Normal 0 0 1 91 520 .. 4 1 638 11.1280 0 14 0 0 Moving among historical material and contemporary debates on xenophobia and war, this paper is an exploration of the self-representation “ Italiani Brava Gente ”, an image claiming the intrinsic goodness of the Italian people. Originated during the first Italian colonial enterprises, it has been used also for overcoming the horrors of Fascism and is evoked in contemporary Italy too for justifying traumatic and violent events. Functioning (...) as an ideological laundry for reformulating and then setting aside disquieting moments of national shame, “ Italiani Brava Gente ” is central to the construction of a modern Italian identity. (shrink)

É preciso refletir sobre a formação do professor de Filosofia. É necessário olhar a própria prática dos cursos, o perfil dos alunos que os estão freqüentando, a inserção desses estudantes nas escolas, o tipo de Filosofia que nelas está sendo trabalhada, a receptividade que a Filosofia está tendo, os livros didáticos de Filosofia e o seu uso.

Ao pesquisar a realidade educacional contemporânea é preciso conceber que os desafios que atingem a práxis pedagógica em sala de aula se apresentam de forma multifacetada e complexa. Pensar a atuação docente se mostra cada vez mais desafiadora e prescinde de problematizações que auxiliem no enfrentamento das dificuldades. Assim, a presente pesquisa trata da temática acerca do diálogo como um princípio ético na prática pedagógica em sala de aula, com ênfase na concepção dos docentes da Escola X. Tratando-se de uma (...) pesquisa de cunho analítico-hermenêutico, é adotada a metodologia da observação participante, realizada om observações diretas, em atividades cotidianas, na escola indicada, nas quais buscou-se evidenciar o conceito de diálogo de Paulo Freire (1981) e de sua função primordial na relação professor/aluno. Assim, o problema de pesquisa localizou-se na seguinte questão: é possível exercer o diálogo como um princípio ético na concepção dos docentes da Escola X? Assim, com justificativa no fomento ao debate acerca de princípios éticos na prática pedagógica, presentes nos escritos de Elli Benincá (2010) que devem ser assumidos pelos docentes em seu fazer diário, pode-se observar que embora desejável na teoria, o diálogo nem sempre é exercido na pratica cotidiana em sala de aula. No entanto, entendemos que sua compreensão conceitual e seu efetivo exercício por parte dos docentes, de forma a preservar princípios éticos, pode propiciar um sentimento de esperança ao crer no diálogo como possibilidade de superar o modelo "bancário" de educação, transformando a sala de aula em um lugar de troca de saberes e de emancipação individual e coletiva. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma proposta de vivência da democracia na escola discutindo num primeiro momento a relação entre educação escolar e democracia a partir de Biesta e, num segundo momento, a proposta de educação formulada por Dewey em Democracia e educação. Em seguida, abordando a obra de Joseph Püig et al., Democracia e participação escolar, trata das características da escola democrática e de como elas podem efetivar-se no cotidiano escolar.

No contexto da pandemia, vivemos a incerteza de quando a vida tornará a sua normalidade. Esse momento de incerteza nos impulsiona a reflexão sobre o atual cenário, os desafios e possibilidades dessa nova forma de viver. Pensando nisso, o presente estudo de cunho bibliográfico hermenêutico busca refletir acerca da prática pedagógica e do ensino de filosofia no atual contexto, atendo-se aos seguintes problemas: é possível uma prática pedagógica de qualidade em meio a esse cenário? De que modo o ensino de (...) filosofia pautado na reflexão pode ser possível na modalidade à distância? Para dar conta de tais questões, buscamos nas reflexões de Antunes Neto (2020) e Barreto; Rocha (2020), o diálogo acerca da possibilidade da prática pedagógica em tempos de pandemia, assim como a possibilidade do ensino de filosofia por meio da reflexão presente nos escritos de Trombetta (2013). (shrink)

In romantic relationships, individual differences are determinant factors for relational quality. Specifically, romantic attachment and difficulties in emotional regulation influence each other and may have predictive potential for the perceived dyadic adjustment level. This paper aims to identify the developmental parallel between behavioral patterns built since childhood and the construction of the emotional regulation skills that characterize them. Our analysis was based on the attachment theory and the concepts of romantic relationship and DA. In this way, we sought to further (...) the understanding of relationship dynamics, beyond the usual focus on a single element and on associative relationships, and by exploring other effects among the different dimensions of relational functioning. In particular, we explored the predictive ability of emotional regulation patterns in discriminating between RA styles, and their impact on the quality of romantic relationships, in the anticipation of dyadic adjustment variations. (shrink)

In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but (...) also what they should do if they cannot do their part because others will not do theirs. I go on to argue (contra recent proposals) that it is not good enough for members in this situation to reasonably believe that others will not do their part. Rather, for a member of an obligated collective to permissibly escape doing her part in a collective obligation, she must both reasonably doubt that others will do their part and stand ready to act in case others do as well. -/- This necessary condition for collective obligation points the way to plausible sufficient conditions – conditions that, I argue, allow unstructured collectives to bear obligations. For (a) if a collective’s members are individually obligated to be ready to do their part, in a given collective action, and (b) if that individual readiness makes it sufficiently likely that the collective will in fact act, then it is hard to see what could block an attribution of collective obligation. In particular, in that case there ought to be no additional objection that there is no existing, organized “agent” on which the obligation might fall. For agents are, simply, things that can act. To be able to act is just to be able to succeed by trying. Unstructured collectives try to do something, I argue, when each member acts on their willingness to do their part in that thing if others do theirs; sometimes they succeed, producing a collective action. Some unstructured collectives, therefore, can succeed by trying; therefore, they can act; therefore they are agents. (shrink)

What makes something a part of my body, for moral purposes? Is the body defined naturalistically: by biological relations, or psychological relations, or some combination of the two? This paper approaches this question by considering a borderline case: the status of prostheses. I argue that extant accounts of the body fail to capture prostheses as genuine body parts. Nor, however, do they provide plausible grounds for excluding prostheses, without excluding some paradigm organic parts in the process. I conclude by suggesting (...) that embodiment is moralized all the way down: to be a body part is to be the sort of thing that ought to be protected, in a certain way, by social practices. (shrink)

In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and (...) make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help. (shrink)

This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I (...) argue that it is often wrong to use the term ‘healthy’ in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is ‘healthy’ properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as ‘healthy’ per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is ‘healthy’ in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power. (shrink)

In The Minority Body, Elizabeth Barnes rejects prevailing social constructionist accounts of disability for two reasons. First, because they understand disability in terms of oppressive social responses to bodily impairment, they cannot make sense of disability pride. Second, they maintain a problematic distinction between impairment and disability. In response to these challenges, this paper defends a version of the social model of disability, which we call the Social Exclusion Model. On our account, to be disabled is to be in a (...) bodily or psychological state that is represented as an impairment in the prevailing ideology of one’s society, and to be excluded from valuable activities on the basis of this representation. While this model refers to a distinction between disability and impairment, it makes no presuppositions about which bodies function ‘normally’ and which do not. It is the ideology of impairment rather than impairment itself that does any work to determine whether a person is disabled. We argue that this model answers some of the important objections that Barnes raises against prevailing social constructionist accounts of disability, and that it’s focus on the oppressive social positioning of disabled people gives it explanatory power that Barnes’s own account lacks. (shrink)

This paper critically engages ethical issues in the allocation of novel, and potentially costly, health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness. First, we review potential benefits of novel health care resources for patients and their families and outline preliminary considerations to address concerns about cost. We then address two problems regarding the allocation of health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness: (1) the problem of uncertain moral status; and (2) the problem of accurately measuring the welfare (...) burdens these resources would relieve. We conclude by suggesting that opportunity-based frameworks might complement standard approaches for justifying resources allocation to patients with disorders of consciousness. (shrink)

Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them—and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient’s heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases (...) at the boundary—procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it—particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively “bodily” rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices. (shrink)

This article asks whether personal ventilators should be redistributed to maximize lives saved in emergency condition, like the COVID-19 pandemic. It begins by examining extant claims that items like ventilators are literally parts of their user’s bodies. Arguments in favor of incorporation for ventilators fail to show that they meet valid sufficient conditions to be body parts, but arguments against incorporation also fail to show that they fail to meet clearly valid necessary conditions. Further progress on this issue awaits clarification (...) of difficult normative, conceptual, and metaphysical questions about the possible boundaries of a person’s body. Rather than relying solely on incorporation arguments, we propose an argument against reallocation from widely accepted anti-discrimination principles. Possession of a personal ventilator is an obvious marker of disability identity; thus, reallocating ventilators from those that already possess them discriminates on the basis of a stigmatized trait – a paradigm case of presumptively wrongful discrimination. This discrimination claim, taken together with uncertainty about the bodily status of ventilators, yields a strong presumption against personal ventilator reallocation. (shrink)

Technological measures meant to change sexual orientation are, we have argued elsewhere, deeply alarming, even and indeed especially if they are safe and effective. Here we point out that this in part because they produce a distinctive kind of ‘clinical collective action problem’, a sort of dilemma for individual clinicians and researchers: a treatment which evidently relieves the suffering of particular patients, but in the process contributes to a practice that substantially worsens the conditions that produce this suffering in the (...) first place. We argue that the role obligations of clinicians to relieve the suffering of their patients put them in a poor position to solve this problem, though they can take measures to avoid complicity in the harms that would result from widespread use of individually safe and effective reorientation biotechnology. But in the end the medical community as a whole still seems obligated to provide these measures, if they become technologically feasible. Medical researchers are in a better position to prevent the harms that would result if reorientation techniques were safe, effective and widely available. We argue that the harms attendant on the development of safe and effective re-orientation techniques give researchers reason to avoid ‘applied‘ research aimed at developing these techniques, and to be careful in the conduct of basic orientation research which might be applied in this way. (shrink)

A Lei de Diretrizes e Bases 9.394/96 inseriu a Filosofia nos currículos do Ensino Médio com o indicativo de interdisciplinaridade, permanecendo em aberto questões acerca de como fazer com que a Filosofia potencialize a experiência interdisciplinar. Com o objetivo de correlacionar interdisciplinaridade e Filosofia, o artigo resulta de uma análise hermenêutica que confronta reflexões de Hannah Arendt sobre a crise na educação e a proposta da comunidade de investigação de Lipman. Parte da noção de que em meados do século XX, (...) a educação tradicional foi substituída pela pedagogia progressista e a educação passou a ser pensada como ciência do ensino em geral, a fim de atender à dinâmica do avanço científico e tecnológico. A visão analítica e linear das especialidades não responde satisfatoriamente às demandas atuais de uma ciência complexa, articulada e em rápida transformação. Diante do requisito interdisciplinar da ciência, o específico da Filosofia é a problematização e a sistematização do filosofar; de mediação entre as disciplinas, em virtude da dimensão holística de seus conteúdos, e de vigilância epistemológica como recurso de revisão e atualização dos saberes. Palavras-chave: Interdisciplinaridade. Filosofia. Ciência. Crise na educação. Comunidade de investigação. (shrink)