Results for 'Adrian Haddock Alan Millar'

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  1.  79
    Social Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in the social dimension of the subject. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers on a wide range of topics in social epistemology, such as the nature of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and the social genealogy of the concept of knowledge.
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  2.  50
    Epistemic Value.Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be (...)
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  3.  3
    I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
  4.  5
    II—Adrian Haddock: Meaning, Justification, and‘Primitive Normativity’.Adrian Haddock - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
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  5.  93
    The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock[REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):187-189.
    This is a review of "The nature and value of knowlege: Three investigations", by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011).
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  6. Social Epistemology, by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Eds). [REVIEW]Kareem Khalifa - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt068.
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  7.  17
    Extending the Space of Reasons: Comments on Chapter Four of Understanding People.Adrian Haddock - 2007 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind 6 (1).
    Wilfrid Sellars employs the metaphor of the space of reasons to express a certain conception of knowledge: “in characterising an episode or state as that of knowing … one is placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says”.1 A growing number of philosophers employ the same metaphor to express a conception of at least some (other) mental states: in characterising a state as that of belief, or intention, one is placing (...)
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  8.  14
    Review of Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, Duncan Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic Value[REVIEW]Joshue Orozco - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6).
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  9.  5
    Epistemic Value, Edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard.Mark T. Nelson - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):609-612.
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  10.  38
    Review of Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations[REVIEW]Stephen R. Grimm - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  11.  10
    Reviews The Nature and Value of Knowledge. By Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock. Oxford University Press, 2010 288 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-958626-4. Hb £37. [REVIEW]Peter Tramel - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (04):618-623.
  12.  3
    Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar's The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations.Daniel Whiting - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61:645-648.
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  13.  92
    Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms (...)
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  14.  43
    Reasons and Experience.Alan Millar - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach (...)
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  15.  36
    Berkeley’s Puzzle.Alan Millar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):232-242.
    Millar, A. 2017. Berkeley's Puzzle. Analysis 77: 232–242.
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  16. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
  17. What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this (...)
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  18. Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 330--47.
    A conception of recognitional abilities and perceptual-discriminative abilities is deployed to make sense of how perceptual experiences enable us to make cognitive contact with objects and facts. It is argued that accepting the emerging view does not commit us to thinking that perceptual experiences are essentially relational, as they are conceived to be in disjunctivist theories. The discussion explores some implications for the theory of knowledge in general and, in particular, for the issue of how we can shed light on (...)
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  19. Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  20. The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving.Adrian Haddock - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):23-42.
    John McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, (...)
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  21.  59
    Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
    A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which a belief is justified, in the sense of being well-founded, only if there is an adequate reason to believe it, reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not (...)
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  22. Disjunctivism and Skepticism.Alan Millar - unknown
    The paper explains what disjunctivism is and explores its implications for skepticism. Following an account of Paul Snowdon’s conception of a disjunctivist account of perceptual experience the the focus is on how disjunctivism has figured in the epistemological work of John McDowell. A conception of recognitional abilities is deployed to expand on McDowell’s position. Finally, there is consideration of whether McDowell offers a satisfactory response to skepticism, taking account of criticism’s made by Crispin Wright.
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  23.  86
    Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
    An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that (...)
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  24. The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (291):73-88.
    Plausibly perceptual knowledge satisfies the following: It is knowledge about things from the way they appear. It can embrace more than the way things appear. It is phenomenologically immediate and thus, in one sense, non-inferential. and place a significant constraint on adequate elucidations of . Knowledge about an object, from the way it looks, which embraces more than the way it looks, should not turn out to be inferential in the relevant sense. The paper shows how this constraint can be (...)
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  25. What is It That Cognitive Abilities Are Abilities to Do?Alan Millar - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):223-236.
    This article outlines a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities. These include abilities to recognize certain things from their appearance to some sensory modality, as being of some kind, or as possessing some property. An assumption of the article is that these abilities are crucial for an adequate understanding of perceptual knowledge. The specific aim here is to contrast those abilities with abilities or competences as conceived in the virtue-theoretic literature, with particular reference to views of Ernest Sosa and John Greco. In (...)
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  26. How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.
    It is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to (...)
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  27.  9
    Metaphor and Religious Language. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):224-226.
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  28.  89
    Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'.Adrian Haddock - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
    I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt (...)
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  29.  41
    The Knowledge That a Man has of His Intentional Actions.Adrian Haddock - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
  30. Knowledge and Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  31.  78
    At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.
    Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as 'doing' the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of 'agent causation'. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are 'tryings' that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so (...)
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  32.  47
    The State of Knowing.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.
  33. From Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 140.
     
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  34. A Précis of Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2007 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind 6 (1).
    The article provides a summary of the author's book Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). It details three areas in which the notion of a normative commitment is made central. These are (1) believing and intending, (2) practices conceived as essentially rule-governed activities, and (3) meaning and concepts. An account is given of how we may best explain the commitments incurred by beliefs and intentions. It is held that those states are themselves essentially normative. A problem (...)
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  35.  1
    The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Alan Millar & Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):621.
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  36.  60
    Davidson and Idealism.Adrian Haddock - 2011 - In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 26--41.
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  37. Possessing Concepts: Christopher Peacocke's a Study of Concepts. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):73-82.
  38. Knowing From Being Told.Alan Millar - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  39. I—Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
    An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that (...)
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  40. Truth and Understanding.Alan Millar - 1977 - Mind 86 (343):405-416.
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  41.  34
    Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief.Alan Millar - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):43-59.
    Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justificatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an affirmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justified belief is conceived as well-founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.
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  42.  72
    Concepts, Experience, and Inference.Alan Millar - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):495-505.
  43.  8
    Erratum.Alan Millar - forthcoming - Analysis:anx034.
    Berkley's Puzzle, Analysis anw070, doi: 10.1093/analys/anw070.
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  44. How Reasons for Action Differ From Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
     
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  45.  95
    Possessing Concepts. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):73-82.
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  46. The Normativity of Meaning.Alan Millar - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57-73.
    In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is , roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer (...)
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  47.  51
    The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution • by Robert J. Matthews. [REVIEW]Alan Millar - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):185-187.
    The deflationary aim of this book, which occupies Part I, is to show that a widely held view has little to be said for it. The constructive aim, pursued in Part II, is to make plausible a measure-theoretic account of propositional attitudes. The discussion is throughout instructive, illuminating and sensitive to the many intricacies surrounding attitude ascriptions and how they can carry information about a subject's psychology. There is close engagement with cognitive science. The book should be read by anyone (...)
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  48.  96
    Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response (...)
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  49.  43
    The Idea of Experience.Alan Millar - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):75-90.
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  50. McDowell and Idealism.Adrian Haddock - 2008 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):79 – 96.
    John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common-sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this (...)
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