O presente trabalho tem como objetivo desenvolver uma comparação direta entre a ética da futurologia jonasiana e o neopragmatismo rortyano no que diz respeito ao tema da esperança na prática política. Este tema foi amplamente discutido por Ernest Bloch que propõe um princípio esperança capaz de ser o impulso basilar para que o homem transcenda o presente em direção ao futuro. Por sua vez, Richard Rorty aborda este tema enquanto esperança social, que diz respeito à manutenção do orgulho nacional (...) capaz de tornar-se condição necessária para o auto-aperfeiçoamento da sociedade. Porém, Hans Jonas trará a esse discurso da esperança uma perspectiva da ética da responsabilidade que prefere a prudência às previsões das ações a longo prazo enquanto promessa para um “mais” ou “melhor”. (shrink)

Resumo: Rorty tem sido por vezes caracterizado como o mais carbonário e destrutivo dos pensadores americanos. Este retrato parece ser confirmado por sua adoção de um historicismo radical que poderia ser entendido como equivalente ao abandono de toda forma de racionalismo. Nestes termos, não surpreendentemente, passa a ser um perfeito exemplar daquilo que expoentes da velha guarda epistemológica qualificam escandalizadamente como "perigos para a Civilização Ocidental".Neste contexto, a tarefa premente que se coloca é a de se aniquilar a verdadeira (...) dimensão do repto rortyano à filosofia contemporânea: seria seu ataque à ortodoxia realmente apropriado? Ou seria ele mais consistente do que se afirma com variantes racionalistas? Minha intenção é a de enfrentar estas questões e apontar o que me parece ser uma falha de Rorty na interpretação do projeto racionalista.: Rorty has been for several times characterized as the most revolutionary and destructive among the American Philosophers. This portrait seems to be confirmed by its adoption of a radical historicism which might have been understood as equivalent to the abandon of all form rationalism. In these terms, not surprisingly, it becomes a perfect example of what exponents of the old epistemological group scandallizedly qualify as "threats to the western civilization".In this context, the proposed urgent task is to evaluate the real dimension of Rotyan challenge to contemporary philosophy: would his assault on orthodoxy be really appropriate? Would it be more consistent than what is affirmed through rationalist alternatives? My intention is to face these questions and point what is for me Rorty's failure concerning the comprehension of rationalist project. (shrink)

Este trabalho procura apresentar uma visão geral da perspectiva do Filósofo Richard Rorty acerca do Pensamento Foucaultiano, principalmente seu posicionamento em relação à autonomia privada e a posição dos seres humanos em relação às determinações imperativas da sociedades nas quais se incluem.: This paper tries to present a general view of the perspective of the philosopher Richard Rorty towards Michel Foucault’s thoughts, most of all his positioning about the private autonomy and the human position in front of the (...) imperative determinations of the societies in whose they are included. Keywords : Autonomy. Power. Foucault. Society. (shrink)

O texto fala a respeito do debate entre Searle e Rorty sobre “irracionalismo” de Rorty. Ele tenta mostrar que a posição de Rorty está fora do campo “realismo versus anti-realismo” e o “irracionalismo” não é um bom adjetivo. Searle estaria sobre uma linha incorreta em sua abordagem do tema da verdade em Rorty.

Este artículo analiza la discusión entre Taylor y Rorty sobre los resultados de la superación de la epistemología. Primeramente, este artículo resume la crítica de Taylor a Rorty. En segundo lugar, considera la respuesta rortyana a Taylor y sus propios argumentos contra el realismo de Taylor. Los desacuerdos principales entre Rorty y Taylor son los siguientes: 1) Rorty dice que el pragmatismo supera la epistemología, mientras que Taylor dice que el realismo no-comprometido es el que supera (...) la tradición epistemológica popular; 2) ellos están en desacuerdo sobre cómo entender cierto vocabulario: Taylor afirma que siempre es posible conocer qué vocabulario describe mejor al mundo, pero Rorty parece sostener que los vocabularios son inconmensurables; 3) Taylor piensa a la verdad como una relación de correspondencia con el mundo; Rorty, sin embargo, rechaza esta concepción. En tercer lugar, se hace aquí una evaluación de los argumentos ofrecidos por cada lado, especialmente la sección que argumenta contra la concepción rortyana de los juegos del lenguaje y sus consecuencias no-realistas. Finalmente, se sugiere una reconsideración de la dicotomía realismo-pragmatismo. (shrink)

This paper examines two contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are apt for rational criticism and justification: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach—which is centered around the notion of contingency and is characterized by a dismissal of all claims to philosophical justification—and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics—which encompasses highly ambitious claims to justification and universal validity. Contrasting the key theses of Rorty’s contextualism with those of Apel’s universalist discourse ethics and reconstructing their (...) respective conceptions of moral progress we argue that neither Rorty’s nor Apel’s position is convincing. (shrink)

Se revisará e intentará fundamentar la tesis de Rorty según la cual no hay ni jerarquía ni diferencia radical entre las disciplinas o géneros discursivos, tanto en las así llamadas humanidades como en las ciencias positivas. Unas y otras componen un todo de continuidad. Todo ello es 'juego de lenguaje' o prácticas sociales variadas y diversamente relacionadas. Asimismo, se analizará el giro narrativo de la ética descrito por Rorty, entendido éste como la descripción ya no de formulaciones abstractas, (...) sino de experiencias humanas concretas, como el dolor o la traición, las que, al ser compartidas a través de géneros tales como la etnografía, el informe documental, el cine, el drama teatral y, especialmente, la novela, logran generar la necesaria empatia desde la cual se gesta la solidaridad y la compasión. Sólo la literatura es capaz de narrar, en ocasiones dramáticamente, el flujo de la vida, la ambigüedad propia de un "mundo interpretado", un mundo que muday acerca del cual realizamos múltiples descripciones redescripciones.Rorty's thesis will be revised, the same as its foundations will be laid in the presen! article. According to Rorty, there is neither a hierarchy ñor a radical difference between the disciplines or discursive genres contained in both, the so-called humanities, and in the positive sciences. Some sciences compose a "whole of continuity. " Consequently. (shrink)

Este presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal analisar a crítica de Richard Rorty à filosofia representacionista, buscando apresentar uma resposta de Rorty ao representacionismo. Rorty se opõe as ideias tradicionais em filosofia, oriundas de uma tradição mentalista, descritas por meio dos conceitos de “essência”, “natureza” e “fundamento”. Ao contrário deste vocabulário, ele apresenta a ideia de antirrepresentacionismo, etnocentrismo e liberalismo. Nesse sentido, o projeto tomará por base a obra clássica de Rorty: A filosofia e o espelho (...) da natureza, bem como a obra Objetivismo, relativismo e verdade. Para Rorty, não existe uma representação da mente e da linguagem que seja exata ou que possa formular uma verdade objetiva. A crítica rortyana se estabeleceu a partir de uma concepção de conhecimento como “representação acurada” da realidade, uma concepção de conhecimento que, conforme a interpretação rortyana, pressupõe supostamente que a “mente” e a “linguagem” desempenham um papel principal na construção de “representações” necessárias à compreensão da realidade, uma vez que “conhecer é representar, acuradamente, o que está fora da mente, assim, compreender a possibilidade da natureza do conhecimento é compreender o modo pelo qual a mente é capaz de construir representações”. Para Rorty, ao contrário dessa explicação, conhecer é tomar consciência das diversas descrições e vocabulários disponíveis ao sujeito num processo interacionista constante. (shrink)

Richard Rorty es una de las grandes figuras del pensamiento que todavía permanece en activo. Su intento de conjugar autores como Derrida, Foucault, Wittgenstein o Heidegger con la democracia liberal, su particular propuesta ética y su definición de intelectual ironista se han convertido en algunas de las propuestas más sugerentes que ha producido la actualidad filosófica. Su obra ha dado pie a numerosos debates e investigaciones en el seno de nuestro Seminario de Filosofía Política. Por ello aprovechamos la ocasión (...) del lanzamiento de este primer número de ¿Astrolabio¿ para ponernos en contacto con Richard Rorty a través de la Universidad de Stanford, con el objetivo de pedirle que nos resolviera algunas cuestiones que su obra nos sugería. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s views of truth and knowledge are often trought to be incompatible with political liberalism. But these views are pretty much the same as those of William James and John Dewey, who were right to see no such incompatibility. The pragmatists, like Nietzsche, wanted to drop the congnitivism which has dominated western intellectual life since Plato, but, unlike Nietzsche, they wished to do so in the interests of an egalitarian society rather than in the interests of a defiant and lonely (...) individualism. (shrink)

The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that (...) denies to its own statements of purported fact correspondence truth what use it is, the answer has to be, “Worse than no use at all”---at least, if like Rorty’s preferred pragmatism it demonstrably concludes in the conceptual annihilation of all inquiry. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie: jak można być konstruktywistą, a jednocześnie traktować naukę jako jedno z najważniejszych osiągnięć współczesnych społeczeństw? Jako że konstruktywizm jest bogatym nurtem, mającym wiele odmian, autor skupia się tylko na jego dwóch przedstawicielach – Richardzie Rortym i Bruno Latourze. Stara się dowieść, że z połączenia wybranych aspektów ich stanowisk można zbudować spójną odpowiedź na zadane pytanie. Choć Rorty i Latour odrzucają realistyczną wizję nauki, to jednocześnie przekonują, że nauka jest skutecznym sposobem na radzenie sobie (...) ze światem, czy też – by użyć terminu Latoura – z czynnikami pozaludzkimi. Tak więc to pragmatyczna kategoria „radzenia sobie” – a nie filozoficznie rozumiane pojęcia reprezentacji bądź korespondencji – staje się uzasadneniem renomy nauki. Obaj myśliciele podkreślają, że skuteczność we wchodzeniu w interakcje z czynnikami pozaludzkimi jest wynikiem swoistej kultury współpracy i wzajemnej kontroli, wpisanej w działalność naukową. (shrink)

O presente trabalho investiga a crítica de Rorty à teoria do conhecimento como essência especular. Considerando a ideia presente na tradição filosófica de que o conhecimento verdadeiro é aquele que representa fidedignamente a realidade, Rorty se insurge contra esta posição, argumentado que, o pensamento representacionista se ergueu a partir da crença de que é possível construir descrições do mundo que espelhem sua própria natureza, ou seja, descrições que representem de maneira fidedigna realidade, que é objeto do conhecimento e (...) do mundo, tal como ela é em si mesma, no qual a filosofia criou uma teoria do conhecimento como essência especular. Desse modo, o trabalho direciona-se para a seguinte questão: de que forma, a teoria do conhecimento como essência especular ocasionou peseudosproblemas para a filosofia antirrepresentacionista de Richard Rorty? Sendo assim, este trabalho tentará encontrar uma resposta ou um direcionamento para a resolução desse problema. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra las líneas generales de la lectura rortiana de Kant, centrada en su papel como máximo representante de la conversión de la filosofía en epistemología, así como algunas críticas a dicha lectura.

The limited objectives of this paper are to show that A), what seem to be merely superficial incoherencies in Rorty’s preferred pragmatism [according to which, “the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones”] really are not but B), along with every assertion of Rorty’s defining his system and its consequences, belie an intrinsic incoherency resulting from that system’s intended conflation of “correspondence truth” and “pragmatic truth.” Then C), I shall argue that should we ask of a philosophy that (...) denies to its own statements of purported fact correspondence truth what use it is, the answer has to be, “Worse than no use at all”---at least, if like Rorty’s preferred pragmatism it demonstrably concludes in the conceptual annihilation of all inquiry. (shrink)

Rorty se debe estudiar, no especialmente por la fidelidad de sus narraciones de la historiografía filosófica, o por la corrección de sus lecturas, sino principalmente porque, como los grandes pensadores de la filosofía occidental, él nos ha ofrecido una gran meta-narrativa. Rorty fue un meta-filósof..

order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...) is described. Secondly, the article presents some objections to Williams’ physicalism. Thirdly, some reasons are given against the notion of objectivity as a point of view without perspective in. (shrink)

Este artigo consiste em um diálogo com textos de Jürgen Habermas e Richard Rorty referentes ao tema da religião e seu lugar na sociedade contemporânea. Em vista do tom dialogal, as citações desses autores são relativamente numerosas, a fim de que as suas vozes sobressaiam no texto. O objetivo do diálogo é extrair pistas para a construção de uma filosofia da religião em tom pós-metafísico, ou não fundacional. Não é um texto exaustivo, mas sugestivo. Não se propõe a tecer (...) críticas ao sistema de ideias dos autores com quem dialoga, mas aproveitar criticamente algumas de suas ideias para a definição de possíveis rumos para uma filosofia da religião pós-metafísica. Os termos pós-metafísico e não fundacional são usados aqui de modo intercambiável e não se referem a um tipo de filosofia antimetafísica, mas sim, a uma filosofia para a qual os temas da metafísica não assumem papel de explicação fundacional da realidade como um todo. Palavras-chave : Filosofia pós-metafísica; Habermas; Rorty; Religião.This essay is a dialogue with Jürgen Habermas’s and Richard Rorty’s texts on the theme of religion and its place in contemporary society. Given the conversational tone, the number of quotations from those authors is relatively large, so that their voices can speak up in the text. The goal of that dialogue is the formulation of clues to the elaboration of a post-metaphysical or non-foundational philosophy of religion. The essay is not exhaustive, but suggestive. It does not mean to criticize Habermas’s and Rorty’s systems of thought, but to appropriate critically some of their ideas as guidelines to a post-metaphysical philosophy of religion. The terms ‘post-metaphysical’ and ‘non-foundational’ are interchangeable here and do not refer to an anti-metaphysical philosophy. They try to express a kind of philosophy in which metaphysical themes do not play a role of foundational explanation of reality as a whole. Key words : Post-metaphysical philosophy; Habermas; Rorty; Religion. (shrink)

The work of the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars continues to have a significant impact on the contemporary philosophical scene. His writings have influenced major thinkers such as Rorty, McDowell, Brandom, and Dennett, and many of Sellars basic conceptions, such as the logical space of reasons, the myth of the given, and the manifest and scientific images, have become standard philosophical terms. Often, however, recent uses of these terms do not reflect the richness or the true sense of Sellars original (...) ideas. This book gets to the heart of Sellars philosophy and provides students with a comprehensive critical introduction to his lifes work. The book is structured around what Sellars himself regarded as the philosophers overarching task: to achieve a coherent vision of reality that will finally overcome the continuing clashes between the world as common sense takes it to be and the world as science reveals it to be. It provides a clear analysis of Sellars groundbreaking philosophy of mind, his novel theory of consciousness, his defense of scientific realism, and his thoroughgoing naturalism with a normative turn. Providing a lively examination of Sellars work through the central problem of what it means to be a human being in a scientific world, this book will be a valuable resource for all students of philosophy. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende resgatar o debate entre Richard Rorty e Nancy Fraser, ocorrido no início da década de 1990, especificamente a partir do texto Feminismo e Pragmatismo apresentado na Tanner Lectures on Human Value. Nesta conferência o filósofo discorreu sobre a possibilidade de conciliação entre o seu pragmatismo e o feminismo. Rorty aborda o feminismo enquanto autocriação da mulher através da “redescrição” mediante a manifestação poética, onde o filósofo encara as feministas como criadoras do novo. Em seguida, (...) exporemos a crítica de Fraser, que trabalha sobre a proposta apresentada pelo pragmatista e que oferece suas próprias idéias dentro de uma concepção do feminismo como movimento democrático de massa. Ao final, uma breve avaliação das implicações das críticas e sugestões apresentadas por Rorty ao feminismo e também da resposta de Fraser. (shrink)

This book is an extended and provocative exercise in describing pragmatism’s past and in attempting to chart a course for its future. This description is not merely a history of philosophy or paean to American thought. It is rather a re-description that draws attention to a neglected and potentially fruitful theme in pragmatism, one that Koopman has termed “transitionalism” for its focus on historicity and temporality. One of the enduring features of pragmatism is its commitment to the revisability of truth (...) claims and even to revising its own methods and aims. If pragmatism encourages philosophers to revise old ways of thinking, then pragmatists are people who expect important ideas and institutions to develop .. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest omówienie roli filozofii we współczesnych społeczeństwach zachodnich. Autor nie zgadza się z tezą Richarda Rorty’ego, według której filozofia jest bezużyteczna, jeśli chodzi o współczesne problemy społeczno-polityczne. Amerykański filozof twierdzi, że jeśli ktoś jest antyesencjalistą, to nie powinien oczekiwać od filozofii żadnego porządku w sprawach publicznych. Autor artykułu stara się dowieść, że można zaakceptować antyesencjalizm i antyfundacjonalizm Rorty’ego, a jednocześnie odrzucić jego poglądy na rolę filozofii.

El artículo examina la concepción neopragmatista desde la cual Rorty defiende una concepción antirrcalista del conocimiento. A fin de evaluar si es correcta la radicalización del «signo lingüístico) emprendida por el autor estadounidense, se compara la problemática contextualista con la duda epistemológica del escéptico moderno y se analiza el problema -tradicionalrnente ligado a las concepciones de la verdad como coherencia que subyacen a los planteamientos contextualistas-> de cómo distinguir la verdad de la aceptabilidad racional. Ante esta cuestión las opiniones (...) se dividen: mientras que Rorty asimila verdad y justificación al precio de sacrificar la intuición realista cotidiana, otros autores intentan dar cuenta de esta intuición desde dentro del paradigma lingüístico, ya sea mediante una deflación de la problemática de la verdad o mediante una idealización del proceso de justificación mismo. El autor reacciona frente a ambas posiciones: por un lado, contra un deflacionismo que se apoya en el concepto semántico de verdad, hace valer aquí una posición pragmática; por otro, desde esta misma óptica, crítica un tipo de epistemologizacíón del concepto de verdad que él mismo había defendido hasta el momento. Por esta vía se articula unaalternativa frente a la liquidación de las pretensiones de verdad incondicionales que ha llevado a Rorty a una naturalización de la razón lingüística muy problemática. (shrink)

Este ensayo expone las ideas fundamentales de la ética pragmática de Rorty, partiendode su crítica de la verdad como representación y la propuesta de la solidaridad en unsentido moral. El autor intenta sentar las bases de una crítica a la ética pragmática yestablece la necesidad de volver a plantear el tema de la persona -desde un cristianismomás “actualizado”- y se formula el problema de la esencia de lo pragmático al interiorde una metafísica que, fundándose un referente simbólico o analógico, (...) supere eldogmatismo y logre inspirar sentimientos como la solidaridad. (shrink)

La atención en la obra rortiana a la retórica como tal es mínima, por no decir nula. No hay en Rorty una Filosofía de la Retórica en el sentido objetivo del genitivo. Sin embargo, al romper explícitamente «el espejo de la naturaleza», Rorty está rompiendo implícitamente aquello que posibilitaba el divorcio entre la filosofía y la retórica. De hecho, el propósito de este ensayo es explicitar ese implícito presentando la filosofía rortiana como una Filosofía de la Retórica en (...) el sentido subjetivo del genitivo, es decir, como una Retórica de la Filosofía o una Retórica filosófica. (shrink)

Neste artigo, as filosofias de Rorty e de Popper são comparadas na perspetiva das suas implicações sociais, culturais e políticas. O autor foca‑se em dois conceitos nucleares: conversação e argumentação. Ele argumenta que o contexto histórico e filosófico dessas filosofias é basicamente o mesmo: a problemática das consequências do holismo, no que diz respeito à teoria da significação, para o estatuto da própria filosofia – uma problemática como aquela que Quine, Kuhn, e Popper estabeleceram desde os anos sessenta do (...) século passado. Contudo, quando os dois conceitos são mais estreitamente comparados, eles parecem conduzir a conceções contrastantes da sociedade, da cultura e da política, que são cuidadosamente discutidas. (shrink)

El presente ensayo se ocupa de una de las obras capitales de Rorty –Contingencia, ironía y solidaridad– en la que es posible encontrar las claves de su pensamiento ético y político. El sujeto de Rorty es “el ironista”, los ciudadanos de su sociedad liberal son quienes perciben la contingencia de su lenguaje de deliberación moral, aquella serie de palabras que le permiten justificar sus acciones, creencias y vida. Estas son las palabras con las que narramos prospectiva o retrospectivamente (...) nuestras vidas, un léxico último. Desde el neo-pragmatismo de Rorty se muestran las condiciones que han hecho posible que las sociedades se consideren a sí mismas como contingencias históricas antes que como expresiones de una subyacente naturaleza ahistórica o, si se quiere, realizaciones de metas suprahistóricas. Rorty sostiene que es en realidad la literatura, y no la filosofía, la que puede promover un sentido genuino de la solidaridad humana; esto a partir de la lectura de novelistas como Orwell y Nabokov. Se busca la descripción ya no de formulaciones abstractas, sino de experiencias humanas concretas, como el dolor o la traición, las que al ser compartidas, generen la necesaria empatía desde la cual se geste la solidaridad y la compasión. (shrink)

O artigo propõe uma interlocução entre o filósofo francês Michel Foucault e o filósofo norte-americano Richard Rorty. Apresenta a descrição que Rorty realizou do colega francês. Analisa essa leitura e oferece, a partir do próprio Foucault, uma interpretação alternativa, que aponta para algumas imprecisões cometidas por Rorty, em sua interpretação. Conclui com um comentário sobre a conversação proposta.

O presente trabalho discute a crítica realizada pelo filósofo Richard Rorty ao também filósofo Michel Foucault, e tem como objetivo elucidar em quais aspectos a crítica de Rorty seria ou não adequada a este último. Richard Rorty ficou conhecido pelas árduas análises que fez à filosofia tradicional, preocupada em representar o mundo e sua complexidade e desinteressada em resolver os problemas humanos, e a determinados filósofos do século XX, notavelmente Heidegger e Foucault, interessados menos em apresentar soluções (...) viáveis aos problemas sociais que em divagar sobre questões intelectuais que levam apenas à falta de esperança nos modos pelos quais a sociedade está constituída. Desse modo, Rorty concebe as análises de Foucault sobre o poder como um exemplo de tais divagações e o fato de Foucault ter se voltado para o cuidado de si como exemplo de desesperança e alheamento social, pois o que estaria em questão no cuidado de si não seria o bem comum ou a possibilidade de mudar determinada configuração social a fim de alcançar melhorias para as vidas humanas em seu seio comum, mas a perspectiva de um auto aperfeiçoamento. É certo que Foucault não menciona maneiras politicamente viáveis da sociedade alcançar um melhor desenvolvimento, para que se encontre o problema de Foucault há que se fazer um deslocamento, e não de questões mais urgentes para questões menos urgentes, mas de foco, de modo a se ter melhor discernimento sobre qual é o problema de cada um destes filósofos e quais questões cada um pretende resolver. Palavras-Chave: Crítica. Análise. Social. (shrink)

Pogosto se govori o »krizi« na humanističnih oddelkih ameriških univerz. Vendar imajo ljudje, ki to govorijo, v mislih prekomerno politično korektnost, ki jo še lahko zasledimo na ameriških oddelkih za književnost. Oddelki za filozofijo v Združenih državah so imeli svojo zadnjo krizo v štiridesetih in petdesetih – v obdobju, ko je analitična filozofija dovršila svoj prevzem. Od takrat se ni zgodil noben dramatičen generacijski preobrat, razen nenadnega vznika feministične filozofije kot novega področja specilizacije v sedemdesetih letih. Posledice radikalizma so sicer (...) imele velik vpliv na matrice številnih drugih disciplin na univerzi, toda ameriško filozofijo so pustile večinoma nedotaknjeno. Veliko analitičnih filozofov je bilo politično aktivnih, toda zaradi te aktivnosti niso spreminjali svoje profesionalne samopodobe ali svojih bralnih navad.There is often said to be a “crisis” in the humanities departments of American universities. But people who say this usually have in mind the excessive political correctness which is still sometimes found in US departments of literature. American philosophy departments had their last crisis back in the 1940’s and 1950’s—the period during which analytic philosophy accomplished its takeover. There has been no dramatic generational shift since then, except for the sudden emergence, in the 70’s, of feminist philosophy as a new area of specialization. Whereas the aftermath of the radicalism of the 60’s had a profound impact on several disciplinary matrices elsewhere in the university, it left American philosophy largely unaffected. Many analytic philosophers were politically active, but this activity usually did not lead them to change either their professional self-images or their reading habits. (shrink)

Rorty enfrentou as contingências do mundo contemporâneo apostando no partilhamento da “retórica das democracias liberais”, como a mais aceita e mais adequada em uma sociedade caracterizada pelo fim das metanarrativas e das condutas de moral absoluta. Mas essa aposta resvala claramente num pragmatismo moral mal disfarçado. Luhmann, ao contrário, levou até o fim a preocupação, abandonada por Rorty, de elaborar uma teoria antimetafísica e despida de um projeto normativo para a sociedade contemporânea. Sua teoria dos sistemas enfrenta as (...) contingências do mundo, excluindo tudo que for externo ao sistema, ou seja, tudo que não possa se tornar um mecanismo de manutenção da identidade dos sistemas face à complexidade do mundo. Rorty faces the contingencies of contemporary world by betting on the sharing of liberal democracies rhetorics as most fitted for a society characterized by the end of meta-narratives and absolute moral conducts. This bet clearly presents a moral pragmatism contrary to the ideas of Luhmann, who takes to its final consequences the project abandoned by Rorty of elaborating an antimetaphysics without a normative project for contemporary society. Luhmann’s theory of systems faces the contingencies of the world by excluding all that is external to the system, that is, all that cannot be converted into a mechanism of the maintenance of the identity of systems in facing the complexity of the world. (shrink)

O que acontece quando uma teoria da interpretação se inspira em Wittgenstein em vez do pensamento kantiano nas raízes da neo-hermenêutica e exemplificado por Ricoeur? Davidson retrabalha a noção de "tradução radical" de Quine ao transformá-la em "interpretação radical" e Rorty estende a ideia à actividade interpretativa em geral. A postura filosófica que permite estas passagens é fundamentalmente a de Wittgenstein na segunda fase do seu pensamento. /// Qu'est-ce qui se passe quand une théorie de I'interprétation a, en tant (...) qu'inspiration, Wittgenstein au lieu de Kant dont I'influence domine la tradition herméneutique, exemplifiéd récemment dans l'oeuvre de Ricoeur? Davidson retravaille la notion de "traduction radicale" de Quine en la transformant en "interprétation radicale" et, à son tour, Rorty applique applique l'idée à l'activité interprétative en général. Mais c'est surtout la posture philosophique de Wittgenstein Il qui permet ces transformations. /// What happens when theory of interpretation has for its inspiration Wittgenstein instead of Kant, who in fact dominates Neo-Hermeneutics of which Ricoeur is the nearest and best example? Davidson reworks Quine's notion of "radical translation" in terms of "radical interpretation", and Rorty extends the affair to whole of the interpretative process. The basic posture that enables the realization of these transitions is fundamentally Wittgenstein's. (shrink)

En los debates actuales sobre ética y filosofía política, a menudo se acusa a autores de tradiciones tan distintas como Gianni Vattimo, Paul K. Feyerabend y Richard Rorty de pecar de un mismo vicio: el relativismo en su idea de lo que es la racionalidad (tanto epistémica como moral). Nuestra tesis en este escrito es doble: en primer lugar, defendemos que ninguno de ellos es (ni se considera) relativista; sino que, bien al contrario, su pensamiento podría considerarse como un (...) ejercicio de "antirrelativismo". En segundo lugar, puntualizaremos que este antirrelativismo no les lleva a identificarse con el universalismo (epistémico o moral); sino que, de algún modo, logran recuperar una vía intermedia entre estos dos extremos para apostar a favor de una idea de racionalidad práctica que cifra en el diálogo sin apriorismos sus esperanzas. (shrink)

Central to Sellars’ account of human cognition was a clear distinction, expressed in varying terminology in his different works, “between conceptual and nonconceptual representations.” Those who have come to be known as ‘left-wing Sellarsians’, such as Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell, have tended to reject Sellars’ appeals to nonconceptual sensory representations. So-called ‘right-wing Sellarsians’ such as Ruth Millikan and Jay Rosenberg, on the other hand, have embraced and developed aspects of Sellars’ account, in particular the central underlying (...) idea that human perceptual cognition involves a certain naturalistic ‘mapping’ correspondence or structural ‘picturing’ isomorphism between internal mental representations and the layout and behavior of objects in the surrounding environment. Sellars, despite his defenses of nonconceptual representational content throughout his career, has with no small irony come to be cited as one of the “founding fathers of conceptualism.” While recognizing the strong conceptualist elements in Sellars’ Kantian account of perceptual cognition, I argue that a central core of Sellars’ account of nonconceptual sensory contents does not by itself fall afoul of the philosophical worries raised by the left-leaning Sellarsians, and that in fact it has significant merits in its own right. (shrink)

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Affection Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies (...) of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism. (shrink)

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of (...) the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina o projecto ético-politico de Richard Rorty nas suas vertentes teórica (enquanto projecto ideal de sociedade - a democracia liberal) e prática (enquanto tentativa de efectivação dessa Utopia). Porém, uma análise atenta permite concluir que ele redunda no seguinte paradoxo: por um lado, Rorty argumenta que a democracia liberal é o 'melhor regime político', mas, por outro, admite que ele não é realizável na prática. O autor do artigo vai mais longe: se fosse realizável, tornar-se-ia (...) num dos 'piores regimes políticos'. Sugere-se que as diflculdades no pensamento rortyano não estão tanto nos pressupostos, mas antes no modo como deriva as suas conclusões porque: algumas vezes as conclusões não são deriváveis das premissas; noutras são simplesmente contraditórias. /// This article examines Richard Rorty s ethical and political project both in its theoretical (as an ideal social project - a liberal democracy) and practical (as an attempt to implement this Utopia) aspects. However, a closer analysis permits us to conclude that it falls into the following paradox: on the one hand, Rorty argues that liberal democracy is the 'best political regime', but, on the other, he admits that it cannot be put into practice. The author of the article goes further: if it could be realized, it would be one of the 'worst political regimes'. It is suggested that the difficulties in Rorty's thought are not so much at the level of the presuppositions but rather in the way it derives its conclusions because: sometimes the conclusions are not derivable from the premises; at other times they are simply contradictory. (shrink)

Richard Rorty's recreation of pragmatism is a piece with his long and persistent practice of metaphilosophizing The author of this essay proposes that something can be learned about the limits of Rorty's enterprise by comparing it with François Laruelle's transcendental approach to metaphilosophy, which coincides to a considerable degree with what Laruelle calls "non-philosophy". Particular use of Laruelle's notions of "mystics" and "pragmatics" is made to bring out not only the lessons they might provide to Rorty's metaphilosophizing, (...) but also aspects of Laruelle's original thinking. /// A recriação do pragmatismo, efectuada por Richard Rorty, coincide com a sua longa e persistente prática de metafllosofia. O autor deste ensaio pretende mostrar que algo pode ser aprendido acerca dos limites do empreendimento rortyano ao compará-lo com o modo transcendental empregue por François Laruelle relativamente à metafllosofia, o que se aproxima bastante do que Laruelle chama, "não-filosofia". Para este fim, as noções de "mística" e de "pragmática", propostas por Laruelle, são exploradas: há licões a reter acerca do neo-pragmatismo de Rorty, mas também uma apreciação da originalidade do pensamento de Laruelle. (shrink)

The article talks about debate between Searle and Rorty on a "irrationalism" of Rorty. The text tries to show that the Rorty's position is out of the field "Realism versus Anti Realism" and the "irracionalism" is not a good adjective. Searle would be on a incorrect line in his account of the Rorty's theme of truth.O texto fala a respeito do debate entre Searle e Rorty sobre "irracionalismo" de Rorty. Ele tenta mostrar que a (...) posição de Rorty está fora do campo "realismo versus anti-realismo" e o "irracionalismo" não é um bom adjetivo. Searle estaria sobre uma linha incorreta em sua abordagem do tema da verdade em Rorty. (shrink)

The article investigates the use of the term “Law” in Richard Rorty and suggests an alternative use of the word. Although Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and antirepresentationalism are well known specially in relation to the metaphysical grounds of the human sciences, I argue that he would employ the term “law” in important rhetorical contexts. The text proposes to identify some aspects of the Rortyan Approach to “law” and, at the same time, focuses on the environment and the professional activity of (...) the jurists in this context. At the end, I suggest a different use of the term, in the sense of a literary and conversational art (an artistic ability). This use of the term shall be understood as a provisional suggestion for narrative purposes and seems to partly escape a rigorous Rortyan view. If the practice of law was for the romans not only a “science”, but also an “art” (ars), so it can be for those that act in the juridical practice today a practice of prudence qua art. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Sellars formulated his thesis of 'psychological nominalism' in two very different ways: (1) most famously as the thesis that 'all awareness of sorts…is a linguistic affair', but also (2) as a certain thesis about the 'psychology of the higher processes'. The latter thesis denies the standard view that relations to abstract entities are required in order to explain human thought and intentionality, and asserts to the contrary that all such mental phenomena can in principle ‘be accounted for causally' without (...) any use of normative terms in the explanation. Recent 'Hegelian Sellarsians' such as Rorty, McDowell, and Brandom have argued that the holistic, normative themes in (1) support various non-realist or rather (German) 'idealist but common-sense realist' outlooks. By contrast, Sellars' own defenses of (2) reveal psychological nominalism itself to be a naturalistic empiricism intended to sustain the normative-holistic themes in (1) within an exhaustively scientific naturalist conception of reality. (shrink)

While universalist theories have come under increasing attack from relativist and post-modern critics, such as Walzer, MacIntyre and Rorty, Kantian constructivism can be seen as a saviour of universalist ethics. Kantian constructivists accept the criticism that past universalist theories were foundational and philosophically comprehensive and thus contestable, but dispute that universalist principles are unattainable. The question then arises if Kantian constructivism can deliver a non-foundational justification of universal principles. Rawls, the first Kantian constructivist, has seemingly retreated from the universalist (...) ambitions of Kantian constructivism. However, others have taken up the project of Kantian constructivism. One of them is O’Neill, who argues that she can succeed where Rawls failed and provide a truly universal non-foundational constructivism. Her requirements for such a constructivism are a constructive justification of the procedure of construction and the use of only abstract, non-ideal starting points. I will argue that O’Neill fails on both accounts. Instead of justifying the principle of practical reason constructively she gives an instrumental and therefore conditional justification. Instead of relying on purely abstract starting points her account builds on an underlying value assumption. This indicates inherent contradictions within constructivism, and might force defenders of universalism to look elsewhere to answer the relativist and post-modern critic. (shrink)

The article is concerned with D. Davidson\'s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein\'s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out (...) of the question; hence Rorty\'s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson\'s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson\'s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics. (shrink)

Liberalism sanctions both democracy and capitalism, but incorporating the two into a coherent intellectual system presents difficulties. The anti-foundational pragmatism of Richard Rorty offers a way to describe and defend a meaningful democratic capitalism while avoiding the problems that come from the more traditional liberal justification. Additionally, Rorty's rejection of the search for extra-human grounding of social and political arrangements suggests that democracy is entitled to a philosophical support that capitalism is not. A viable democratic capitalism therefore justifies (...) its use of markets on the consent of the governed, rather than appeals to liberal notions of individualism, liberty, and property. (shrink)

U članku je riječ o bitnim obilježjima i modelu demokratskoga odgoja u Deweyevu djelu. Polazno je pitanje: što za suvremenu deliberativnu demokraciju znači Deweyev koncept odgoja i obrazovanja. Može li se njegov etički ideal čovječnosti primijeniti kao filozofski temelj za vrednovanje i opravdanje demokratske prakse? Je li Dewey potkopao i razorio temelje liberalizma, kako je tvrdio Richard Rorty? Ili njegova obnova filozofije zapravo tek vraća u život liberalizam i otvara nove putove demokraciji? Najnoviji val recepcije Deweyeve filozofije sve dubljim (...) intenzitetom pokazuje zacijelo da iz njezina misaonoga naslijeđa plodonosnim sudarima s idejama i tendencijama suvremenoga doba izlazi na vidjelo nešto što ujedno prekoračuje okvir suvremenosti i upućuje na budućnost. U aktualnoj renesansi pragmatizma posebice je znakovito primijetiti kako Deweyeva vrhunski profinjena kritika modernoga »individualizma« i zagovor jačanja ćudorednih i participativno demokratskih poveznica u lokalnim zajednicama pronalazi odjeka u komunitarističkim argumentacijskim diskursima. Zaključna je teza da Dewey isticanjem supstancijalne povezanosti »communicatio–community–common« ne ruši temelje liberalizma i demokracije nego ih štoviše obogaćuje, učvršćuje i podiže na višu razinu. (shrink)

While universalist theories have come under increasing attack from relativist and post-modern critics, such as Walzer, MacIntyre and Rorty, Kantian constructivism can be seen as a saviour of universalist ethics. Kantian constructivists accept the criticism that past universalist theories were foundational and philosophically comprehensive and thus contestable, but dispute that universalist principles are unattainable. The question then arises if Kantian constructivism can deliver a non-foundational justification of universal principles. Rawls, the first Kantian constructivist, has seemingly retreated from the universalist (...) ambitions of Kantian constructivism. However, others have taken up the project of Kantian constructivism. One of them is O’Neill, who argues that she can succeed where Rawls failed and provide a truly universal non-foundational constructivism. Her requirements for such a constructivism are a constructive justification of the procedure of construction and the use of only abstract, non-ideal starting points. I will argue that O’Neill fails on both accounts. Instead of justifying the principle of practical reason constructively she gives an instrumental and therefore conditional justification. Instead of relying on purely abstract starting points her account builds on an underlying value assumption. This indicates inherent contradictions within constructivism, and might force defenders of universalism to look elsewhere to answer the relativist and post-modern critic. (shrink)

Let me begin by asking you to consider some thought experiments. Suppose that you are being pursued by the police and you go to your family home and ask them to hide you. You would expect that they would do so. It would be abnormal if they did not. Consider again the reverse situation. You know that one of your parents or one of your children is guilty of a sordid crime and nonetheless he or she asks for your protection, (...) asks to be hidden from police inquiries. Many of us would be willing to perjure ourselves in order to supply such a child or parent with a false alibi. But if an innocent person would then be wrongly convicted as a result of our perjury, most of us would be torn by a conflict between loyalty and justice.Such a conflict will be felt, however, only to the extent that we can identify with the innocent person whom we have harmed. If the person is a neighbour the conflict will probably be intense. If a stranger, especially of a different race or class or nation, it may be considerably weaker. There has to be some sense that the victim is one of us before we start being tormented by the questionof whether we did the right thing when we committed perjury. So it might be equally appropriate to describe us as torn between conflicting loyalties — loyalty to our family and loyalty to some group large enough to include the victim of our perjury, rather than torn between loyalty andjustice.Our loyalty to such larger groups will however weaken or perhaps vanish when things get really tough. Then people whom we once thought of as like ourselves will be excluded. Sharing food with impoverished people down the street is natural and right in normal times but perhaps not in a famine when doing so would amount to disloyalty to one’s own family. The tougher things get, the more ties of loyalty to those near at hand tighten and those to everyone else slacken. (shrink)

Bioethics in a Liberal Societ By Max Charlesworth, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. 172. ISBN 0?521?44952?9. £9.95 pbk. The Logical Universe: The Real Universe By Noel Curran Avebury, 1994. Pp. 158. ISBN 1?85628?863?3. £32.50. Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault By Honi Fern Haber Routledge, 1994. Pp.viii + 160. ISBN 0?415?90823?X. $15.95. Baudrillard's Bestiary: Baudrillard and Culture By Mike Gane Routledge, 1991, Pp. 184. ISBN 0?415?06307?8. £10.99 pbk. Truth, Fiction and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective By Peter Lamarque and Stein (...) Haugom Olsen Clarendon Press, 1994. Pp. 456. ISBN 0?19?824082?1. £45.00. Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, and the Literary Imagination By David Loewenstein Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. x + 197. ISBN 0?521?37253?4. £25.00. Philosophy and Knowledge: A Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus Ronald M. Polansky Associated University Presses, 1992. Pp. 260. ISBN 0?8387?5215?2. £29.95. Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being By Tom Rockmore Routledge, 1995. Pp. xx + 250. ISBN 0?415?11181?1. £14.99 pbk. Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential Aesthetics By Sylvia Walsh The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Pp. 294. ISBN 0?271?01328?1. (shrink)