11 found
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  1.  56
    Harmless Discrimination.Adam Slavny & Tom Parr - 2015 - Legal Theory 21 (2):100-114.
    In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of (...)
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  2.  49
    Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them.Adam Slavny, Kai Spiekermann, Holly Lawford-Smith & David V. Axelsen - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (1):1-25.
    In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, Directed Reflective Equilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers (...)
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  3.  36
    What’s Wrong with Risk?Tom Parr & Adam Slavny - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):76-85.
    Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v‐ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that (...)
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  4.  29
    Rescuing Basic Equality.Tom Parr & Adam Slavny - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):837-857.
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  5.  16
    On Being Wronged and Being Wrong.Adam Slavny - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):3-24.
    If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and (...)
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  6.  45
    Negating and Counterbalancing: A Fundamental Distinction in the Concept of a Corrective Duty. [REVIEW]Adam Slavny - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (2):143-173.
    I argue in this paper that negating and counterbalancing should be recognised as two fundamental categories of corrective action. First, I show that recognising the distinction helps to avoid confusion when asking normative questions about the justification of imposing corrective duties. Second, I argue that we have moral reasons to care about the difference between negating and counterbalancing detrimental states, and this has implications for permissible action. I then outline some ways in which the discussion helps us explain and justify (...)
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  7.  11
    The Normative Foundations of Defamatory Meaning.Adam Slavny - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (5):523-547.
    This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dual view - can be split into two versions. The first version (...)
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  8.  30
    Big Data Justice: A Case for Regulating The Global Information Commons.Kai Spiekermann, Adam Slavny, David V. Axelsen & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2021 - Journal of Politics 83 (2):577-588.
    The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data ownership and policymakers to regulate the collection and use of public data. AI producers benefit from free public data for training their systems while retaining the profits. We argue against the view that the use of public data must be free. The proponents of unconstrained use point out that consuming data does not diminish its quality and that information is in ample supply. Therefore, they suggest, publicly available (...)
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  9.  34
    How Eventful is the Event-Based Theory of Harm?Adam Slavny - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):559-571.
    IntroductionHarm is a fundamental concept featuring in many normative claims. In the political context, it is sometimes argued that the only justification for state coercion is the prevention of harm to others, or that it is impermissible to forcibly prevent someone harming themselves. In ethics, many philosophers endorse weighty constraints against harming others. Finally, remedial duties in the civil law are usually conceptualised as responses to harm. Given its broad significance, the recent increase in attention to the philosophical foundations of (...)
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  10.  14
    Benefits, Entitlements and Non‐Responsible Threats.Adam Slavny - 2019 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (3):405-419.
    This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non‐responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non‐responsible threat – a person who threatens another through no fault or choice – is required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources (...)
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  11.  19
    Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly.Adam Slavny - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):833-846.
    Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpret Harel as making two central objections to this form of reasoning. First, traditional approaches require comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extreme cases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of (...)
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