1. Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (4):337-367.
    Argumentation is pervasive in everyday life. Understanding what makes a strong argument is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. One factor that seems intuitively important to the strength of an argument is the reliability of the source providing it. Whilst traditional approaches to argument evaluation are silent on this issue, the Bayesian approach to argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) is able to capture important aspects of source reliability. In particular, the Bayesian approach predicts that argument content and source reliability (...)
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  2. Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
    Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this (...)
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    Public Reception of Climate Science: Coherence, Reliability, and Independence.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):180-195.
    Possible measures to mitigate climate change require global collective actions whose impacts will be felt by many, if not all. Implementing such actions requires successful communication of the reasons for them, and hence the underlying climate science, to a degree that far exceeds typical scientific issues which do not require large-scale societal response. Empirical studies have identified factors, such as the perceived level of consensus in scientific opinion and the perceived reliability of scientists, that can limit people's trust in science (...)
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    James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise.Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):414-429.
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    Estimating the probability of negative events.Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2009 - Cognition 110 (1):51-64.
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    Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success.Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):153-163.
    In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), (...)
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    Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is there a Slippery Slope Argument against Slippery Slope Arguments? [REVIEW]Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2007 - Argumentation 21 (4):349-359.
    Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes (...)
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