Search results for 'Agentive experience' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Oisín Deery (2015). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency (...)
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  2. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that (...)
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  3.  48
    Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Agentive Phenomenology. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. (...)
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  4.  66
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2010). Self-Agency. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    We are perceivers, we are thinkers, and we are also agents, bringing about physical events, such as bodily movements and their consequences. What we do tells us, and others, a lot about who we are. On the one hand, who we are determines what we do. On the other hand, acting is also a process of self-discovery and self-shaping. Pivotal to this mutual shaping of self and agency is the sense of agency, or agentive self-awareness, i.e., the sense that (...)
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  5.  66
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2012). The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency Vs. Joint-Agency. In Seemann Axel (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments. MIT Press.
    This chapter aims at investigating the phenomenology of joint action and at gaining a better understanding of (1) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs from the sense of agency one has for individual actions and (2) how the sense of agency one experiences when engaged in a joint action differs according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in it.
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  6. Terry Horgan (2007). Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. Psyche 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension results (...)
     
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  7.  15
    Julia Jansen (2016). Kant’s and Husserl’s Agentive and Proprietary Accounts of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.
    In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. (...)
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  8.  23
    Adrian John Tetteh Smith, Bodily Experience and Bodily Self Knowledge: Feeling and Knowing Oneself as a Physical Agent.
    I tend to think of myself as bodily. Probably, so do you. Philosophically this takes some explaining. A candidate explanation is this: The bodily self is a physical agent. Knowledge of oneself as bodily is fundamentally knowledge of oneself as agentive; such knowledge is grounded in both experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that affords a limited range of actions; and experience of oneself as a physical agent that tries to perform a limited range of (...)
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  9.  39
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2013). How Does It Feel to Act Together? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint (...)
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  10.  19
    Joshua Shepherd (2016). Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal (...)
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  11.  34
    John Dewey (2008). Experience and Nature. McCutchen Pr.
  12.  32
    John Dewey (1998). Experience and Education. Kappa Delta Pi.
    Many pages of this volume illustrate Dr. Dewey's ideas for a philosophy of experience and its relation to education.
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  13. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of (...)
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  14.  42
    Dave Ward (2016). Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.
    The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent. I then argue that i) we (...)
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  15. Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires addressing what I (...)
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  16. Gregg Caruso (2012). The Folk Argument Against Compatibilism. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):56-89.
    This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briey discuss the standard incompatibilist argumentthe so-called consequence argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua (...)
     
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  17.  42
    William James (1991). The Varieties of Religious Experience. Triumph Books.
    'By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots.'The Varieties of Religious Experience is William James's classic survey of religious belief in its most personal, and often its most heterodox, aspects. Asking questions such as how we define evil to ourselves, the difference between a healthy and a divided mind, the value of saintly behaviour, and what animates and characterizes the mental landscape of sudden conversion, James's masterpiece stands at a unique moment in the relationship between belief (...)
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  18. David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
    Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world.Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the (...)
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  19. Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  20.  39
    Holly Andersen (forthcoming). The Hodgsonian Account of Temporal Experience. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Handbook of The Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target (...)
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  21. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. (...)
     
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  22.  36
    Eran Guter (2004). Wittgenstein on Musical Experience and Knowledge. In J. C. Marek & E. M. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis, Contributions to the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Wittgenstein’s thinking on music is intimately linked to core issues in his work on the philosophy of psychology. I argue that inasmuch musical experience exemplifies the kind of grammatical complexity that is indigenous to aspect perception and, in general, to concepts that are based on physiognomy, it is rendered by Wittgenstein as a form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of mankind.
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  23.  38
    William James (2004). The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Simon & Schuster.
    The culmination of William James' interest in the psychology of religion, The Varieties of Religious Experience approached the study of religious phenomena in a new way -- through pragmatism and experimental psychology. The most important effect of the publication of the Varieties was to shift the emphasis in this field of study from the dogmas and external forms of religion to the unique mental states associated with it. Explaining the book's intentions in a letter to a friend, James stated: (...)
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  24. Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We (...)
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  25. Richard Pettigrew (2015). Transformative Experience and Decision Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):766-774.
    This paper is part of a book symposium for L. A. Paul (2014) Transformative Experience (OUP).
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  26. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences (...)
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  27. William G. Lycan (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  28. Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  29.  17
    Ann Taves (2009). Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton University Press.
    I don't know of any other book like it."--Wayne Proudfoot, Columbia University "This is a terrific book. -/- The essence of religion was once widely thought to be a unique form of experience that could not be explained in neurological, psychological, or sociological terms. In recent decades scholars have questioned the privileging of the idea of religious experience in the study of religion, an approach that effectively isolated the study of religion from the social and natural sciences. Religious (...)
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  30. Claire Petitmengin (2006). Describing One's Subjective Experience in the Second Person: An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of (...)
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  31.  83
    Eden Lin (2016). How to Use the Experience Machine. Utilitas 28 (3):314-332.
    The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of (...)
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  32.  49
    Guy Bennett-Hunter (2014). Ineffability and Religious Experience. Routledge.
    Ineffability—that which cannot be explained in words—lies at the heart of the Christian mystical tradition. It has also been part of every discussion of religious experience since the early twentieth century. Despite this centrality, ineffability is a concept that has largely been ignored by philosophers of religion. In this book, Bennett-Hunter builds on the recent work of David E. Cooper, who argues that the meaning of life can only be understood in terms of an ineffable source on which life (...)
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  33. Andy Clark (2001). Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.
    How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this (...)
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  34. Antti Kauppinen (2015). What's So Great About Experience? Res Philosophica 92 (2):371-388.
    Suppose that our life choices result in unpredictable experiences, as L.A. Paul has recently argued. What does this mean for the possibility of rational prudential choice? Not as much as Paul thinks. First, what’s valuable about experience is its broadly hedonic quality, and empirical studies suggest we tend to significantly overestimate the impact of our choices in this respect. Second, contrary to what Paul suggests, the value of finding out what an outcome is like for us does not suffice (...)
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  35. Clare Batty (2010). What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.
    We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us. In this paper, I explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead. I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply. Integral to the traditional distinction is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately. I argue that there are no such presented objects in olfactory experience. (...)
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  36. Craig French (2013). Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we can’t (...)
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  37. Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
    The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience.
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  38.  96
    Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2006). Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been an explosion of philosophical interest in perception; after decades of neglect, it is now one of the most fertile areas for new work. Perceptual Experience presents new work by fifteen of the world's leading philosophers. All papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics dealing with sensation and representation, consciousness and awareness, and the connections between perception and knowledge and between perception and action. This (...)
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  39. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more (...)
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  40. Ben Bramble (2016). The Experience Machine. Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
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  41.  26
    Fiona Macpherson (2015). The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight‌. Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or (...)
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  42. Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features (...)
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  43. J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience. Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We (...)
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  44. Clare Batty (2010). A Representational Account of Olfactory Experience. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):511-538.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. In this paper, I consider the challenge that olfactory experience presents to upholding a representational view of the sense modalities. Given the phenomenology of olfactory experience, it is difficult to see what a representational view of it would be like. Olfaction, then, presents an important challenge for representational theories to overcome. In this paper, I take on this (...)
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  45. Christopher Peacocke (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
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  46. Jane Friedman, Epistemically Transformative Experience.
    A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.
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  47. Rick Grush (2016). On the Temporal Character of Temporal Experience, its Scale Non-Invariance, and its Small Scale Structure.
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this (...)
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  48. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judge- ments (...)
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  49. Joshua Shepherd (2016). Conscious Action/Zombie Action. Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of (...)
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  50.  20
    Berit Brogaard & Dimitria E. Gatzia (2016). Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable? Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (4).
    Is color experience cognitively penetrable? Some philosophers have recently argued that it is. In this paper, we take issue with the claim that color experience is cognitively penetrable. We argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non-perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. We use this distinction to show that studies suggesting that color experience can be modulated by (...)
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