The gulf separating Anglo-American and continental philosophers is due in large part to the different problems with which they are concerned. Where their interests cross, the differences in approach make mutual appreciation difficult. A pleasant exception to this is Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language. The book is an edition of lectures transcribed by students and then approved for publication by Merleau-Ponty; for this reason, it lacks the developed, consequential form of a finished work. First delivered in 1949-50, the lectures (...) are programmatic and introductory to his subsequent essays on language, most of which fall within the period 1949-59; yet, and more importantly, they are able to stand on their own right and present from the viewpoint of another tradition results nonetheless germane to the Anglo-American discussion of language. (shrink)

Is aesthetics a viable discipline? Berel Lang in Art and Inquiry admits that despite the efforts of philosophers like Aristotle and Kant aesthetics has little to show for itself in its "verbose career" and hence there is reason for genuine doubt about its viability. Why has the work of aesthetics been so futile? Although Lang does not state the matter this way, the method of the book discloses the answer and the need which Lang felt for having to write the (...) book: the verbose career of aesthetics accords to a lack of understanding of what the aesthetic moment itself is. Because that lack precludes a straight-forward differentiation of the aesthetic from the nonaesthetic moment, Lang chooses a transcendental approach, beginning with an analysis of talk about art—namely, criticism—and disclosing by means of that analysis the object about which criticism purports to be. If we understand criticism, we have a possible answer to the question what is art. This answer is a possible, perhaps a probable one, Lang asserts, though certainly not a necessary one. For a final answer must transcend aesthetics. The categories which demarcate the aesthetic and non-aesthetic moments are metaphysical ones whose final test lies outside of aesthetics. (shrink)

The major portion of this important work is the "Summary of the Republic." Coordinated with Grube’s translation, it proceeds book by book, first summarizing a chunk of text anywhere from a couple of Stephanus sections to several pages, then commenting in lettered notes of from two lines to four and a half pages. More technical material, aimed at advanced students and scholars, appears occasionally in smaller type. There is a fine bibliography. The format is successful: the book is easy to (...) use and attractive in appearance. (shrink)

This is the first full-length commentary on De Motu Animalium since Albertus Magnus's thirteenth century treatise, De Principiis Motus Progresivi. Several paraphrases, and numerous editions, have appeared over the years, but a general belief, particularly in the nineteenth century, that MA was not an authentic work of Aristotle's, and doubt about the overall importance of this brief and cryptic work, had served to discourage more ambitious projects. Scholarly opinion changed in this century, and the authenticity of MA is now generally (...) accepted. Nussbaum relates this history, establishes MA's authenticity beyond a doubt, and finds ample philosophical reason for bringing her--and our--attention to a full-length commentary. For MA, as she shows, is a treatise not only in biology, but also in cosmology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, theory of action, and practical reasoning. (shrink)

Since Descartes the relationship between philosophy and psychology has often been obscured and in need of redefinition. In Weinberg’s book this problem of psychology and philosophy is posed once again. As the title indicates, the investigation is of our "contact with reality"; in other words, it is of our belief in a real order independent of our thought to which we strive to realize a rational connection through the various sciences and philosophy. Basic to his argument is the distinction between (...) Tatsachenwissenschaft and Wesenswissenschaft; and through numerous studies in the history of modern philosophy, he seeks to show that the problem of transcendence is one for psychology and not philosophy. Epistemology is a psychological discipline. Weinberg wants to deny emphatically that philosophy is, in any sense, a Tatsachenwissenschaft; on the other hand, he does not want to demean the philosophical task but indicate its proper limits. The sciences, philosophy, and religion are what Weinberg calls "levels of objectivication" [[sic]] and, insofar, of equal status. Within a psychological system, philosophy is to be assigned its role. He comes to the conclusion that it is the responsibility of philosophy, as a Wesenswissenschaft, to simplify and filter the results of the sciences and to provide each civilization with a "vital and coherent whole." The method pursued in order to establish a psychological foundation for philosophy is neither experimental nor a mere imitation of what is commonly thought to be scientific method. (shrink)

The editors of the invaluable "Philosophische Bibliothek" perceived the need of providing readers of German with translations of both the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, two volumes in their edition of the Organon that had been out of print for some time. Having lost hope—so they tell us in the Vorwort—of obtaining fresh versions of them in the near future, they decided to reprint the old Rolfes translation of the Posteriora which had appeared in the series for the first time (...) in 1922. In spite of Rolfes’s undeniable merits as a translator of Aristotle, the solution seems to be unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the quality of the Greek text and our understanding of Aristotelian idioms and terminology in this treatise have been improved considerably in the last fifty years. A landmark in this type of studies is doubtless the edition with an extensive and valuable commentary by Sir David Ross. On the other hand, contemporary developments in logic and philosophy of science have led to new and sometimes more accurate assessments of Aristotelian ideas on demonstrative science. There is in fact an excellent English translation with notes by Jonathan Barnes conceived along these lines. One token example of the disadvantages of a translation that cannot take into account scholarly work done after 1922 can be seen at 89b25-26 where Aristotle speaks about "putting into number" a certain type of question. Both Ross and Barnes warn us that the phrase is curious, that it is bizarre, and we may easily infer that not much weight should be put on it in interpreting the passage. Rolfes, on the contrary, has an uncritical attitude towards the expression. He translates it literally and then goes on to comment on it as if it were normal Aristotelian usage. Needless to say, this can easily mislead the unexperienced student of Aristotle to pursue a chain of false problems. But the tendency to translate as literally as possible has its advantages, and it is fair to say that Rolfes’s translation is sufficiently accurate to be of considerable help in many difficult passages. (shrink)

The word "metacritique," as present in the title, strikes the American reader as strange. Perhaps the closest English translation of the title would be "Philosophy of Formal Logic." For what is in question is not the formal structure of logic; instead, the question is: What is the relation between formal logic and the world? The thesis that Eley seeks to dislodge is that of nominalism. His interest is not in formal logic as such, but in the philosophical thesis purported by (...) logicians that formal logic has no intrinsic relation to the world but is, at best, an instrument for our scientific understanding of the world. This postfoundational, instrumental theory is for him nominalistic dogmatism. Correlative to this dogmatism is the transformation of the world into a "technical world of things" or, as he also contends, "the medium of an industrial society." Opposed to nominalism and such a technical world, Eley proposes a transcendental-phenomenological critique of formal logic by means of which the origin of formal logic in life-world structures is to be uncovered. Through such a return to the life-world, he believes he is able to reintegrate formal logic and the world. Insofar as those schematic operations essential to a logic of statements and an elementary predicate logic are to be traced to their origin in the life-world, the method employed is a genetic one. (shrink)

Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding is an anthology of articles on themes common both to phenomenology and other philosophical positions, especially those within the analytic tradition. All of the essays are previously unpublished and were written specifically for this volume; among the authors represented are both phenomenologists and nonphenomenologists. “Phenomenology” means usually Husserl’s phenomenology, although there is discussion of other representatives as well.