Aristotle shares with Plato the attitude that the world, ‘the all,’ is a kosmos, a well-ordered and beautiful whole which, as such, can be rendered intelligible, or understood, by the intellect. One understands things, generally speaking, by tracing them back to their sources, origins or principles and causes or explanatory factors, and seeing in what manner they are related to these principles. We know, or understand, a thing when we grasp ‘the why’ or cause. Consequently, understanding is systematic. Some things (...) we understand through themselves - these are the first principles and as such are not understood by tracing them back to causes. We understand other things by systematically relating them in appropriate ways to what is known through itself. These other things are known through, or by means of, their causes and principles. (shrink)
Professor geach's article criticized our earlier "analysis" paper on pages 48-50 of "on denoting." he took us to have offered an account of russell's earlier use of the expression "denoting phrase" which he regarded as inadequate. But we had not done so: we were interested solely in the denoting phrases which are perplexing russell on those pages, And we repeat our view that the problem which russell had found arises as much for frege's theory of reference as for russell's own (...) earlier theory. The extension of "denoting phrase" as used in "principles of mathematics" is irrelevant, As was geach's subsequent discussion of the problem we tried to identify. (shrink)
The paper analyzes the famous passage in "on denoting" where russell appears to be attacking frege's theory of the sense and reference of proper names. We argue that russell's attack has been misinterpreted and unjustly condemned. The strategy is to show what difficulties do genuinely face a two-Part theory, And then to show that it is quite easy to interpret russell as having perceived them.