7 found
Order:
  1. Recognizing the Diversity of Cognitive Enhancements.Walter Veit, Brian D. Earp, Nadira Faber, Nick Bostrom, Justin Caouette, Adriano Mannino, Lucius Caviola, Anders Sandberg & Julian Savulescu - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4):250-253.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2.  85
    Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement.Lucius Caviola, Adriano Mannino, Julian Savulescu & Nadira Faber - 2014 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8.
    Research into cognitive biases that impair human judgment has mostly been applied to the area of economic decision-making. Ethical decision-making has been comparatively neglected. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important results. In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive enhancement and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral intuitions and judgments about CE: status (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  3.  94
    Deeper into Argumentative Bullshit.Nikil Mukerji & Adriano Mannino - 2022 - Informal Logic 42 (4):439-470.
    In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter. Similarly, Gascón argues, the hallmark of argumentative bullshit should be viewed as a lack of concern for whether the reasons that are adduced for a claim genuinely support that claim. Gascón deserves credit for drawing attention to the idea (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  19
    Deeper into Argumentative Bullshit.Nikil Mukerji & Adriano Mannino - 2022 - Informal Logic 43 (3):439-470.
    In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter. Similarly, Gascón argues, the hallmark of argumentative bullshit should be viewed as a lack of concern for whether the reasons that are adduced for a claim genuinely support that claim. Gascón deserves credit for drawing attention to the idea (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  18
    Nudge Me If You Can! Why Order Ethicists Should Embrace the Nudge Approach.Nikil Mukerji & Adriano Mannino - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 186 (2):309-324.
    Order ethicists favour incentives as a means for making moral progress but largely ignore an alternative method, namely, nudging, which has come to prominence through the work of behavioural scientists in recent years. In this paper, we suggest that this is a mistake. Order ethicists have no reason to ignore nudging as an alternative method. Arguments they might press against it include worries about paternalism, manipulation, autonomy, and unintended bad consequences. These are, we argue, largely unfounded insofar as they involve (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  11
    How will future generations look back on the pandemic?Adriano Mannino - 2022 - Intergenerational Justice Review 7 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  38
    Why Leave the Car at Home, If That Doesn’t Save the Climate?Adriano Mannino - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (4):693-704.
    Why take individual action against collectively caused evils such as climate change? Prima facie, one’s individual contribution may seem to make a negligible difference at best. Consequentialists as well as consequence-sensitive nonconsequentialists should be interested in whether a consequence-based justification for taking individual climate action can be found nonetheless. The author argues that even though individual agents are able to make a non-zero difference in expectation, the altruistic expected value may be so small as to be insufficiently worthwhile, given the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark