The article offers an analysis of the concept of the Absolute in Fichte’s philosophy. Despite the difficulty of the definition, this concept receives a rich and creative rethinking in Fichte and will further influence the philosophical systems of thought. Gradually introducing this concept into his philosophical project of Wissenschaftslehre Fichte often changes its interpretation. So, starting with a somewhat vague understanding of the concept of the "absolute I" through Schelling's criticism of the Absolute, he develops the theory (...) of the manifestation of the Absolute, each time choosing new metaphors to denote it, and sometimes filling it with religious content, when the Absolute becomes a substitute for the concept of God. On the one hand, it’s important not to reduce the Absolute to a simple object of thought because this would indicate the limitation of the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider the Absolute as an empty or neutral concept or something completely enclosed in itself. Then, its existence will be doubtful. Fichte is careful about a clear definition of the Absolute. He solves this dilemma through the idea of the manifestation of the Absolute. Manifestation is the exit of the Absolute beyond itself while remaining unchanged. The ability to manifest itself is a prerequisite that the Absolute can be recognized and thought. This is how the Absolute manifests itself in the form of knowledge. Fichte emphasizes that the Absolute is not a projection of our mind, it may not depend on our thinking, however with such peculiarity that truth and knowledge have their basis in it. Thereby, with the theory of the Absolute, Fichte develops the idea of the foundation that is outside of ourselves, has transcendental character, and thus allows knowledge or truth not to be trapped in subjective tenets. Analyzing step by step the process of evolution of this concept, we will be able to see how in the last years of his life, Fichte states the importance of two realities: the “I” and the “Absolute” and how he explains the connection between them. (shrink)

A formal model of metaphor is introduced. It models metaphor, first, as an interaction of “frames” according to the frame semantics, and then, as a wave function in Hilbert space. The practical way for a probability distribution and a corresponding wave function to be assigned to a given metaphor in a given language is considered. A series of formal definitions is deduced from this for: “representation”, “reality”, “language”, “ontology”, etc. All are based on Hilbert space. A few (...) statements about a quantum computer are implied: The sodefined reality is inherent and internal to it. It can report a result only “metaphorically”. It will demolish transmitting the result “literally”, i.e. absolutely exactly. A new and different formal definition of metaphor is introduced as a few entangled wave functions corresponding to different “signs” in different language formally defined as above. The change of frames as the change from the one to the other formal definition of metaphor is interpreted as a formal definition of thought. Four areas of cognition are unified as different but isomorphic interpretations of the mathematical model based on Hilbert space. These are: quantum mechanics, frame semantics, formal semantics by means of quantum computer, and the theory of metaphor in linguistics. (shrink)

. Humans can be described as existing somewhere on a descriptive continuum between the poles expressed by the metaphors “humans are machines” and “humans are animals.” Arguments for these metaphors are examined, and the metaphors are rejected as absolute descriptions of humans. After a brief examination of the nature of metaphor, all metaphors are discovered to mediate between biological and cultural evolution. Contrary to the reductionist program of sociobiologists, religious metaphors that generate transcendent meaning offer a legitimate description (...) of humans. (shrink)

The dream of achieving artificial intelligence and, in particular, artificial consciousness, is reflected in mythologies and popular culture as utopia and dystopia. This article discusses its conceptual possibility. It first relates the desire to realise strong AI to a self-perception of humanity as opposed to nature, metaphorically represented as gods or God. The realisation of strong AI is perceived as an ultimate victory on nature or God because it represents the crown of creation or evolution: conscious intelligence. The paper proceeds (...) to summarise two debates relevant to AI: one educational and one technological. The technological debate, almost invariably presupposing a materialist framework, is related to the mind–body problem of philosophy; the educational one to understanding the concept of intelligence. By proposing a definition of intelligence linked to an idealist conception of reality, postulating mind as participation in Absolute Mind, I attempt a convergence of these debates, rejecting the possibility of strong AI. (shrink)

At the foundation of systematic thinking lie decisive assumptions that cannot be articulated and treated in a theoretical manner. Nonetheless, they are settled practically and metaphorically to orient and provoke the systematic attempts of philosophy. This field of non-theoretical assumptions is the theme of this paper. In the following, I articulate one specific metaphorical and practical answer that defies theoretical and systematic treatment. While it is among the most fundamental and fatal answers that can ever be ventured in the entire (...) field of systematic thinking, they cannot occupy center-stage in theoretical thinking. The problematic concerns the pragmatic or absolute establishment of the edifice of philosophy. In the following, I try to portray a fundamental but irresolvable conflict in a back-and-forth movement between rival answers given to this problematic. This investigation concludes by emphasizing the irremediable failure to settle, once and for all, the conflict portrayed between the two opposed designations of philosophy in principle. (shrink)

The mirror metaphor has been an essential asset especially during the pre-modern history of philosophy. The present article is concerned with its use in the philosophy of the German thinker Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464). Being rooted in the intellectual traditions of Greek antiquity and Medieval Christian philosophy, Nicolas of Cusa has also been hailed as one of the first modern European philosophers. Long before other occidental thinkers, Nicolas of Cusa used the mirror metaphor to describe the foundational logic (...) of self-consciousness on his own terms and in the context of his time and his cultural environment. This article presents the most important passages where Nicolas of Cusa uses the images of the mirror and of mirroring to explain the creative self-relation of consciousness as well as to hint at a way of a transformation of the common forms of reflexivity of the epistemological functions of the mind into its complete form of existence as absolute self-consciousness. In this context, Nicolas of Cusa’s use of the mirror metaphor is also concerned with the question of an all-encompassing humanistic self-perfection, practice as well as with basic anthropological considerations. (shrink)

The traditional philosophical metaphors of epistemology, which speak of grounds or foundations, produce a conception of knowledge as fixed and absolute. This paper is not an effort to revive traditional epistemological view of foundations and origins. After a preliminary and cursory discussion of how the metaphors of foundation and ground are employed, principally by Descartes and Heidegger, and what is suggested by such an employment, I sketch the postmodern rejection of these metaphors. However, I further indicate how, as valuable (...) as it is, postmodern criticism leaves us with an inadequate account of how we understand ourselves and how it is that weunderstand in general. I criticize postmodern thinking for ignoring the human elements of feeling and imagination and endorse the more satisfying model suggested by Paul Ricoeur. By understanding the role of feeling and imagination, we can escape the strict sterility of the grapheme. I end with my own suggestion that we gain a better sense of our attachment to and understanding of the world if we change the metaphors of foundations, grounds, and origins and instead employ metaphors of gathering, coalescence, or coagulation. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theory to explain the remarkable emotional power of our response to abstract music. It reviews and rejects metaphysical arguments derived from notions of a divine spiritual realm and from absolute forms of human reason. Its conclusion is that musical experience is always essentially inter-subjective and potentially empathetic, and arises from “action-metaphors,” through which we link musical performances, as forms of action, to subconscious, archetypal dimensions of our awareness of ourselves and of our feelings towards others. (...) It ends with a discussion of the implications of this theory for music education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 346-353 [Access article in PDF] Stevens after Davidson on Metaphor Clive Stroud-Drinkwater IN "NOTES TOWARD A SUPREME FICTION" 1 Wallace Stevens suggests that the absolute as we imagine that an angel would experience it constitutes the supreme fiction. We conceive the experience of the angel only in a fantasy, but it is our fantasy, and therefore the experience of the angel and (...) its absolute are things that we comprehend in our imagination. Thus, in imagination we can apprehend that which we may at first suppose only angels can apprehend, since "the lapis-haunted air" of the angel's absolute is a creature of our own imagination and nothing more. When Stevens asks, "Is it he or is it I that experience this?," the question is rhetorical, since the angel's "experience" exists only within the poet's imagination. In "Sunday Morning," likewise, Stevens suggests that the concept of paradise is defined only within the limits of human imagination. It is a construct which people can comprehend only in the terms of their essentially finite "passions," "moods," "grievings," "elations," "remembrance" and "desire;" it is a construct which people create in "a chant of paradise, / Out of their blood, returning to the sky." Abstracting from our ordinary feelings will not leave us with a transcendent conception of paradise; on the contrary, it will deprive us of our sense of value. The image of the inhuman god ("Jove in the clouds" with "his inhuman birth") is sterile, remote from all human concern. For Stevens, "The ultimate value is reality." 2 [End Page 346]It is possible to regard this as a sad and resigned affirmation that we have at most this world and its parochial values, since God is "dead" and we cannot really have paradise at all, 3 but it is also possible to regard it as an affirmation of the genuine value of the ordinary and the human. On this interpretation of Stevens, "Sunday Morning" calls us from the shadows of a self-defeating attempt to transcend our own values to a consideration of the place of ordinary values in our conception of paradise: Shall she not find in comforts of the sun, In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else In any balm or beauty of the earth, Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven? The question, which is already rhetorical, is answered flatly in another poem, "The Rock"; the imagination can indeed find paradise in reality: In this plenty, the poem makes meanings of the rock, Of such mixed motion and such imagery That its barrenness becomes a thousand things And so exists no more. This is the cure Of leaves and of the ground and of ourselves. In this "cure" we imagine the world as paradise, or the rock as meaningful, or barrenness as a thousand things. There is, however, an unresolved tension between imagining one thing as another and recognizing that the things are, in fact, different. Max Black regards this tension as the greatest weakness in his "interaction" theory of metaphor. 4 In "Notes" Stevens addresses this problem: Fat girl, terrestrial, my summer, my night, How is it I find you in difference, see you there In a moving contour, a change not quite completed? The problem here is the general problem of metaphor: metaphors seem to constitute an "evasion" 5 since they are usually literally false. 6 For example, the "fat girl" is presumably not literally summer or night, and may not even be fat or a girl, metaphors being what they are. To the "fat girl," the poet says, [End Page 347] You remain the more than natural figure. You Become the soft-footed phantom, the irrational Distortion, however fragrant, however dear. His metaphors disguise the object; the object is represented in them as "more than natural"—in other words, not natural, not the thing as it is. "The very thing and nothing else" ("Credences") that Stevens, the poet of the real world, wishes to see thus becomes "obscure," a thing in "an obscure world / Of things that would... (shrink)

This article investigates what Hans Blumenberg has in mind when he characterizes his own philosophical activity as a „metaphorology”. An adequate understanding of Blumenberg's work has to consider the author's fundamental change of perspective concerning the relationship between metaphorical and conceptual language. First, metaphorology is considered as an auxiliary discipline of the „history of concepts” as it was developed in the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte and the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie . Even at this stage, however, Blumenberg already respects metaphors as (...) „basic constituents of philosophical language” which can never be recuperated adequately and completely by conceptual language. In this context, he proposes to comprehend the „truth” of a metaphor as „pragmatic”. Gradually, Blumenberg gives up the priority of the concept and announces his „theory of unconceivability” , which has its starting point in the assumption that reality transcends whatever can be predicated in a clear and distinct way. Blumenberg, however, stresses the predicability of the „mystical” with his notion of „metaphorics of break-up” . Although Blumenberg rejects every form of essentialism in his thinking of man and reality, his view on the functioning of metaphors has its foundation in some anthropological and ontological assumptions, with the central notion of man as a „being of lack who tries to overcome his unability to adapt to reality, by a rhetorical, i.e. indirect and functional relationship to reality. Blumenberg's metaphorology stands midway between pragmatics and metaphysics. It is more than pragmatics because it also implies a statement on the character of reality. It is less than metaphysics because these statements precisely bring into the open the vanity of conceptual language. Therefore, we propose to characterize Blumenberg's philosophy as a kind of „negative metaphysics”. (shrink)

Trying to assess Kant's impact on contemporary aesthetics is by no means a straightforward task, for the simple reason that the subject is saturated with his influence. In all aspects of the theory and practice of art, it is possible to observe concepts and attitudes at work which are either a reflection of, or a response to, Kant's thinking. This might seem a rather overblown claim and a difficult one to substantiate but, without going into too much detail at this (...) point, one has only to consider that the central tenets of both modernism and postmodernism can be traced back to Kant's Critical thought. There is the modernist's interest in the conditions of possibility of representation – as evidenced, for example, by the push towards abstraction in the visual arts and the attempt to paint not the world but the process of painting itself – and, responding to this, the postmodernist's concern that these conditions of possibility should not become universal absolutes. (shrink)

Across cultures, people employ space to construct representations of time. English exhibits two deictic space–time metaphors: the “moving ego” metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time and the “moving time” metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward towards the ego. Earlier research investigating the psychological reality of these metaphors has shown that engaging in certain types of spatial-motion thinking may influence how people reason about events in time. More recently, research has shown that people’s interactions with cultural (...) artifacts may also influence their representations of time. Extending research on space–time mappings in new directions, three experiments investigated the role of cultural artifacts, namely calendars and clocks, in the interpretation of metaphorical expressions about time. Taken together, the results provide initial evidence that, in their interpretation of ambiguous metaphorical expressions about time, people automatically access and use spatial representations of absolute time, whereby moving forward in space corresponds with moving later in time. Moreover, asking participants to use a reverse space–time mapping causes interference, which is reflected through their temporal reasoning. (shrink)

The Aymara of the Andes use absolute (cardinal) frames of reference for describing the relative position of ordinary objects. However, rather than encoding them in available absolute lexemes, they do it in lexemes that are intrinsic to the body: nayra (“front”) and qhipa (“back”), denoting east and west, respectively. Why? We use different but complementary ethnographic methods to investigate the nature of this encoding: (a) linguistic expressions and speech–gesture co-production, (b) linguistic patterns in the distinct regional Spanish-based variety (...) Castellano Andino (CA), (c) metaphorical extensions of CA’s spatial patterns to temporal ones, and (d) layouts of traditional houses. Findings indicate that, following fundamental principles of Aymara cosmology, people, objects, and land—as a whole—are conceived as having an implicit canonical orientation facing east, a primary landmark determined by the sunrise. The above bodily based lexicalizations are thus linguistic manifestations of a broader macro-cultural worldview and its psycho-cognitive reality. (shrink)

In this essay I will attempt to show that Derrida not only mistakenly reads the Hegelian text in terms of reflection, but that his own way of thinking could be characterized from a Hegelian perspective as itself reflective. For this I will not focus upon those writings of Derrida which are explicitly “about” Hegel, nor will I compare those places in both the Derridian and Hegelian corpora which seem to present a contiguity in an at least superficial resemblance between concepts, (...) such as Hegelian difference vis-à-vis Derridian différance. Rather, I will focus upon one of Derrida’s texts which indicates his own contributions to the field of thinking and writing and the directions for inquiry initiated in his work, as well as his engagement with Hegel. Such a text is his masterful essay, White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, a writing overtly concerned with the difficulties posed by metaphoricity in the text of philosophy and the attempt in the latter to domesticate and “interiorize” its tropic reserve or condition of possibility within the concept of metaphor itself, which turns out to be a philosopheme. The problems of philosophy are posed in terms of such mastery and interiorization. Since my concern in this essay is to problematize this kind of reading by showing that it presupposes reflective distinctions, I will not here attempt a positive philosophical account of metaphoricity per se. Indeed, Derrida will indicate what he takes to be the conditions of the impossibility of such an account, but it is precisely his reasons for this impossibility that I find problematic in terms of reflection. (shrink)

The golden mean metaphor is suggested as a key to understanding the universal and the particular in moral philosophy since finding metaphorical links provides a way of seeing different traditions in a manner that does not erect absolute boundaries. The choice of the golden mean is made keeping in mind that all cultures recognize the worth of moderation. The prime reason for that lies in human nature which sets human beings apart from all the other living creatures by (...) a goal-oriented activity. As a rational being endowed with will, a human person cannot move toward a goal without adopting a certain strategy of actions. An instinct for self-preservation and astute prudence, personal experience and that of one's own ancestors are all prompting a human being to moderate and commensurate in dispositions and actions for an optimal attainment of the goals. Yet, the same principle is concretized in a particular cultural context (Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Russian cases are considered). Along with cultural distinctions, situational, temporal factors are of importance: much depends on whether it is the human person guided by own free will or a certain driving force, public, government, etc., outside and above defines the content of the golden mean. (shrink)

The golden mean metaphor is suggested as a key to understanding the universal and the particular in moral philosophy since finding metaphorical links provides a way of seeing different traditions in a manner that does not erect absolute boundaries. The choice of the golden mean is made keeping in mind that all cultures recognize the worth of moderation. The prime reason for that lies in human nature which sets human beings apart from all the other living creatures by (...) a goal-oriented activity. As a rational being endowed with will, a human person cannot move toward a goal without adopting a certain strategy of actions. An instinct for self-preservation and astute prudence, personal experience and that of one's own ancestors are all prompting a human being to moderate and commensurate in dispositions and actions for an optimal attainment of the goals. Yet, the same principle is concretized in a particular cultural context (Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Russian cases are considered). Along with cultural distinctions, situational, temporal factors are of importance: much depends on whether it is the human person guided by own free will or a certain driving force, public, government, etc., outside and above defines the content of the golden mean. (shrink)

The author examines literary sources, takes poets as subjects, and allows their philosophical implications to emerge. Man is thought, but thought is figuring. Hence man is the figure who figures. And good figuring works. Sewell selects six modern figures for man: temple, labyrinth, gambler, laboratory, language, machine, showing the partiality of each, only to lead into a detailed examination of the cosmic figures: the universe itself, as pole of the I; suffering and effort, as capabilities of the I; love and (...) death, as man's absolute reach. Though the book as a whole may not work, its somewhat ragged character may well display the true state of our philosophical methods for coming to grips with man.—D. B. B. (shrink)

A imagem da noite é uma constante em diversas tradições místicas, estando associada à necessidade, expressa pela mística apofática, de transcender às imagens, ao conhecimento e ao nome de Deus, bem como a um método ascético que conduziria a uma experiência que não sendo sensível ou inteligível, não é catalogável pelo nosso sistema de cognição. A noite será uma das imagens mais poderosas e de maior expressividade na poesia de São João da Cruz, representante da mística ibérica do séc. XVI. (...) Uma imagem negativa que nos fala de um processo de negação gradual e progressivo que avança até um ponto limite que onde reste a afirmação absoluta do Nome divino. O artigo pretende, pela análise dos poemas Cântico espiritual e Noite escura, ensaiar algumas conjecturas sobre o significado da metáfora noite escura em São João da Cruz e no discurso místico em geral. Palavras-chaves: São João da Cruz. Poesia mística. Cântico spiritual. Noite escura.: The image of the night is a constant in various mystical traditions, and it is generally related to the need, expressed by the mystical apophatic, of transcending the images, the knowledge, and the name of God. Such image is also comprehended as an ascetic method which would lead to an experience that is neither sensible nor intelligible, and because of that it is not understandable by our system of cognition. The night is one of the most powerful and expressive image in the poetry of São João da Cruz, a representative poet of the Iberian mystical poetry of the nineteenth century. The metaphor of the night is a negative image that speaks us of a process of gradual and progressive denial that moves toward a tipping point where the absolute affirmation of the Divine Name remains. The paper develops, through the analysis of the poems “Spiritual Chant” and “Dark Night”, some conjectures about the meaning of the dark night metaphor in São João da Cruz and in the mystical discourse as a whole Key-words : São João da Cruz. Mystical poetry. Spiritual Chant. Dark Night. (shrink)

David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a quantum potential, Q. In his early work, the effects of Q are understood in causal terms as acting through a real (quantum) field which pushes particles around. In his later work (with Basil Hiley), the causal understanding of Q appears to have been abandoned. The purpose of this paper is to understand how the use of certain metaphors leads Bohm away from a causal treatment of Q, and to evaluate the use of (...) those metaphors. (shrink)

이 글은 하이데거(M. Heidegger)와 비트겐슈타인(L. Wittgenstein)의 철학체계를 사유의 미침으로 해석한 블루멘베르크(H. Blumenberg) 철학의 비개념적 사유의 고유성을 조명하고자 한다. 사유의 미침은 최초의 철학자 탈레스의 우물추락에서 하이데거의 세계내의 던져진(geworfen) 존재와 비트겐슈타인의 경우(Fall)까지 전승된 철학사적 개념이다. 현대에서 사유의 미침은 프로이트(S. Freud)가 코페르니쿠스(N. Copernicus)의 탈 지구중심우주이래 인간 자의식의 나르시스 성향의 질병으로 지칭하면서 비롯되었고, 프랑스 구조주의는 이를 광기(狂氣)로 취급하면서 전 세계적으로 확산되었다. 블루멘베르크는 20세기 사상을 풍미한 두 철학자가 구축한 철학적 개념체계를 비철학적 언어로 간주되던 수사학적 은유로 접근하였다. 그는 플라톤 철학의 동굴의 비유이래 철학사적 개념상태를 사유의 덫에 (...) 빠진 그림에서 고찰하면서, 철학적 인간학의 웃음으로 해소하고 직립보행으로 조감하는 철학적 방법론을 확립하였다. 그는 두 철학자의 개념적 사유체계를 사유하지 않는 것을 사유하고, 개념적 정의로 전이되기를 거부하고 논리적으로 번역될 수 없는 절대은유로 파악하므로 철학적 사유의 단초에 대한 새로운 이해의 지평을 열었다. (shrink)

As well as Vico was the first and most persistent to understand myth as a contemporary phenomenon that, far of being in conflict with reason, is originally the instrument for escaping the loneliness of man against the mutism of a meaningless nature, Hans Blumenberg has been in our age who has spoken most forcefully for the rationality of mythical thought, doing it with arguments that the author finds very similar to Vico¿s ones. "Absolutism of reality", "absolute metaphor" and (...) "principle of insufficient reason", the three main elements, according to this reading, of Blumenberg¿s work, share with Vico the same metaphorical sensibility. (shrink)

Abstract: Spatial metaphors have peculiar prominence in accounts of rationality, such as in the phrase “space of reason” made prominent by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. This article attempts to understand the potential of such comparisons of reason to space, taking Wittgenstein’s metaphor of “logical space” as exemplary. As Hans Blumenberg observes in his reading of Wittgenstein and in contrast to its stated aim, the account of “logical space” in the Tractatus does not achieve a final delimitation of reason. (...) Wittgenstein’s discussion of different forms of rationality rather leads him to consider a plurality of spaces. Asking how these different spaces or fields of meaning can be congruent at all, Wittgenstein is led to consider the indeterminacy of space itself in contrast to the different localizations it allows. (shrink)

This paper examines the Hans Blumeberg’s philosophical program: the metaphorology. My intention is to show the importance of Blumenberg’s ideas into the current debate on the relations between philosophy and metaphor.

This paper examines the Hans Blumeberg’s philosophical program: the metaphorology. My intention is to show the importance of Blumenberg’s ideas into the current debate on the relations between philosophy and metaphor.

The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant’s legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of “ tabula rasa ” and “unplowed virgin soil,” first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country’s “absolute metaphors to live by” up to present time. Several known and unknown episodes (...) from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant’s life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its “subject,” occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action. (shrink)

The text consists of two parts. Part one puts the works of Hans Blumenberg, as far as they tackle the problem of rhetoric, into their historical context. Relevant here in particular is the tradition of topological philosophies of the Renaissance and their different types of revival in the 20th century. Part two analyses three main ‘absolute metaphors’ or ‘topoi’ Hans Blumenberg has investigated, the metaphors of ‘light’, ‘shipwreck’, and ‘book of nature’, in order to add to the philosophical perspective (...) taken by Blumenberg a hidden philological perspective, which shows the shortcomings of conceptualizing rhetorical techne (how does a metaphor work), which does not always account for philological techne (how do we write texts). (shrink)

In a time imbued with civilisation crisis, José Manuel Naredo's work is of particular relevance. Naredo, one of the most prestigious economists in Spain and a pioneer of ecological economics, first published his most popular book ( La economía en evolución. Historia y perspectivas de las categorías básicas del pensamiento económico) in 1987. This article reviews its most recent and updated version released in 2015. Beyond a brilliant criticism of neoclassical economics, he discusses the underlying ideology and implications of the (...) notion of economic system uncritically endorsed by most schools of economic thought. Transcending the usual dichotomy between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ economics, Naredo calls for an economic transition built on the integration of different kinds of scientific knowledge as well as other intuitive, metaphysical and ethical fields in favour of a truly inclusive economics. This is, he warns us, a sine qua non for a socioecological transformation to flourish. (shrink)

Le projet métaphorologique de Hans Blumenberg correspond – répond et s’oppose, comme « la Mythologie blanche » de Jacques Derrida – à l’idée heideggérienne de «l’histoire de l’être ». Le concept de « l’inconceptuabilité » révise cette critique historiquement limitée du logocentrisme, en réduisant le concept d’Etre de Heidegger ad absurdum.

The author of the article puts a question about the limits of the 20th century individualism. He expresses a hypothesis about the cyclic nature of the cultural and political theory. In particular, he draws attention to the rhythm of changes of the hedonistic and ascetic ep- ochs, spiritualist and materialist epochs, individualist and holist epochs. The author ana- lyzes holistic doctrines of the 19th century: philosophies of Fabre d’Olivet, Auguste Comte, Pierre Leroux. Although today almost forgotten, the ideas of these (...) authors can be revived again in the 21st century, he says. Based upon the analysis of the 19th century holism which the author did in his book Liquid ideologies, the author makes a hypothesis that the 21st century is becoming much less individualistic and much less materialistic than the 20th century. The metaphors of the “collective body” and “absolute spirit” are coming back in the 21st century, in the new form of the digital reality. (shrink)

Consciousness confronts itself with the aim of achieving absolute knowing. This is the first commentary to regard metaphor, irony, and memory as keys to the understanding of Hegel's basic philosophical position.

Articulates an imaginationist solution to the question of how purely instrumental music can be perceived by a listener as having emotional content. Both musicians and laypersons can perceive purely instrumental music without words or an associated story or program as expressing emotions such as happiness and sadness. But how? In this book, Saam Trivedi discusses and critiques the leading philosophical approaches to this question, including formalism, metaphorism, expression theories, arousalism, resemblance theories, and persona theories. Finding these to be inadequate, he (...) advocates an “imaginationist” solution, by which absolute music is not really or literally sad but is only imagined to be so in a variety of ways. In particular, he argues that we as listeners animate the music ourselves, imaginatively projecting life and mental states onto it. Bolstering his argument with empirical data from studies in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science, Trivedi also addresses and explores larger philosophical questions such as the nature of emotions, metaphors, and imagination. Saam Trivedi is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College, City University of New York. (shrink)

Everybody knows that Superman is Clark Kent. Nobody knows that Superman is Clark Kent. Located between these two absolute statements is the epistemological limit that separates the superhero fictitious universe from our universe of causal reality. The superheroic double identity is a secret shared by the superhero and the reader of the comic or the viewer of the movie, and quite often the superhero winks at the outside world, thus breaking the 4th wall and establishing this collusive relationship. However, (...) in our hypothesis, we are interested in Superman not as a fictitious archetype, but rather as a fictitious metaphor. We are not interested in his double identity as the matrix of superheroic attributes and narratives, but rather as the differential limit between superhuman and human within the fictional universe. Because, the reader or the viewer may share the secret identity with Superman and also with Spiderman or Batman or any other superhuman, but the secret equivalence of Superman and Clark Kent contains another hidden antithesis. (shrink)

Not so long ago phenomenon of death was fundamental dimension of human being for continental philosophy. After Second World War postmodern culture deconstructed the “Subject” and the Age of Enlightenment’s values and the phenomenon of death also. It turned into the language game, metaphor, in other words, moved into the space of texts and linguistic. Now people in developed societies behave as if death does not exist. The main hidden barrier to the investigation of human mortal nature – “shame (...) of death” (F. Aries). People shame of aging and therefore death and avoid them. In the modern world there is a domination of technological immortality’s logic, i.e. aging/death is considered as a fatal mistake of Nature, which may be and must be corrected. Collapse of the Soviet communist system was the accomplished logic of immortality of limit-less man, who encountered inevitability of absolute historical and cultural limit. Unfortunately, phenomenon of death of the Soviet and post-Soviet person remained without serious attention of both Russian and West culture. However, from my point of view, logic of Soviet “mangod”, Soviet ideology and empire’s collapse hold answers on most cardinal issues of modern period of world history. The matter is not the returning to the religious values, but next step to the image of mortal being and, therefore, to the mortal human being, who is aware and demand human limits in practice. (shrink)

This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on ‘Abhinavagupta on Reflection’ appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (_pratibimbavāda_) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (_fl.c._ 975-1025 CE) in the _Tantrāloka_ and his commentator Jayaratha (_fl.c._ 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is (...) simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (_pratibimba_) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (_bimba_) or an illusion (_bhrānti_). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Śaiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky’. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta’s system has generally been referred to as ‘idealism’, I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as ‘dynamic realism’ i.e., the ‘dynamism’ that is common to both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’. This is why he uses the metaphor _consciousness-as-mirror_ (_ciddarpaṇa_) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection. (shrink)

North by Northwest -- Metaphor and the cultivation of intimacy -- Notes on metaphor -- What's special about photography? -- Sports and art -- Clay for contemplation -- There are no ties at first base -- A driving examination -- Objects of appreciation -- And what if they don't laugh? -- Liking what's good: why should we? -- Language games -- Ethics class -- Kings and salesmen -- One way to think about popular art -- Caring -- The (...) idea of absolute gin -- Playing by the rules -- Freedom from rules. (shrink)