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Aaron Z. Zimmerman [13]Aaron Zachary Zimmerman [3]
  1. The nature of belief.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.
    Neo-Cartesian approaches to belief place greater evidential weight on a subject's introspective judgments than do neo-behaviorist accounts. As a result, the two views differ on whether our absent-minded and weak-willed actions are guided by belief. I argue that simulationist accounts of the concept of belief are committed to neo-Cartesianism, and, though the conceptual and empirical issues that arise are inextricably intertwined, I discuss experimental results that should point theory-theorists in that direction as well. Belief is even less closely connected to (...)
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  2. Moral epistemology.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2010 - New York: Routledge.
    How do we know right from wrong? Do we even have moral knowledge? Moral epistemology studies these and related questions about our understanding of virtue and vice. It is one of philosophy’s perennial problems, reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume and Kant, and has recently been the subject of intense debate as a result of findings in developmental and social psychology. Throughout the book Zimmerman argues that our belief in moral knowledge can survive sceptical challenges. He also draws (...)
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  3. Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.
    Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist (...)
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  4. Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
    Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
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  5.  65
    Unnatural Access.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):435-38.
    Jordi Fernandez has recently offered an interesting account of introspective justification according to which the very states that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that one believes that p. I provide two objections to Fernandez's account.
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  6.  35
    Belief and Commitment: Commentary on Annalisa Coliva, The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, London: Pallgrave Macmillan.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):335-342.
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  7. By Maria Baghramian.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ars Disputandi 6:1566-5399.
     
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  8. Self-verification and the content of thought.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):59-75.
    Burge follows Descartes in claiming that the category of conceptually self-verifying judgments includes (but is not restricted to) judgments that give rise to sincere assertions of sentences of the form, 'I am thinking that p'. In this paper I argue that Burge’s Cartesian insight is hard to reconcile with Fregean accounts of the content of thought. Burge's intuitively compelling claim that cogito judgments are conceptually self-verifying poses a real challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
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  9.  67
    A Conflict in Common-Sense Moral Psychology.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4):401-423.
    Ordinary thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons.
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  10. Directly in Mind: An Account of First Person Access.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2002 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The proximity of introspection makes it difficult to explain. In what does our knowledge of our own beliefs and desires consist? Do we observe them with an inner eye? Do we infer their existence from premises concerning our actions and feelings? I reject both of these suggestions. Instead, I defend the view that facts about what we believe, and certain facts about what we want, are known by us in a direct or unmediated fashion. When one has genuinely introspective knowledge (...)
     
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  11. Infallible introspection.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - manuscript
  12. Against relativism. [REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.
    Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
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  13. Review of Maria Baghramian, Relativism[REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ars Disputandi 6.
     
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  14. Review of Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge[REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Ars Disputandi 7.
  15.  50
    On Believing: Being Right in a World of PossibilitiesHunter, David, On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. xi + 244, UD$70 (hardback). [REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):240-242.
    There was a brief interval, around the turn of the century, when philosophers of mind had converged around a bio-psycho-functionalist account of our ‘propositional attitudes’. Our beliefs and desir...
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  16.  53
    Review of Jennifer Lackey, Learning From Words: Testimony As a Source of Knowledge[REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
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