Results for '*Consciousness States'

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  1. Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs?that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist?undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a (...)
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  2. Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
    Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim of this paper (...)
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  3. Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness: The Transient Hypofrontality Hypothesis.A. Dietrich - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.
    It is the central hypothesis of this paper that the mental states commonly referred to as altered states of consciousness are principally due to transient prefrontal cortex deregulation. Supportive evidence from psychological and neuroscientific studies of dreaming, endurance running, meditation, daydreaming, hypnosis, and various drug-induced states is presented and integrated. It is proposed that transient hypofrontality is the unifying feature of all altered states and that the phenomenological uniqueness of each state is the result of the (...)
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  4.  13
    Altered States of Consciousness.Charles T. Tart (ed.) - 1990 - (Third Edition).
  5.  87
    Consciousness, Intention, and Command-Following in the Vegetative State.Colin Klein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):27-54.
    Some vegetative state patients show fMRI responses similar to those of healthy controls when instructed to perform mental imagery tasks. Many authors have argued that this provides evidence that such patients are in fact conscious, as response to commands requires intentional agency. I argue for an alternative reading, on which responsive patients have a deficit similar to that seen in severe forms of akinetic mutism. Akinetic mutism is marked by the inability to form and maintain intentions to act. Responsive patients (...)
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  6. The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness.Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some (...)
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  7.  50
    Consciousness is a “Subjective” State.Philip M. Merikle & Jim Cheesman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):42-42.
  8. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  9.  35
    When Does Consciousness Matter? Lessons From the Minimally Conscious State.Joseph Vukov - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):5-15.
    Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it (...)
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  10. State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction.Neil Campbell Manson - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
    It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct (...)
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  11.  91
    Identifying Neural Correlates of Consciousness: The State Space Approach.Juergen Fell - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):709-29.
    This article sketches an idealized strategy for the identification of neural correlates of consciousness. The proposed strategy is based on a state space approach originating from the analysis of dynamical systems. The article then focuses on one constituent of consciousness, phenomenal awareness. Several rudimentary requirements for the identification of neural correlates of phenomenal awareness are suggested. These requirements are related to empirical data on selective attention, on completely intrinsic selection and on globally unconscious states. As an example, neuroscientific findings (...)
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  12. Psychobiology of Altered States of Consciousness.Dieter Vaitl, Niels Birbaumer, John Gruzelier, Graham A. Jamieson, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Dietrich Lehmann, Wolfgang H. R. Miltner, Ulrich Ott, Peter Pütz, Gebhard Sammer, Inge Strauch, Ute Strehl, Jiri Wackermann & Thomas Weiss - 2005 - Psychological Bulletin 131 (1):98-127.
  13.  42
    Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
    In this paper, we review recent neuroimaging investigations of disorders of consciousness and different disciplines' understanding of consciousness itself. We consider potential tests of consciousness, their legal significance, and how they map onto broader themes in U.S. statutory law pertaining to advance directives and surrogate decision-making. In the process, we outline a taxonomy of themes to illustrate and clarify the variance in state-law definitions of consciousness. Finally, we discuss broader scientific, ethical, and legal issues associated with the advent of neuroimaging (...)
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  14.  16
    Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State.Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):374-385.
    Recent studies indicate that patients who are diagnosed with vegetative states may retain more awareness than their clinical assessments suggest. Disorders of consciousness traditionally have been diagnosed on the basis of outwardly observable behaviors alone, but new functional imaging studies have shown surprising levels of brain activity in some patients, indicating that even higher-level cognitive functions like language processing and visual imagery may be preserved. For example, one recently developed method purports to detect voluntary mental imagery solely on the (...)
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  15. State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1994 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.
  16. Consciousness and the State/Transitive/Creature Distinction.R. McBride - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):181-196.
    This essay examines the grammatical structure underlying the use of the word "conscious". Despite the existence of this grammatical structure, I reject the assumption that actual consciousness has a similar structure. Specifically, I reject the claim that consciousness consists of three subtypes: state consciousness, transitive consciousness, and creature consciousness. I offer an inductive argument and a deductive argument that no such psychological entities exist. The inductive argument: given the lack of evidence or arguments for the entities and given that a (...)
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  17.  32
    Consciousness in Congenitally Decorticate Children: Developmental Vegetative State as Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.D. A. Shewmon, G. L. Holmes & P. A. Byrne - 1999 - Dev Med Child Neurol 41:364-374.
  18. Altered States and the Study of Consciousness: The Case of Ayahuasca.Benny Shanon - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):125-154.
    This paper is part of a comprehensive research project whose aim is to study the phenomenology of the special state of mind induced by the psychoactive Amazonian potion ayahuasca. Here, I focus on those aspects of the ayahuasca experience that are related to basic features of the human consciousness. The effects of the potion are discussed in terms of a conceptual framework characterizing consciousness as a cognitive system defined by a set of parameters and the values that they take. In (...)
     
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  19. Hypnotic Phenomena and Altered States of Consciousness: A Multilevel Framework of Description and Explanation.Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo - 2003 - Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164.
  20.  96
    Altered States of Consciousness and Hypnosis in the Twenty-First Century: Comment.John Gruzelier - 2005 - Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7.
  21.  54
    Brain Death, States of Impaired Consciousness, and Physician-Assisted Death for End-of-Life Organ Donation and Transplantation.Joseph L. Verheijde, Mohamed Y. Rady & Joan L. McGregor - 2009 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (4):409-421.
    In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism, minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. Brain death does not disrupt (...)
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  22.  5
    State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):355-363.
  23.  83
    Cosmopsychism and Consciousness Research: A Fresh View on the Causal Mechanisms Underlying Phenomenal States.Joachim Keppler & Itay Shani - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11 (Article 371):1-7.
    Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism (...)
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  24. EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in resting condition quantitatively (...)
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  25. Waves, Streams, States and Self: Further Considerations for an Integral Theory of Consciousness.Ken Wilber - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176.
    Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the ‘mind’ side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be (...)
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  26.  85
    The Periconscious Substrates of Consciousness: Affective States and the Evolutionary Origins of the SELF.Jaak Panksepp - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    An adequate understanding of ‘the self’ and/or ‘primary-process consciousness’ should allow us to explain how affective experiences are created within the brain. Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms of consciousness. At present, abundant evidence indicates that affective states arise from the intrinsic neurodynamics of primitive self-centred emotional and motivational systems situated (...)
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  27.  18
    State Dependence of Character Perception: Implausibility Differences in Dreaming and Waking Consciousness.David Kahn & J. Allan Hobson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):57-68.
    Dreaming consciousness can be quite different from waking consciousness and this difference must depend upon the underlying neurobiology. Our approach is to infer the underlying brain basis for this difference by studying dream reports and comparing them with waking. In this study we investigated mentation during dreaming by asking subjects to provide us with dream reports and by asking them to create a dream log. In the dream log, the subjects recorded all implausibility, illogicality or inappropriateness of character during the (...)
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  28.  73
    Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness.Levente Móró - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):241-252.
    Altered states of consciousness (ASC), especially hallucinatory ones, are philosophically and scientifically interesting modes of operation of the mind–brain complex. However, classical definitions of ASC seem to capture only a few common characteristics of traditionally regarded phenomena, thus lacking exact classification criteria for assessing altered and baseline states. The current situation leads to a priority problem between phenomena-based definitions and definition-based phenomena selection. In order to solve the problem, this paper introduces a self-mapping procedure that is based on (...)
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  29. Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  30.  11
    Altered States of Consciousness in North American Indian Ceremonials.Wolfgang G. Jilek - 1982 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 10 (4):326-343.
  31.  13
    Consciousness as a State-Dependent Phenomenon.J. Allan Hobson - 1997 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--379.
  32. Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play.Marjan Persuh, Eric LaRock & Jacob Berger - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
    Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious (...)
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  33.  4
    What is a Global State of Consciousness?Andy Kenneth Mckilliam - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II).
    The notion of a global state of consciousness is an increasingly important construct in the science of consciousness. However, exactly what a global state of consciousness is remains poorly understood. In this paper I offer an account of global states of consciousness as consciousness-related capacity modulations. On this view global states are not themselves phenomenal states – they are not occurring experiences. Rather, they are states that specify which of a creature’s overall consciousness-related capacities are currently (...)
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  34.  30
    State Consciousness and What It's Like.David M. Rosenthal - 1997
  35. Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and Humans.Jaak Panksepp - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):30-80.
    The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain–mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill (...)
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  36. The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State?Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 193-247.
  37.  46
    Consciousness Versus States of Being Conscious.Ernst Pöppel - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):155-156.
    States of being conscious (S) can be defined on the basis of temporal information processing. A high-frequency mechanism provides atemporal system states with periods of approximately 30 msec to implement the functional connection of distributed activities allowing the construction of primordial events; a low frequency mechanism characterized by automatic temporal integration sets up temporal windows with approximately 3 seconds duration. This integration mechanism can be used to define S. P-consciousness and A-consciousness as conceived of by Block can be (...)
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  38.  34
    Consciousness and Lesser States: The Evolutionary Foothills of the Mind.Grant Gillett - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (3):331-360.
    Consciousness and its relation to the unconscious mind have long been debated in philosophy. I develop the thesis that consciousness and its contents reflect the highest elaboration of a set of abilities to respond to the environment realized in more primitive organisms and brain circuits. The contents of the states lesser than consciousness are, however, intrinsically dubious and indeterminate as it is the role of the discursive skills we use to construct conscious contents that lends articulation and clarity to (...)
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  39. Consciousness Without a Cerbral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine.Bjorn Merker - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):63-81.
    A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain – spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data – is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form (...)
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  40. What is an Altered State of Consciousness?Antti Revonsuo, Sakari Kallio & Pilleriin Sikka - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):187 – 204.
    “Altered State of Consciousness” (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one's own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration (...)
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  41. Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  42.  76
    Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption.Gregg Caruso - 2005 - In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to be pain. (...)
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  43. Self-Consciousness as the Monitoring of Cognitive States: A Theoretical Perspective.Robert G. Kunzendorf - 1988 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 7:3-22.
  44. Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  45. Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. (...)
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  46. Consciousness Reconsidered.Owen Flanagan - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Owen Flanagan argues that we are on the way to understanding consciousness and its place in the natural order.
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  47. Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self.Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas - 2003 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.
    In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin (...)
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  48.  10
    Altered States of Consciousness.Susan Greenfield - 2001 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 68:609-626.
  49. Moral Development and Higher States of Consciousness.Sanford I. Nidich, Randi J. Nidich & Charles N. Alexander - 2000 - Journal of Adult Development. Special Issue 1949 (4):217-225.
  50.  63
    Consciousness Unchained: Ethical Issues and the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious State.Robert T. Knight - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):1 – 2.
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