Is aesthetics a product of evolution? Are human aesthetic behaviors in fact evolutionary adaptations? The creation of artistic objects and experiences is an important aesthetic behavior. But so is the perception of aesthetic phenomena qua aesthetic. The question of evolutionary aesthetics is whether humans have evolved the capacity not only to make beautiful things but also to appreciate the aesthetic qualities in things. Are our near-universal love of music and cute baby animals essential to our (...) species’ evolutionary development, which took place over thousands of years? In other words, do aesthetic practice and appreciation help people to survive or reproduce? Do aesthetic behaviors help to propel natural selection? If so, what does that tell us about ourselves as human beings? What does it tell us about art, our other aesthetic practices, and aesthetic experience? (shrink)

It has always been a matter of curiosity what kind of information art, which is far from ordinary and untouchable, provides people. Confronting a person with an art object means looking at the window of a world different from the world of daily routines, with his head stuck out. We can describe this world as magical in a romantic way. This magic arises from the difference in the functioning of perception, interpretation and judgment processes, which the person confronted with an (...) art object has difficulty in explaining to himself from time to time. Because the acquisition of perception in the world of routines and the acquisition of perception from the art object are different in terms of the functioning of mental processes... (shrink)

There are five principal answers that can be given to this question, each of which proliferates into a good many varieties. We might hold that art discloses an order of being that is uniquely its object, accessible only to it. This was the traditional realistic position, stated most openly by Schopenhauer; and it is still often advanced, though usually under the cloak of mysticism, whether apologetic or arrogant, to cover the appearance of irrationality that modern modes of thought give to (...) it. We might hold that art conveys the impressions and feelings of the artist--that its object is simply the artist's vision of himself: this is the answer of expressionism. We might hold, with the psychologistic schools, that art has no antecedent object, but only the purpose of exciting certain feelings and attitudes in its audience; this is to say that the aesthetic object is a fiction, fabricated only with an eye to the effect it will have. We might hold that the work of art is a construct, a design realized in an ordered medium, having no reference beyond itself; this is the answer of formalism. We might hold that art deals with and discloses one aspect of a single but many-faceted order of reality, other aspects of which are dealt with and conveyed in other ways. (shrink)

The question with which the paper is concerned is whether beauty must be literally "objective" if there are to be any aesthetic standards. the same issue is discussed in ethics and the conclusion reached that no analogy obtains between the two disciplines. the suggestion is made, in conclusion, that adequate aesthetic standards are possible even though beauty is "subjective.".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 65-76 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Identity, Aesthetics, ObjectsGustavo GuerraIn September 1990 UCLA's Wright Art Gallery opened an exhibition entitled Chicano Art: Resistance and Affirmation 1965-1985 (now usually referred to as CARA). While CARA was one of several national events displaying nonmainstream art, it was also distinctive in its politics of self-representation. The artists participating in CARA insisted that they be described (...) as members of a Chicano art movement. With the term Chicano they hoped to step beyond labels preferred by the dominant culture—labels such as Mexican American, Latino, or Hispanic. For these artists, the word Chicano was appealing because it represented a complexity of meanings that they understood as being integral to both their identity and to the art they produced. The word Chicano, as Alicia Gaspar de Alba discusses in Chicano Art Inside/Outside the Master's House,1 embraces multiple meanings and axes of cultural identity; it derives from the Nahuatl pronunciation of Mexicano, often referring to a person of Aztec descent but including, as well, Native American heritage, Mexican roots, and Catholic faith. The CARA artists also embraced the label's association with a politics of liberation, popular protest, and working-class creativity. From the outset, then, the CARA exhibition was more than an art exhibition.By some lights, however, CARA was too much more than an art exhibition. When the organizers realized they needed funds, they applied for a National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH) grant and were initially turned down. While an NEH rejection might mean a number of things, the language of the rejection reports in this case narrows the possibilities down [End Page 65] to an issue that I mean to consider in this article. One rejection report states thatThe panelists understood that Chicano art arose from a variety of political movements and social causes, and therefore the political aspect of this proposal is appropriate to the subject matter.... Even so, the panelists worried that the project makes a political statement, that it is politics masquerading as culture, and that the proposal contains jargon and rhetoric and reads like a manifesto. 2Other reviewers objected to the general language of the report along similar lines. While Chicano artists made a point of representing themselves in complex, multidimensional terms, the NEH found such complexity and multidimensionality perplexing and thus their art not worthy of funding. One referee, for instance, claimed that the terminology used in the proposal was too narrow; he complained that defining Chicano in terms of struggle was too restrictive and excluded other Chicano artists for whom struggle was not a major concern. But later the same reporter objected that some of the concepts in the proposal were not inclusive enough, as they failed to include issues and topics that are central to the Chicano community. Thus the complexity and cluttered characterization that the artists felt was central to their sense of identity was dismissed as either too excessive or as too restrictive. According to the NEH, Chicano artists failed not because of their art (which the referees did describe as "visually compelling") but because of the way in which they chose to identify themselves—because, in other words, of their "rhetoric and jargon." Whatever it was that the NEH found compelling in the Chicano art they found uncompelling in the description of the Chicano artists' lives.After the organizers revised their proposal and reapplied for the grant, they were once again turned down. This second rejection highlights even more clearly the nature of the problem. This second report argues that "[T]here is a disjunction between the organizers' intentions and the exhibition. The proposal does not differentiate clearly between Chicano art and Hispanic art and, in its dependence on self-referential analysis rather than a comparative perspective, the exhibition does not place art in the bigger picture." 3I would like to consider what is at issue when descriptions of identity are said not to work, or when descriptions of art are likewise accused of failure and... (shrink)

This article unravels the process of objectification by empirically examining a social context where it occurs almost incessantly: fashion modeling. Drawing on an ethnography of fashion modeling in Amsterdam, Paris and Warsaw, I argue that objectification is neither ubiquitous nor one-dimensional: it takes place in specific social contexts and unfolds itself differently under different social conditions. Moreover, objectification is not unidirectional: it is done by and happens to both men and women. By taking an experiential perspective which involves models’ subjective (...) responses to being objectified, I call into question theoretical arguments of objectification pertaining to disempowered subjects, and the assumption that objectification is inherently negative or immoral. Instead, I argue that objectification is socially rooted in institutions and specific situations and that this matters considerably for its varying forms, levels of intensity and the emotional and practical responses it evokes in people. This does not imply that objectification is less compelling as a process, or easy to avoid. Objectification might be all the more effective exactly because the process is embedded in different social contexts, and adapts itself accordingly. (shrink)

Of all the kinds of arguments that philosophers use to support their conclusions, the one type that I find personally to stick longest and most vividly in my mind is the verbal pictures they occasionally draw. Whether this is a result of the fact that I myself think best in pictorial terms or, as I would rather like to believe, is a tribute to the verbal artistry of the writers themselves, it remains true that, for me, the history of philosophy (...) is punctuated with pictures, some pleasing and others perplexing. I need hardly mention Plato; with the Allegory of the Cave, the Myth of Er, the Charioteer of the Soul, and countless others he is beyond question the supreme master of the art. But other examples easily come to mind. I see Descartes seated in solitude before the fire in his dressing gown, suddenly to be surprised by a malignant demon, who appears at his shoulder to whisper insinuatingly into his ear that 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 at all. Or William James on a camping trip with friends trying to decide whether one of their number who keeps circling a tree on which a squirrel clings - and in turn circles the tree at equal speed, keeping the tree between him and his tormenter and never permitting the latter to get into a position behind his back - does or does not circle the squirrel, as he undoubtedly does circle the tree to which the squirrel clings. Or, I see G. E. Moore - and it is this picture that gives rise to the present paper - carefully contemplating two complete, independent, and quite different worlds, trying to decide which of the two is intrinsically better than the other. (shrink)

Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians have neither fully appreciated nor resolved; and that appealing to various realization relations (...) avoids these puzzles and allows for a richer description of how the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the (...) capacity to attract aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

The purpose here is to give a thorough phenomenological account of the aesthetic experience. The difference between cognitive perception of a real object and the aesthetic experience of an esthetic object is discussed at length. Elements and phases of an esthetic experience are delineated; illustrations of a preliminary emotion of esthetic experience are given, All of which suggest a fundamental change of attitude. From normal perceiving to esthetic perceiving there is a change from categorical structures to qualitative harmony (...) structures, Producing pleasure in the presence of an esthetic object. (staff). (shrink)

Medicine does not usually consider the human body from an aesthetic point of view. This article explores the notion of the lived body as aesthetic object in anthropological medicine, concentrating on the views of Buytendijk and Straus on human uprightness and gracefulness. It is argued that their insights constitute a counter-balance to the way the human body is predominantly approached in medicine and medical ethics. In particular, (1) the relationship between anthropological, aesthetic and ethical norms, (2) the (...) possible danger of a naturalistic fallacy, (3) the implications for the care of disabled people and (4) the intrinsic aesthetic quality of the human body are dealt with. (shrink)

Art is one thing, the aesthetic another. Things can be appreciated aesthetically – for instance, in terms of the traditional category of the beautiful – without being works of art. A landscape can be appreciated as beautiful; so can a man or a woman. Appreciation of such natural objects in terms of their beauty certainly counts as aesthetic appreciation, if anything does. This is not simply because landscapes and people are not artefacts; for there are also artefacts which (...) are assessable aesthetically without being works of art (e.g. an elegant car or a mathematical proof)... (shrink)

It seems often to have been assumed by art theorists and aestheticians that concepts of art and the aesthetic are related, if not actually identical. In recent times, however, David Best has criticized this widespread assumption in the interests of marking a quite radical distinction between artistic and aesthetic concerns. But this claim may be considered problematic in turn, not only in terms of its denial of the conventional conception of art as implicated in the production of (...) class='Hi'>aesthetic effects, but also because it obscures our understanding of the objectivity of aesthetic judgement – and hence, ultimately, of the rational basis of artistic appreciation and endeavour. In the light of some critical attention to Joseph Dunne’s recent work on practical reason in Aristotle, the following paper argues that a suitably modified notion of phronesis may provide the key to understanding the relationship of aesthetic sensibility to artistic knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on Über emotionale Präsentation, I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the (...) capacity to attract aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

The aesthetic experience, In husserl's language, Brackets or suspends the natural standpoint. Consciousness perceives the work of art not as an object of the factual world, But as a man-Made artifact to be enjoyed just for certain immediately experienced qualities. The work of art is neither a real physical entity nor a real psychical entity, But a purely intentional object, For which the physical object serves as a substratum. The critic must recreate the purely intentional object by completing the (...) schema of the work and by actualizing its merely potential elements. He must experience the ensemble of axiologically neutral qualities, Aesthetic qualities, And aesthetic values as an harmonious whole. A full concretion of the work is the aesthetic object-The object the critic describes and judges. By metaphorical or partly metaphorical language-Never completely adequate-He tries to convey to his readers the experience of its qualities and values. (shrink)