In The Idea of a Social Science Winch, argues that, sociology is more properly conceived as a branch of philosophy than of empirical science. Winch falls victim here to the Humean assimilation of the empirical to the generalizable. He notes that much of our talk about social practice is in terms of conventions, so that explanations of social action can be given without recourse to statistical or experimental findings. But such talk depends nonetheless on the accuracy and detail with which (...) the situations in which actions occur are? recorded, and this is surely an empirical enterprise. It is the misleading conception of sociology as a discipline, characterized by common procedures, that leads Winch to espouse the assimilation of sociology to conceptual inquiry. We need to see instead that sociology embraces a group of questions and subjects so loosely connected that it would be mistaken to speak of, and idle to project, a procedure common to all of them. (shrink)

Narrative as it is used by historians is not merely an incidental, stylistic feature of the historian's craft, but essential to historical explanation. Narrative presupposes a world of things that endure through change. Stories fill in the gaps in our experience and thus make continuity visible. Ideally, narrative stands proxy for experience, though this ideal can never be attained. No criterion can be formulated that will signify when a story is complete enough. The changing perspective of the historian and the (...) infinite detail with which he has to deal makes his task a continuous one. Yet the historian cannot be radically subjective because his story is always limited by the chronology of his events and the accuracy of his details. The rationale of narrative enables the historian to repudiate the covering-law model of historical explanation. (shrink)

There are obvious grounds for the conjunction anthropology and ethics, proposed as the Monist topic. When philosophers teach or write ethics, material from alien ways of life illuminates and enriches the discussion, and sometimes helps chasten the urge to elevate local practises into universal principles. The question might then be raised: to what extent do anthropological discoveries affect the status and theories about the status of moral principles? The answer will affirm or take issue with that vaguely defined view, cultural (...) relativism. (shrink)