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Ariel Rubinstein [56]Annette T. Rubinstein [21]A. Rubinstein [5]Aynat Rubinstein [3]
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  1. Modeling Bounded Rationality.Ariel Rubinstein - 1998 - MIT Press.
    p. cm. — (Zeuthen lecture book series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-262-18187-8 (hardcover : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-262-68100-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Decision-making. 2. Economic man. 3. Game theory. 4. Rational expectations (Economic theory) I. Title. II. Series.
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  2.  56
    Comments On the Interpretation of Game Theory.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. Game theory is viewed as an abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict and not as an attempt to predict behavior. The first half of the paper..
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  3.  69
    On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) with imperfect recall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the ‘‘paradox of the absentminded driver.’’ Journal of Economic Literature Classification (...)
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  4. Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models provide the hypothesis (...)
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  5.  40
    Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning.
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  6.  22
    On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    This paper is an examination of some modelling problems regarding imperfect recall within the model of extensive games. It is argued that, if the assumption of perfect recall is violated, care must be taken in interpreting the main elements of the model. Interpretations that are inconsequential under perfect recall have important implications in the analysis of games with imperfect recall.
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  7.  25
    On Necessity and Comparison.Aynat Rubinstein - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):512-554.
    The ability to compare possibilities and designate some as ‘better’ than others is a fundamental aspect of our use of modals and propositional attitude verbs. This article aims to support a proposal by Sloman that certain modal expressions, in particular, ought, in fact have a more pronounced comparative backbone than others . The connection between ‘ought’ and ‘better’ is supported by linguistic data and a proposal is advanced for modeling ideals in a way that makes room for non-comparative, strong, priority-type (...)
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  8. Economics and Language: Five Essays.Ariel Rubinstein - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for (...)
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  9.  78
    (A, F ) Choice with Frames.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We develop a framework for modeling choice in the presence of framing effects. An extended choice function assigns a chosen element to every pair (A, f ) where A is a set of alternatives and f is a frame. A frame includes observable information that is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless affects choice. We relate the new framework to the classical model of choice correspondence. Conditions are identified under which there exists either a transitive or (...)
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  10.  53
    Comments on Neuroeconomics.Ariel Rubinstein - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):485-494.
    Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics.
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  11.  33
    A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    A survey was carried out among two groups of undergraduate economics students and four groups of students in mathematics, law, philosophy and business administration. The main survey question involved a conflict between profit maximisation and the welfare of the workers who would be fired to achieve it. Significant differences were found between the choices of the groups. The results were reinforced by a survey conducted among readers of an Israeli business newspaper and PhD students of Harvard. It is argued that (...)
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  12.  28
    Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent.Ariel Rubinstein - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics.
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  13.  61
    On the Question "Who is a J?"* A Social Choice Approach.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The determination of “who is a J” within a society is treated as an aggregation of the views of the members of the society regarding this question. Methods, similar to those used in Social Choice theory are applied to axiomatize three criteria for determining who is a J: 1) a J is whoever defines oneself to be a J. 2) a J is whoever a “dictator” determines is a J. 3) a J is whoever an “oligarchy” of individuals agrees is (...)
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  14. A Model of Choice From Lists.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from sets of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a list. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice from sets. We show that they characterize all the choice functions from lists that involve the choice of either the first or the last optimal alternative in the list according to some (...)
     
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  15.  44
    A Theorist's View of Experiments.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The paper springs from a position that economic theory is an abstract investigation of the concepts and considerations involved in real life economic decision making rather than a tool for predicting or describing real behavior. It is argued that when experimental economics is motivated by theory, it should not look to verify the predictions of theory but instead should focus on verifying that the considerations contained in the economic model are sound and in common use. It is argued that when (...)
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  16.  38
    A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule specifies which statements the listener finds persuasive. We study persuasion rules that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request if and only (...)
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  17.  34
    Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    (2) Mental preferences: These describe the mental attitude of an individual toward the objects. They can be defined in contexts which do not involve actual choice. In particular, preferences can describe tastes (such as a preference for one season over another) or can refer to situations which are only hypothetical (such as the possible courses of action available to an individual were he to become Emperor of Rome) or which the individual does not fully control (such as a game situation (...)
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  18.  46
    On Optimal Rules of Persuasion.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the values of two aspects. The values of the aspects are known only to the speaker and the listener can check the value of at most one. A mechanism specifies a set of messages that the speaker can send and a rule that determines the listener’s response, namely, which aspect he checks and (...)
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  19.  31
    Freak-Freakonomics.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    New York University. He is the recipient of the Bruno Prize (2000), the Israel Prize (2002), the Nemmers Prize (2004).
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  20.  59
    Tracking Decision Makers Under Uncertainty.Amos Arieli & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    Eye tracking is used to investigate human choice procedures. We infer from eye movement patterns in choice problems where the deliberation process is clear to deliberations in problems of choice between two lotteries. The results indicate that participants tend to compare prizes and probabilities separately. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers use an expected utility type of calculation exclusively. This is particularly true when the calculations involved in comparing the lotteries are complicated.
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  21.  30
    New Directions in Economic Theory- Bounded Rationality.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    Resumert Este trabajo presenta varios modelos que destacan el contraste entre las teorias de la decision y de los juegos, por una parte, y la intuicidn y los datos empiricos y experimentales, por otra. Estos ejemplos estimulan la adopcion del punto de vista de la ra-.
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  22.  22
    Sampling Equilibrium, with an Application to Strategic Voting.M. J. Osborne & A. Rubinstein - unknown
    We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win (...)
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  23.  39
    Discussion of “Behavioral Economics”.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    For me, economics is a collection of ideas and conventions which economists accept and use to reason with. Namely, it is a culture. Behavioral economics represents a transformation of that culture. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), its methods are pretty much the same as those introduced by the Game Theory revolution. At the core of most models in Behavioral Economics there are still agents who maximize a preference relation over some space of consequences and the solution (...)
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  24.  32
    Equilibrium in the Jungle.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylised model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle.
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  25.  45
    The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    from now on , was to point out that the model commonly used to describe . a decision problem with imperfect recall suffers from major ambiguities in its interpretation. We claimed that several issues which were immaterial in decision problems with perfect recall may be of importance in the analysis of decision problems with imperfect recall. The issues that we raised can be summarized by the following questions.
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  26.  26
    Eliciting Welfare Preferences From Behavioral Datasets.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A behavioral dataset contains various preference orderings displayed by the same individual in different payoff-irrelevant circumstances. We introduce a framework for eliciting the individual’s underlying preferences in such cases, in which it is conjectured that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences. We then demonstrate for two cognitive processes how to elicit the individual’s underlying preferences from behavioral datasets.
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  27.  23
    Choice Problems with a 'Reference' Point.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In many decision scenarios, one has to choose an element from a set S given some reference point e. For the case where S is a subset of a Euclidean space, we axiomatize the choice method that selects the point in S that is closest to e. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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  28.  7
    Fair Division, Steven Brams and Alan Taylor. Cambridge University Press, 1996, 272 + Xiv Pages.Ariel Rubinstein - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):113.
  29.  22
    An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through (...)
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  30.  27
    Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two ``cultures.'' In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the (...)
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  31.  31
    Gradable Possibility and Epistemic Comparison.Elena Herburger & Aynat Rubinstein - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (1):165-191.
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  32. I Vote My Conscience: Debates, Speeches and Writings of Vito Marcantonio.Vito Marcantonio & Annette Rubinstein - 2004 - Science and Society 68 (1):108-110.
     
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  33. Human Values--An Interpretation of Ethics Based on a Study of Values.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1932 - Journal of Philosophy 29 (12):331-332.
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  34.  21
    Desire, Belief, and Semantic Composition: Variation in Mood Selection with Desire Predicates.Paul Portner & Aynat Rubinstein - 2020 - Natural Language Semantics 28 (4):343-393.
    Mood selection properties of desire verbs provide a rich source of evidence regarding the semantics of propositional attitudes. This paper approaches the topic by providing an analysis of crosslinguistic variation in the selection patterns of the desire verbs ‘want’ and ‘hope’, focusing on Spanish and French. There is no evidence that the meanings of ‘hope’ and ‘want’ differ between these languages, and yet in Spanish esperar ‘hope’ and querer ‘want’ both take subjunctive, while in French only vouloir ‘want’ selects subjunctive (...)
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  35.  26
    An ´ Etude in Choice Theory: Choosing the Two Finalists.Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    This paper studies a decision maker who tackles a choice problem by selecting a subset of (at most) two alternatives which he will consider further in the second stage of his deliberation. We focus on the first stage where he chooses the delebration set. We axiomatize three types of procedures: (i) The top two: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the two maximal alternatives. (ii) The two extremes: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and (...)
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  36.  23
    Ayala Arad.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    We study experimentally a two-player game which we find ideal for investigating k-level reasoning. Each player requests an amount of money between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the amount that he requests and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. The best response function in this game is straightforward, the k-level strategies are invariant to the two prominent level-0 specifications (randomization or attraction to salience) and the situation calls for (...)
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  37. Autobiography and Black Identity Politics (Book Review).Annette T. Rubinstein - 2000 - Science and Society 64 (3):382.
  38.  20
    An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through (...)
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  39.  31
    A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debate: An Expository Note.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    In this paper, the term ‘debate’ refers to a situation in which two parties disagree over some issue and each of them tries to persuade a third party, the listener, to adopt his position by raising arguments in his favor. We are interested in the logic behind the relative strength of the arguments and counterarguments; we therefore limit our discussion to debates in which one side is asked to argue first, with the other party having the right to respond before (...)
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  40.  1
    A Note on American Literary Independence.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1976 - Science and Society 40 (3):352 - 355.
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  41.  7
    A Stay Against Confusion.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1969 - Science and Society 33 (1):25 - 41.
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  42.  18
    A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures for a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the players employ an equal number of search units and conduct a completely random search. (...)
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  43.  8
    Bourgeois Equality in Shakespeare.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1977 - Science and Society 41 (1):25 - 35.
  44.  60
    Colonel Blotto's Top Secret Files.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    Colonel Blotto “secret files” are opened and Information about the way that people play the game is revealed. The files rely on web-based experiments, which involve a tournament version of the Colonel Blotto Game. A total of 6,500 subjects from two diverse populations participated in the tournaments. The results are analyzed in light of a novel procedure of multi-dimensional iterative reasoning. According to the procedure, a player decides separately about different features of his strategy using iterative reasoning. Measuring the response (...)
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  45. Choosing Revolution (Book).Annette T. Rubinstein - 2003 - Science and Society 67 (2):259.
     
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  46. Civil Society (Book Review).Annette T. Rubinstein - 2000 - Science and Society 64 (2):237.
     
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  47.  23
    Choosing the Two Finalists.A. Rubinstein - unknown
    This paper studies a decision maker who for each choice set selects a subset of (at most) two alternatives. We axiomatize three types of procedures: (i) The top two: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the two maximal alternatives. (ii) The two extremes: the decision maker has in mind an ordering and chooses the maximal and the minimal alternatives. (iii) The top and the top: the decision maker has in mind two orderings and he chooses the (...)
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  48. Darwin's Audubon (Book Review).Annette T. Rubinstein - 2000 - Science and Society 64 (1):128.
     
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  49.  39
    Disinterestedness as Ideal and as Technique.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (17):461-466.
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  50.  1
    David Goldway July 20, 1907—July 24, 1990.Annette T. Rubinstein - 1990 - Science and Society 54 (4):386 - 390.
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