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Adam Leite [35]Adam Joaquim Leite [1]
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Profile: Adam Leite (Indiana University, Bloomington)
  1.  46
    Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscript
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
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  2.  89
    On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
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  3. Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique".Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456–464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
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  4. Love as a Reactive Emotion.Kate Abramson & Adam Leite - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):673-699.
    One variety of love is familiar in everyday life and qualifies in every reasonable sense as a reactive attitude. ‘Reactive love’ is paradigmatically (a) an affectionate attachment to another person, (b) appropriately felt as a non-self-interested response to particular kinds of morally laudable features of character expressed by the loved one in interaction with the lover, and (c) paradigmatically manifested in certain kinds of acts of goodwill and characteristic affective, desiderative and other motivational responses (including other-regarding concern and a desire (...)
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  5. Believing One's Reasons Are Good.Adam Leite - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...)
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  6.  34
    But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True!Adam Leite - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):81-104.
    If p is false, it isn't evidence for anything. This view is central in one important response to a familiar sceptical argument. I consider and reject various motivations for refusing to accept this view – proposals arising from, e.g., our practice of providing rationalising explanations of people's beliefs, various locutions appearing to relativise evidence to persons, the significance of people's mental states for attributions of reasons to them, and the role of evidence in epistemic principles and requirements. I close by (...)
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  7.  29
    A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification.Adam Leite - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):395 – 421.
    Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in (...)
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  8.  82
    How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to DeRose's "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111 - 129.
    Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...)
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  9.  13
    Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  10. Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
    Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...)
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  11.  99
    How to Take Skepticism Seriously.Adam Leite - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.
    Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...)
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  12.  26
    Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief.Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456-464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
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  13.  5
    Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  14.  43
    Why Don't I Know That I'm Not a BIV?Adam Leite - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):205-213.
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  15.  18
    Some Worries for Would-Be WAMmers.Adam Leite - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):101-126.
    DeRose appeals to ordinary English usage to support his contextualist semantics for "know"-attributions. A common objection holds that though the relevant assertions are both appropriate and seemingly true, their seeming truth arises merely from their appropriateness. This Warranted Assertability Maneuver (WAM) aims to provide a stand-alone objection by providing a reason not to take the ordinary language data at face-value. However, there is no plausible model or mechanism for the pragmatic phenomena WAMmers must postulate. Given what the WAM requires, it (...)
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  16.  8
    Believing One’s Reasons Are Good.Adam Leite - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):419-441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called "Inferential Internalist" principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...)
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  17. What the Basing Relation Can Teach Us About the Theory of Justification.Adam Leite - manuscript
    According to a common view, the activity of justifying is epistemologically irrelevant: being justified in believing as one does never requires the ability to justify one’s belief. This view runs into trouble regarding the epistemic basing relation, the relation between a person’s belief and the reasons for which the person holds it. The view must appeal to basing relations as part of its account of what it is for a person to be justified in believing as she does, but the (...)
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  18.  55
    Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology.Adam Leite - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505–533.
    Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one (...)
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  19. Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...)
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  20.  91
    On Williamson's Arguments That Knowledge is a Mental State.Adam Leite - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):165–175.
    Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a state of mind.
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  21.  2
    How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to Derose’s "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111-129.
    Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...)
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  22.  11
    Some Thoughts on "Varieties of Skepticism" by James Conant and Andrea Kern.Adam Leite - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (2):146-152.
    Book review of Conant, James and Kern, Andrea, Varieties of Skepticism: Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014, vi + 458 pp.
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  23.  8
    Socrates' Critique of Cognitivism.Wallace I. Matson & Adam Leite - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (256):145 - 167.
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  24.  68
    Fallibilism.Adam Leite - unknown
    In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...)
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  25.  1
    Second-Personal Desire.Adam Leite - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4):597-616.
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  26.  44
    For Jim Pryor, with Gratitude, in Order to Find Out Exactly Where We Disagree.Adam Leite - unknown
    “Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...)
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  27.  21
    Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232 - 251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
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  28.  39
    Austin, Dreams, and Skepticism.Adam Leite - unknown
    J. L. Austin’s attitude towards traditional epistemological problems was largely negative. They arise and are maintained, he charged, by “sleight of hand,” “wile,” “concealed motives,” “seductive fallacies,” fixation on a handful of “jejune examples” and a host of small errors, misinterpretations, and mistakes about matters of fact (1962: 3- 6, 1979: 87). As these charges indicate, he did not offer a general critical theory of traditional epistemological theorizing or of the intellectual motivations that lead to it. Instead, he subjected individual (...)
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  29. Taking Skepticism Seriously.Adam Leite - unknown
    Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...)
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  30.  19
    Aleite@Indiana.Edu.Adam Leite & Sycamore Hall - unknown
    In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and non-mental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the non-analyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the “primeness” of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the “internal” element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the (...)
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  31.  28
    Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington.Adam Leite - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):311-324.
    This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior (...)
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  32.  6
    Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck[REVIEW]Adam Leite - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4).
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  33. Leite.Adam Leite - unknown
    I take as my starting point the evident fact that people are capable of modifying their beliefs in response to reasons in the course of deliberation. This fact is sufficient to make notions such as responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness applicable to people with regard to their beliefs. If a state is such, and one is such, that one is capable of determining it through one’s best evaluations of reasons in the course of deliberation, then even if it isn’t under one’s (...)
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  34. Getting Told and Being Believed.Luca Ferrero Faulkner, Amy Gutmann, Paul Harris, Pamela Hieronymi, Karen Jones, Adam Leite, Wolfgang Mann, Peter de Marneffc, David Owens Minar & Connie Rosati - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press.
     
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  35. Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology.Adam Leite - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505-533.
    Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one’s belief must obtain in the world outside of one’s mind in order for one (...)
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