12 found
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Alan R. Rhoda [12]Alan Robert Rhoda [1]
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Alan Rhoda
Indiana University, Bloomington
  1.  96
    Presentism, Truthmakers, and God.Alan R. Rhoda - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):41-62.
    The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy. In light of these constraints, I examine and reject responses by Bigelow, Keller, Crisp, and Bourne. Consideration of how these responses fail, however, points toward a proposal that works; one that posits God’s memories as truthmakers for truths about the (...)
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  2. Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence.Alan R. Rhoda - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (3):281-302.
    Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of 'gratuitous evil' that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how (...)
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  3.  68
    Generic Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof.Alan R. Rhoda - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (2):225-234.
    The goal of this paper is to facilitate ongoing dialogue between open and non-open theists. First, I try to make precise what open theism is by distinguishing the core commitments of the position from other secondary and optional commitments. The result is a characterization of ‘generic open theism’, the minimal set of commitments that any open theist, qua open theist, must affirm. Second, within the framework of generic open theism, I distinguish three important variants and discuss challenges distinctive to each. (...)
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  4.  67
    Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference.Alan R. Rhoda - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:215-234.
    I argue that Richard Fumerton’s controversial “Principle of Inferential Justification” (PIJ) can be satisfactorily defended against several charges that have been leveled against it, namely, that it leads to skepticism, that it confuses different levels of justification, and that it involves a fallacy of “misconditionalization.”The basis of my defense of PIJ is a distinction between two theories of the nature of inference—an internalist conception (IC), according to which inferring requires that the reasoner have a conscious perspective on the evidential relation (...)
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  5.  71
    The Fivefold Openness of the Future.Alan R. Rhoda - 2011 - In William Hasker Thomas Jay Oord & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), God in an Open Universe. pp. 69--93.
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  6.  41
    Probability, Truth, and the Openness of the Future.Alan R. Rhoda - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):197-204.
    Alexander Pruss’s recent argument against the open future view (OF) is unsound. Contra Pruss, there is no conflict between OF, which holds that there are no true future contingent propositions (FCPs), and the high credence we place in some FCPs. When due attention is paid to the semantics of FCPs, to the relation of epistemic to objective probabilities, and to the distinction between truth simpliciter and truth at a time, it becomes clear that what we have good reason for believing (...)
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  7.  27
    Bayes’s Theorem.Alan R. Rhoda - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):269-270.
  8.  10
    Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of Inference.Alan R. Rhoda - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:215-234.
    I argue that Richard Fumerton’s controversial “Principle of Inferential Justification” can be satisfactorily defended against several charges that have been leveled against it, namely, that it leads to skepticism, that it confuses different levels of justification, and that it involves a fallacy of “misconditionalization.”The basis of my defense of PIJ is a distinction between two theories of the nature of inference—an internalist conception, according to which inferring requires that the reasoner have a conscious perspective on the evidential relation between premises (...)
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  9.  21
    Peirce and Lonergan on Inquiry and the Pragmatics of Inference.Alan R. Rhoda - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):181-194.
    Drawing on the work of Charles Peirce and Bernard Lonergan, I argue (1) that inferences are essentially related to a process of inquiry, (2) that there is a normative pattern to this process, one in which each of Peirce’s three distinct types of inference—abductive, deductive, and inductive—plays a distinct cognitive role, and (3) that each type of inference answers a distinct type of question and thereby resolves a distinct kind of interrogative intentionality.
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  10.  8
    In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism: Reply to Alexander.Alan R. Rhoda - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:379-385.
    David Alexander has argued that “weak inferential internalism”, a position which amounts to a qualified endorsement of Richard Fumerton’s controversial “principle of inferential justification,” is subject to a fatal dilemma: Either it collapses into externalism or it must make an arbitrary epistemic distinction between persons who believe the same proposition for the same reasons. In this paper, I argue that the dilemma is a false one, for weak inferential internalism does not entail internalism simpliciter. Indeed, WII is compatible with modest (...)
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  11.  14
    In Defense of Weak Inferential Internalism.Alan R. Rhoda - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:379-385.
    David Alexander has argued that “weak inferential internalism” , a position which amounts to a qualified endorsement of Richard Fumerton’s controversial “principle of inferential justification,” is subject to a fatal dilemma: Either it collapses into externalism or it must make an arbitrary epistemic distinction between persons who believe the same proposition for the same reasons. In this paper, I argue that the dilemma is a false one, for weak inferential internalism does not entail internalism simpliciter. Indeed, WII is compatible with (...)
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  12.  8
    Bayes’s Theorem: Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 113. [REVIEW]Alan R. Rhoda - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):269-270.