undermine the confident assumption that natural kind terms form a special semantic category. In the paper I try to shake that confidence. I argue that although natural kind terms are no doubt important (for instance, from an explanatory point of view), we are certainly not warranted in concluding that they form a separate, semantic category among the kind terms. (shrink)

Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist (...) can opt for a. (shrink)

This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second.

The question of whether content externalism poses a threat to the traditional view of self-knowledge has been much debated. Compatibilists have tried to diffuse the threat by appealing to the self-verifying character of reflexive judgments about our own thoughts, while incompatibilists have strenuously objected that this does not suffice. In my paper I argue that this debate is fundamentally misconceived since it is based, on both sides, on the problematic notion of ‘knowledge of content’. What this shows, I argue, is (...) not that content externalism is unobjectionable, but that the real challenge to content externalism is not an epistemological one. The real difficulty concerns the content externalist’s seemingly necessary commitment to the idea that individuals have an incomplete grasp of the concepts that go into their own thoughts. This idea poses a threat not to self-knowledge, I argue, but rather to our first- and second-order reasoning abilities. (shrink)

Sarah Sawyer has challenged my claim that social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts. Sawyer denies that Burge's later sofa thought-experiment relies on this assumption: the unifying principle behind the thought-experiments supporting social externalism, she argues, is just that referents play a role in the individuation of concepts. I argue that Sawyer fails to show that social externalism need not rely on the assumption of incomplete understanding. To establish the content externalist (...) conclusions, further considerations are required, and these do commit the externalist to the assumption of incomplete understanding. (shrink)

The thesis examines a central and controversial question in the philosophy of mind and language: Is meaning normative? Are there rules we must follow for our words to have meaning? ;Philosophers are sharply divided over this question. One side, often associated with Wittgenstein and more recently Kripke, sees meaning as essentially normative. If a sign is to be meaningful, then surely, it is argued, there must be a distinction between the correct and incorrect use of that sign. The other side (...) eschews the appeal to rules. This line of thought goes back to Quine, and has been vigorously defended by Davidson, who argues that linguistic rules are no more essential to speaking a language than the rules of etiquette at a dinner table are to consuming food. ;The dissertation proposes that we approach the question by asking whether there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning. Various common versions of the notion of linguistic incorrectness are considered, including the one appealed to by Saul Kripke in his discussion of Wittgenstein, the suggestion that going against the communicative conventions is making a linguistic error, and Tyler Burge's idea that we err when we violate certain constitutive community norms. Neither of these suggestions, it is argued, supports the idea that rules are essential to meaning. ;But we should not conclude from this, as does Davidson, that we can reject the notion of linguistic incorrectness altogether. If a speaker is to be interpretable there must be certain constraints on her linguistic use, and a plausible construal of these constraints, it is argued, presupposes a notion of linguistic incorrectness. The conclusion is that there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning, although this notion is not to be understood along the ordinary lines. (shrink)

At the time that Quine wrote "Two Dogmas" an attack on analyticity was considered a simultaneous attack on the very idea of necessary truth. This all changed with Kripke's revival of a non-epistemic, non-linguistic notion of necessity. My paper discusses the question whether we can take Kripke one step further and free analyticity from its epistemic ties, thereby reinstating a notion of analyticity that is immune to Quine's attack, and compatible with his epistemic holism. I discuss this question by examining (...) Tyler Burge's claim that truths of meaning depend on features of the external environment and are a posteriori. I argue that although Burge's construal of analyticity circumvents Quine's objections, it is not well-motivated philosophically and has problematic implications. Kripke's strategy with respect to necessity, I conclude, is not easily transferable to analyticity. (shrink)

I consider an individualist reply to Burge's well-known anti-individualist thought experiment. It is commonly assumed that the individualist has one of two options: accept that reference is socially determined and opt for a bifurcation of content ; or reject the conclusions of the thought experiment and insist that Burge's patient uttering "I have arthritis in my thigh" has her or his own "arthritis"-concept and utters a true belief. I suggest that neither of these options is very attractive and thus the (...) individualist seems faced with a dilemma. However, Burge's thought experiment rests on problematic philosophical assumptions that the individualist need not accept. One such assumption is that the speaker uttering "I have arthritis in my thigh" makes a non-empirical error. This assumption, as Burge himself makes clear, is crucial if the thought experiment is to go through. So, Burge presents an account of the notion of a "non-empirical error" which is very problematic and fails to support the conclusions of the thought experiment. Once this account is questioned, the individualist can reject the claim that meaning is determined by the speaker's social environment without falling into the dilemma. (shrink)

According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and subtle (...) defense of (RG) against the threat of paradox, as proponents of the received view are wont to do. Instead, we argue, the rule-following considerations provide Wittgenstein's deep and subtle reasons for rejecting the very idea that speaking a language involves rule-guidance. Although Wittgenstein subscribed to (RG) during his middle period writings, his later remarks on rules, far from being a clarification and elaboration of his earlier views, are directed against the claim of the middle period that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. (shrink)

Cet article expose la critique de Maimon du principe kantien de causalité. Pour ce faire, nous considérerons les deux niveaux sur lesquels cette critique se développe, l’un formel et l’autre matériel. Au premier niveau, Maimon soulève trois objections au jugement hypothétique, relativement à son origine, sa fonction et sa modalité. Selon le deuxième, Maimon développe deux objections, dont la première concerne en général la démonstration kantienne de la validité des catégories, tandis que la seconde concerne en particulier celle du principe (...) de causalité. Cela nous permettra de mieux comprendre le sens de ses deux objections fondamentales contre la philosophie kantienne, formulées à travers les questions quid juris? et quid facti? (shrink)

Santos-Viola, Maria Paz Nakpil & Mark Joseph Santos (trans.). 2023. Ang aking paglalakbay noong dekada 1980: Pakikipagtagpo sa kawalan ng pagkakapantay at diskriminasyon. In Banwa at Layag: Antolohiya ng mga Kuwentong Paglalakbay ng mga Pilipino sa Ibayong Dagat, ed. Axle Christien Tugano, pp. 86-88. Manila: Limbagang Pangkasaysayan.

Por ocasião do centenário de nascimento de Paul Ricoeur, a Universidade de Coimbra juntou num mesmo volume um conjunto de estudos académicos em tributo a este pensador. Reuniram-se deste modo comunicações de professores, de novos investigadores e de estudantes de doutoramento em redor de temas que marcaram a receção da obra e do filósofo francês em Coimbra. Cada capítulo do presente livro demonstra a fecundidade de um pensamento que, enraizado na “tradição reflexiva”, assumindo a mensagem das “filosofias da existência”, articulando (...) Fenomenologia e Hermenêutica, adquire, hoje, crescente impacto e relevância. Esta é uma filosofia que promove o diálogo entre disciplinas, autores e culturas e supera divisões teóricas em ordem a enfrentar as exigências da praxis. O desafio da praxis fez assim emergir um pensamento exigente e, simultaneamente, capaz de dialogar com diversas áreas do saber como: a psicoterapia, a história, as neurociências, a bioética, as ciências sociais e os estudos literários. At the occasion of the Paul Ricoeur’s centenary this volume joined in tribute several scholars, young researchers, and Ph.D students around the main themes that marked the reception of the philosopher’s work in Portugal and, especially in the University of Coimbra. Each chapter demonstrates the vigour Ricoeur’s thought as it is rooted in the "reflexive tradition", as it assumed the "existentialist" horizon, as it articulated Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. This philosophical project as, today, an enormous range of influence. This is a project that promotes dialogue between disciplines, authors, and cultures, overcoming theoretical divisions in face the demands of praxis. From this rich and plural inspiration comes the ability to meet with other fields of thought, namely psychotherapy, history, neuroscience, bioethics, social sciences, and literary studies. (shrink)

L'ouvrage nous offre un exposé minutieux de la Poétique de Gaston Bachelard, qui nous mène à un dialogue imaginaire où María Noel Lapoujade exprime ses propres points de vue dérivés de sa Philosophie de l'imagination, des images et des imaginaires et donne ainsi les fondements de sa notion originale d'Homo imaginans. La lecture de cet ouvrage original et fondé nous conduit à un scénario peuplé de résonances inédites de la pensée de Bachelard.

QUESTIONS DE METHODE I. Au contraire de Sartre qui, a partir de quelques elements cueillis dans les ecrits de HusserI concernant la conscience ima geante, a bllti sa propre doctrine de!'imagination, nous nous proposons de reconstituer, a partir de ces m~mes elements, ce qu'on pourrait appeler la theort:e husserlienne de l'imagination, c'est-a-dire la theorie que HusserI eut lui-m~me construite, s'il avait reuni en une synthese les elements qu'il a laisses epars. Une entreprise de ce genre est toujours delicate et souleve (...) des prob!emes difficiles - a commencer par celui de sa legitimite. N ous ecartons d'emblee l'objection d'ordre general qui contesterait Ie droit de systematiser dans l'reuvre d'un auteur ce que lui-m~me a laisse disperse et eventuellement inacheve. Par un tel scrupule, on sacrifie sans doute a la rigueur historique mais on est beaucoup moins soucieux de penetrer une pensee dans son dynamisme in terne et profond et, en derniere analyse, on protege les droits de l'archeologie mais non pas ceux de la culture et de son progreso Nous pensons a une difficulte beaucoup plus serieuse; de sa so lution depend l'attitude a adopter en face des textes dont nous devons nous servir dans notre etude. Nous utilisons des ouvrages qui couvrent la totalite de la car riere philosophique de HusserIl. (shrink)

Dans sa Psychologie du point de vue empirique Brentano fonde le caractère scientifique de la psychologie sur le geste qui délimite le domaine particulier de cette science aux seuls phénomènes psychiques, en excluant les phénomènes physiques. La distinction entre ces deux types de phénomènes devient ainsi essentielle pour le projet brentanien d’une psychologie scientifique. L’objectif de ce travail est de montrer d’une part que la critique que Husserl fait à la fin de ses Recherches logiques de la distinction brentanienne entre (...) phénomènes psychiques et phénomènes physiques ne tient pas compte entièrement de la finesse de la théorie brentanienne des phénomènes physiques. Il s’agira cependant, par la suite de montrer les difficultés qui découlent précisément de cette conception brentanienne complexe des phénomènes physiques, en particulier ceux qui se présentent sous la forme des sensations. Nous montrerons que la théorie brentanienne des sensations à l’époque de sa Psychologie donne à ces phénomènes un caractère double, à la fois physique et psychique, et met ainsi en danger le projet même de délimiter définitivement le domaine de la psychologie aux seuls phénomènes psychiques. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Actes Sémiotiques n°117 | 2014. Nous remercions Maria Chalevelaki de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Ce n'est pas par hasard si le vêtement constitue l'un des sujets de prédilection des sémioticiens. Que ce soit dans sa forme visuelle, dans sa forme verbale, ou dans sa relation avec le corps, le vêtement et les pratiques vestimentaires sont des matrices de signification très riches aussi bien d'un point de vue théorique que du point (...) de vue de la sémiotique de la - Linguistique et théorie du langage – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Le travail de Maria Goupil-Travert clôt, de façon sans doute définitive, le sujet des combattantes de la Révolution et de l’Empire. Les Républicaines sont privilégiées puisque la jeune chercheuse s’est principalement appuyée sur vingt-huit dossiers du service historique de la Défense, constitués par ces dernières pour appuyer leur demande de pension auprès du ministère de la Guerre. Certes, leur nombre est faible, mais Manon Pignot, pour sa part, n’a pu travailler de façon approfondie que sur...

Le problème central des Recherches logiques est de déterminer le rapport entre deux types d’actes : les actes de signification et les actes d’in­tuition (perception et imagination), donc entre d’un part des actes dont les objets sont de l’ordre du langage et, d’autre part, les actes qui « accèdent » à la réalité, dans lesquels l’objet réel est présent lui-même. Ce rapport est introduit dans la I re R echerche logique sous le nom de « remplissement » mais sa vraie (...) nature deviendra claire seulement dans la VI e R echerche logique . Le remplissement sera alors la synthèse d’un acte de signification et d’un acte d’intuition visant un même objet. Ce modèle d’une intention vide qui se remplit par la suite pose cependant certains problèmes. Premièrement, les significations peuvent-elles jouer le rôle d’objets et, si oui, quelle est la nature de ceux-ci ? Deuxièmement, peut-on vraiment isoler des intentions de signification, dont l’objet ne serait ni réel (comme dans la perception) ni même possible (comme dans l’imagination), mais d’une tout autre nature ? Puisqu’une imagination peut aussi jouer le rôle d’intuition remplissante, toute intention de signification doit se remplir (aboutir à un objet réel ou, au moins, possible), sans quoi elle ne serait pas une signification du tout, elle n’aurait aucun sens. Enfin, si nous acceptons cette thèse de l’universalité du remplissement, ou au moins de sa possibilité, comment penser le cas des objets idéaux, dont le remplissement ne va pas de soi ? (shrink)

Day 4 of advanced course on "Crosslinguistic compositional semantics" at 2009 LSA Summer Institute at UC Berkeley. Plan to today: (a) Introduction (syn-sem traits of English vs. Kalaallisut, scope corollary), (b) UC1 + event (re)centering = UC2, (c) English and Kalaallisut in CCG+UC2, (d) Analysis of Kalaallisut BA.TO.L (review) vs. English SA.SU.S (new).

Day 5 of advanced course on "Crosslinguistic compositional semantics" at 2009 LSA Summer Institute at UC Berkeley. Plan for today: (a) Introduction: scope prediction (SA vs. BA), sample data (English vs. Kalaallisut), (b) Analysis of English data.

On abordera le sujet de la barbarie sur le plan de la « réflexion », c’est-à-dire à partir du processus interne à la connaissance. Ce processus s’installe quand notre rationalité, après un parcours d’acquisition de nouvelles données et d’actions déterminées, qui coïncide avec sa propre fonction, retourne sur soi même, réexamine les données acquises et les actions produites et en prend conscience pour une autre élaboration, un autre parcours, d’autres actions. Il s’agit d’un moment très import...

Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio . She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on (...) the necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio . Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)

Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio. She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on the (...) necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio. Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)