Al-ʽĀmirī’s Chapters on Metaphysical Topics are an impressive example of the fusing of Greek Neoplatonism with Islamic Theology. Being a paraphrase of the Proclean Elements of Theology , they provide a better understanding of the tradition of the Liber de Causis in Arabic.
En cet article nous analysons les notions de taqiyya et kitmān telles qu’elles ont été élaborées par des auteurs ismaéliens des 10e et 11e siècles. Tout au long du présent « cycle d’occultation », la « science véritable » est voilée sous la lettre des textes révélés et des lois qui en découlent. Seuls les imāms et leurs disciples ont accès à cette science, mais ils n’ont pas le droit de la divulguer au tout venant. Cette obligation de garder le (...) secret fait partie du sermon d’allégeance que chaque Ismaélien doit prêter avant le début de son initiation. Mais même les imams ont été forcés d’agir avec prudence et en secret. À certains moments, ils ont été obligés d’entrer en occultation , en cachant leur véritable identité et leur lieu de résidence. Cette pratique de taqiyya et kitmān est présentée comme le sens caché des prescriptions coraniques relatives au jeûne du Ramadan. La rupture illicite du jeûne signifie la transgression des règles de la taqiyya, tandis que le ‘Id al-fiṭr symbolise l’abolition finale de l’obligation de la taqiyya. Les auteurs fatimides interprètent l’avènement de ‘Abd Allāh al-Mahdi et la fondation de l’état fatimide en Ifrīqiya comme un signe annoncant le ‘Id al-fiṭr, qui aura lieu avec l’apparition du Qā’im lors de la Grande Résurrection. En ouvrant un nouveau « cycle de manifestation », il abrogera toutes les eligions et les lois exotériques. La science sera alors directement accessible, sans zāhir ni bāṭin. Par conséquent, il ne sera plus nécessaire d’observer la taqiyya et le kitmān. L’ismaélisme étant un mouvement messianique avec des objectifs éminemment politiques, il n’y a pas lieu de dissocier l’aspect sécuritaire de l’aspect ésotérique dans sa théorie de la taqiyya. (shrink)
This paper examines the concept of _taw__ḥ__īd _ c Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Sinkīlī. Using the historical approach and content analysis, this paper argues that_ __taw__ḥ__īd__ _is an important aspect in Islam and becomes an interesting discourse in the Islamic intellectual tradition, especially _Sufism. _ c Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Sinkīlī stated that the first commitment for a human being is to accept the Oneness of Allah SWT, and purity it from all things inappropriate to Him with the statement of _lā ilaha illā Allāh_. (...) This confirmation Allah is believed as the one existence, there is no existence without the existence of Allah. In this context, there are two meanings, to negate any existence, and to confirm only one existence, which is _al-__Ḥ__aqq_. Al-Sinkīlī also stated that Allah is One, without we trying to make it one, Allah is true without having a truth legitimating from us. _ _. (shrink)
An Introduction to Islamic Philosophy: Based on the Works of Murtada Mutahhari, by Abd al-Rasul Obudiyyat, is a useful guide to the ways in which philosophy is taught in much of the Islamic world, and in particular in what is surely the center of Islamic philosophy, Iran. Mutahhari is an important twentieth-century thinker and his grasp of Islamic philosophy is displayed nicely in this volume, although it has to be said it is not actually by him. It is a selection (...) of his writings from various places, and the author makes it clear that he has gathered together Mutahhari's views and arguments and put them together here in a concise and clear way. To a large extent the style of the text reflects the fact that it is a... (shrink)
This paper attempts to rethink the philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal and challenge the still prevailing tendency in Iqbal scholarship to view it merely as an outcome of the influence of the ideas of various Western/European philosophers. I present Iqbal’s arguments in their particular historical and intellectual context to show that they developed in response to a specific philosophical problem and that Iqbal looked for a solution to that problem in Islamic tradition. I suggest that Iqbal’s philosophy is best understood in (...) the context of, and as a response to, the problem of nihilism as it was debated in modern German philosophy during ‘the pantheism controversy’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To demonstrate this, I analyse Iqbal’s article on ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī to show his concern with the problem of nihilism, and his solution to it based on al-Jīlī’s Sufism. (shrink)
The explanation of the relationship between God and humans, as portrayed in Islam, is often influenced by the images of God and of human beings which theologians, philosophers and mystics have in mind. The early period of Islam disclose a diversity of interpretations of this relationship. Thinkers from the tenth and eleventh century had the privilege of disclosing different facets of the relationship between humans and the divine. God and Humans in Islamic Thought discusses the view of three different scholars (...) of the time: Abd al-Jabbar, Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali. The relationships discussed in this work are: divine assistance, lu³f, according to 'Abd al-Jabbar; human love and attraction to the divine, 'ishq, according to Ibn Sina, and finally the mystical annihilation of the self in the divine unity, fana', of al-Ghazali. They introduce three approaches of looking at this relationship. In order to perceive these concepts, their perception of God and of the human nature will also be examined here. The starting-point of this research was the desire to set forth a variety of possible relationships which are all in accordance with Islamic belief, but nevertheless demonstrate diversity in understanding the relationship between the human and the divine which in turn suggests the concept of plurality within one religion. Examining these three concepts, which build firm connections between God and humans, reveals the importance of rational inquiry in medieval Islamic thought, not only because it was a source of logical arguments for Islam against its opponents but mainly because it built different bridges leading to God. God and Humans in Islamic Thought attempts to shed light on an important side of medieval rational thought in demonstrating its significance in forming the basis of an understanding of the nature of God, the nature of human beings and the construction of different bridges between them. (shrink)
In _Knowing God_, Ismail Lala investigates the nature of God and whether we can truly know Him according to the influential mystic, Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, and his disciple, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī.
The present work provides a detailed account of the available data on ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s biography, an outline of his philosophical thought, and a detailed analysis of his reworking of pre-Avicennian Greek and Arabic metaphysics.
: Skepticism as doubts about religious knowledge played a significant role in the intellectual reflection of the fourth and fifth Islamic centuries, a period of considerable plurality within Islam on many levels. Such skepticism was directed at revealed knowledge that spelled out the customs and norms particular to the Islamic way of life. Doubts were pushed by theologians who, themselves caught within a web of "parity of evidence" between the various schools of Islam, saw little hope of verifying the superiority (...) of Muslim ways over those of other communities, and Muslim intellectuals who viewed the particular religio-moral practices of Islam as shamefully atavistic and primitive, seeking instead to table "visible" religion for an esoterically conceived one. Against such detractors, a significant scholar of the period, Abū l-Hasan al-'Āmirī, constructed a philosophical defense of exoteric Islam, arguing in Aristotelian terms for the superiority of religio-moral knowledge over philosophical knowledge in light of the greater benefit of the former to the welfare of society and the superiority of Islamic religio-moral knowledge, since, he claims, it squares with logic more than any other communal way of life. The argument, one of many seeking to come to terms with the intellectual vagaries of the day, demonstrates how skepticism pushed scholars to explore more profoundly the nature of religion. In al-'Āmirī's case, his argument, metaphysically based with mystical inclinations, set the stage for later articulations of Islamic religiosity that integrated the human mind into the arena of Islam's revealed way of life. (shrink)
Los califas almohades afirmaron pertenecer a la tribu árabe de Qays cAylān por descendencia agnática. Qays cAylān no incluye a la tribu de Qurayš, con la que los mu'miníes afirmaban estar emparentados por línea materna. Según la doctrina clásica del califato, recogida por ejemplo por Ibn Hazm, los califas deben ser qurayšíes por línea paterna. En este artículo se analizan las ventajas que ofrecía a los califas mu'miníes esa ascendencia qaysí, de larga tradición entre las poblaciones beréberes del Norte de (...) África. Entre esas ventajas se cuentan la vinculación de parentesco con las tribus árabes de Sulaym y Hilāl, elementos fundamentales del ejército mu'miní, y con el profeta árabe pre-islámico Jālid b. Sinān al-cAbsī. (shrink)
Since Ibn Mattawayh and Mm up until George Hourani and Marie Bernand, there is an unstoppable interest among scholars towards r theory of knowledge. This interest has increased after the publication of the works of the late Mub al-Mu Ul al-D and Kitaffu al-rAbd al-Jabb and other sources from his students and the late MuAbd al-JabbAbd al-Jabbn).
A study of the opinions of a prominent tenth-century scholar pertaining to different aspects of pain, including his theological explanation of the existence of human suffering as well as a historical survey of his Bahšamiyya Mu‘tazila school.
This paper sets out to chart the fortunes of one of the most significant moral propositions in Mu'tazilite moral theory — namely, that it is evil to lie, and it is evil irrespective of the consequences of so doing. The reasons which promote this principle to significance relate to the broader context of Mu'tazilite theological orientation, which aims to vindicate God's justice through demonstrating that moral value does not derive from revelation. Yet this principle suffers the difficulties which commonly afflict (...) deontological precepts, particularly the challenges posed by their conflict with teleological moral demands in certain situations, as well as the difficulty of empirically ascertaining that a moral principle has in fact given the agent his reason for action, as the Mu'tazilites attempt to do. These were difficulties which Aš'arite critics of Mu'tazilite moral claims were quick to pick up on, and it is in the light of such hostile fire that the coherence of the Mu'tazilite position on the evilness of lies is examined. This is the principal focus of this essay, and it is complemented by an examination of how the principle carries over to the realm of divine morality: can God tell a lie? If not, why not? And what does this reveal about the ordering of moral values in Mu'tazilite thought? (shrink)