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Aaron Wilson
South Texas College
  1.  33
    Locke's Externalism About 'Sensitive Knowledge'.Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):425-445.
    Locke characterizes sensitive knowledge as knowledge of the existence of external objects present to the senses, and in terms of an ‘assurance’ that falls short of the certainty of intuition and demonstration. But it is unclear how this fits with his general definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and it is unclear how that assurance can amount to knowledge, rather than amounting to mere probability (which he contrasts with knowledge). Some contend that Locke (...)
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    Interpretation, Realism, and Truth: Is Peirce's Second Grade of Clearness Independent of the Third?Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2020 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 56 (3):349.
  3. Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and its Originality.Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    This book defends an interpretation of Peirce’s philosophical work as forming a systematic whole, emphasizing his empiricist epistemology and explaining the roots of his thought in earlier empiricist and common sense philosophers. In particular, the book develops the connections between Peirce, Reid, and the British empiricists, and provides focused analyses of Peirce’s accounts of experience, habit, perception, semeiosis, truth, and ultimate ends.
     
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    The Peircean Solution to Non-Existence Problems: Immediate and Dynamical Objects.Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2017 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (4):528.
    Whether in Plato’s Sophist or in Quine’s “Plato’s Beard,”1 the representation of unreal or non-existent objects is usually presented as a puzzle. How is it that we can think and talk coherently about things that do not exist or are not real, given that thinking and talking about such things seem to involve relations between things that exist and things that don’t exist? Uriah Kriegel articulates the problem most generally as the following inconsistent triad:One can think of non-existents.One cannot bear (...)
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  5. What Do We Perceive? How Peirce "Expands Our Perception".Aaron Bruce Wilson - 2017 - In Kathleen Hull & Richard Kenneth Atkins (eds.), Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 1-13.
    On Peirce’ view, we can perceive many things commonly thought not to be perceptible—or thought to be ‘abstract’—including but not necessarily limited to (some) generals or universals, habits or law-like properties, modal properties, and semeiotic properties (sign relations). My contention turns on his arguments in ‘Some Consequences’ that ‘no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate’, his mature account of perception, particularly his criteria for what counts as perception and what does not, his analysis of the predication of concepts (i.e. his (...)
     
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