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Profile: Aidan McGlynn (University of Edinburgh)
  1.  87
    Interpretation and Knowledge Maximization.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405.
    Timothy Williamson has proposed that we should give a ‘knowledge first’ twist to David Lewis’s account of content, maintaining that for P to be the content of one’s belief is for P to be the content that would be attributed by an idealized interpreter working under certain constraints, and that the fundamental constraint on interpretation is a principle of knowledge maximization. According to this principle, an interpretation is correct to the extent that it maximizes the number of knowledgeable judgments the (...)
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  2.  55
    Knowledge FIrst?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - Palgrave Macmillian.
    According to a tradition reaching back to Plato, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by offering an analysis in terms of truth, belief, justification, and other factors presumed to be in some sense more basic than knowledge itself. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy instead takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology and related areas of the philosophies of language and mind. Knowledge cannot be analyzed in the traditional sense, (...)
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  3.  93
    The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):276-285.
    Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can (...)
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  4. Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
  5.  28
    Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism (...)
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  6.  80
    Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.
    In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. (...)
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  7.  51
    Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):89-102.
  8.  16
    Propaganda and the Authority of Pornography.Aidan McGlynn - 2016 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 31 (3):329-344.
    Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works characterises and explores one democratically problematic kind of propaganda, ‘undermining propaganda’, which involves ‘[a] contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals’. Stanley’s model for how undermining propaganda functions is Rae Langton and Caroline West’s treatment of moves in pornographic language games. However, Stanley doesn’t consider whether his theory of propaganda might in turn illuminate the harmful nature of (...)
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  9.  47
    Review of Anthony Hatzimoysis (Ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  10.  40
    The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. By Peter Carruthers. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 456. Price £30.00.). [REVIEW]Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):635-637.
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  11.  13
    Simon Prosser and François Recanati, Eds. , Immunity to Error Through Misidentification . Reviewed By.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):318-321.
  12.  5
    The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):72-75.
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  13. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought.Aidan McGlynn - 2016 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 25-55.
  14. On Epistemic Alchemy.Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here (...)
     
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