Results for 'A. A. Buckareff'

942 found
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  1. Causalisms Reconsidered.Z. H. U. Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-156.
    In “Considering Causalisms”, Andrew Sneddon critically examines causalism, the dominant position in action theory since Donald Davidson published his influential article, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Sneddon’s analysis is based on a distinction he makes between two kinds of causalism. One is a minimal version of causalism, which holds only a causal view of reasons explanations. Sneddon calls it “restricted-causalism,” or causalismR.
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  2. Practical Induction by Elijah Millgram.A. A. Buckareff - 2002 - Auslegung 25 (2):161-166.
     
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  3. (1 other version)Persons & Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will by Timothy O'Connor.A. A. Buckareff - 2003 - Auslegung 26 (1):69-76.
  4. Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-156.
    In “Considering Causalisms”, Andrew Sneddon critically examines causalism, the dominant position in action theory since Donald Davidson published his influential article, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Sneddon’s analysis is based on a distinction he makes between two kinds of causalism. One is a minimal version of causalism, which holds only a causal view of reasons explanations. Sneddon calls it “restricted-causalism,” or causalismR.
     
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  5. Can faith be a doxastic venture?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...)
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  6.  62
    Helen Steward , A Metaphysics for Freedom . Reviewed by.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (6):493-495.
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  7. Theological realism, divine action, and divine location.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2016 - In Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
     
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  8. A Critique of Substance Causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1019-1026.
    In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.
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  9. Acceptance and deciding to believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
    ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...)
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  10. Yujin Nagasawa, God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (3):208.
  11. Deciding to Believe Redux.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...)
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  12.  9
    The Brewer, the Yeast, and the Boundaries of Human Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2023 - Psyche.
    The brewer and the yeast: why brewing beer sheds light on the philosophical debate about the boundaries of human agency.
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  13.  61
    Action and Doxastic Control: The Asymmetry Thesis Revisited.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):5-12.
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  14.  81
    Pantheism.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    This Element focuses on some core conceptual and ontological issues related to pantheistic conceptions of God by engaging with recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on this topic. The conceptual and ontological commitments of pantheism are contrasted with those of other conceptions of God. The concept of God assumed by pantheism is clarified and the question about what type of unity the universe must exhibit in order to be identical with God receives the most attention. It is argued that (...)
  15.  18
    Editorial Introduction.Andrei A. Buckareff & Philip Goff - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (9):7-9.
    The articles in this issue are devoted to the question of whether consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality. In recent years the physicalist orthodoxy in the science and philosophy of consciousness has been challenged by a panpsychist insurgency (Chalmers, 2016; Goff, 2017; 2019), panpsychism being the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical universe. This new wave of panpsychists claim that their view avoids the deep challenges faced by physicalism as well as those faced (...)
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  16.  51
    Maria Alvarez , Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action . Reviewed by.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (4):245-247.
  17. Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am (...)
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  18. Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (1):51-71.
    Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the (...)
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  19. Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine.Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    According to traditional Judeo-Christian-Islamic theism, God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect agent. This volume shows that philosophy of religion needs to take seriously alternative concepts of the divine, and demonstrates the considerable philosophical interest that they hold.
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  20. Disentangling Dispositions from Powers.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (1):107-121.
    Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made (...)
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  21.  74
    Surviving resurrection.Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render (...)
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  22. I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4617-4635.
    In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot account for how agency is exercised in intentionally omitting to act in the same way it explains how agency is exercised in intentional action. Thus, causalism appears to provide us with an incomplete picture of intentional agency. I argue that causalists should distinguish causalism as a general theory of intentional agency from causalism as a theory of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that, while (...)
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  23. Pantheism and Saving God.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2016 - Sophia 55 (3):347-355.
    In this paper, I examine Mark Johnston’s panentheistic account of the metaphysics of the divine developed in his recent book, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry. On Johnston’s account, God is the ‘Highest One’ and is identified with ‘the outpouring of Being by way of its exemplification in ordinary existents for the sake of the self-disclosure of Being’. Johnston eschews supernaturalism and takes his position to be consistent with what he calls ‘legitimate naturalism’ which he takes to be some version of (...)
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  24. Emergent Mental Properties are Not Just Double-Preventers.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jessica Hawkins - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-22.
    We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...)
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  25.  98
    Divine freedom and creaturely suffering in process theology: A critical appraisal.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2000 - Sophia 39 (2):56-69.
    : The suffering of creatures experienced throughout evolutionary history provides some conceptual difficulties for theists who maintain that God is an all-good loving creator who chose to employ the processes associated with evolution to bring about life on this planet. Some theists vexed by this and other problems posed by the interface between religion and science have turned to process theology which provides a picture of a God who is dependent upon creation and unable to unilaterally intervene in the affairs (...)
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  26. Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action.Jesús Humberto Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) - 2010 - Bradford.
    The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...)
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  27. Direct Manipulation Undermines Intentional Agency (Not Just Free Agency).Andrei A. Buckareff - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, standard deterministic (...)
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  28. An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    The problem of doxastic agency concerns what sort of agency humans can exercise with regard to forming doxastic attitudes such as belief. In this essay I defend a version of what James Montmarquet calls "The Asymmetry Thesis": Coming to believe and action are asymmetrical with respect to direct voluntary control. I argue that normal adult human agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over the acquisition of any of their doxastic attitudes in the same way that they exercise such control over (...)
     
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  29.  87
    Unity, ontology, and the divine mind.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (3):319-333.
    In his landmark book on philosophical theology, Saving God: Religion After Idolatry, Mark Johnston develops a panentheistic metaphysic of the divine that he contends is compatible with ontological naturalism. On his view, God is the universe, but the ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of constitution, not identity. The universe and God are coinciding objects that share properties but have different essential modal properties and, hence, different persistence conditions. In this paper, I address the problem of accounting for what it is about (...)
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  30.  62
    Mental Action. Edited by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou. (Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. x + 286. Price £50.00).Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):401-403.
  31. How (not) to think about mental action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
    I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.
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  32. Mental overpopulation and mental action: Protecting intentions from mental birth control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
    Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...)
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  33. Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):425-.
    In their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the "replacement thesis"--proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and (...)
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  34. Pantheism, Omnisubjectivity, and the Feeling of Temporal Passage.Andrei A. Buckareff - forthcoming - Religions.
    By “pantheism” I mean to pick out a model of God on which God is identical with the totality of existents constitutive of the universe. I assume that, on pantheism, God is an omnispatiotemporal mind who is identical with the universe. I assume that, given divine omnispatiotemporality, God knows everything that can be known in the universe. This includes having knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature. Hence, if God has knowledge de se of the minds of (...)
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  35. Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic agency may have for (...)
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  36. (1 other version)Escapism, religious luck, and divine reasons for action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Allen Plug - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (1):63-72.
    In our paper, ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, we defended a theory of hell that we called ‘escapism’. We argued that given God’s just and loving character it would be most rational for God to maintain an open door policy to those who are in hell, allowing them an unlimited number of chances to be reconciled with God and enjoy communion with God. In this paper we reply to two recent objections to our original paper. The (...)
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  37. How Does Agent‐Causal Power Work?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):105-121.
    Research on the nature of dispositionality or causal power has flourished in recent years in metaphysics. This trend has slowly begun to influence debates in the philosophy of agency, especially in the literature on free will. Both sophisticated versions of agent-­‐causalism and the new varieties of dispositionalist compatibilism exploit recently developed accounts of dispositionality in their defense. In this paper, I examine recent work on agent-­‐causal power, focusing primarily on the account of agent-­‐causalism developed and defended by Timothy O’Connor’s in (...)
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  38.  68
    Theistic consubstantialism and omniscience.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):233-245.
    According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same stuff. If theistic consubstantialism is correct, then God possesses the essential power to have knowledge de se of the contents of the mind of every conscious being internal to God. If theistic consubstantialism is false, then God lacks this essential property. So either God is essentially corporeal and possesses greater essential epistemic powers than God would have otherwise or God is essentially incorporeal and has a diminished (...)
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  39. Escaping hell but not heaven.Andrei A. Buckareff & Allen Plug - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):247-253.
    Benjamin Matheson has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respond to Matheson. Building on some of our work in defense of escapism that Matheson does not discuss we show that the threat posed by Matheson’s critique is chimerical. We begin by summarizing our escapist theory of hell. Next, we summarize both Matheson’s central thesis and the main arguments offered in its defense. We then respond to those arguments.
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  40. Keith Frankish, Mind and Supermind. [REVIEW]Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (4):254-256.
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  41. Two-Way Powers as Derivative Powers.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 228-254.
    Some philosophers working on the metaphysics of agency argue that if agency is understood in terms of settling the truth of some matters, then the power required for the exercise of intentional agency is an irreducible two-way power to either make it true that p or not-p. In this paper, the focus is on two-way powers in decision-making. Two problems are raised for theories of decision-making that are ontologically committed to irreducible two-way powers. First, recent accounts lack an adequate framework (...)
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  42. Hell and the Problem of Evil.Andrei A. Buckareff & Allen Plug - 2014 - In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Wiley. pp. 128-143.
    The case is discussed for the doctrine of hell as posing a unique problem of evil for adherents to the Abrahamic religions who endorse traditional theism. The problem is particularly acute for those who accept retributivist formulations of the doctrine of hell according to which hell is everlasting punishment for failing to satisfy some requirement. Alternatives to retributivism are discussed, including the unique difficulties that each one faces.
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  43. Introduction : Alternative conceptions of divinity and contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa - 2016 - In Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
     
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  44. Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de se.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):59--71.
    A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists (...)
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  45. Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.
    We reply to Andrew Sneddon’s recent criticism of the causal theory of action (CTA) and critically examine Sneddon’s preferred alternative, minimal causalism. We show that Sneddon’s criticism of CTA is problematic in several respects, and therefore his conclusion that “the prospects for CTA look poor” is unjustified. Moreover, we show that the minimal causalism that Sneddon advocates looks rather unpromising and its merits that Sneddon mentions are untenable.
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  46.  43
    New waves in philosophy of action.Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) - 2010 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  47. Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...)
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  48. Metaepistemology and divine revelation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (1):85-90.
    In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
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  49. The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.
    The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account (...)
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  50.  36
    Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (1):217-224.
    Some of the most salient features of Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action are explicated and his theory critiqued. It is shown that invoking agent-causation is unnecessary and makes his theory cumbersome. For insofar as Clarke seeks to render the agency theory more intelligible by appealing to event-causation as contributing to the generation of basic actions, his theory gravitates closer to a causal indeterminist theory of free action.
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