O presente trabalho procura refletir sobre o processo de construção da educação como uma “educação da interioridade” que parte de uma concepção do cuidado de si, a partir do viés do pensamento filosófico do dinamarquês Sören Kierkegaard. Num primeiro momento, aponto paro o seu conceito de existencialismo, que versa a construção de um indivíduo singular, voltado para sua existência individual; e, num segundo momento, apresento, ainda, que de forma breve, a relação entre o mestre e o discípulo marcada na obra (...) Migalhas Filosóficas (2008) , como fundamento para uma educação da interioridade. Palavras-chave : cuidado de si, educação da interioridade, Kierkegaard. (shrink)

A partir de uma sugestão de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari – a de que todos os filósofos ocidentais terminaram construindo, no interregno do seu pensamento, personagens conceituais, uma espécie de assinatura do filósofo – este livro objetiva identificar esse traço a partir da obra de Michel Foucault. A tese em questão é que este autor não se enquadra em uma imagem única, como a do Juiz em Kant, ou a do sedutor em Kierkegaard, mas em uma imagem híbrida e (...) triádica, fazendo coro com muitos filósofos chamados de transversais e que se instalaram no horizonte de filosofias chamadas de pós-estruturalistas, como Deleuze. (shrink)

No contexto da pandemia, vivemos a incerteza de quando a vida tornará a sua normalidade. Esse momento de incerteza nos impulsiona a reflexão sobre o atual cenário, os desafios e possibilidades dessa nova forma de viver. Pensando nisso, o presente estudo de cunho bibliográfico hermenêutico busca refletir acerca da prática pedagógica e do ensino de filosofia no atual contexto, atendo-se aos seguintes problemas: é possível uma prática pedagógica de qualidade em meio a esse cenário? De que modo o ensino de (...) filosofia pautado na reflexão pode ser possível na modalidade à distância? Para dar conta de tais questões, buscamos nas reflexões de Antunes Neto (2020) e Barreto; Rocha (2020), o diálogo acerca da possibilidade da prática pedagógica em tempos de pandemia, assim como a possibilidade do ensino de filosofia por meio da reflexão presente nos escritos de Trombetta (2013). (shrink)

Today, there is an emerging interest for the potential role of hermeneutics in reflecting on the practices related to digital technologies and their consequences. Nonetheless, such an interest has neither given rise to a unitary approach nor to a shared debate. The primary goal of this paper is to map and synthetize the different existing perspectives to pave the way for an open discussion on the topic. The article is developed in two steps. In the first section, the authors analyze (...) digital hermeneutics “in theory” by confronting and systematizing the existing literature. In particular, they stress three main distinctions among the approaches: between “methodological” and “ontological” digital hermeneutics; between data- and text-oriented digital hermeneutics; and between “quantitative” and “qualitative” credos in digital hermeneutics. In the second section, they consider digital hermeneutics “in action”, by critically analyzing the uses of digital data for studying a classical object such as the political opinion. In the conclusion, we will pave the way to an ontological turn in digital hermeneutics. Most of this article is devoted to the methodological issue of interpreting with digital machines. The main task of an ontological digital hermeneutics would consist instead in wondering if it is legitimate, and eventually to which extent, to speak of digital technologies, or at least of some of them, as interpretational machines. (shrink)

That we can learn something from literature, as cognitivists claim, seems to be a commonplace. However, when one considers matters more deeply, it turns out to be a problematic claim. In this paper, by focusing on general revelatory facts about the world and the human spirit, I hold that the cognitivist claim can be vindicated if one takes it as follows. We do not learn such facts from literature, if by “literature” one means the truth-conditional contents that one may ascribe (...) to textual sentences in their fictional use, i.e., in the use in which one makes believe that things unfold in a certain way. What we improperly call learning from literature amounts to knowing actually true conversational implicatures concerning the above facts as meant by literary authors. So, in one and the same shot, we learn both a general revelatory fact and the fact that such a fact is meant via a true conversational implicature by an author. The author draws that implicature from the different truth-conditional content a sentence possesses when the sentence is interpreted in a fictional context, meant as Kaplan’s (1989) narrow context, i.e., a set of circumstantial parameters (agent, space, time, and world). (shrink)

In a recent paper, Anthony Everett has mounted a very serious attack against realism with respect to fictional entities. According to Everett, ficta raise deep logico-ontological worries, for they violate some basic logical laws and are problematically indeterminate with respect to both their existence and identity. Since an antirealist account for sentences apparently committing us to ficta is available, no such committment is really needed. In this paper I will try to show, first, that the antirealist account Everett proposes for (...) those sentences is not convincing. Moreover, by relying on the Meinongians’ distinctions between i) predicative and propositional negation and ii) either modes of predication or kinds of property, I will argue that the logico-ontological problems Everett arises against ficta can be solved. Finally, I will try to show that both the ‘modes of predication’- and the ‘kinds of property’- distinctions (especially the first one) are not so problematic as Everett holds. (shrink)

A searing introduction to Franco Fortini, a Jewish communist and a major figure in postwar Italian intellectual life, _The Dogs of the Sinai_ is a book against—against those who love to rush to the aid of the victors, against the widespread and racist contempt for Arabs, and against the celebration of modern civilization and technology that Israel embodies. It is also the book in which Fortini sought to clarify for himself his conflicted identity as an Italian Jew. An uncomfortably timely (...) book, _The Dogs of the Sinai_ combines polemic and autobiography with narrative and criticism in a terse and finely wrought reflection on politics, identity, and truthfulness in the period after the Six Day War of 1967. As topical today as it was forty-five years ago, this meditation against power is published alongside _Fortini/Cani_, a film by Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet, drawn from Fortini’s essay. The film includes moving scenes of the author reading excerpts from his book against quiet landscapes. _The Dogs of the Sinai_ is a powerful text from one of the most important intellectuals of the Italian New Left. (shrink)

Se distingue entre principios racionales sustantivos y metódicos, y entre criterios de aceptabilidad y criterios de cosntrucción de argumentos. Sobre esta base se mantiene que la lógica y semántica formales son componentes necesarios de la teoría de la argumentación. Tmbién se consideran dos objeciones típicas : la retendida inaplicabilidad en genral de esas técnicas debido a su radical insuficiencia, y la presunta inutilidad de la lógica formal.

In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...) out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise. (shrink)

En la oscuridad no se ven las cosas, pero la oscuridad misma sí que es visible, mientras que la luz, bajo la que todo que se ve, es ella misma invisible. La iluminante «luz de noche» es un vacío transparente que puede llegar a conocerse con un tipo de conocimiento, llamado «hábito», que recuerda a la memoria.

During modernity, in the last two hundred years, there was a gap in social theory, a space that was visible to contemporaries, but that was not firmly integrated into the center of reflections on the social: we refer to what here we call the dark matter of modernity. This article aims to highlight this gap, the way in which it was approached and has been approached, as well as to propose a definition of this concept. In a second moment, we (...) will carry out an analysis of the European traumas of the 20th century and the relationship of both with the dark matter, underlining the importance of the intensive accelerators of violence. (shrink)

In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ (...) in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5.. (shrink)

Over and above differences in terminology and cultural background, we try to show that the quantum physicist, David Bohm, and poststructuralist philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, shared a common aim in thought: to replace the classical image of reality, which is still dominant in our time, with a metaphysics finally in agreement with the concepts and results of relativity, quantum mechanics andcontemporary biology. For these two thinkers, the world of things that are well individuated in space and time, and ordered according to (...) mechanical relations of cause and effect, are nothing but the momentary expression of an “undivided wholeness in flowing movement” that constitutes its true ontological ground. By means of this new metaphysics, the world of daily experience and classical science appears as the explicit manifestation or development of implicate order that undivided wholeness contains virtually in itself at deeper and deeper levels of envelopment and imbrication. The explicit world is the result of a process of repetition, deceleration and temporal stabilization, triggered by the interaction of our measuring instruments – technical devices, sensory organs and motors, a priori forms and categories of the understanding – with moving wholeness, the thinking and observing subject of which represents a momentary and partial reflection rather than a solitaryand autonomous fragment. By criticizing the classical image of thecorrespondence/adequation of being and thought, Bohm and Deleuzeshow that the thought seeking to grasp this wholeness in flowingmovement inevitably interacts with it – by modifying, recreating andaccomplishing it in one direction rather than another. Thought thusresembles a dance that tries to harmonize with the universal flux thatgenerates and carries it away in a single movement with matter. **************************************************************************************************** ***********************Para além das diferenças de terminologia e de background cultural, tenta-se aqui mostrar que o físico quântico David Bohm e o filósofo pós-estruturalista Gilles Deleuze tiverem um objetivo comum de pensamento: substituir a imagem clássica da realidade, ainda dominante em nossa época, por uma metafísica finalmente de acordo com os conceitos e resultados da relatividade, da mecânica quântica e da biologia contemporânea. Para estes dois pensadores, o mundo das coisas bem individuadas no espaço e no tempo, e ordenadas conforme as relações mecânicas de causa e efeito, não é nada outro que a expressão momentânea de uma “Totalidade indivisa em devir” que constitui seu verdadeiro fundamento ontológico. Pelo meio desta nova metafisica, o mundo da experiência cotidiana e da ciência clássica aparece como a manifestação explicita ou desenvolvida da ordem implícita que a totalidade indivisa contém virtualmente nela mesma em níveis de envolvimento e de imbricação sempre mais profundos. O mundo explícito é o resultado de um processo de repetição, desaceleração e estabilização temporal, desencadeado pela interação de nossos instrumentos de medição -- aparelhos técnicos, órgãos sensoriais e motores, formas “a priori” e categorias do entendimento – com uma totalidade movente no qual o sujeito pensante e observante representa um reflexo momentâneo e parcial ao invés de um fragmento solitário e autônomo. Ao criticar a imagem clássica da correspondência/adequação entre o ser e o pensamento, Bohm e Deleuze mostram finalmente que o pensamento que intenta capturar esta Totalidade em devir interage inevitavelmente com ela, modificando-a, recriando-a e realizando-a em uma direção ao invés de outra. O pensamento se aparenta assim a uma dança que tenta se harmonizar com o flux universal que o gera e o leva em um movimento só com a matéria.Palavras-chave: Bohm; Deleuze; totalidade indivisa em devir; física quântica; pós-estruturalismo; ontologia. (shrink)

In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...) is called to by means of ‘N.N.’ (in context)”. This character is a partial function that maps narrow contexts onto referents. Such contexts are enriched narrow contexts, for they also include an ‘acquisition’ parameter, i.e., a parameter filled by a naming practice constituted by a dubbing, which consists in calling via the name one’s interlocutor’s attention to something (if any), and usually also by a certain transmission chain. I will also claim that such a proposal works independently of one’s ontological stance on fictional entities, that is, independently of whether one believes either that there are or that there are no such entities. Moreover, I will claim that such a proposal is better than similar indexicalist proposals such as the one put forward by Tiedke (2011), Finally, I will try to show how this proposal can deal with some objections one may raise against an indexicalist treatment of proper names. (shrink)

El concepto de poder ha sido uno de los más tradicionales y arraigados de la ciencia política, desde la temprana reflexión de los griegos hasta la actualidad. Es aún hoy un término de extraordinaria vigencia en el lenguaje científico y popular. Sin embargo, cuando indagamos en su real materialidad, advertimos que el mismo es elusivo, confuso y difuso. Desde la emergencia del positivismo, pasando por las revoluciones burguesas, el concepto se mantuvo más o menos inalterado. Con la emergencia del marxismo, (...) de las ideologías modernas y de las escuelas críticas se persiguió su racionalización y redireccionamiento, sin cuestionar la esencia de su significado. Sugerimos que a partir de la Teoría de la Complejidad y de la Teoría de Redes, el concepto podría muy bien dejarse fuera de la ciencia política o quedar limitado sólo a los alcances de la fuerza o coacción. (shrink)

This book reclaims Hegel's notion of the "end of art"-or, more precisely, of "art's past character"-not just as a piece of the history of philosophy but as a living critical and interpretive methodology. It addresses the presence of the past character of art both in Hegel and contemporary philosophy and aesthetics. The book's innovative contribution lies in unifying the Hegelian thesis with discussions of contemporary art and philosophy. The author not only offers a Hegelian exegesis but applies the idea of (...) the past character of art to themes that are both related to Hegel's philosophy, such as the French Revolution and the modern state, Kantian aesthetics, and religion and the sacred space disclosed for art, and going beyond Hegel, such as Celan's poetry, Gramsci's criticism of Croce, human rights, and even the grunge rock band Pearl Jam. Conversely, such non-Hegelian explorations will help enlighten what may look like a specific thread of Hegel's aesthetics, but can be used to shed light on some core motives of his philosophy. The author's interpretation of art's past character reclaims the full value, attractiveness, and philosophical soundness of Hegel's thesis, while rejecting its interpretation in terms of a complete dissolution of the aesthetic element into the philosophical one. Hegel and the Present of Art's Past Character will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, philosophy of art and aesthetics, history of philosophy, political philosophy, and art theory. (shrink)

La democracia hizo que los sentados a la mesa fuésemos más. Que pudiéramos tener mejores productos y más cocineros. Que el sabor no tuviese que pedir permiso para poder viajar. Que los aromas no fuesen detenidos por alcabalas ni en aduanas. Con la libertad se come mejor. La posibilidad de escoger se agranda hasta volverse casi infinita. La presencia de la democracia, y también su ausencia y restricciones, se observan no sólo en la calle y en la prensa sino también (...) y mejor en la mesa cotidiana. La libertad se olfatea, se bebe y se mastica. La democracia en la mesa tiene también su precio. Los malos, el engaño y la especulación forman parte del proceso. Saber escoger implica saber vivir. Table and FreedomDemocracy increased the number of those sitting at the table. It made possible for us to have better products and more cooks; for flavor not to ask for permission to be able to travel around; for aromas not to be detained by checkpoints or customs. With freedom one eats better. The possibility to choose grows larger, ultimately becoming almost infinite. The presence of democracy, and also its absence and restrictions, can be noticed not also in the street and the press, but also, and in a better fashion, at the ordinary table. Freedom can be smelled, drunk and chewed. Democracy at the table also has its price. The delinquents, deceit and speculation are part of the process. The art of choosing entails knowing the art of living. (shrink)

In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...) be freed from a certain tension that seems to affect it, namely the fact that he appeals to nonexistent intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states and at the same time he attempts at dispensing with them. (shrink)

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism and Crane’s psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished (...) from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions. (shrink)

There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist (...) flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism. (shrink)

Se analiza el significado filosófico del libro de Ricardo Sánchez Ortiz de Urbina Por amor al Arte (2024). ¿Qué es lo que intenta Urbina con su aparentemente inocua distinción entre conocimientos propios y conocimientos impropios? ¿Cómo se recoge el distanciamiento de Richir con respecto a los análisis heideggerianos sobre los mismos fenómenos de las síntesis pasivas y de las fantasías perceptivas arrancando de la influencia que sobre su antropología ejercía Ser y tiempo? Respondo que en su Por amor al Arte (...) cree Urbina poder liberar a Richir de las adherencias heideggerianas doblando la apuesta sobre la intencionalidad y criticando el Dasein como un ejercicio, no tanto de objetivación como de retórica. ¿Cómo se las arregla Urbina para saltar desde la fenomenología richiriana que induce un escepticismo inevitable para seguir apostando por la existencia de la realidad y la posibilidad de su conocimiento? Una respuesta sistemática pretende articularse en un enigmático Tractatus logico-phenomenologicus, que se apoya en el mostrar de las aparencias y no en el decir del lenguaje. (shrink)

This chapter provides a conceptual analysis of Tommy J. Curry’s anti-ethical stance. In what sense is anti-ethics opposed to, or against, ethics? I argue that, despite appearances, anti-ethics is a kind of ethical theory. Close analysis reveals that the term “ethics” in the term “anti-ethics” does not refer to ethics per se, but to an idealist approach to ethics that frames white people as virtuous. I argue that Leonard Harris’ insurrectionist ethics provides a naturalistically-informed deontological framework that is useful for (...) analyzing the normative dimensions of anti-ethics. In this way, insurrectionist ethics enables us to analyze the positive content of anti-ethics, an ethics founded on a form of ethical hope that abandons the premise of white virtue. (shrink)

Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, Translated, Edited and withan Introduction by Norman Madarasz ISBN - 9780791442197Alain Badiou, Deleuze. The Clamor of Being, Translated and with aPreface by Louise Burchill ISBN - 9780816631391.

The paper attempts at yielding a language-independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.