I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
Mehmet Akif İnan is a leading figure in Turkey’s sendification and is also known by the majority as a prominent personality in the fields of literature, poetry and authoring. However, his sufi and tariqa personality is not known much. Our research sets forth that the reality providing him with a more combatant and active personality is his unknown sufi and tariqa aspect. He shows a faithful and altruistic friendship coming from the heart with the manners gained through sufism nurture, (...) to the people. After fulfilling his self-transformation with sufism, İnan endeavors, both in his syndication work and in his writings and poems, to make sure that the generation grows up with their core culture and civilization. While Inan's affiliation to a tariqa was greeted with amazement by his close circle, his embracement of people and sharing their troubles by the virtue of being a Sufi, made him be described by his friends as an "intellectual dervish". In this regard, he is highly criticized by his close friends and the people who know him. This study talks about the life, works, life struggle and the unknown sufi personality of a person like İnan. (shrink)
Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.
This paper outlines the methodology and experiments associated with the reshaping of human intentions based on robot movements within Human-Robot Interactions. Although studies on estimating human intentions are well studied in the literature, reshaping intentions through robot-initiated interactions is a new significant branching in the field of HRI. In this paper, we analyze how estimated human intentions can intentionally change through cooperation with mobile robots in real Human-Robot environments. This paper proposes an intention-reshaping system that includes either the Observable Operator (...) Models or Hidden Markov Models to estimate human intention and decide which moves a robot should perform to reshape previously estimated human intentions into desired ones. At the low level, the system needs to track the locations of all mobile agents using cameras. We test our system on videos taken in a real HRI environment that has been developed as our experimental setup. The results show that OOMs are faster than HMMs and both models give correct decisions for testing sequences. (shrink)
Translation is a subject that can never be spoken of sufficiently, especially at a time when exchanges and conflicts between cultures are intensifying with globalization. Starting from the possibility of translation, this article does not reflect upon the old question of the opposition between the fidelity and freedom of the translator, or the theories of foreignization and domestication, but rather focuses on the role of the translator in the relations of otherness. In the face of indetermination, we seek, through the (...) example of the translation of a word ‘honor’, full of historical and cultural connotations in the French language, to prove that grasping meaning is fundamental in order to produce a good translation. In order for that, the translator should be a linguist to grasp meaning and significance in the vast semantic fields, then be a scientist who knows how to reappropriate the conceptual tools proposed by other social sciences. These two roles guarantee the understanding and the demonstration of the otherness, which can only come from a systematic structuring of the culture of departure. (shrink)
When people speak of ‘the law of the jungle’, they usually mean unions restrained and ruthless competition, with everyone out solely for his own advantage. But the phrase was coined by Rudyard Kipling, in The Second Jungle Book , and he meant something very different. His law of the jungle is a law that wolves in a pack are supposed to obey. His poem says that ‘the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is (...) the Pack’, and it states the basic principles of social co-operation. Its provisions are a judicious mixture of individualism and collectivism, prescribing graduated and qualified rights for fathers of families, mothers with cubs, and young wolves, which constitute an elementary system of welfare services. Of course, Kipling meant his poem to give moral instruction to human children, but he probably thought it was at least roughly correct as a description of the social behaviour of wolves and other wild animals. Was he right, or is the natural world the scene of unrestrained competition, of an individualistic struggle for existence? (shrink)
Robert Stern has argued that Levinas is a kind of command theorist and that, for this reason, Løgstrup can be understood to have provided an argument against Levinas. In this paper, I discuss Levinas’s use of the vocabulary of demand, order, and command in the light of Jewish philosophical accounts of such notions in the work of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Emil Fackenheim. These accounts revise the traditional Jewish idea of command and I show that Levinas’s use of this (...) vocabulary is also revisionary. I show that in light of this tradition of discussion, Levinas’s use is not susceptible to the interpretation Stern proposes and thus that the Løgstrup-style argument cannot be used against Levinas. (shrink)
Thought, according to Hegel, is not only the product of a faculty of a subject, or a means by which a thinking subject tries to grasp a world that is alien to him. It is also the very structure of the world, that is disclosed to a subject through the thinking activity of a subject. The fundamental question that crosses the whole post-Kantian philosophy is that of the relation between thought and reality, i.e. the question of whether reality depends on (...) the categorial requirements imposed by the thinking subject, or whether reality maintains some form of independence from the thinking subject. Seen from this standpoint, Hegel can be read both as an author who radicalizes Kant’s transcendental perspective, and also as a critic of that perspective. In other words, he can be seen as an idealist: according to Hegel, any philosophy is idealist if it claims that something finite, qua finite, is essentially connected with something other. He can also be seen as an anti-idealist: insofar as his philosophy aims to overcome a hyper-transcendentalist perspective, i.e. it is so since it rejects idealism as subjective idealism. Moreover, Hegel’s anti-idealism can be characterized as realism. This is because, if we admit that overcoming transcendentalism without falling back again on a pre-critical conception of thought and of reality involves an idea of thought which is not reducible to a "mentalistic" conception of it, we need to conceive of thought as something that is not alien to reality. Hegel conceives of thought as intimately connected with the world, as its own rational structure. This “realism” of thought is what makes Hegelian idealism, so to speak, anti-idealistic. Through this "realism" of thought Hegel pursues two goals. On the one hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought, according to which a subject talks and relates to a reality that is always only a construction of him, and so it is necessarily the simulacrum of something that remains inaccessible in its truth. On the other hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a conception of reality characterized merely as alien and opposite to thought itself, and which is the counterpart of the subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought. By pursuing these two goals it should be gained a conception of reality which could warrant some form of objectivity, but which cannot be equated with the substantialistic conception of the pre-Kantian metaphysics. (shrink)