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Profile: Aaron Sloman (University of Birmingham, University of Birmingham)
  1. The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy Science and Models of Mind.Aaron Sloman - 1978 - Harvester.
    Since 1991 the author has been Professor of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science in the School of Computer Science at the University of Birmingham, UK.
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  2.  23
    Motives, Mechanisms, and Emotions.Aaron Sloman - 1987 - Cognition and Emotion 1 (3):217-233.
  3.  42
    An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
  4. Physicalism and the Bogey of Determinism.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    This paper rehearses some relatively old arguments about how any coherent notion of free will is not only compatible with but depends on determinism. However the mind-brain identity theory is attacked on the grounds that what makes a physical event an intended action A is that the agent interprets the physical phenomena as doing A. The paper should have referred to the monograph Intention by Elizabeth Anscombe, which discusses in detail the fact that the same physical event can have multiple (...)
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  5.  53
    Why Robots Will Have Emotions.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - manuscript
    Emotions involve complex processes produced by interactions between motives, beliefs, percepts, etc. E.g. real or imagined fulfilment or violation of a motive, or triggering of a 'motive-generator', can disturb processes produced by other motives. To understand emotions, therefore, we need to understand motives and the types of processes they can produce. This leads to a study of the global architecture of a mind. Some constraints on the evolution of minds are disussed. Types of motives and the processes they generate are (...)
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  6. Virtual Machines and Consciousness.Aaron Sloman & Ronald L. Chrisley - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):133-172.
    Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word “consciousness” has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal informationprocessing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual-machine (...)
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  7.  48
    Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):117-169.
  8. `Ought' and `Better'.Aaron Sloman - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):385-394.
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  9. How to Dispose of the Free Will Issue.Aaron Sloman - 1993 - AISB Quarterlye 82:31-2.
  10.  19
    What Sorts of Machines Can Understand the Symbols They Use?Aaron Sloman - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-80.
  11. Comments on “The Emulating Interview... With Rick Grush”.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):35–44.
    Author comments Rick Grush’s statements about emulation and embodied approach to representation. He proposes his modification of Grush’s definition of emulation, criticizing notion of “standing in for”. He defends of notion of representation. He claims that radical embodied theories are not applicable to all cognition.
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  12. Evolution: The Computer Systems Engineer Designing Minds.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):45–69.
    What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin’s opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which (...)
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  13. Virtual Machine Functionalism: The Only Form of Functionalism Worth Taking Seriously in Philosophy of Mind.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    Most philosophers appear to have ignored the distinction between the broad concept of Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) described in Sloman&Chrisley (2003) and the better known version of functionalism referred to there as Atomic State Functionalism (ASF), which is often given as an explanation of what Functionalism is, e.g. in Block (1995). -/- One of the main differences is that ASF encourages talk of supervenience of states and properties, whereas VMF requires supervenience of machines that are arbitrarily complex networks of causally (...)
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  14.  25
    Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  15.  23
    How to Turn an Information Processor Into an Understander.Aaron Sloman & Monica Croucher - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):447.
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  16. Machine Consciousness: Response to Commentaries.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):75-116.
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  17. What Cognitive Scientists Need to Know About Virtual Machines.Aaron Sloman - 2009 - In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1210--1215.
  18.  85
    Prolegomena to a Theory of Communication and Affect.Aaron Sloman - 1992 - In Andrew Ortony, Jon Slack & Oliviero Stock (eds.), Communication from an Artificial Intelligence Perspective: Theoretical and Applied Issues. Springer.
    As a step towards comprehensive computer models of communication, and effective human machine dialogue, some of the relationships between communication and affect are explored. An outline theory is presented of the architecture that makes various kinds of affective states possible, or even inevitable, in intelligent agents, along with some of the implications of this theory for various communicative processes. The model implies that human beings typically have many different, hierarchically organized, dispositions capable of interacting with new information to produce affective (...)
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  19.  42
    The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to Artificial Intelligence.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
  20.  16
    Orthogonal Recombinable Competences Acquired by Altricial Species.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    CONJECTURE: Alongside the innate physical sucking reflex for obtaining milk to be digested, decomposed and used all over the body for growth, repair, and energy, there is a genetically determined information-sucking reflex, which seeks out, sucks in, and decomposes information, which is later recombined in many ways, growing the information-processing architecture and many diverse recombinable competences.
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  21. VARIETIES OF ATHEISM What is Analytical Atheism?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    William James wrote about varieties of religious experience (See http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JamVari.html) but I don't know of anyone who has documented the varieties of atheism. Unlike James I don't here attempt to collect data about what atheists say and do, and how they came by their atheism. This is, instead, an analytical paper describing how various sorts of atheistic position can arise in opposition to various sorts of theistic position. Clarity about this could help to make debates about atheism and theism more (...)
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  22.  81
    Colour Incompatibilities and Analyticity.Aaron Sloman - 1964 - Analysis 24 (Suppl-2):104 - 119.
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  23. What is It Like to Be a Rock?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    This paper aims to replace deep sounding unanswerable, time-wasting pseudo- questions which are often posed in the context of attacking some version of the strong AI thesis, with deep, discovery-driving, real questions about the nature and content of internal states of intelligent agents of various kinds. In particular the question.
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  24.  20
    What Sort of Architecture is Required for a Human-Like Agent?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially (...)
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  25.  55
    Transformations of Illocutionary Acts.Aaron Sloman - 1969 - Analysis 30 (2):56 - 59.
    Speech-Act analyses of words like 'good', 'true', 'know' and 'probable' were criticised by j.R. Searle in "speech acts". I have tried to show how his criticisms can be met by an analysis in terms of operators on speech acts which 'transform' them into other speech-Acts. I conclude, Not that speech-Act analyses are correct, But that they survive searle's criticism.
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  26.  71
    New Bodies for Sick Persons: Personal Identity Without Physical Continuity.Aaron Sloman - 1971 - Analysis 32 (2):52 - 55.
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  27.  16
    How Many Separately Evolved Emotional Beasties Live Within Us.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Robert Trappl (ed.), Emotions in Humans and Artifacts. Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 35--114.
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  28.  38
    Diversity of Developmental Trajectories in Natural and Artificial Intelligence.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    It may be of interest to see what can be done by giving a robot no innate knowledge about its environment or its sensors or effectors and only a totally general learning mechanism, such as reinforcement learning, or some information-reduction algorithm, to see what it can learn in various environments. However, it is clear that that is not how biological evolution designs animals, as McCarthy states.
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  29.  95
    The Evolution of What?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    There is now a huge amount of interest in consciousness among scientists as well as philosophers, yet there is so much confusion and ambiguity in the claims and counter-claims that it is hard to tell whether any progress is being made. This ``position paper'' suggests that we can make progress by temporarily putting to one side questions about what consciousness is or which animals or machines have it or how it evolved. Instead we should focus on questions about the sorts (...)
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  30.  92
    The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to AI.Aaron Sloman - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
  31.  54
    Why Some Machines May Need Qualia and How They Can Have Them (Including a Demanding New Turing Test for Robot Philosophers.).Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Many debates about consciousness appear to be endless, in part because of conceptual confusions preventing clarity as to what the issues are and what does or does not count as evidence. This makes it hard to decide what should go into a machine if it is to be described as 'conscious'. Thus, triumphant demonstrations by some AI developers may be regarded by others as proving nothing of interest because the system does not satisfy *their* definitions or requirements specifications.
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  32.  48
    Supervenience and Implementation.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    How can a virtual machine X be implemented in a physical machine Y? We know the answer as far as compilers, editors, theorem-provers, operating systems are concerned, at least insofar as we know how to produce these implemented virtual machines, and no mysteries are involved. This paper is about extrapolating from that knowledge to the implementation of minds in brains. By linking the philosopher's concept of supervenience to the engineer's concept of implementation, we can illuminate both. In particular, by showing (...)
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  33.  53
    The Mind as a Control System.Aaron Sloman - 1993 - In Christopher Hookway & Donald M. Peterson (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-110.
    This is not a scholarly research paper, but a ‘position paper’ outlining an approach to the study of mind which has been gradually evolving since about 1969 when I first become acquainted with work in Artificial Intelligence through Max Clowes. I shall try to show why it is more fruitful to construe the mind as a control system than as a computational system.
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  34.  82
    Did Searle Attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI?Aaron Sloman - 1986 - In Artificial Intelligence and its Applications. Chichester.
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  35.  57
    A First Draft Analysis of Some Meta-Requirements for Cognitive Systems in Robots (An Exercise in Logical Topography Analysis. ).Aaron Sloman & David Vernon - unknown
    This is a contribution to construction of a research roadmap for future cognitive systems, including intelligent robots, in the context of the euCognition network, and UKCRC Grand Challenge 5: Architecture of Brain and Mind. -/- A meeting on the euCognition roadmap project was held at Munich Airport on 11th Jan 2007. This document was in part a response to discussions at that meeting. An explanation of why specifying requirements is a hard problem, and why it needs to be done, along (...)
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  36.  78
    Misrepresenting Einstein's Views on Religion.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    There are many religious scientists who misrepresent or misquote Einstein in support of their claim that there is no conflict between science and religion, and who, deliberately or out of ignorance, fail to point out that what Einstein meant by 'religion' is totally different from what most people mean, and moreover that he regards the ordinary kinds of religion as possibly only for inferior minds and inferior cultures.
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  37.  77
    What Are Virtual Machines? Are They Real?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
  38.  78
    Toward a General Theory of Representations.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
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  39.  75
    The Emperor's Real Mind -- Review of Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers Minds and the Laws of Physics.Aaron Sloman - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 56 (2-3):355-396.
    "The Emperor's New Mind" by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the "strong" AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion (...)
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  40.  49
    Damasio's Error.Aaron Sloman - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 28 (28):61-64.
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  41.  43
    Acquiring Orthogonal Recombinable Competences.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    It is conjectured that humans and some other altricial species instead use innate mechanisms for decomposing situations into components that can be explicitly learnt about, and stored in such a way that the competence can be re-used in combination with other learnt competences, in perceiving novel situations and performing novel actions.
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  42.  29
    'Necessary', 'A Priori' and 'Analytic'.Aaron Sloman - 1965 - Analysis 26 (1):12 - 16.
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  43.  24
    Komentarze do „Emulującego wywiadu… z Rickiem Grushem”.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
    [Przekład] Author comments Rick Grush’s statements about emulation and embodied approach to representation. He proposes his modification of Grush’s definition of emulation, criticizing notion of “standing in for”. He defends of notion of representation. He claims that radical embodied theories are not applicable to all cognition.
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  44.  67
    The Primacy of Non-Communicative Language.Aaron Sloman - 1979 - In M. MacCafferty & Kurt Gray (eds.), The Analysis of Meaning: Informatics 5, Proceedings Aslib/Bcs Conference. Aslib.
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  45.  52
    Simplicity and Ontologies The Trade-Off Between Simplicity of Theories and Sophistication of Ontologies.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Often, when people discuss the role of simplicity in science, they do not notice the trade-off between simplicity of ontology and simplicity of theory using an ontology. Einstein appears to have been emphasising simplicity of ontology (basic elements), though he might have included theory as well (basic axioms/assumptions).
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  46.  63
    What Sort of Architecture is Required for a Human-Like Agent?Aaron Sloman - 1996 - In Ramakrishna K. Rao (ed.), Foundations of Rational Agency. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially (...)
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  47.  39
    Polyflaps as a Domain for Perceiving, Acting and Learning in a 3-D World.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Test domains for AI can have a deep impact on research. The polyflap domain is proposed for testing complex AI theories about architectures, mechanisms and forms of representation involved in features of human and animal intelligence that evolved to enable perception, action, and learning in diverse environments containing things that we can perceive and manipulate, and many complex processes involving objects that differ in shape, materials, causal properties, and relations to one another. We need a test environment that is rich (...)
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  48. Must Intelligent Systems Be Scruffy.Aaron Sloman - 1990 - In J. E. Tiles, G. T. McKee & G. C. Dean (eds.), Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence. Pitman. pp. 17.
  49.  21
    Ewolucja: inżynier systemów komputerowych projektujący umysły.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
    [Przekład] To, czego w ciągu ostatnich sześciu lub siedmiu tego nauczyliśmy się na temat wirtualnej maszynerii w wyniku dużego postępu nauki i techniki, umożliwia nam zaoferowanie stanowisku darwinowskiemu nowej obrony przeciw krytykom, którzy twierdzili, że jedynie forma fizyczna – a nie zdolności umysłowe czy świadomość – może być produktem ewolucji poprzez dobór naturalny. Obrona ta porównuje zjawiska umysłowe, wspominane przez przeciwników Darwina, z treściami maszynerii wirtualnej w systemach obliczeniowych. Obiekty, stany, zdarzenia i procesy w owej maszynerii, które dopiero od niedawna (...)
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  50.  36
    Joined-Up Higher Education (a Letter to My Mp Lynne Jones).Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Maybe they have been made, but I missed them because I don’t read and listen enough, as most of my energies are focused elsewhere. Apologies if this is all old hat. Don’t feel you have to read on. In case others are interested, I shall put this on my web site at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/˜axs/gov/ My main point is that it is just silly to talk so much about universities and top-up fees without putting universities in the context of a complete policy (...)
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