This introduction to a collection of papers on normativity provides a framework modelled on the division in ethics to approach normative issues. It suggests that is is useful to divide questions about normativity into five groups: normative ontology, normative semantics, normative epistemology, normative psychology, and substantial normative theory.

There is no one such thing as the continental tradition in philosophy, but rather a whole discordant family of notably distinct traditions. They are, nevertheless, broadly recognisable to each other. For much of the last century, however, most of those engaged in or with philosophy in continental Europe, on the one hand, and in the English-speaking world, on the other hand, had surprisingly little knowledge of, interest in or even respect for what was going on in the other. Happily, the (...) situation today is vastly improved on each side of the philosophical channel. What follows is an attempt to gain some understanding of the background to this long-standing (and still to some diminishing extent persistent) mutual incomprehension from the standpoint of one who came to philosophy as a PPE student in the Oxford of the late 1940s. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that stressful conditions can facilitate evolutionary change. The mechanisms elucidated thus far accomplish this with a generic increase in heritable variation that facilitates more rapid adaptive evolution, often via plastic modifications of existing characters. Through scrutiny of different meanings of stress in biological research, and an explicit recognition that stressors must be characterized relative to their effect on capacities for maintaining functional integrity, we distinguish between: (1) previously identified stress-responsive mechanisms that facilitate evolution by maintaining an (...) adaptive fit with the environment, and (2) the co-option of stress-responsive mechanisms that are specific to stressors leading to the origin of novelties via compensation. Unlike standard accounts of gene co-option that identify component sources of evolutionary change, our model documents the cost-benefit trade-offs and thereby explains how one mechanism—an immediate response to acute stress—is transformed evolutionarily into another—routine protection from recurring stressors. We illustrate our argument with examples from cell type origination as well as processes and structures at higher levels of organization. These examples suggest a general principle of evolutionary origination based on the capacity to switch between regulatory states related to reproduction and proliferation versus survival and differentiation. (shrink)

The authors focus on the ways in which various models of the distribution of power in society treat interest groups and evaluate their significance.

[…] Open the pages of almost any national journal or magazine, and where ten years ago one found only one or another kind of free verse lyric, one now finds well rhymed quatrains, sestinas, villanelles, sonnets, and blank verse dramatic monologues or meditations.1 In a recent issue of the New Criterion, Robert Richman describes this rekindled interest in formal verse among younger poets as a return to the high seriousness, eloquence, and technical fluency that characterized the best achievements of American (...) poetry forty years ago.2 As Mr. Richman numbers me among the younger poets working in form, I ought to be as cheered by these developments as he is. Yet I am anything but cheered. And not because I don’t want to belong to club that would have me as a member, though this may be a part of it; but because I suspect that what Mr. Richman hails as a development may in fact be nothing but a mechanical reaction, and that the new formalists, in rejecting the sins of their experimental fathers may end up merely repeating the sings of their New Critical grandfathers, resuscitating the stodgy, overrefined conventions of the “fifties poem,” conventions which were of course sufficiently narrow and restrictive to provoke rebellion in the first place. Any reform, carried to uncritical extremes by lesser talents who ignore rather than try to assimilate the achievements of their predecessors, will itself require reformation. If James Wright, say, or Robert Bly, produced more than their fair share of imitators, if they even imitate themselves much of the time, they nonetheless have written poems all of us can and ought to learn from. Maybe we have had too much of the “raw” in recent years. But the answer to the raw is not the overcooked. Besides, it’s dangerous to think we have to choose exclusively between free verse and form. The wider the range of styles and forms that we avail ourselves of, the more enriched, more flexible and inclusive our expressive resources will be. It’s as important for those who work in form to be familiar with the experiments and innovatins of the last hundred years as it is for those who work in looser measures to be familiar with traditional verse forms that go back beyond the twentieth century. Alan Shapiro’s most recent book of poems, Happy Hour, was published this year. (shrink)

Cosmic questions concern the relationship between the meaning we attribute to our lives and the cosmos within which such lives are situated. After explaining why such questions are liable to seem problematic, this article considers two responses to the envisaged difficulties. The first, a dismissive philosophical response, is itself dismissed. And, the second, which takes into account the socio-historical context of these difficulties, points towards Richard Rorty’s idea of radical self-reliance as a solution. Thomas Nagel’s exceptionalism, his reluctance to accept (...) either of these responses is then criticized on the grounds that it resurrects a conception of the religious temperament that is no longer tenable. (shrink)

Pragmatism established a philosophical presence over a century ago through the work of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, and has enjoyed an unprecedented revival in recent years owing to the pioneering efforts of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. The essays in this volume explore the history and themes of classic pragmatism, discuss the revival of pragmatism and show how it engages with a range of areas of inquiry including politics, law, education, aesthetics, religion and feminism. Together they provide (...) readers with an overview of the richness and vitality of pragmatist thinking and the influence that it continues to exert both in philosophy and other disciplines. The volume will be of interest to students and scholars of pragmatism, American philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

A distinct group of receptors including DCC, UNC5, RET and Ptc1 is known to function in ligand‐dependent neuronal growth and differentiation or axon guidance. Acting as “dependence receptors”, they may also regulate neuronal cell survival by inducing apoptosis in the absence of cognate ligand. Receptor‐initiated apoptosis requires proteolytic (caspase) cleavage and exposure of a pro‐apoptotic region in the cytoplasmic domains of the receptors. In contrast, classical apoptosis induced by growth factor or cytokine deprivation involves loss of survival signaling without receptor (...) cleavage. DCC, UNC5, RET and Ptc1 are downregulated or mutated in diverse cancers, and show properties characteristic of tumor suppressors, consistent with their ability to promote neuronal cell death. Dysfunctional dependence receptors have been linked to the loss of specific neurons in certain inherited and neurodegenerative diseases. Dependence receptor‐initiated apoptosis represents a novel paradigm for the controlled removal of specific cells during neural development and elimination of malignant cells that have strayed beyond regions of ligand availability. BioEssays 26:656–664, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This piece is a commentary on a Behavioral and Brain Sciences target article by Robert Wilensky entitled: Story grammars vs story points.

J'examine d'abord trois sortes de fondations métaphysiques de l'éthique : ontologique (Aristote, G. E. Moore), non-cognitiviste (Stevenson, Havre), et rationnelle épistémologique (Kant). Ces théories ne donnent pas des fondations catégoriques et déterminées. Ensuite, je présente une esquisse de ma théorie selon laquelle l'action humaine donne la fondation ontologique et rationnelleépistémologique de l'éthique. First I examine three kinds of metaphysical foundations f or ethics: ontological (Aristotle, G. E. Moore), non-cognitivist (Stevenson, Hare) and rational-epistemological (Kant). These do not provide foundations that are (...) categorical and determinate.Then I briefly sketch my own theory that human action provides the ontological and rational-epistemological foundation of ethics. (shrink)

The 'individualizability objection' to the universalizability thesis asserts that the thesis is trivial because both the reason for a singular moral judgment and the corresponding universal principle may be so individualized that they apply to only one person. Purported reasons which are thus individualized, However, Fail to fulfill two general requirements of a reason: specificity and relevance. If the reasons do fulfill these requirements and also seem to support the individualizability objection, Than either they are logically comparative, In which case (...) they apply to more than one person in a proportional way, Or they indicate unique properties which are nonetheless similar to those of other persons. (shrink)

For many contemporary liberals, Anglo-American democracy seems unimpeachably the best political form. In contrast, adherence to democratic values seems an area in which most Marxian regimes, and perhaps Marx himself, are strikingly deficient. Further, Marxian theory insists on the existence of oppressive ruling classes in all capitalist societies and on the need for class struggle and violent revolution to achieve a more cooperative regime – theses which liberal social theories tend to dismiss peremptorily. From the perspective of modern liberal democratic (...) theory, Marxian arguments seem prima facie outlandish and even morally objectionable. (shrink)