44 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Amos Tversky [43]A. Tversky [2]
  1. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
  2. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1659 citations  
  3.  15
    Choices, Values, and Frames.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   219 citations  
  4. On the psychology of prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
    Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students. The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   423 citations  
  5. Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   599 citations  
  6. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
  7. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   512 citations  
  8. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.
  9. Intransitivity of preferences.Amos Tversky - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (1):31-48.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   174 citations  
  10. Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice.Amos Tversky - 1972 - Psychological Review 79 (4):281-299.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  11.  52
    On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
  12. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I: Additive and Polynomial Representations.David Krantz, Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1971 - New York Academic Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  13.  41
    Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.
  14.  67
    Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic - 1988 - Psychological Review 95 (3):371-384.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  15.  64
    Variants of uncertainty.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):143-157.
  16.  97
    On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1979 - Cognition 7 (December):409-11.
  17.  54
    On the study of statistical intuitions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
  18.  19
    Conjoint-measurement analysis of composition rules in psychology.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (2):151-169.
  19.  23
    Weighing risk and uncertainty.Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (2):269-283.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  20. The Psychology of Preferences.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Scientific American 246:160–173.
  21.  32
    Utility theory and additivity analysis of risky choices.Amos Tversky - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 75 (1):27.
  22.  21
    Foundations of multidimensional scaling.Richard Beals, David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1968 - Psychological Review 75 (2):127-142.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  23. Studies of similarity.Amos Tversky & Itamar Gati - 1978 - In Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence Elbaum Associates. pp. 1--1978.
  24.  28
    Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: Advances in support theory.Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):406-415.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  25. A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive and Normative Considerations.Amos Tversky - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (2):163 - 173.
  26.  41
    Similarity, separability, and the triangle inequality.Amos Tversky & Itamar Gati - 1982 - Psychological Review 89 (2):123-154.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  27.  22
    Languages and Designs for Probability Judgment.Glenn Shafer & Amos Tversky - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (3):309-339.
    Theories of subjective probability are viewed as formal languages for analyzing evidence and expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probability langauges, the Bayesian language and the language of belief functions (Shafer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meaning of the scale) and the syntax (i.e., the formal calculus) of these languages. We also investigate some of the designs for probability judgment afforded by the two languages.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  28.  17
    L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
  29. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. II: Geometrical, Threshold, and Probabilistic Representations.Patrick Suppes, David Krantz, Duncan Luce & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1989 - New York Academic Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30.  15
    Nearest neighbor analysis of psychological spaces.Amos Tversky & J. Wesley Hutchinson - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (1):3-22.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31. Probabilistic reasoning.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 43--68.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32.  57
    Information versus reward in binary choices.Amos Tversky & Ward Edwards - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (5):680.
  33.  14
    Preference trees.Amos Tversky & Shmuel Sattath - 1979 - Psychological Review 86 (6):542-573.
  34. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. III: Representation, Axiomatization, and Invariance.Duncan Luce, David Krantz, Patrick Suppes & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1990 - New York Academic Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35.  41
    Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
  36.  33
    Assessing Uncertainty.Amos Tversky - 1974 - Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 36 (2):148-159.
    Intuitive judgments of probability are based on a limited number of heuristics that are usually effective but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Research shows, for example, that people judge the probability of a hypothesis by the degree to which it represents the evidence, with little or no regard for its prior probability. Other heuristics lead to an overestimation of the probabilities of highly available or salient events, and to overconfidence in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. These biases (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. The Notion of Cognitive Bias.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 2000 - In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications. pp. 8--349.
  38. Numbers l-2.Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson, Amos Tversky, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, Pn Johnson-Laird, Edward E. Smith, Daniel Osherson & Nancy Pennington - 1993 - Cognition 49 (297):297.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  9
    A reply to Evans.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 12 (3):325-326.
  40.  16
    An exchange on functional and conjoint measurement: Reply.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (5):457-458.
  41.  13
    An exchange on functional and conjoint measurement: Reply.David H. Krantz & Amos Tversky - 1971 - Psychological Review 78 (5):458-458.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  3
    On the relation between common and distinctive feature models.Shmuel Sattath & Amos Tversky - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (1):16-22.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43.  8
    "Preference trees": Correction to Tversky and Sattath.Amos Tversky & Shmuel Sattath - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (2):159-159.
  44. Cognitive Illusions in Judgment and Choice in The Kaleidoscope of Science. The Israel Colloquium: Studies in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science. Volume I. [REVIEW]A. Tversky - 1986 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 94:75-94.