To mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of scholarly publishing at PIMS, and the thirtieth anniversary of Gilson’s death, PIMS is releasing the lectures devoted to Thomas Aquinas, many of them revised and updated. The volume contains nine lectures from this prestigious series by some of the most prominent Thomists, including Leonard Boyle, Edward Synan, James Weisheipl, Mark Jordan, and James P. Reilly. The volume includes an introduction by James P. Reilly written especially for the occasion, as well as a general (...) index, an index of modern authors, and an index to citations from the Scriptum super Sententiis, Summa contra Gentiles, and Summa theologiae. (shrink)

As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one’s own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning (...) of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one’s own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems. (shrink)

The important work, exquisitely translated by Mark Wauck, brings the essential elements of philosophy into view as a cohesive, readily understandable, and erudite structure, and does so rigorously in the best tradition of St. Thomas.

ABSTRACTThis essay elaborates how an imbalanced reciprocity between inhabitants of places of relative safety and places of greater precarity results from pursuing security on the basis of a reactive fear of vulnerability. It analyzes a range of features that shape the complex forms that vulnerability takes with a particular focus on how the constitution of places as rhetorically and corporeally secure or not renders different groups of people secure and/or subject to heightened exposure to harm. This analysis suggests that vulnerability (...) is better conceived as a process than a quality, mediating between conceptions of vulnerability as a universal condition and as a highly specific empirical condition. Finally, by departing from the negative, reactive view of vulnerability that animates the supposition of the boundedness of selves and places, an alternative conception of security that neither equates it with invulnerability nor opposes it to vulnerability can be developed. (shrink)

Si l’histoire de la pensée médiévale inclut celle de ses influences, comme l’histoire de la pensée moderne celle de ses sources, il est alors doublement légitime de se demander ce que peut nous apprendre sur la pensée cartésienne sa confrontation historique avec la pensée médiévale, au contact de laquelle elle s’est formée, et à l’encontre de laquelle elle s’est développée.Prenant la suite de travaux antérieurs, cet ouvrage d’Étienne Gilson envisage tout d’abord la confrontation dans une perspective génétique , avant (...) de considérer plus précisément le rapport de la métaphysique cartésienne et de la métaphysique médiévale à travers l’examen de certains points de doctrine particulièrement délicats. C’est ici notamment que sont rencontrés et éclaircis les problèmes de la critique cartésienne des formes substantielles, du « dialogue » de Descartes avec saint Augustin à l’occasion du cogito, avec saint Thomas dans la preuve de l’existence de Dieu par la causalité de l’idée, et avec saint Anselme dans la preuve dite « ontologique ». Le caractère novateur de la pensée cartésienne se trouve ainsi établi avec une acuité inédite. (shrink)

Ce volume recueille des éléments propres à éclairer l’œuvre de Duns Scot et entend montrer que sa lecture n’est pas pas inutile pour comprendre Thomas d’Aquin. Gilson rappelle que le sens des principes dont use l’auteur ne se comprend bien que par l’usage qu’il en fait. Car le Docteur Subtil ne nous a pas laissé un système : la parole de Dieu, dont il cherche l’intellection, n’est pas un donné à reconstruire par mode de déduction. La philosophie, la sienne (...) en propre, doit être traversée de thèmes fondamentaux ausquels il revient sans cesse pour éclairer les profondeirs de la foi. On trouvera dans cet ouvrage magistral des analyses fondées sur les Commentaires de Pierre Lombard par Duns Scot, ainsi que des études sur l’objet de la métaphysique, l’existence de l’être infini, la nature divine, l’origine du contringent, la connaissance intellectuelle et la volonté. (shrink)

Dans sa thèse de 1913, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie, Étienne Gilson inaugure le geste qu’il prolongera dans l’Index scolastico-cartésien et les Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien : situer l’œuvre de Descartes dans le contexte intellectuel de son époque.S’il est certain qu’avec Descartes la philosophie tout entière semble prendre un nouveau départ, il n’en est pas moins sûr que cette pensée s’est formée sous l’influence de la théologie scolastique (...) à laquelle Descartes fut initié lors de ses études chez les Jésuites. Étienne Gilson se propose ainsi d’éclairer de cette influence les définitions cartésiennes de la liberté. Notion cardinale de sa philosophie, la liberté fut en effet, avant Descartes, l’objet de nombreuses réflexions théologiques : elle se présente donc comme le point de rencontre privilégié de ces deux systèmes de pensée.Par cette entrée dans l’œuvre de Descartes, Étienne Gilson nous invite à la lire d’un œil neuf : c’est ainsi qu’il nous permet, par exemple, de déplacer le cœur de l’apport cartésien de la définition de la liberté humaine à celle de la liberté divine. Dès lors, Descartes se révèle plus fidèle à la tradition scolastique qu’il ne l’affirme : n’en transformant les cadres que lorsqu’il s’y trouve contraint par les exigences de sa physique, il s’efforce de minimiser autant que possible les modifications qu’il y applique. (shrink)

In the half century since its first publication in English, this small book has become a classic of medieval theology. Directing his attention to 'perhaps the most neglected aspect' of Cistercian mysticism, the great French medievalist and philosopher Etienne Gilson directs attention to 'that part of [Bernard's] theology on which his mysticism rests', his 'systematics'. Cistercian Publications brings this important book back into print in celebration of the nine-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Saint Bernard, hoping that new generations (...) of scholars will find it food for thought and further research. (shrink)

L'Index scolastico-cartesien elabore par Etienne Gilson se concoit avant tout comme un instrument de travail apportant des materiaux pour l'application d'une these audacieuse qui sera plus tard developpee dans les Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, et que Gilson inaugure en ces termes : On a longtemps considere que le principal titre de gloire de Bacon et Descartes avait ete de constituer une philosophie radicalement detachee de toutes les philosophies anterieures, (...) et d'en construire l'edifice entier a nouveaux frais. [...] Une pareille conception du cartesianisme peut a la limite se soutenir en ce qui concerne la physique, mais la psychologie, la doctrine de la connaissance, la morale et la metaphysique de Descartes sont remplies d'elements empruntes a la scolastique. La doctrine du temps, des elements et qualites des corps, de Dieu et de ses attributs, des preuves de son existence, de la creation et conservation du monde, de la substance et de son rapport aux accidents, des idees innees et de notre mode de connaissance, des etats actifs et passifs de l'ame, du rapport de la volonte a l'entendement, enfin les vues de Descartes sur la religion et ses rapports avec la philosophie temoignent que sa pensee n'est pas sans devoir quelque chose a la philosophie de l'Ecole. (shrink)

“Latin American Positivism: Theory and Practice” is unique in that the work examines this subject from a multi-disciplinary prospect. The philosophy contributors examine the doctrines of Latin American positivism as they evolved during the nineteenth century while the historians study the interplay between the philosophy and the larger society.

This paper continues as the second part of my study of the relationship of Fr. Lawrence Dewan OP and Etienne Gilson. My first paper explored their metaphysical differences, while this second paper explores their common commitment to Christian philosophy and to St. Thomas Aquinas’ seminal work on the interrelationship of faith and reason as manifest most clearly in the interrelationship of revealed theology and philosophy. This leads us into a closer examination of Gilson's sustained treatment of this topic. (...) However, we must acknowledge that this topic is often susceptible to unproductive philosophical and metaphysical abstraction. In order to avoid this, we depart from the standard method of treatment through an interdisciplinary appeal to the theological, philosophical, and historical implications of the bodily resurrection of Christ. (shrink)

The theology of a theologian worthy of the name cannot be anything but the very movement of his mind and love as he seeks the truth about God in the teaching of sacred scripture and in the study of his creatures. Such is the theology of St.Thomas Aquinas. Some of the propositions are set forth here for meditation. Their choice is entirely my own. The writer who reports them has never been able to reread them without having the impression of (...) their leading him as close to God as is possible for a human mind to approach him while meditating on the meaning of his word. My only desire is to share that experience with others. It will never be a question of demonstrating, but only of showing, leaving to each reader the task of finding his own way and trying in his own fashion to approach the sublime mysteries whose neglect would be the death of metaphysics as well as of theology, and whose meditation, in the humility of love, is a work of piety no less than of wisdom. (shrink)

L’introduction proposée par Étienne Gilson à l’étude de saint Augustin a pour vocation de cerner l’esprit même de l’augustinisme en relevant ce qui, dans la doctrine, a imprimé à la pensée médiévale l’impulsion dont tant d’œuvres profondes sont les témoins. Cette étude se propose ainsi de dégager les quelques thèses essentielles qui, commandant l’ensemble de la doctrine, permettent d’en interpréter le détail. La table systématique des matières annexée à ce volume permettra d’ailleurs au lecteur de l’utiliser à la manière (...) d’un inventaire; la bibliographie raisonnée compétant cette table l’aidera en outre à s’orienter dans une vaste littérature historique. Cependant, à la place de l’ordre synthétique et linéaire des doctrines qui suivent la norme de l’intellect, nous trouvons dans l’augustinisme un mode d’exposition nécessairement autre, approprié à une doctrine dont le centre est dans la grâce et dans la charité. La méthode est digressive : l’ordre naturel de la doctrine augustinienne est ce rayonnement autour d’un centre, qui est l’ordre même de la charité. Et s’il s’agit là moins de savoir que d’aimer, la tâche propre du philosophe est moins de fiare connaître que de faire désirer… On conçoit alors que cet ouvrage, publié pour la première fois en 1929, promette aujourd’hui encore une découverte originale de saint Augustin. (shrink)

Peirce nurtured a lifelong interest in the mathematics, metaphysics, and logic of time. For him, time was the primal form of continuum, and he studied it as such. That study is fundamentally connected to Peirce’s semiotic and metaphysical exploration of the continuum of consciousness. In this paper I will use two successive approaches to answer the question “To what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow of signs and the flow of signs influence or determine the flow of (...) time?” I will first examine Peirce’s views concerning the connection between time, the flow of perception, and the emergence of perceptual judgments. I will then apply several resulting distinctions to show how they illuminate the mutual determination of time and semiosis in Peirce’s mature semiotic theory. I will finish with considerations about how Peirce ended up viewing the genealogy of both time and logic in relation to the birth of a semiotic universe. (shrink)

"Étienne Gilson: His Idea of Beauty and Art”: Two books of Étienne Gilson are especially important in the area of aesthetics: Painting and Reality and The Arts of the Beautiful. In my essay I discuss Gilson’s idea of beauty and his idea of art. To some degree, É. Gilson follows traditional Thomistic point of view, i.e., he claims that the beautiful is that which pleases when seen, or that which consists of integrity, proportion and clarity. He (...) gives, however, a new interpretation of clarity which, for him, means not only physical lucidity, but also a metaphysical radiation and spiritualization of what is material. As for art, É. Gilson is of an opinion that it enjoys a strong metaphysical status, since the existence of the work of art comes from the artist himself. Finally, I explain why É. Gilson’s views are open to further discussion, both metaphysical and theological. (shrink)

La philosophie de l'art d'Étienne Gilson n'accorde aucune place au roman. Après avoir dégagé les raisons de ce rejet et en avoir dévoilé les présupposés, nous montrons que le roman a droit de cité dans la sphère des arts majeurs, et ce même à partir des principes de la théorie de Gilson.Gilson's philosophy of art leaves no room to the novel. First, we elucidate his reasons to do so, then we disclose their presuppositions, and finally we show (...) that the novel should be considered as a major form of art even on Gilson's grounds. (shrink)

“Essayer de dégager l’esprit de la philosophie médiévale c’était se condamner à fournir la preuve de son existence ou à avouer qu’elle n’a jamais existé. C’est en cherchant à la définir dans son essence propre que je me suis vu conduit à la présenter comme la « philosophie chrétienne » par excellence. Il se trouve donc que cet ouvrage converge vers cette conclusion, que le Moyen Age a produit, outre une littérature chrétienne et un art chrétien, une philosophie chrétienne, ce (...) dont on dispute. Mais il ne s’agit pas de soutenir qu’il a créé cette philosophie de rien, pas plus qu’il n’a tiré du néant son art et sa littérature. L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, tel qu’on l’entend ici, c’est l’esprit chrétien, pénétrant la tradition grecque, la travaillant du dedans et lui faisant produire une vue du monde, une Weltanschauung spécifiquement chrétienne.”. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 796-806, July 2022.

Nombreuse, infiniment ondoyante et diverse, cette pensee n'est qu'une charite toujours active dont le mouvement incessant tend vers des objets qui nous echappent ou vers les aspects inconnus de ceux que nous percevions deja. Comment suivre une telle pensee sans etre cette pensee meme?. Le present ouvrage tente une reponse en meme temps qu'il pose la question. Considerant que les ecrits de Bonaventure dessinent moins une progression lineaire qu'ils ne suivent un ordre du coeur, Etienne Gilson propose ici, apres (...) un chapitre introductif de nature biographique qui cherche l'homme derriere l'oeuvre, un parcours circulaire autour du centre de la synthese bonaventurienne, le Verbe, incarne en la personne du Christ. C'est ainsi que se trouvent abordes les themes fondamentaux que sont la critique de la philosophie naturelle, l'evidence de l'existence de Dieu et le probleme de la science et de la volonte divines, mais aussi la creation, les corps inanimes, les animaux, l'ame humaine, les anges, ou encore l'illumination, la grace et la beatitude. Ces etudes convergent et culminent tout a la fois dans un dernier chapitre qui s'attache a saisir l'esprit de ce penseur. A l'encontre de l'argument qui consiste a qualifier Bonaventure de mystique pour le releguer hors de l'histoire de la philosophie, Etienne Gilson se propose de recourir precisement a cet argument pour l'y reintegrer: le sentiment mystique, penetrant en effet toutes les couches de l'edifice, est ce qui lui confere sa systematicite, et une systematicite telle que cette mystique speculative bonaventurienne partage seule avec la doctrine thomiste le titre de synthese de la pensee scolastique tout entiere. Tendant toujours vers une metaphysique de la mystique chretienne comme vers son terme ultime, cette pensee temoigne simultanement de la necessite de la science et de sa subordination aux ravissements mystiques, et se situe a la rencontre des influences de saint Francois, de saint Augustin et des exigences systematiques des Sommes de Thomas d'Aquin. L'oeuvre de Bonaventure marque ainsi un moment capital dans le long progres par lequel la theologie scolastique parvint a l'unite d'un systeme. (shrink)

Etienne Gilson was a strong promoter of the notion of a ‘Christian philosophy’. He viewed it as a type of historical practice whereby Christian thinkers are spurred by revelation to develop philosophical positions congruent with revelation, but which are defensible by reason alone. This paper reviews Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy and argues that the philosophical position of Bernard Lonergan is one example of such a practice.

The members of the Medieval Academy of America are happy to be holding this year's annual meeting — its sixtieth and a kind of Golden Anniversary — at the University of Indiana in Bloomington. Although this is the first time the Academy has met in this university, relations between the two institutions have been personal and warm. Four years ago your Talbot Donaldson was the Academy's President, and a beloved one he was to be sure. In the tradition of institutional (...) and personal friendship, it seems fitting that my address today should focus on a remarkable event that took place in 1940 when Etienne Gilson, a Corresponding Fellow of the Academy since its second annual meeting in 1927, delivered here, under the auspices of the Mahlon Powell Foundation, his memorable lectures on God and Philosophy. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

deux approches de l'être Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain Géry Prouvost. II. UNE SAGESSE RÉDEMPTRICE (Contribution d'Etienne Gilson au volume d' hommage de la Revue Thomiste offert à Maritain en 1948. Voir ci-dessus lettres du 15 ...

The author identifies and discusses the most important elements of Étienne Gilson’s thought which emanate out of his articulation and defense of the Western Creed. To the question: why Gilson, why now?, the author offers a following answer: because we need to champion the Western Creed, defend philosophical realism, rightly interpret the history of philosophy, correctly comprehend Christian philosophy, and show that modernist and postmodernist systems are arbitrary. The author maintains that Gilson delivers us with the realist (...) philosophy of the human person, shows us the undeniable advantages of philosophical realism, and formulates an original notion of Christian philosophy which appreciates that genuine philosophy is non-systematic in its nature, and that it can expose the failure of modernist philosophies that strive to be systems. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and reason, on account of the sin of pride, seeks (...) to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks show that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue (...) that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and reason, on account of the sin of pride, seeks (...) to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks shows that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

A warm portrait of Gilson as historian, educator, and Thomist drawn from his own writings and lectures. The selection is well made and includes several pieces previously unpublished in English; Pegis contributes an introduction in which he explores Gilson's attitude toward Christian philosophy and the Middle Ages.--R. F. T.