181 found
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  1.  11
    Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.
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  2. The Structure of the Skeptical Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.
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  3. On “Epistemic Permissiveness”.Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):165-177.
    In "Epistemic Permissiveness", Roger White presents several arguments against Extreme Permissivism, the view that there are possible cases where, given one's total evidence, it would be rational to either believe P, or to believe ~P. In this paper, we carefully reconstruct White's arguments and then argue that they do not succeed.
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  4. The Evil of Death and the Lucretian Symmetry: A Reply to Feldman.John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):783-789.
    In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account.
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  5. Brains in a Vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  6.  52
    Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson.John Martin Fischer & Anthony L. Brueckner - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):1-9.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).
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  7. What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
  8. Retooling the Consequence Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):10–13.
  9. Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384-391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
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  10. The Simulation Argument Again.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):224-226.
  11. Parfit on What Matters in Survival.Anthony Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
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  12. Why is Death Bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  13. Contextualism, SSI and the Factivity Problem.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):431-438.
    There is an apparent problem stemming from the factivity of knowledge that seems to afflict both contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism . 1 In this article, we will first explain how the problem arises for each theory, and then we will propose a uniform resolution.1. The factivity problem for contextualismLet K t stands for X knows _ at t. Let h stand for S has hands. According to contextualism, ‘K t’ is true as uttered in some ordinary conversational contexts. Let O (...)
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  14. Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  15. Debasing scepticism.A. Brueckner - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):295-297.
    In this paper, I will clarify Jonathan Schaffer's; debasing scepticism, highlighting its logical structure. 1 In many current discussions of scepticism, its scope is limited to propositions about the external world which, if known at all, are known a posteriori. The standard sceptical set-up goes as follows. The sceptic specifies a sceptical hypothesis, or counterpossibility, that is incompatible with the external-world propositions that I claim to know. The hypothesis – e.g. that I am a brain in a vat – is (...)
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  16.  9
    Retooling the Consequence Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):10-13.
  17.  43
    Accommodating Counterfactual Attitudes: A Further Reply to Johansson.John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):19-21.
    Here we respond to Johansson’s main worry, as laid out in his, “Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.” We show how our principle BF*(dd*) can be adjusted to address this concern compatibly with our fundamental approach to responding to Lucretius.
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  18. Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  19.  10
    The Structure of the Skeptical Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
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  20.  71
    ∼K∼Sk.Anthony Brueckner - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):74-89.
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  21. Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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  22. Thinking Animals and Epistemology.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  23. The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge.A. Brueckner - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  24. Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
  25. Modest Transcendental Arguments.Anthony Brueckner - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:265-280.
    Kantian transcendental arguments are aimed at uncovering the necessary conditions for the possibility of thought and experience. If such arguments are to have any force against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world, then it would seem that the conditions the transcendental argument uncovers must be non-psychological in nature, and their special status must be knowable a priori. In "Transcendental Arguments", Barry Stroud raised the question whether there are any such conditions., He answered that it was very doubtful that (...)
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  26. Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
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  27. Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW]Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
    According to Timothy Williamson, where 'E' stands for evidence and 'K' stands for knowledge, E=K. He argues for the following theses, which jointly imply E=K.
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  28.  75
    Klein on Closure and Skepticism.A. L. Brueckner - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
  29.  30
    The Mirror-Image Argument: An Additional Reply to Johansson.John Martin Fischer & Anthony Brueckner - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):325-330.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death.
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  30. Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  31.  93
    The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages: Dialogue.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.
    ABSTRACT We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.
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  32. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  33. Essays on Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The guiding questions of this volume are: Can we have knowledge of the external world of things outside our minds?
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  34. Anti-Individualism and Analyticity.A. Brueckner - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):87-91.
  35.  76
    Externalism and Memory.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12.
  36. If I Am a Brain in a Vat, Then I Am Not a Brain in a Vat.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):123-128.
    Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.
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  37.  90
    Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):315–318.
    Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.
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  38. Justification and Moore's Paradox.Anthony Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):264–266.
  39.  47
    Chalmers’s Conceivability Argument for Dualism.Anthony Brueckner - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):187-93.
  40. No Closure On Skepticism.Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  41. Not Wanting to Know.A. Brueckner - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):250-256.
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  42.  80
    Transcendental Arguments From Content Externalism.Anthony Brueckner - 1999 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  43.  27
    Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  44. The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
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  45. Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity.Anthony Brueckner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  46.  18
    Brains in a Vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
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  47.  11
    Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):294-301.
  48. Transcendental Arguments I.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
    A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...)
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  49. Semantic Answers to Skepticism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.
  50.  17
    Justification and Moore's Paradox.A. Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):264-266.
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