6 found
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  1.  16
    Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks.Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec & Adam Kiersztyn - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):585-604.
    We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability. We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so (...)
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  2.  48
    The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-26.
    In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the (...)
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  3. Przyczynek do krytyki tendencji naukocentrycznych we współczesnej ochronie przyrody.Adam P. Kubiak - 2010 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 58 (2):5-26.
    This paper is an attempt to meta-subjective revision of contemporary “ecological” issues concerning glorification of science (called by the Author „science-centrism) present in paradigm and practice of nature protection. Assuming that science can be often treated as conditio sine qua non of effective pro-ecological activity, and that such approach isn’t in fact appropriate, the Author led diverse arguments supporting the thesis that the presence of science isn’t necessary in theoretical and applied protection of nature. Within the discourse he tried to (...)
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  4.  2
    Selection, growth and form. Turing’s two biological paths towards intelligent machinery.Hajo Greif, Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Stacewicz - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 106 (C):126-135.
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  5.  16
    Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):381-402.
    We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values (...)
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  6. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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