125 found
Order:
See also
Aaron Sloman
University of Birmingham
  1. The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy, Science and Models of Mind.Aaron Sloman - 1978 - Hassocks UK: Harvester Press.
    Extract from Hofstadter's revew in Bulletin of American Mathematical Society : http://www.ams.org/journals/bull/1980-02-02/S0273-0979-1980-14752-7/S0273-0979-1980-14752-7.pdf -/- "Aaron Sloman is a man who is convinced that most philosophers and many other students of mind are in dire need of being convinced that there has been a revolution in that field happening right under their noses, and that they had better quickly inform themselves. The revolution is called "Artificial Intelligence" (Al)-and Sloman attempts to impart to others the "enlighten- ment" which he clearly regrets not having (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   136 citations  
  2.  37
    Motives, Mechanisms, and Emotions.Aaron Sloman - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (3):217-233.
  3. Virtual Machines and Consciousness.Aaron Sloman & Ronald L. Chrisley - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):133-172.
    Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word “consciousness” has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal informationprocessing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual-machine (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  4. Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):45–69.
    What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin’s opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  23
    The Computer Revolution in Philosophy.Martin Atkinson & Aaron Sloman - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):178.
  6.  79
    Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):117-169.
  7.  67
    An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
  8.  74
    Why Robots Will Have Emotions.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - manuscript
    Emotions involve complex processes produced by interactions between motives, beliefs, percepts, etc. E.g. real or imagined fulfilment or violation of a motive, or triggering of a 'motive-generator', can disturb processes produced by other motives. To understand emotions, therefore, we need to understand motives and the types of processes they can produce. This leads to a study of the global architecture of a mind. Some constraints on the evolution of minds are disussed. Types of motives and the processes they generate are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  9. Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    This paper rehearses some relatively old arguments about how any coherent notion of free will is not only compatible with but depends on determinism. However the mind-brain identity theory is attacked on the grounds that what makes a physical event an intended action A is that the agent interprets the physical phenomena as doing A. The paper should have referred to the monograph Intention by Elizabeth Anscombe, which discusses in detail the fact that the same physical event can have multiple (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  22
    What Sorts of Machines Can Understand the Symbols They Use?Aaron Sloman & L. Jonathan Cohen - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1):61-96.
  11. `Ought' and `Better'.Aaron Sloman - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):385-394.
  12.  17
    The Mind as a Control System.Aaron Sloman - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:69-110.
    This is not a scholarly research paper, but a ‘position paper’ outlining an approach to the study of mind which has been gradually evolving since about 1969 when I first become acquainted with work in Artificial Intelligence through Max Clowes. I shall try to show why it is more fruitful to construe the mind as a control system than as a computational system.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  13. How to Dispose of the Free Will Issue.Aaron Sloman - 1993 - AISB Quarterlye 82:31-2.
  14.  58
    Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes.Ian Wright, Aaron Sloman & Luc Beaudoin - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):101-126.
    he design-based approach is a methodology for investigating mechanisms capable of generating mental phenomena, whether introspectively or externally observed, and whether they occur in humans, other animals or robots. The study of designs satisfying requirements for autonomous agency can provide new deep theoretical insights at the information processing level of description of mental mechanisms. Designs for working systems (whether on paper or implemented on computers) can systematically explicate old explanatory concepts and generate new concepts that allow new and richer interpretations (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  15. Virtual Machine Functionalism: The Only Form of Functionalism Worth Taking Seriously in Philosophy of Mind.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    Most philosophers appear to have ignored the distinction between the broad concept of Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) described in Sloman&Chrisley (2003) and the better known version of functionalism referred to there as Atomic State Functionalism (ASF), which is often given as an explanation of what Functionalism is, e.g. in Block (1995). -/- One of the main differences is that ASF encourages talk of supervenience of states and properties, whereas VMF requires supervenience of machines that are arbitrarily complex networks of causally (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  30
    What Sort of Architecture is Required for a Human-Like Agent?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  17. Comments on “The Emulating Interview... With Rick Grush”.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):35–44.
    Author comments Rick Grush’s statements about emulation and embodied approach to representation. He proposes his modification of Grush’s definition of emulation, criticizing notion of “standing in for”. He defends of notion of representation. He claims that radical embodied theories are not applicable to all cognition.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. What Cognitive Scientists Need to Know About Virtual Machines.Aaron Sloman - 2009 - In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1210--1215.
  19.  75
    What Sort of Architecture is Required for a Human-Like Agent?Aaron Sloman - 1996 - In Ramakrishna K. Rao (ed.), Foundations of Rational Agency. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  20.  20
    How Many Separately Evolved Emotional Beasties Live Within Us.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Robert Trappl (ed.), Emotions in Humans and Artifacts. Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 35--114.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21.  26
    What Sorts of Machines Can Understand the Symbols They Use?Aaron Sloman - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60:61-80.
  22.  69
    Architecture-Based Conceptions of Mind.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Peter Gardenfors, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek & Jan Wolenski (eds.), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Vol Ii). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  23. The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to AI.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
  24.  76
    The Mind as a Control System.Aaron Sloman - 1993 - In Christopher Hookway & Donald M. Peterson (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-110.
    This is not a scholarly research paper, but a ‘position paper’ outlining an approach to the study of mind which has been gradually evolving since about 1969 when I first become acquainted with work in Artificial Intelligence through Max Clowes. I shall try to show why it is more fruitful to construe the mind as a control system than as a computational system.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  25.  45
    Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  26.  25
    Beyond Turing Equivalence.Aaron Sloman - 1996 - In Peter Millican Andy Clark (ed.), Machines and Thought The Legacy of Alan Turing. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--179.
    What is the relation between intelligence and computation? Although the difficulty of defining `intelligence' is widely recognized, many are unaware that it is hard to give a satisfactory definition of `computational' if computation is supposed to provide a non-circular explanation for intelligent abilities. The only well-defined notion of `computation' is what can be generated by a Turing machine or a formally equivalent mechanism. This is not adequate for the key role in explaining the nature of mental processes, because it is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  27.  87
    Toward a General Theory of Representations.Aaron Sloman - 1994 - In D. M. Peterson (ed.), Forms of representation: an interdisciplinary theme for Cognitive Science. Exeter: Intellect Books. pp. 118-140.
    This position paper presents the beginnings of a general theory of representations starting from the notion that an intelligent agent is essentially a control system with multiple control states, many of which contain information (both factual and non-factual), albeit not necessarily in a propositional form. The paper attempts to give a general characterisation of the notion of the syntax of an information store, in terms of types of variation the relevant mechanisms can cope with. Similarly concepts of semantics pragmatics and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28.  37
    How to Turn an Information Processor Into an Understander.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):447-448.
  29.  81
    The Primacy of Non-Communicative Language.Aaron Sloman - 1979 - In M. MacCafferty & Kurt Gray (eds.), The Analysis of Meaning: Informatics 5, Proceedings Aslib/Bcs Conference. Aslib.
  30.  94
    Prolegomena to a Theory of Communication and Affect.Aaron Sloman - 1992 - In Andrew Ortony, Jon Slack & Oliviero Stock (eds.), Communication from an Artificial Intelligence Perspective: Theoretical and Applied Issues. Springer.
    As a step towards comprehensive computer models of communication, and effective human machine dialogue, some of the relationships between communication and affect are explored. An outline theory is presented of the architecture that makes various kinds of affective states possible, or even inevitable, in intelligent agents, along with some of the implications of this theory for various communicative processes. The model implies that human beings typically have many different, hierarchically organized, dispositions capable of interacting with new information to produce affective (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31.  47
    Altricial Self-Organising Information-Processing Systems ∗.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    It is often thought that there is one key design principle or at best a small set of design principles, underlying the success of biological organisms. Candidates include neural nets, ‘swarm intelligence’, evolutionary computation, dynamical systems, particular types of architecture or use of a powerful uniform learning mechanism, e.g. reinforcement learning. All of those support types of self-organising, self-modifying behaviours. But we are nowhere near understanding the full variety of powerful information-processing principles ‘discovered’ by evolution. By attending closely to the (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Machine Consciousness: Response to Commentaries.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):75-116.
  33.  60
    What Are Emotion Theories About?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    findings from affective neuroscience research. I shall focus mainly on, but in a manner which, I hope is.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34.  20
    Orthogonal Recombinable Competences Acquired by Altricial Species: Blankets, String and Plywood.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    CONJECTURE: Alongside the innate physical sucking reflex for obtaining milk to be digested, decomposed and used all over the body for growth, repair, and energy, there is a genetically determined information-sucking reflex, which seeks out, sucks in, and decomposes information, which is later recombined in many ways, growing the information-processing architecture and many diverse recombinable competences.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35.  69
    The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to Artificial Intelligence.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
    The common view that the notion of a Turing machine is directly relevant to AI is criticised. It is argued that computers are the result of a convergence of two strands of development with a long history: development of machines for automating various physical processes and machines for performing abstract operations on abstract entities, e.g. doing numerical calculations. Various aspects of these developments are analysed, along with their relevance to AI, and the similarities between computers viewed in this way and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36.  3
    The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy, Science and Models of Mind.Aaron Sloman - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):302-304.
  37. The Emperor's Real Mind -- Review of Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers Minds and the Laws of Physics.Aaron Sloman - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 56 (2-3):355-396.
    "The Emperor's New Mind" by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the "strong" AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38.  75
    A First Draft Analysis of Some Meta-Requirements for Cognitive Systems in Robots (An Exercise in Logical Topography Analysis. ).Aaron Sloman & David Vernon - unknown
    This is a contribution to construction of a research roadmap for future cognitive systems, including intelligent robots, in the context of the euCognition network, and UKCRC Grand Challenge 5: Architecture of Brain and Mind. -/- A meeting on the euCognition roadmap project was held at Munich Airport on 11th Jan 2007. This document was in part a response to discussions at that meeting. An explanation of why specifying requirements is a hard problem, and why it needs to be done, along (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39.  24
    What Sort of Control System is Able to Have a Personality?Aaron Sloman - 1996 - In [Book Chapter].
    This paper outlines a design-based methodology for the study of mind as a part of the broad discipline of Artificial Intelligence. Within that framework some architectural requirements for human-like minds are discussed, and some preliminary suggestions made regarding mechanisms underlying motivation, emotions, and personality. A brief description is given of the `Nursemaid' or `Minder' scenario being used at the University of Birmingham as a framework for research on these problems. It may be possible later to combine some of these ideas (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. Must Intelligent Systems Be Scruffy.Aaron Sloman - 1990 - In J. E. Tiles, G. T. McKee & G. C. Dean (eds.), Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence. Pitman. pp. 17.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41.  42
    The ``Semantics'' of Evolution: Trajectories and Trade-Offs in Design Space and Niche Space.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    This paper attempts to characterise a unifying overview of the practice of software engineers, AI designers, developers of evolutionary forms of computation, designers of adaptive systems, etc. The topic overlaps with theoretical biology, developmental psychology and perhaps some aspects of social theory. Just as much of theoretical computer science follows the lead of engineering intuitions and tries to formalise them, there are also some important emerging high level cross disciplinary ideas about natural information processing architectures and evolutionary mechanisms and that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42.  54
    Knowing and Understanding Relations Between Meaning and Truth, Meaning and Necessary Truth, Meaning and Synthetic Necessary Truth.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    The aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. After the preliminaries, in which the problem is stated and some methodological remarks made, the investigation proceeds in two (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  41
    Two Notions Contrasted: 'Logical Geography' and 'Logical Topography' Variations on a Theme by Gilbert Ryle: The Logical Topography of 'Logical Geography'.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    This paper distinguishes two versions of Ryle's notion of 'logical geography'. Logical geography: The network of relationships between current uses of a collection of concepts. (Probably what Ryle meant by the term.) Logical topography Features of the portion of reality, or types of portions of reality, related to a given set of concepts, where the reality may be capable of being divided up in different ways using different networks of relationships between concepts. -/- Studying/analysing logical topography includes evaluating the alternative (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. VARIETIES OF ATHEISM What is Analytical Atheism?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    William James wrote about varieties of religious experience (See http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JamVari.html) but I don't know of anyone who has documented the varieties of atheism. Unlike James I don't here attempt to collect data about what atheists say and do, and how they came by their atheism. This is, instead, an analytical paper describing how various sorts of atheistic position can arise in opposition to various sorts of theistic position. Clarity about this could help to make debates about atheism and theism more (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. What is It Like to Be a Rock?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    This paper aims to replace deep sounding unanswerable, time-wasting pseudo- questions which are often posed in the context of attacking some version of the strong AI thesis, with deep, discovery-driving, real questions about the nature and content of internal states of intelligent agents of various kinds. In particular the question.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. Colour Incompatibilities and Analyticity.Aaron Sloman - 1964 - Analysis 24 (Suppl-2):104 - 119.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Towards a Grammar of Emotions.Aaron Sloman - 1982 - New Universities Quarterly 36 (3):230-238.
    My favourite leading question when teaching Philosophy of Mind is ‘Could a goldfish long for its mother?’ This introduces the philosophical technique of ‘conceptual analysis’, essential for the study of mind (Sloman 1978, ch. 4). By analysing what we mean by ‘A longs for B’, and similar descriptions of emotional states we see that they inv olve rich cognitive structures and processes, i.e. computations. Anything which could long for its mother, would have to hav e some sort of representation of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48.  38
    IV—Explaining Logical Necessity.Aaron Sloman - 1968 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (1):33-50.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  21
    Musings on the Roles of Logical and Non-Logical Representations in Intelligence.Aaron Sloman - 1995 - In [Book Chapter].
    This paper offers a short and biased overview of the history of discussion and controversy about the role of different forms of representation in intelligent agents. It repeats and extends some of the criticisms of the `logicist' approach to AI that I first made in 1971, while also defending logic for its power and generality. It identifies some common confusions regarding the role of visual or diagrammatic reasoning including confusions based on the fact that different forms of representation may be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50.  92
    Why Some Machines May Need Qualia and How They Can Have Them (Including a Demanding New Turing Test for Robot Philosophers.).Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Many debates about consciousness appear to be endless, in part because of conceptual confusions preventing clarity as to what the issues are and what does or does not count as evidence. This makes it hard to decide what should go into a machine if it is to be described as 'conscious'. Thus, triumphant demonstrations by some AI developers may be regarded by others as proving nothing of interest because the system does not satisfy *their* definitions or requirements specifications.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 125