Was ist es, was Ludwig Wittgensteins Philosophische Untersuchungen zu etwas Besonderem macht? Sind die Philosophischen Untersuchungen als Argumentation für bestimmte philosophische Thesen zu lesen, oder soll man sie therapeutisch verstehen? Wann wurden die Untersuchungen überhaupt begonnen? Wann ist die Wende zu Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie passiert und was hat als solche zu gelten? Warum nennt Wittgenstein seine Philosophischen Untersuchungen ein “Album”? Welche Funktion hat der Stil der Untersuchungen?Auf diese und damit verbundene Fragen versucht das vorliegende Buch eine Antwort zu geben. Ein Teil (...) der Antwort wird sein, dass Wittgenstein mit den Philosophischen Untersuchungen tatsächlich ein Buch schaffen wollte, das philosophische Probleme lösen hilft, ohne dabei dem Dogmatismus Vorschub zu leisten. Für dieses Vorhaben brauchte das Buch eine besondere Form. Die Philosophischen Untersuchungen beginnen also da, wo diese Form beginnt: im November 1936 in Skjolden.Alois Pichler, geboren 1966, ist Leiter des Wittgenstein-Archivs der Universität Bergen, Norwegen. (shrink)
We present the idea of searching for X-rays as a signature of the mechanism inducing the spontaneous collapse of the wave function. Such a signal is predicted by the continuous spontaneous localization theories, which are solving the “measurement problem” by modifying the Schrödinger equation. We will show some encouraging preliminary results and discuss future plans and strategy.
In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...) processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA. (shrink)
This paper introduces and publishes two letters from 1934 written by Wittgenstein to Sraffa. The first of these confirms that on the one hand Wittgenstein and Sraffa had communicative difficulties. On the other hand Wittgenstein acknowledged the strength of Sraffa’s thinking and he was aware of being positively influenced by it. The second longer letter is part of a debate between Wittgenstein and Sraffa that had been ongoing in the few weeks preceding the letter. In the letter, Wittgenstein tried to (...) clarify and review in part his thinking on the points he discussed during the debate. (shrink)
This piece continues my efforts to identify the link between the Philosophical Investigations’ criss-cross form and its conception of philosophy and philosophical methods. In my ‘The Philosophical Investigations and Syncretistic Writing’ I established a connection between the PI’s criss-cross form and Wittgenstein’s saying that philosophy proper is like ‘Dichtung’. In this chapter I link the criss-cross form with the PI’s conception of the example and the central role it receives in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I contrast the PI’s conception of philosophy (...) with a conception that is guided by a scientistic approach and regards philosophical problems as somewhat similar to normal science puzzles. While this approach is prominent nowadays, it is not a conception shared by the PI. Rather, it is exactly this approach that the PI opposes with its criss-cross form. I hold that the radical nature of the PI’s form has largely gone unnoticed in Wittgenstein reception, including among scholars who regard Wittgenstein as a ‘therapeutic’ philosopher. As in my 2013 paper, here too I refer to Ortner’s description of writing strategies as a valuable tool for identifying working strategies and turning points in Wittgenstein’s formation of the PI, especially ‘linear step-by-step’, ‘syncretistic’ and ‘puzzle’ writing. (shrink)
The paper presents the resources offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen on Wittgenstein Source. Moreover, it describes the conditions for their use. Finally, the paper also briefly introduces WAB’s “Nachlass transcriptions” site from which all of WAB’s transcriptions of the Wittgenstein Nachlass can be downloaded, and the tool WiTTFind which permits lemmatized online search in the entire Nachlass and is the result of more than five years of close cooperation between WAB and the Centrum für Informations- (...) und Sprachverarbeitung at the Ludwig Maximilians Universität München. (shrink)
This paper presents two hitherto unknown dream reports by Ludwig Wittgenstein, written down by him in October 1942. The two reports are introduced by the title “Ein Traum” and found in his Nachlass item Ms-126, pages 21–26. They are edited here in parallel diplomatic and linear, gently normalized transcription. Facsimiles of the pages containing the reports can be viewed on Wittgenstein Source where they were published in the spring of 2016.
A conceptual ontology was used to semantically enrich the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen’s taxonomy for Wittgenstein Source to facilitate improved searching in the areas of the philosophies of mathematics and psychology. The classes and sub-classes of the multilingual taxonomy were employed to further refine the ways in which themes in these areas of philosophy could be organised. The taxonomy was intended to facilitate the identification of thematic similarities between remarks in instances where this similarity might not be (...) apparent with free text search and in cases where the classified subject of the remarks differed. The approach taken to constructing the taxonomy allows for both its alteration and potential expansion. (shrink)
In Chapter IV of his Schreiben und Denken , the Austrian linguist Hanspeter Ortner distinguishes and describes ten writing strategies (“Schreibstrategien”). One of them is “syncretistic writing”. 1 A simple application of Ortner’s defi nition and description of syncretistic writing to the genesis of the Philosophical Investigations (PI) makes clear that the PI can be said to be of syncretistic origin. 2 Wittgenstein’s writing of the PI 3 can be characterized by Ortner’s eight features of syncretistic: his writing (1) hops (...) all over the place (“Sprunghaftigkeit”); (2) combines disparate elements from his writings (“Verbindung von weit Auseinanderliegendem”); (3) is semantically open, under-determined and under-determining (“Unterdeterminiertheit und semantische Offenheit”); (4) postpones gestalt-formation/ elaboration (“Aufschub der Gestaltbildung”); (5) invites and offers many opportunities for creative ideas (“viele Chancen für und Einladungen an den kreativen Einfall”); (6) gives freedom to choose the points of departure and reference (“Freiheit bei der Wahl des/der Startpunktes/e und des/der Gesichtspunktes/e”); (7) is hierarchically under-determined (“hierarchische Unterbestimmtheit”); (8) works side-by-side with the already “fi nished” and the newly begun, which implies long text building processes and parallel operations (“lange ‘Bauzeit’ und Nebeneinander von Fertiggestelltem und Neubegonnenem”). 4 -/- In the following, I will try to show in more detail how the genesis of the PI is characterized by these eight features. First, the writings that constitute the PI’s genesis are characterized by a strong discrepancy between the sequence of remarks in their textual order and the sequence of remarks in their physical order. Texts are put together from chronologically and argumentatively dispersed units. One example is Wittgenstein’s rearrangement of remarks from an earlier dictation (TS 208) into a new text in 1930 (TS 209, published by Rush Rhees as Philosophical Remarks ). In this new text, he abandoned both the original argumentative order and the chronological order and did not necessarily obey the criteria of consistency and coherence, not even on linguistic levels such as demonstrative reference. The work that -/- emerges is seen by many as an unordered agglomerate of remarks, although I have argued that this view can be challenged. 5 The second example is the revision and rearrangement of the so-called Big Typescript (TS 213) in 1933-34, which is paradigmatic in its triple use of (1) the text in the typescript, (2) the handwritten revisions of it in the typescript, and (3) text in other manuscripts. In his edition of the Philosophical Grammar (1969), Rush Rhees has tried to take this complicated network of revisions into account and to follow it painstakingly and faithfully; by looking at the manuscript sources for this edition 6 one realizes how much “hopping all over the place” was going on in the originals. Thirdly, MS 142, the “Urfassung” of the PI, was produced in 1936-37 from remarks stemming from different places in manuscripts and typescripts and various loci of discourse. MS 157b, 13v, contains a list of references to pages in TS 213 from which parts of the text were to be taken to write the “philosophy chapter” of this fi rst PI version; other sources include MS 140 (last page), MS 152, MS 156a, MS 156b and MS 157a, all yielding materials, lists and drafts for the text of MS 142. The fi nal example is TS 228: in the later stages of the PI genesis, Wittgenstein selected about 400 remarks from this typescript to include in TS 227, the typescript used as the printer’s copy for the PI. (shrink)
Does the way authors treat their own works tell us something about how these works are to be understood? Not necessarily. But then a standard argument against the “New Wittgenstein” comes under question. The argument is: the undogmatic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus cannot be correct, since Wittgenstein himself later treats it as a work that holds certain positions. My response is: the argument is only correct if the answer to four specific questions is “yes.” The main purpose of the paper (...) is to bring issues of philosophical authorship more into focus within Wittgensteinian interpretation. (shrink)
What have Plato's, Hume's and Wittgenstein's dialogues in common? And what can we learn from this question for our understanding of Wittgenstein? â€“ This paper is a transcript of a lecture given in Bergen on May 4th, 2001.
This volume collects nine essays that investigate the work of Gottlob Frege. The contributors address Frege’s work in relation to literature and fiction (Dichtung), the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), and science (Wissenschaft). Overall, the essays consider internal connections between different aspects of Frege’s work while acknowledging the importance of its philosophical context. -/- There are also further common strands between the papers, such as the relation between Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s approaches to philosophical investigations, the relation between Frege and Kant, and the place (...) of Frege’s work in the philosophical landscape more generally. The volume is therefore of direct relevance to several current debates in philosophy in general, in addition to Frege and Wittgenstein research in particular. -/- Even though Frege’s great significance for contemporary philosophy is not disputed, the question of how we are to understand the character and aims of his project is debated. The debate has a starting point in Frege’s specific conception of logic. The volume elucidates this conception as well as the relation between natural language and the Begriffsschrift. It will help philosophers, researchers, and students better understand the nuances of this great thinker. By extension, it will also help readers seeking to understand Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical difficulties and his struggle to find an apt form of presentation for his philosophical investigations. (shrink)